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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis the various arguments that have 
been put forward for the determinants of a 
company's capital structure are examined 
critically. However, none of these' succeeds 
convincingly in reflecting actual practice. 
Furthermore, it is argued that the common 
practice of concentrating on Earnings Per Share 
(EPS) as a key indicator of a company's 
performance also impacts on the capital issue 
choice, and that there is functional fixation on 
EPS, particularly short-term EPS. Therefore the 
effect on a company's EPS of a particular method 
of finance turns out to be an important influence 
on a company's financing decisions. 
A questionnaire sent to finance directors of 
companies elicits their views on their 
perceptions of the important influences on the 
choice of financing, and the responses are 
analysed using multivariate techniques. The 
results are encouraging as far as the present 
research question is concerned. An innovative 
approach of reconstructing company's financial 
statements to investigate the impact on various 
financial data if an alternative financing method 
had been chosen provides further evidence of a 
fixation on EPS. Limited dependent variable 
analysis is carried out to determine the 
variables which appear to influence the debt- 
equity choice. A by-product of the research 
question is an analysis of 'elasticity' measures 
of gearing, i. e. degrees of financial and 
operating leverage; and the usefulness and 
consistency of the bases of measurement used for 
these. 
This thesis seeks to determine the extent to 
which financial choice is explained by, or at 
least consistent with, the maximisation of 
Earnings Per Share. In so doing, it seeks to 
provide a vital link between finance research and 
related financial accounting issues. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1-1 Finance Issue Puzzle 
There is a plethora of literature published in 
the finance journals over the last few decades 
that deals with various aspects of the financing 
of corporations. The financing issue can be 
broadly subdivided into, on the one hand, the 
essentially static question of the determinants 
of optimal capital structure (if any) ; and on the 
other, the essentially dynamic question of how 
changes in this structure should best be 
achieved, primarily by means of various types of 
finance issues, although repurchase of issued 
securities is a feasible but less common 
alternative. 
It is not too difficult to envisage situations in 
which, where idealised competitive conditions do 
not hold, persuasive models from the existing 
literature may result in apparently perverse 
conflicts of static and dynamic 'optimal 
behaviour'. For example, the Ross (1977) 
analysis of capital structure points to 
equilibrium levels of debt based on signalling 
arguments, whereas the Heinkel and Schwartz 
(1986) analysis of finance issues, again based on 
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signalling arguments (but this time applied to 
the method of finance chosen) may conceivably 
suggest a method of (equity) finance that moves 
the company away from the static Ross equilibrium 
debt level. The inability to find a consensus 
viewpoint based on normative partial equilibrium 
models has led to the 'financing problem' being 
regarded as a long-standing 'puzzle'. 
On the positive level, the problem is potentially 
more tractible. It is not too difficult to ask 
practitioners what they do in practice, and to 
attempt to generalise this into a behavioural 
theory. This essentially empirical approach can 
involve either survey work (eg. Donaldson (1961) 
for an early example) or statistical/econometric 
analysis. Both approaches have difficulties. 
Survey work based on questionnaires may capture 
the intentions of the respondents (or more 
perversely, their view of what they believe to be 
best practice), but it may not adequately 
represent their actual behaviour. Conversely, 
statistical work may reveal little about either 
intentions or the decision processes 
-in a 
particular instance. A combination of approaches 
would therefore appear to be the optimal way 
forward, and that is the procedure adopted in 
this thesis. 
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1-2 Influence of Earnings Per Share (EPS) 
The importance that is attached to EPS in the 
literature, is explored more fully in Chapter 2, 
although a brief overview at this point 
highlights the many studies that have commented 
on the importance of earnings. For example, Ball 
and Brown (1968) focused tightly on the bottom 
line; Lev (1989) stated 'earnings, the "bottom 
line", are widely believed to be the premier 
information item provided in the financial 
statements' page 155; and Tweedie and Whittington 
(1990) refer to 'the apparently excessive weight 
given by financial analysts to "bottom line" 
earnings figures and gearing ratios' page 97. 
This perception appears to be widely held. In 
the Coopers Deloitte 'Shareholder Value Analysis 
Survey (1991)', the Investment Management Group 
was quoted as stating 'the traditional method of 
assessing a company was earnings per share 
growth, which was subject to tremendous 
"camouflage"', page 12. 
This view is also reflected in the pronouncements 
of the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) 
. 
The ASB 
has recently introduced Financial Reporting 
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Standard 3 'Reporting Financial Performance', in 
which the ASB seeks to remove the emphasis that 
has previously been placed on EPS and states 'It 
is not possible to distil the performance of a 
complex organisation into a single measure. 
Undue significance, therefore, should not be 
placed on any one such measure which may purport 
to achieve this aim' (para 52). 
Although FRS 3 includes several key changes to 
the way companies' results are reported, it may 
not succeed in removing the emphasis given to 
EPS. The Institute for Investment Management and 
Research has already set up a committee to 
consider the principles under which 'maintainable 
EPS' could be calculated (maintainable earnings 
being the earnings attributable to the ongoing 
business). 'Maintainable EPS' would then be a 
key performance indicator which analysts would 
use to assess company performance. The idea of 
'maintainable EPS' has its roots in such concepts 
as permanent income, or the Hicks' No. 2 concept 
of income maintenance. However, in invoking 
these elemental income concepts, it should be 
borne in mind that it is the company dividend 
that provides the means of consumption and not 
the company's earnings. 
ýý4 
The traditional functional fixation hypothesis 
(as posited by Ball (1972); Watts (1982); Watts 
and Zimmerman (1986)) is the view that individual 
investors interpret accounting information 
without regard for the rules used to arrive at 
the information. It maintains that investors can 
be misled by firms' accounting methods and 
choices. Given the investors' perceived 
preoccupation with short-term EPS as an indicator 
of company performance, it seems highly probable 
that the effect on EPS will be a key 
consideration in the debt-equity choice, i. e. 
there is functional fixation on short-term EPS. 
1-3 The Research Question 
The primary focus of this thesis is to address 
the question of the extent to which financing 
decisions can be explained on the basis of 
behaviour conditioned by financial reporting 
practices 
- 
in particular those relating to 
earnings per share calculation. Therefore the 
key point at issue is whether or not the debt- 
equity choice appears to be a function of 
financial reporting practice. 
Such a view is echoed by Higson (1990) in the 
context of takeovers. He maintains "the evidence 
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is consistent with the hypothesis that accounting 
considerations affect the choice of means of 
payment in combinations" and "Though companies do 
appear to seek advantage through accounting 
means, the intriguing question....... is whether 
such advantage actually exists. It is hoped that 
future research can address the impact of the 
accounting choice on the firm's market 
capitalisation. " 
Although he points to the need for future 
research, Higson's analysis was concerned with 
mergers and acquisitions and the effects of SSAP 
22 (Accounting for Goodwill) and SSAP 23 
(Accounting for Acquisitions and Mergers), and 
did not attempt to deal with the financing 
choice, but confined itself to an historical 
analysis of the information. 
In investigating particular financing decisions, 
it should be noted that data for the alternatives 
to the method chosen in any particular instance 
are not always readily available. For example, 
if a firm chooses to issue equity, the terms and 
conditions of alternative methods of finance at 
that particular time are not published in any 
form that allows easy assimilation and 
comparison. One particular contribution made in 
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this thesis is in the detailed reconstruction of 
the decision alternatives that were available to 
the firm's managers/directors at the time any 
particular issue was made. Thus the terms and 
conditions of alternative financing methods are 
investigated using contemporary published 
information. 
The results of these investigations are then 
assembled with the intention of enabling valid 
comparisons of alternate financing methods to be 
investigated, with particular reference to the 
impact on EPS. Considerable care was needed to 
allow for the accounting treatment of different 
finance methods, the effects on taxation charges 
and the impact of prevailing economic conditions 
(particularly with respect to interest rates). 
Research into the financing behaviour of 
corporations has traditionally concentrated on 
the normative aspects of finding an optimal set 
of rules to determine the preferred method of 
finance. Less emphasis has been placed on the 
influences of prevailing economic activity and 
policies of financial intermediaries which may, 
at a given time, force corporations into 
financing methods which, under more competitive 
conditions, the corporation may not regard as 
1-7 
optimal. 
1-4 Organisation of the Thesis 
There is a considerable literature looking at 
financing decisions both from the point of view 
of the relevant advantages of debt and equity 
issues and the equilibrium considerations of 
capital structure choice. This literature is 
reviewed in the context of the current resreach 
question in Chapter 2. 
In Chapter 3a survey of the attitudes of finance 
directors of companies which have made capital 
issues over the period 1985-1990 is conducted. 
The objective of Chapter 3 is to ascertain the 
factors which finance directors consider to be 
important in their capital issue decisions. In 
Chapter 4 an extensive analysis of the 
questionnaire responses is undertaken using 
factor and discriminant analysis. This provided 
more motivation for detailed study into the 
possibility of a fixation on EPS, by showing that 
financial information, and particularly short-run 
EPS, is important to capital issue decisions. 
In Chapter 5, EBIT-EPS analysis is examined and 
the framework extended to incorporate 
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"elasticity" type risk measures. This analysis 
forms the basis of empirical work in Chapters 5 
7, and 8. The degree of financial leverage (DFL) 
and the degree of operating leverage (DOL), both 
potentially important explanatory variables in 
the debt/equity choice decision, are estimated 
using regression methods following procedures 
suggested by Mandelker and Rhee (1984). 
In Chapter 6 reconstructions of the decision 
alternatives of a number of companies are made in 
order to investigate the hypothesis that 
financing decisions are made in a way which gives 
the highest short-run EPS. This involved 
assessing the impact of a hypothetical issue on 
the income statement of the firm. The impact is 
analysed in terms of the effect on EPS in Chapter 
6. 
In Chapter 7 the impact of the reconstruction in 
terms of capital and income gearing measures and 
also dividend cover is analysed. In addition, 
profiles of companies which had made particular 
types of issue, i. e. equity or debt, are examined 
in terms of their tax and cash flow ratios. 
In addition, in Chapter 8a probit model is 
formulated in order to find the independent 
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variables which have most influence on the 
dichotomous debt-equity choice. The independent 
variables used in the analysis include capital 
and income gearing ratios, interest cover, and 
dividend cover (for the year of issue and the 
year prior) ; estimates of DFL and DOL obtained by 
using time series regression, as well, as those 
obtained on the basis of actual data and 
averaging; the industry sector, age and beta of 
the firm; and dummy variables for the type of 
capital issue, and whether the actual issue, or 
the reconstruction gives the higher EPS for a 
particular company. 
The final Chapter, Chapter 9, discusses the 
position reached, and the extent to which the 
study has been successful in showing that there 
is functional fixation on short-term EPS. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF FINANCING 
DECISIONS 
2-1 Introduction 
The understanding of most subjects. proceeds 
incrementally, with new ideas being debated at 
the frontiers of a core of generally accepted 
knowledge. Finance has less secure foundations: 
whereas the tools of analysis have broad 
acceptance, there is still no apparent consensus 
on the acceptability or dominance of the various 
theoretical paradigms. Even recent literature 
still contains a considerable amount of work on 
'core' level theorising, and most empirical 
results can be made to sound plausible in the 
light of one or other theoretical paradigm. Even 
if this fails, anomalous results are sometimes 
rationalised in terms of ad hoc theories such as 
'money illusion', 'debt capacity' or even the 
'pecking order' hypothesis. 
The absence of a dominant theoretical perspective 
could have one of two positive consequences. 
Either the types of financing decisions made are 
fairly randomly distributed between the 
alternatives (i. e. on the basis that the decision 
2-1 
outcomes are equivalent, or that any preference 
is justifiable); or some simple ground rules 
emerge for what is considered to be 'good 
practice'. In this chapter, the various 
viewpoints from the literature are discussed with 
the purpose of deciding which of these 
alternatives is the more likely consequence of 
the current state of analysis. 
The 
- 
main theoretical perspectives will be 
examined under the headings of fundamental 
analysis, taxation, asymmetric information 
(dealing mainly with agency theory), signalling, 
and functional fixation. 
2-2 Fundamental analysis 
2-2-1 Introduction 
Fundamentalists believe in the existence of 
underlying value determining factors, and that 
careful examination of available financial data 
about a company will provide valuable 
information. By implication, where financial 
decisions are not indeterminate, there are 
'optimal' (value maximising) courses of action 
for management to take. 
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The late 1950s and early 1960s were notable for 
the discursive paradigms expounded by, for 
example, Durand (1952), and for the pioneering 
analytical work of Modigliani and Miller (1958, 
1963 and 1966). 
In their famous 1958 paper, Modigliani 5and Miller 
(MM) put forward the view that the financial 
structure of a company is irrelevant on the basis 
of their analysis showing that the market value 
of a firm is independent of its debt/equity 
ratio. The arguments are essentially partial 
equilibrium in nature, in that for firms of 
equivalent risk class (i. e. equal business risk) 
the market value could not be altered by changes 
in capital structure since this would give rise 
to arbitrage opportunities. Essentially, the 
argument is that the value of an organisation is 
dependent on its 'real' assets and liabilities 
(and hence the earnings these generate), and not 
on the way these are financed. Thus the overall 
cost of capital reflects the return on these 
assets and for firms with similar business risk 
would be equal. MM's 1963 paper introduced the 
effect of the tax advantage of debt on the 
capital structure decision, with the implication 
that a company financed almost totally by debt 
had the best structure. This is because the tax 
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advantage of debt does affect, the net cash flows 
generated, at least up to the point of tax 
exhaustion, although Miller (1977) suggests that 
the tax advantage may be considerably reduced 
because of equilibrium price considerations 
applied to debt finance. 
In a recent review of their work published on the 
thirtieth anniversary of their seminal work, 
Miller (1988) makes two interesting points. 
Firstly, he states 'the view that capital 
structure is literally irrelevant or that 
"nothing matters" in corporate finance, though 
still sometimes attributed to us, is far from 
what we ever actually said about the real world 
applications of our theoretical propositions', 
(page 100). Miller then went on to say 
'... Proposition II showed that when Proposition 
I held, the cost of equity capital was a linear 
increasing function of the debt/equity ratio. 
Any gains from using more of what might seem to 
be cheaper debt capital would be offset by the 
correspondingly higher cost of the now riskier 
equity capital. Our propositions implied that 
the weighted average of these costs of capital to 
a firm would remain the same no matter what 
combination of financing sources the firm 
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actually chose' page 100. Later in the paper 
Miller states '... our proposition that value was 
independent of capital structure at the 
individual firm level was never intended to 
suggest that the debt/equity ratio was 
indeterminate', page 102. Perhaps Miller is 
saying here that the original MM analysis was 
partial, because there is nothing in this paper 
which makes the debt/equity ratio determinate. 
Secondly, the clearly evident disparity between 
the conclusions of their 1963 paper and the real 
world position where firms often had low debt 
levels, could be partially explained by the well- 
known costs of debt finance such as restrictive 
covenants-and bankruptcy costs. However, Miller 
suggests 'for reducing the moral hazards and 
agency costs in the bondholder-stockholder 
relation, the undoing-of-leverage-blade in the 
original MM proof offered a clue: let the capital 
suppliers hold some of each, either directly or 
through convertible or exchangeable securities of 
any of a number of kinds', page 113. This would 
then enable firms to have high leverage and 
benefit from the associated tax savings without 
incurring prohibitive costs (asymmetric 
information and agency theory are discussed 
below) 
. 
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These comments might be interpreted uncharitably 
as altering the original theory to fit in with 
observed behaviour over a number of years. Also, 
given the difficulties that have always existed 
in testing the Modigliani and Miller propositions 
empirically, Miller's remarks bring into question 
whether those propositions, with their perfect 
market assumptions, ever stood a realistic chance 
of trying to explain the real world financing 
decisions and capital structures of f irms 
. 
Myers 
(1984), in his presidential address to the 
American Finance Association, refers to 
Modigliani and Miller's capital structure theory 
and states that the 'theories don't seem to 
explain actual financing behavior' page 575. 
Miller (1988) reaffirms Myers' view when he 
states 'direct statistical calibration of the 
goodness of fit of the MM value-invariance 
propositions has not so far been achieved by us 
or others for a variety of reasons', page 103.. 
2-2-2 Evaluation of MM Position 
Over the years many attempts have been made, both 
theoretical and empirical, to assess the 
robustness of the Modigliani and Miller 
irrelevance theory. 
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The empirical results of Chatterjee and Scott 
(1989) appear to reject the irrelevance theory. 
Chatterjee and Scott derived a theory of capital 
structure based on three deviations from the 
perfect market assumptions of Modigliani and 
Miller (1958), viz (i) a net tax effect, (ii) 
bankruptcy and bankruptcy costs, and. (iii) an 
unprotected creditor effect. They confirmed the 
earlier findings of Warner (1977) and Ang et al 
(1982) that the fixed (explicit) costs of 
bankruptcy are not statistically significant but 
find strong explanatory power in the marginal 
(implicit) costs of bankruptcy 
- 
firms with high 
fixed asset intensity carry heavier debt loads, 
because of the floor that these assets create for 
potential bankruptcy costs to be borne by 
security-holders. This result would also appear 
to explain the inter-industry differences in debt 
ratios found by Schwartz and Aronson (1967) and 
Scott (1972). However, there could be other 
interpretations of Chatterjee and Scott's results 
- 
for example, long-term assets would tend to be 
financed or 'matched' by long-term finance, or it 
could be that the cost of assets in capital- 
intensive businesses means that they have to 
borrow to finance them. 
Chatterjee and Scott's data also suggest a class 
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of unprotected creditors who provide a positive 
stimulus to the issuance of long-term debt, and 
that this stimulus is stronger than the net tax 
effect. 
Titman and Wessels (1988) find that firms with 
unique or 
- 
specialised products have relatively 
low debt ratios. Also smaller firms tend to use 
significantly more short-term debt than larger 
firms. This latter finding was consistent with 
that of Brealey, Hodges and Capron (1976) who 
found that large companies were more prone to 
issue debt (although this is not surprising in 
the U. K. because of institutional reasons). 
Titman and Wessels' model explains virtually none 
of the variation in convertible debt ratios 
across firms and finds no evidence to support 
theoretical work that predicts that debt ratios 
are related to a firm's expected growth, non-debt 
tax shields, volatility or the collateral value 
of its assets. They do however find some support 
for the proposition that profitable firms have 
relatively less debt relative to the market value 
of their equity. 
Some of their results contradict Bradley, Jarrell 
and Kim (1984) who developed a model that 
synthesised the 'balancing theory' of capital 
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structure. Their model incorporated positive 
personal taxes on equity and bond income, 
expected costs of financial distress and positive 
non-debt tax shields. They showed, in a 
simulation analysis, that optimal firm leverage 
is related inversely to expected costs of 
financial distress and to the amount of non-debt 
tax shields. In the empirical part of their 
paper, they found that average firm leverage 
ratios are strongly related to industry 
classification and firm leverage ratios are 
related inversely to earnings volatility. 
However it may be that some predictions from 
static capital structure theories may not hold, 
as these models ignore the firm's optimal 
restructuring choices in response to changing 
circumstances over time. For example, high-risk 
firms might have lower optimal debt ratios but 
adopt a more active debt management policy, thus 
counterbalancing the higher risk firm. A capital 
structure model set in a continuous-time 
framework might therefore have better explanatory 
power. 
Such a model was developed by Fischer, Heinkel 
and Zechner (1989). Their model of dynamic 
optimal capital structure choice in the presence 
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of recapitalisation costs builds on the 
traditional tax/bankruptcy cost theory of capital 
structure relevance. They state that a firm 
pursuing an optimal financing policy offers a 
'fair' risk-adjusted rate of return to its 
investors. Assuming that leverage is 
advantageous, the unlevered assets wit]iout debt- 
related tax shields must offer a 'below fair' 
risk-adjusted rate of return. The difference 
between the risk-adjusted rate of return on the 
unlevered assets and the total rate of return on 
the levered firm is due to the benefits from 
leverage. A firm choosing the optimal dynamic 
capital structure policy would seek to maximise 
this rate of return to leverage. The range over 
which a company allows its debt to vary is used 
as a measure of capital structure relevance. The 
resulting optimal dynamic capital structure 
policy depends upon the benefit of debt financing 
(for example, a tax advantage), potential costs 
of debt financing (for example, bankruptcy 
costs), underlying asset variability, the 
riskless interest rate, and the size of the costs 
of recapitalising. Smaller, riskier, lower-tax, 
lower-bankruptcy cost firms tend to exhibit wider 
swings in their debt ratios over time. 
A model which obviates the need to invoke 
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concepts like bankruptcy cost, agency cost, 
asymmetric information and signalling is the cash 
flow beta theory of capital structure put forward 
by Ross (1985). The important feature of this 
model is that it is based on the interplay of 
cash flow, uncertainty and taxes. The cash flow 
beta is the regression coefficient of the firm's 
cash flows before interest and taxes on an 
aggregate price level. He finds that for firms 
of similar cash flow variance, there will be an 
inverse relationship between financial leverage 
and cash flow beta. 
Empirical support for Ross' cash flow beta theory 
is provided by Sugrue and Scherr (1989) but this 
support depends upon the sample period and the 
leverage specification. This would suggest that 
equilibrium models of capital structure should be 
tested using relatively long estimation periods 
to lessen the effects caused by firm's short-term 
response to economic conditions. 
Whilst many attempts have been made over the 
years to derive a theory of capital structure, no 
one theory predominates. A common feature in 
many of these models, emphasised to a greater or 
lesser degree, is that the amount of debt that 
a business will employ is related to the tax 
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shields and bankruptcy costs. 
2-3 Taxation 
2-3-1 Introduction 
There are certain tax advantages to debt in as 
much as the interest on debt is an allowable 
expense for tax purposes. 
The seminal work of Modigliani and Miller(1963), 
in which they introduced the tax advantage of 
debt into their model of the impact of capital 
structure on the firm's financing value, has led 
to much theorising about the role of taxation in 
determining the financial policy of the firm. 
According to Modigliani and Miller, any firm 
could increase its total market value by 
increasing the amount of debt in its capital 
structure (presumably up to the limit of tax 
exhaustion). Miller (1977) finds an equilibrium 
analysis at the level of the market as a whole 
and not of the individual firm. Taking into 
account both corporate and personal taxes, he 
goes back to the original MM decision, that 
capital structure decisions by the firm are 
irrelevant, i. e. changes in capital structure 
have no effect on the firm's total valuation. 
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Miller's model suggests that in market 
equilibrium, personal and corporate taxes cancel 
out. 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) showed that the net 
tax advantage to debt would in equilibrium be low 
but positive, exactly offsetting 
, 
marginal 
bankruptcy costs. Brick and Ravid (1985) 
presented a tax-induced framework to analyze debt 
maturity problems. They found that an increasing 
term structure of interest rates, adjusted for 
default risk, usually results in long-term debt 
being optimal, whereas a decreasing term 
structure renders short-term debt optimal. This 
may explain why long-term debt may be issued even 
though from agency considerations, short-term 
debt is often optimal (Barnea, Haugen and Senbet, 
1985). The problem is that the term structure 
can change very quickly. 
There have been many empirical studies carried 
out both in the U. S. and the U. K. since Miller's 
1977 paper. The results have been inconclusive 
and often contradictory. Myers (1984) stated 'I 
know of no study clearly demonstrating that a 
firm's tax status has predictable, material 
effects on its debt policy. ', page 588. 
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2-3-2 U. K. Tax Studies 
In his book 'Public Policy and the Corporation', 
King (1977) tried to investigate the relationship 
between the values of various tax incentive 
variables (eg. tax relief for debt interest) and 
the actual-pattern of corporate financing in the 
U. K. over the period 1947-1971. He reported that 
'a reasonable picture of the determinants of the 
debt-equity ratio of U. K. industrial and 
commercial companies can be obtained from a 
simple model relating the target debt-equity 
ratio to the tax incentives to the use of debt 
finance, and to the amount of takeover activity 
going on in the economy', page 226. King's model 
is given by: 
dr'ao+alvß+a2 VC+a3dr-ý 
where 
dt = debt-equity ratio 
VB 
(1-0 
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marginal rate of income tax on 
unearned income 
z= 
, 
accrued capital gains rate of 
taxation 
t= corporation tax rate 
King concluded that other factors such as 
uncertainty and bankruptcy costs, which the above 
model does not take account of, also play a role 
in the firm's choice of financing policy. 
Subsequently Rutterford (1986) investigated the 
effects of corporate and personal taxation on 
company capital structure. She developed a model 
of the effects on firm value of an increase in 
corporate gearing, under the assumptions of 
perfect capital markets but allowing for both 
investor and corporate taxes. The model was 
defined as: 
ASoo* (1-tPd)ßd (1-tg)ßu 
ABO -a u(1-t9) 
(1-tpb) 
and: 
(A So *) 
_1- 
(l-t9) ad 
AB 
o 
(1- tpb 
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where So = ex-dividend value of all the shares 
in the firm 
Bo = amount of debt 
tpd = personal tax rate on dividend income 
t9 = tax rate on gains 
Bu = the net of corporate tax prof its 
where profits are undistributed 
Bd = the net of corporate tax profits 
where profits are distributed 
These equations gave the change in the value of 
shareholders' equity for each additional unit of 
debt raised at time 0. The values of the right 
hand side are the "tax advantage of debt" under 
any tax system. Rutterford derived these values 
for the U. K. tax system 1930 to 1980 using one or 
other of the above equations according to the 
optimal dividend policy of each particular tax 
system. 
She claimed that the model allows for the 
interaction of optimal dividend policy and 
optimal debt policy of the firm. This, of 
course, brings into question the basis on which 
'optimality' is defined. It turns out that 
'optimal' covers a range of possible alternative 
policies depending on the period in time as 
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different tax regimes impacted on what was 
'optimal'. 
Rutterford stated 'the results of the tests 
provide little evidence, after allowing for 
measurement differences, in support of a 
significant role for taxes in company. choice of 
debt-equity ratios', page 2 and 'the role of 
corporate and personal taxes as major 
determinants of U. K. company capital structure is 
found to be generally not significant', page 548. 
Lasfer (1987) develops a model of optimal debt 
capacity; under this model the firm's debt to 
equity ratio is hypothesised as being determined 
by the asset base, the corporation tax rate and 
risk. His model can be expressed algebraically 
as: 
ODt 
- 
ßo+ß1At+02ODt-1+03Taxt+ß4RiSkt+e t 
where: 
ODt = the firm's outstanding debt at time t 
At = the firm's net assets at time t 
Lasfer tries to model the effective marginal 
corporation tax rates and not use a proxy - thus 
alleviating one criticism that could be made of 
Rutterford (1986).. as unlike her, Lasfer 
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estimates the effective marginal corporation tax 
rate for each company in his sample (88 firms), 
thus identifying the companies that are tax- 
exhausted. 
Lasfer also seeks to analyse the effects of 
personal income taxation on 
. 
dividend 
distribution, viewing the decision on whether to 
distribute or not, as a function of the marginal 
personal income tax rates of the firm's 
shareholders. His evidence in this area is 
rather patchy. The results of Davidson and 
Mallin (1989) show some evidence for a weak tax 
based clientele effect that appears to operate 
for firms with high annual dividend yields, but 
overall they suggest that ex-dividend value 
changes may have little implication for long-term 
tax-induced effects on security prices. The 
direct evidence of Lewellen et al (1978) is also 
only very weakly supportive of any clientele 
effect. 
Lasfer concludes 'companies do not appear to 
select their debt levels randomly but rather take 
account of their tax position, level of risk, 
assets base and the market expectations reflected 
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in Tobin Is q. 1 Companies that are tax exhausted 
are found to have significantly lower debt ratios 
than those in a tax paying position', page 19. 
His results therefore support the view that a 
target debt-capital ratio is a function of the 
tax exhaustion position, the required rate of 
return by shareholders and the level of interest 
rates. It appears that a company that is tax- 
exhausted and therefore cannot take advantage of 
the tax shields prefers to finance its investment 
projects using new issues or retained earnings. 
Lasfer's results may be subject to certain 
econometric considerations and interpretational 
differences. For example, serial correlation in 
the error term of his partial adjustment model, 
simultaneous equation bias and spurious 
correlation. 
Ashton (1989) argued that under the present U. K. 
tax system, the theoretical advantage afforded by 
debt should be estimated at no more than 13% of 
the debt's market value. In a later paper 
(1991), Ashton extends and corrects his earlier 
'Tobin' sq is 
to the replacement 
used the product 
corresponding year 
issues, whilst for 
fixed assets, stock 
lef ined as the ratio of market value of equity 
cost of net assets. For the former Lasfer 
of the average price of equity for the 
by the number of shares adjusted for new 
the replacement cost of net assets he used 
and work-in-progress. 
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paper, dealing now with the case of non-constant 
earning streams. He makes the crucial assumption 
that dividends are irrelevant for tax purposes (a 
rather strong assumption), as if they were not 
the tax advantage to debt would depend on the 
pattern of financing through time. He also 
assumes the existence of quitt simple 
relationships between weighted averages of 
marginal personal tax rates. He sums up 'we can 
fairly confidently conclude that under the 
current U. K. Imputation Tax System, any tax 
advantage to debt finance is likely to be small. 
As such, the role played by taxation in shaping 
the financial policy of the firm is likely to be 
minor rather than major', page 480. 
However, Dempsey (1991) draws attention to the 
market spread between borrowing and lending which 
constitutes a 'cost' for corporate borrowing and 
finds that, in the context of the present U. K. 
tax system, this 'cost' of borrowing is 
sufficient to nullify entirely the perceived tax 
benefits of corporate borrowing. He concludes 
that at present corporate borrowing could imply 
a net disadvantage for the valuation of a 
company's equity by about 6% or 7% of the debt's 
market value. 
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2-3-3 U. S. Tax Studies 
Studies that have been carried out on U. S. data 
and in the context of the U. S. tax system, which 
differs significantly from the U. K. system, have 
tended to find that there is a substantial 
advantage to using debt finance. The vA1ue added 
to a company by debt has been estimated as high 
as 35% to 50% of the debt's market value 
according to Dempsey (1991), page 221. 
Feldstein (1989) recommended replacing the 
current corporate income tax with a cash flow 
corporate income tax in order to reduce the 
incentive for the excess use of corporate debt. 
This could be achieved by dispensing with the 
deductibility of interest expenses and allowing 
an immediate write-off of all investment in plant 
and equipment. 
MacKie-Mason (1990) pointed out that the 
desirability of debt finance at the margin 
increases with the firm's effective marginal tax 
rate on deductible interest. He found ' clear and 
substantial tax effects', page 1488. He thought 
most tax shields would have a negligible effect 
on the marginal tax rate for most firms, so he 
studied the incremental financing choices made by 
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firm managers. The actual decisions, made at the 
margin, would provide more powerful tests than 
the studies of debt/asset ratios because the 
ratios reflect the outcomes of many decisions 
made over a number of years. Secondly, tax 
shields affect the value of incremental debt 
insofar as they lower the effective marginal tax 
rate on interest deductions, and it is only for 
firms that are already close to tax exhaustion 
for whom tax shields have a large marginal 
effect. His results supported this view as they 
showed that a firm with high tax shields, already 
exhausted (with loss carryforwards) or with a 
high probability of facing a zero marginal tax 
rate, is less likely to finance with debt. 
In summary there is no real consensus arising 
from the tax studies carried out in the U. K. and 
the U. S. on the advantages of debt. However it 
would appear that tax exhausted companies are 
less inclined to issue debt. 
2-4 Agency Theory 
2-4-1 Agency Costs 
Agency theory is concerned with costs that arise 
due to conflicts of interest. Jensen and 
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Meckling 
monitoring 
loss. 
(1976) identify three main costs : 
costs, bonding costs and residual 
Monitoring costs might include restrictive 
covenants on debt finance, and the higher the 
level of debt, the more restrictive these 
covenants may be. This can lead to residual loss 
because the company may be constrained in its 
activities and so may not meet its competitive 
ideal. Monitoring costs are also apparent in 
rights issues, as Smith (1977) showed 
- 
although 
rights issues involve significantly lower costs 
than underwritten offerings, underwriters were 
involved in over 90% of the offerings. Smith's 
explanation is that the use of underwriters 
reduced overall monitoring costs. 
Bonding costs are incurred when the agent agrees 
not to engage in certain activities which could 
be to the detriment of the principals (for 
example, an agent may agree not to deal with one 
of the firm's competitors). Bonding costs act as 
a signal that the agent is bona fide. 
Residual loss is a measure of the extent to which 
the firm does not behave in a way that is optimal 
for the principal. This type of behaviour 
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relates a priori to the extent of separation and 
control (because of conflicts that arise between 
managers and shareholders, where managers hold 
less than 100% of the residual claim), but it is 
possible that highly restrictive debt covenants 
could, also, lead to suboptimal behaviour. 
These costs arise in the corporate context 
because of conflicts between shareholders and 
managers where managers hold less than 100% of 
the residual claim to the firm's equity. In this 
situation managers may act in a manner that is 
suboptimal to the shareholders, as rather than 
investing more time and effort into profit 
enhancement activities, they may prefer to 
transfer firm resources to themselves in the form 
of perquisites, such as company cars, luxurious 
offices, etc. However the larger the manager's 
share of equity, the less prone he is to act in 
this way. By financing investment by debt and 
holding the manager's share of equity constant, 
the loss between the managers and shareholders 
can be mitigated. 
There is also a conflict that may arise between 
equityholders and debtholders because the debt 
contract gives equityholders an incentive to 
invest suboptimally. For example, the lower the 
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proportion of equity, the higher is the 
inducement for ordinary shareholders/managers 
acting on their behalf, to invest in risky 
projects, reducing the value of debt. However if 
the debtholders correctly predict at the time of 
issue of the debt that this suboptimal behaviour 
may occur, then the equityholders will receive 
less for the debt than they otherwise would. So, 
the cost of the incentive to invest in value- 
decreasing projects created by debt is borne by 
the equityholders who issue the debt. This is 
known as the 'asset substitution effect' and is 
an agency cost of debt financing. 
In addition there is the moral hazard problem 
which may arise when one contracts to act in a 
particular way, but if there is no check on it, 
it is possible to renege. This is distinct from 
the problem of adverse selection, an example of 
which is the insurance industry where the people 
who choose to insure may well be those that are 
at particular risk. Adverse selection is ex-ante 
information asymmetry, whereas moral hazard is 
ex-post information asymmetry. They can occur 
when the actions of the agent are unobservable. 
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2-4-2 Conflict Between Managers and Investors 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that an optimal 
capital structure can be obtained by trading off 
the agency cost of debt against the benefit of 
debt. Fama (1980) also argued that managerial 
incentive problems (i. e. those usually attributed 
to the separation of security ownership and 
control of the firm) could be resolved given a 
competitive market for management (a very 
'Chicago' oriented approach). Agrawal and 
Mandelker (1987) found that there was a positive 
relationship between the security holdings of 
managers and the changes in firm variance and in 
financial leverage. It would seem that executive 
holdings of common stock and options in the firm 
have a role in reducing managerial incentive 
problems, i. e. if managers have an equity stake in 
the business they are less likely to indulge in 
behaviour which may harm the returns on equity. 
Kim and Sorensen (1986) find that firms with 
higher insider ownership have greater debt ratios 
than firms with lower insider ownership. This 
finding is ambiguous. It may be explained by 
agency costs since high insider ownership firms 
may issue debt in order to remain as high insider 
ownership firms because of the costs of outside 
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equity. Alternatively, more debt may be issued 
by high insider ownership firms because the 
agency costs of outside debt decline with 
ownership concentration. Their other findings 
show that high-growth firms use less debt rather 
than more debt, high-operating risk f irms use 
more debt rather than less debt, and firm size 
appears to be uncorrelated to the level of debt. 
An interesting variation is provided by 
Hirshleifer and Thakor (1989) who considered a 
situation where managers have an incentive to 
pursue relatively safe projects out of a concern 
for their reputation. Faced with a choice of two 
projects, each with only two outcomes, success or 
failure, managers would choose the safer project 
if it had a higher probability of success. This 
reduces the agency cost of debt, so if managers 
are susceptible to a reputation effect, the firm 
would be expected to have more debt than 
otherwise. 
Harris and Raviv (1990) provide a theory of 
capital structure based on the effect of debt on 
investors' information about the firm and on 
their ability to oversee management. They 
contend that managers do not always behave in the 
best interests of their investors and so need to 
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be disciplined. Debt serves as a disciplining 
device as default allows creditors the option to 
force the firm into liquidation. Also debt 
generates information that can be used, by 
investors to evaluate major operating decisions 
including liquidation. The optimal amount of 
debt is determined by trading off the value of 
information and opportunities for disciplining 
management against the probability of incurring 
investigation costs. 
Stulz (1990) also concentrated on the conflict 
between equityholders and managers, and his 
optimal capital structure is determined by 
trading off the benefit of debt in preventing 
investment in value decreasing projects against 
the cost of debt in preventing investment in 
value increasing projects. As in Jensen (1986), 
firms with an abundance of good investment 
opportunities can be expected to have low debt 
levels relative to firms in mature, slow-growth, 
cash-rich industries. Stulz argues that managers 
will be reluctant to implement the optimal debt 
levels but are more likely to do so the greater 
is the threat of takeover. 
There is also some evidence that the presence of 
outside third parties moderates agency-related 
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costs of debt and equity. 
Slovin, Sushka, and Hudson (1990) demonstrate 
that the market reaction to announcements of 
seasoned stock offerings varies with the presence 
of outside agents (accounting firms, commercial 
banks and underwriters) who monitor the firm. 
The presence of substantial bank debt in a firm's 
capital structure and the use of. a high- 
reputation investment banker would appear to 
mitigate the negative effect of equity issuance. 
In an earlier paper, Moyer, Chatfield and 
Sisneros (1989) found some support for the role 
of analyst monitoring as an efficient device for 
controlling agency-related costs of debt and 
equity. 
- 
2-4-3 Conflict between Equityholders & 
Debtholders 
One aspect of agency theory which has received 
considerable attention is the conflict between 
equityholders and debtholders. 
Green and Talmor (1986) explicitly examined the 
incentive for asset substitution by solving 
endogenously for the optimal risk policy. Their 
results supported the notion that more debt 
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increases shareholders' incentives to take risk. 
Conversely, Gavish and Kalay (1983) found that 
stockholders' incentive to increase the 
investment's risk is not an increasing function 
of the leverage ratio, i. e. the increase in 
shareholder wealth does not depend monotonically 
on the leverage ratio. 
Diamond (1989) posited a model concerned with a 
firm's reputation for choosing projects that 
assure debt repayment. The longer a firm's 
history of repaying its debt, the better its 
reputation and the lower its borrowing cost 
(reflected, for example, in Standard and 
Poor/Moody's AAA bond rating). An older, more 
established firm would find it optimal to choose 
the safe project (and not engage in asset 
substitution) to avoid losing a valuable 
reputation. Firms with long track records will 
therefore tend to have lower default rates and 
lower costs of debt than firms with brief 
histories. 
Brennan and Dunlop (1991) were concerned with the 
adverse selection problem of a firm that must 
sell new equity in order to finance an investment 
project, when there is also a managerial agency 
problem of over-investment. They show that it 
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may be efficient for a firm to issue a class of 
shares that are partly paid or assessable. Their 
findings show that management does not maximise 
the interest of one class of investors 
(stockholders) at the expense of the others 
(bondholders) 
. 
This is in accordance with Haugen 
and Senbet (1981) and (1988) who suggested that 
the risk incentive problem may be solved through 
complex financing contracting (for example, the 
inclusion of call or conversion provisions in 
debt). However, Narayanan (1987) argued that 
convertible debt does not solve the perquisite 
consumption problem, and that callable debt might 
also not mitigate that particular problem as 
management is retaining a call option. 
The rapid growth of finance which is strictly 
neither debt nor equity in the traditional sense, 
may prove to have been instrumental in reducing 
the usual perceived conflicts between managers 
and shareholders on the one hand, 
-and 
shareholders and debtholders on the other. 
Brick and Ravid (1985) argued that in the 
presence of a rising term structure of interest 
rates, long-term debt, with appropriate call and 
convertible features, may play a role in 
maximising the tax benefits of debt and 
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simultaneously resolving agency conflicts which 
arise due to informational asymmetry and moral 
hazard. Such arguments are in line with the 
analysis developed by Hirshleifer (1971) who 
argued that the various features of different 
financial liabilities contribute to market 
completeness and can lead to higher overall 
valuation. It can be seen, for example, that 
different types of secured position will have an 
effect on the value of debt, given bankruptcy 
costs. 
2-4-4 Economic Consequences 
Research from the economic consequences viewpoint 
also has agency implications. For example, 
Holthausen and Leftwich (1983) looked at the 
effect of contracting and monitoring costs on 
accounting choice. This economic consequence 
approach predicts that particular accounting 
methods are chosen because they affect firms' cash 
flows. Empirical tests of economic consequences 
reveal systematic associations between accounting 
technique choices and firm size, a proxy for 
political visibility, and leverage, a proxy for 
contracting costs. These results are, however, 
difficult to interpret as there is little 
evidence for these proxies. 
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Malmquist (1990) and Mian and Smith (1990) both 
take an efficient contracting view of the world. 
Malmquist's work is based on the premise that 
accounting methods are chosen to enhance the 
efficiency of contracting and monitoring 
arrangements. Mian and Smith conjecture that the 
more interdependent the subsidiary's activities 
are, the more likely the financial statements 
will be presented on a consolidated basis. The 
strength of the two papers is in their attempt to 
structure a set of tests which assume that 
accounting methods are chosen to increase the 
efficiency of contracts in monitoring the 
conflicts of interest among agents in the firm. 
Recent work by Mangos (1991) advances a 
theoretical framework which incorporates the 
contractual links which exist between managers 
and shareholders, and managers and debtholders, 
but also incorporates the political visibility 
factors that he feels are associated with 
accounting choice. Mangos and Lehman (1991) 
state that contracting costs should be overtly 
integrated with political costs instead of 
treating them as a hidden agenda. 
To conclude the review of the literature in this 
section a pertinent comment is that it is 
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difficult to formulate testable hypotheses in 
agency theory, even though it has a theoretical 
strand, in addition to a discursive one. This 
is, in essence, a problem of the data as ideally 
cross-sectional data are needed, relating to 
firms which are highly similar except with 
respect to their ownership structure. Walker 
(1989) examines the empirical testability of 
agency theory from a falsificationist perspective 
and also argues that agency models involving pre- 
decision information are practically devoid of 
empirical content. 
It would seem then that agency theory is not 
capable of providing an empirically testable 
explanation of capital structure. 
2-5 Pecking Order Hypothesis 
Myers and Majluf (1984) put forward the concept 
of a modified pecking order theory whereby firms 
would finance investment by internal funds as 
first preference, then by debt and, as final 
choice, equity. The theory is essentially ad hoc 
but can be viewed as building on the empirical 
work of Donaldson (1961) who had studied the 
financing practices of a sample of large 
corporations and found that management favoured 
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internal sources of finance but if external funds 
were sought, debt was favoured over equity. 
This pecking order is partly attributed to the 
effects of asymmetric information 
- 
as when 
equity is issued there is often a fall in the 
share price as the market would appear to think 
that if the company is issuing equity, management 
must believe that the shares are Qver-valued. 
This has been supported by several studies, 
including those by Korwar (1983), Asquith and 
Mullins (1986) and Mikkelson and Partch (1986). 
Debt often has the drawbacks of restrictive 
covenants and other monitoring costs, but is 
generally still preferable to equity because of 
associated tax advantages and lower issue costs. 
Funding from internal sources does not carry any 
of the afore-mentioned costs. 
Although Baskin (1989), Krasker (1986) and 
Narayanan (1988) found empirical evidence of the 
pecking order hypothesis, Brennan and Kraus 
(1987), Noe (1988) and Constaninides and Grundy 
(1989) dispute the pecking order result in models 
similar to that of Myers amd Majluf. Also other 
theoretical signalling models, such as Ross 
(1977), Leland and Pyle (1977) and Heinkel (1982) 
do not obtain a pecking order result. Myers 
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himself (1984) had summed up the modifed pecking 
order theory by stating that it 'depends on 
sticky, dividends, but does not explain why they 
are sticky. Second, it leaves us with at best a 
fuzzy understanding of when and why firms issue 
common equity' page 590. On balance, it would 
seem that the Myers and Majluf pecking order 
model is at best only a partial explanation. 
2-6 Signalling Theory 
2-6-1 Introduction 
Signalling theory is based on information 
asymmetry and the existence of a well behaved 
signalling cost function which forms the basis 
for an equilibrium model of signalling behaviour. 
The foundations of signalling theory were 
formalised by Akerlof (1970) and Spence (1974), 
the latter concentrating mainly on the use of 
education as a signal in the labour market. 
In his 'market for lemons' article, Akerlof 
(1970) suggested that firms could give guarantees 
etc. as signals of quality. There are many 
markets in which buyers use some market statistic 
to judge the quality of prospective purchases. 
2-36 
There is an incentive for sellers to market poor 
quality merchandise, since the returns for good 
quality accrue mainly to the whole group whose 
statistic is affected rather than to the 
individual seller. Akerlof cited the second-hand 
car market as an example 
- 
the bad ones, 
'lemons', still get sold as it is very. difficult 
to differentiate between the good cars and the 
bad ones. Akerlof suggests that the sellers of 
good cars could give guarantees on them, to try 
to counteract the effects of quality uncertainty 
on the purchaser. Other ways of counteracting 
the effects of quality uncertainty might be 
through brand names, or licensing practices. 
Spence (1974) wrote of the concept of a signal 
being the observable attribute upon which the 
employer makes judgements about individual 
productivity, for example, education. The signal 
is read, interpreted in the light of past 
experience and reacted to accordingly. An 
equilibrium is reached when the employer's 
beliefs concerning the relation between the 
signal and the productivity are confirmed by his 
experience in the market. 
A signal is characterised by the following: 
(i) it is discretionary 
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(ii) it has a cost 
(iii) the costs increase with the amount of the 
signal 
(iv) the costs at the margin are negatively 
correlated with the value determining factor 
being signalled 
(v) experience must confirm the signal (i. e. 
there is reinforcement of the signal) 
In relation to point (ii) above, generally 
signalling must have a cost, but in certain 
circumstances it is argued by some authors, for 
example, Heinkel (1982), that signalling can be 
costless. Subsequently, Franke (1987) cited two 
conditions for costless signalling 
- 
the outsider 
rationality condition and the no-arbitrage 
condition. However, the concept of costless 
signalling is not intuitively appealing and does 
not lend itself to empirical proof. 
Riley (1975) and (1979) argued that sellers of 
high quality products have an incentive to engage 
in some distinguishing activity which operates as 
a signal to potential buyers. He showed that 
there is a unique reactive informational 
equilibrium and argued that stability can be 
achieved by building into the equilibrium 
concept, a recognition of possible reactions by 
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other agents. The transfer of information via 
markets can be explained as a non-cooperative 
equilibrium phenomenon. In essence, Riley's 
contribution is basically to formulate 
mathematically the nature of equilibrium response 
but his framework is essentially that adopted by 
Spence. 
There have been two approaches to the signalling 
implications of financial structure. The work of 
Ross (1977) and Leland and Pyle (1977) 
concentrated on the theory that the choice of a 
firm's capital structure signals to outside 
investors the information of insiders. The work 
of Myers and Majluf 
. 
(1984) and Myers (1984) 
viewed capital structure as being designed to 
mitigate inefficiencies in the firm's investment 
decisions that are caused by the information 
asymmetry. These are discussed below. 
2-6-2 Ross Interpretation of Signalling 
Ross (1977) stated that the choice of a 
managerial incentive schedule and of a financial 
structure signals information to the market, so 
the value of a firm will rise with leverage since 
increasing leverage increases the market's 
perception of value. However, increasing debt 
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levels increase bankruptcy costs, and furthermore 
the better management is, the lower the expected 
bankruptcy costs per unit of debt at any given 
debt level. Thus better companies would, in 
equilibrium, finance themselves with more debt. 
Ross (1977) argued that leverage was positively 
correlated with firm value, whilst Leland and 
Pyle (1977) argued that leverage was positively 
correlated with the extent of the managerial 
equity ownership. Ross' findings were supported 
theoretically by Noe (1988), Narayanan (1988) and 
Poitevin (1989), and empirically by Lys and 
Sivaramakrishnan (1988), Cornett and Travlos 
(1989) and Dann et al (1989). Conversely, Leland 
and Pyle's analysis was supported empirically by 
Kim and Sorensen (1986), Agrawal and Mandelker 
(1987) and Amihud at al (1990), but was not 
supported by Friend and Hasbrouck (1988) and 
Friend and Lang (1988). The empirical evidence 
would therefore seem to be inconclusive. 
2-6-3 Myers & Maj luf Interpretation of Signalling 
A further aspect of the Myers and Maj luf (1984) 
paper mentioned previously is the assumption of 
asymmetric information between shareholders and 
management. The method of raising finance acts 
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as a signal of the firm's value. There is a 
'pecking order', whereby firms' preferences for 
the method of finance are inversely related to 
the securities' price sensitivity to firm 
performance. 
The empirical studies of Chaplinsky and Niehaus 
(1990) and Ahimud at al (1990) supported this 
theory, whilst Korajczyk et al (1990) did not. 
Recent work by Bayless and Diltz (1991) extended 
and elaborated on Myers and Majluf (1984) to 
produce a set of specific predictions for the 
impact of asymmetric information on the entire 
security offering process (i. e. for the choice of 
security, the timing of the issue and subsequent 
market reaction). Their findings provide support 
for Myers and Majluf, showing that equity issues 
tend to occur following increases in a firm's 
stock price, while debt issues are observed for 
firms with relatively large amounts of financial 
slack or when issue size is large relative to 
firm size. 
Williams (1988) provided some support for Myers 
and Majluf, arguing that in an efficient 
signalling equilibrium, firms should finance 
their real investments first from internal funds. 
However, he found that the second choice of 
2-41 
finance would be from the sale of 
outside investors, in contrast t 
Majluf, who found that "the firm 
equity when it has the option to 
regardless of whether the firm 
undervalued", page 197. 
new stock to 
o Myers and 
never issues 
issue debt, 
is over-or 
Blazenko (1987) 
, 
like Myers and Majluf (1984), 
follows the general assumption that financial 
signalling is less than fully revealing 
- 
neither 
the signal itself nor the investors' ability to 
interpret the signal is perfect. Blazenko argues 
that if firm performance affects managers' wealth 
or reputation, preferences of managers dominate 
firms' financing decisions. When managers know 
more about asset quality than do investors, and 
if managers are sufficiently risk averse, they 
signal high quality projects with debt. 
Coversely, when information about asset 
investment is symmetric, managers finance 
exclusively with equity. 
John (1987) also lends support to the theory that 
debt can be a favourable signal. He found that 
although increasing risky debt also increases 
agency costs, the signalling effect leads to a 
favourable re-evaluation of the firm by the 
market. 
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An equity issue is viewed as a negative signal, 
as it is felt that equity is only issued when the 
price is high. Asquith and Mullins (1986) looked 
at signalling with dividends, stock repurchases 
and equity issues. They found that over 80% of 
their sample experienced a price decline on 
announcement of the equity issue, and that the 
size of the price decline was directly 
proportional to the size of the equity issue. 
Similarly, Mikkelson and Partch (1986) found that 
an offer of common stock or convertible debt is 
a signal that stock is over-valued. 
Hess and Bhagat (1986) also found that the share 
price drops on announcement of a new issue of 
common-stock, the fall being associated either 
with the size of the issue relative to the number 
of shares previously outstanding or to bad news 
about shareholder returns being signalled by the 
announcement. 
This perceived negative view of equity issues is 
also apparent in the findings of White and 
Lusztig (1980) who noted a drop in share price on 
announcement of a rights issue, although they had 
acute small sample problems. It would seem that 
on average investors believe that there is 
negative information associated with a rights 
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offering. Davidson and Mallira (1992) noted that 
the reason for the rights issue affects the 
amount of the price drop on announcement of the 
issue. Also in relation to rights issues, 
Heinkel and Schwartz (1986) found that the choice 
of method of rights issue (underwritten, 
uninsured 
-or 
insured) could act as. a signal 
revealing the quality of the firm. However, this 
analysis is partial in that debt issues were not 
considered. 
Tinic (1988) argued that the underpricing of 
initial public offers serves as an efficient form 
of insurance against potential legal liabilities 
of issuers and their agents. However it is worth 
noting that some of the results are also 
consistent with models of underpricing based on 
asymmetric information. 
Subsequently Krinsky and Rotenberg (1989) looked 
at the relationship between entrepreneurial 
ownership retention and the initial value of 
unseasoned common shares. They found that the 
entrepreneurial signal is not found to possess 
statistical significance. 
A recent study by Schadler and Moore (1992) 
confirmed that firms' decisions to issue equity 
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result in significant adverse price reactions; 
whilst a decision to issue straight non-mortgage 
debt results in no significant stock price 
reaction. They posit that the predictability 
(from an investor' s point of view) of a 
particular type of issue may result in 
differential price reactions. Their model uses 
seven variables which they perceive proxy for the 
information set used by investors to form their 
probabilities of security type. Their 
explanatory variables fell into three categories: 
(i) those relying on the existence of a target 
capital structure. These comprised a 
target long-term debt ratio, and two 
measures of operating risk -a financial 
distress measure and fixed asset 
financing measure, 
(ii) those dependent on existing market 
conditions. These comprised measures of 
equity market conditions and debt market 
conditions, 
(iii) those relating to the actual issuing of 
securities. These comprised a target 
short-term debt ratio and a firm size 
measure. 
They find that their model correctly predicts, as 
being debt or equity, 77.65% of their sample. 
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They conclude that market participants can also 
predict the type of issue; and that 
predictability of issue type is partially 
responsible for the differential effect on stock 
price. They state that the discriminatory power 
might be improved by choosing different 
variables. Interestingly the probit model 
developed in Chapter 8 would appear to have 
slightly better classificatory power. 
Harris and Raviv (1985) found that, in 
equilibrium, a decision to call on convertible 
debt is perceived by the market as a signal of 
unfavourable private information. This 
information-signalling hypothesis is supported by 
the findings of Ofer and Natarajan (1987) who 
find that bad news is manifested in that firms 
calling their convertible bonds experience an 
unexpected decline in performance in the years 
following after the call. 
Acharya (1988) builds a generalized economic 
model with two possible discrete signals and uses 
it to test whether firms signal their true value 
by forcing or not forcing an outstanding 
convertible bond. He concludes that the call- 
announcement signals of the managers are 
partially anticipated. 
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An interesting idea is put forward by Stein 
(1992) who argues that convertible bonds are 
'backdoor equity financing', and that companies 
may find them attractive as a middle ground 
between the negative informational consequences 
associated with an equity issue and the potential 
for costly financial distress associated with a 
debt issue. A company issuing a convertible with 
an early call provision can circumvent to some 
extent the adverse price impact of a common stock 
offering. 
The review of the literature from a signalling 
perspective would seem to provide a theoretical 
consensus favouring debt over equity. 
The main arguments are: 
(i) debt levels are seen as signals of 
management ability (Ross, 1977); and 
(ii) the issue of new equity can be construed as 
a signal that equity is over-priced (Asquith and 
Mullins, 1986) 
A certain amount of empirical evidence is 
consistent with this view (Mikkelson and Partch, 
1986) 
, 
but such findings may also be rationalised 
from a fundamental perspective in that equity 
finance provides a lower tax shield effect. 
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Attempts to establish the existence of signalling 
behaviour for other financial variables (for 
example, dividends) have not been very 
successful, and indeed, sometimes counter- 
intuitive (Eades, 1982). 
2-7 The Importance of Earnings 
2-7-1 Influence of Earnings 
Earnings have been perceived as a key indicator 
of company performance for many years. 
It was mentioned in Chapter 1 that Ball and Brown 
(1968) focused tightly on the bottom line, 
although 
-there are many other numbers in the 
financial statements. Brown (1989) reviews Ball 
and Brown (1968) and the research in that area 
since then. Regarding the importance of these 
other items, he states 'one conclusion being that 
there may not be a whole lot more to be said, 
once earnings had been accounted for' page 207. 
Further support for this view comes from Gonedes 
(1974), who looked at six ratios, including 
working capital/total assets, financial leverage, 
the asset turnover rate, cash flow to debt plus 
preferred stock, the accounting rate of return, 
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and EPS. He concluded that the numbers, jointly, 
were uninformative and that, given EPS, the other 
six explained little. 
Similar findings were obtained by Castagna and 
Matolcsy (1989) who stated 'given the information 
content of earnings per share or net profit, the 
marginal information content of some 
"supplementary" financial items appear to be 
zero, and given the information content of some 
"supplementary" financial items the marginal 
information content of earnings per share or net 
profit appears to be non-zero' page 318. 
In fact the importance of earnings was also 
stressed by Lintner (1956) in his classic paper 
on dividends, when he stated that current net 
earnings met the condition 
, 
better than any other 
accounting variable, of being of importance to 
stockholders and the financial community 
generally, of being reported frequently and 
receiving wide publicity in the press, and that 
'most officers and directors regarded their 
stockholders as having a proprietory interest in 
earnings' page 100. 
Lev and Ohlson (1982) state 'Accounting data 
convey useful and timely information to 
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investors. While this conclusion definitely 
holds for earnings data, the marginal 
contribution of the voluminous nonearnings data 
published in-financial reports is still largely 
unknown' page 250. 
Lev (1989) stated 'earnings, the "bottom line", 
are widely believed to be the premier information 
item provided in the financial statements' page 
155. Kay and Mayer (1986) stated 'the 
information most commonly used to assess 
profitability concerns the earnings of a firm or 
an industry over some finite segment of its life' 
page 200. 
Arnold and Moizer (1984) examined the way that 
analysts assess companies. They found that 
initially the analysts look at a one step ahead 
earnings forecast for next year; then they apply 
an 'appropriate' P/E ratio. This means that, 
mutatis mutandis, the higher the EPS, the higher 
will be the analyst's fundamental valuation. 
Therefore it provides a good argument for the 
directors of a company to report the highest EPS 
figure as that will lead to the highest valuation 
being imputed by analysts. 
Analysts want to make a profit in the short-term 
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and believe that the price will react to the next 
earnings announcement. However one fundamental 
fault with this line of thinking is that earnings 
are an unreliable predictor of both future 
earnings and future market value. Rappaport 
(1986) reports that companies may achieve 
positive 
-earnings growth rates y. et their 
shareholders realise negative rates of return. 
More-recently Gniewosz (1990) looked at the use 
of accounting and other information in the share 
investment decision process of an institutional 
investor, and the major factor that was 
emphasized was earnings per share. Similarly, 
Reimann (1989) stated 'Perhaps the most commonly 
accepted gauge of corporate financial performance 
is that of historical (and projected) growth in 
earnings per share' page 17. 
Marsh (1990), in his report on short-termism, 
cites a survey by 3i which found '.... 81 percent 
[of UK finance directors] believed that EPS was 
the main basis for the valuation of share prices, 
and 91 percent felt that the City had been 
justifiably criticised for being too focussed on 
short-term earnings', pages 28-29. 
Tweedie and Whittington (1990) recognise this 
2-51 
when they mention 'the apparently excessive 
weight given by financial analysts to "bottom 
line" earnings figures and gearing ratios' page 
97. A similar view is expressed by Holmes and 
Sugden (1992) "the real trouble with the present 
regime is the overriding importance placed on 
earnings per share per se", page 29. 
The impact of this emphasis on earnings per share 
is very real for companies, as Williams (1991) 
affirms ' Having experienced the full wrath of the 
market following a set-back in our earnings per 
share......... Whether the practitioners within 
the equity market like it or not, its actions are 
often perceived as short termist and their 
effects, however imperceptible and intangible the 
mechanics of cause and effect may seem within 
"the City", may be very real', page 35. The 
short termist view is echoed by Brealey (1991) 
'.... the notion that investors are short termist 
and that this is damaging British industry has 
now become a fundamental part of our culture and 
I suspect that nothing I or other economists can 
say will shake this view', page 8. 
In a more practical paper, Chow, Gritta and 
Hockstein (1988) made a useful study of the 
effects of 12 U. S. airlines' financial decisions 
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on EPS. They found that three of the airlines 
evidenced significant negative impacts on EPS as 
a result of their financial policies. As a 
result of their increased leverage and the 
increased volatility of earnings, these airlines 
were unable to compete successfully in the 
deregulated environment. However, the. remaining 
nine carriers managed the transition by altering 
their financial policies accordingly 
- 
these 
carriers tended to issue securities in such a way 
as to maintain a conservative to average capital 
structure, which served to maximise the apparent 
return to shareholders (as measured by EPS). 
An important point to remember about a firm's 
earnings is the effect of accounting procedures 
on them, as Canning (1929) observed 'What is set 
out as a measure of net income can never be 
supposed to be a fact in any sense at all except 
that it is the figure that results when the 
accountant has finished applying the procedures 
which he adopts' page 98. 
From this review of the perceived influence of 
earnings, it is clear that earnings are viewed as 
important by analysts who use them as a key 
indicator of company performance. Therefore the 
earnings figure gains prominence with managers of 
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companies, and with investors; and is often 
perceived as the 'single measure' of company 
performance. 
2-8 Functional Fixation 
To the extent that the receipt of information may 
not lead to a 'correct' interpretation, it is of 
relevance to consider arguments of the 
'functional fixation' type that appear in the 
positive accounting and economic consequences 
literature. The functional fixation hypothesis 
claims that investors fail to recognize that 
alternative accounting methods may produce 
different accounting numbers. 
Lev (1989) called for more research on the 
'quality' of earnings. This would then shift the 
focus to an explicit consideration of accounting 
issues by calling for a systematic examination of 
the extent to which the specific principles 
underlying accounting measurements and 
valuations, as well as managerial manipulations, 
detract from the usefulness of earnings and other 
financial variables. Dharan (1989) provided 
supporting evidence when he examined firms that 
changed accounting methods and found that, on 
average, the firms that adopted income-increasing 
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accounting changes (eg. a switch from accelerated 
to straight-line depreciation) had a prechange 
decline in EPS of 23%, while the income- 
decreasing firms had a prechange increase of 12% 
in EPS. It would appear from this that 
accounting change may be used as an income- 
smoothing device. 
Further evidence is provided by Hand (1989) and 
Hand and Hughes (1990) where they investigate 
firms undertaking debt-equity swaps 1981-1984 and 
defeasances 1981-1987. The evidence suggests 
that managers undertake costly debt-equity swaps 
and defeasances in "bad times" in order to 
disguise downturns in reported earnings. Stock 
market investors respond negatively to these 
transactions. However, the reason for this 
negative response is unclear 
- 
it could be that 
investors interpret the attempts to manipulate 
earnings as a sign of poor operating results 
ahead, or as a result of reduced corporate 
leverage and the reduction in the associated tax 
shields. 
Findings like this would tend to run counter to 
Ball (1972) and Sunder (1973) who found that 
there was no stock price effect associated with 
changes in accounting techniques, and. with Kaplan 
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and Roll (1972) who stated 'Earnings manipulation 
may be fun, but its profitability is doubtful',, 
Similarly, in a review of studies which had 
attempted to determine how the stock market 
interprets alternative accounting policies, Ricks 
(1982) criticised several studies which had 
concluded that the market was not fooled by 
cosmetic accounting differences or changes. 
However, it would seem that if there is no stock 
price change then it would not really explain the 
everyday pre-occupation of managers and investors 
with EPS. 
Whitley (1988) states that Watts and Zimmerman's 
positive accounting theory analysis is flawed and 
relies on theories of scientific method that are 
incoherent and inapplicable to accounting 
research. Similarly, Williams (1989) states that 
experimentally, positive accounting theory is 
transformed into a tautology as a causal variable 
is defined in terms of the phenomenon it seeks to 
explain. 
A subsequent work by Hand (1990), in which he 
details his extended functional fixation view, 
proposes that when responding to accounting data, 
sometimes a firm's stock price is set by a 
sophisticated marginal investor, and sometimes by 
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an unsophisticated marginal investor 
- 
i. e. he 
proposes and tests a middle ground between the 
traditional functional fixation view and the 
efficient markets hypothesis. Using the stock 
price reaction to the announcement of the 
accounting gain arising from a debt-equity swap, 
he concludes that the evidence is inconsistent 
with the efficient market view, but consistent 
with the extended functional fixation view. 
Tinic (1990) reviewed the work of Hand (1990) and 
Harris and Ohlson (1990) and was sceptical of 
both studies, as they used cross-sectional 
analysis, when time series would have been 
better. This is a valid criticism as in cross- 
sectional analyses, it is difficult to 
distinguish whether the market's reaction to 
accounting changes is caused by the altered 
accounting procedures or by the unforeseen 
changes in the real characteristics of the firms. 
Ball and Kothari (1991) also reexamined Hand's 
(1990) research and conclude that Hand's PR 
variable (the probability that the marginal 
investor is unsophisticated) is in effect a proxy 
for an anomolous size effect at earnings 
announcements. In reply Hand (1991) states that 
he believes that their conclusion is premature, 
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and a potential explanation is that the firm-size 
correlations are in fact proxying for the impacts 
of cross-sectionally varying concentrations of 
sophisticated and unsophisticated investors. 
Further support for the notion of functional 
fixation on EPS is provided in a study of 
executive and employee share option schemes by 
Egginton, Forker and Grout (1993). They find 
that there is functional fixation on EPS as 
managers choose the share option scheme which 
gives the higher EPS. 
A key argument of this thesis is that profit 
reporting is behaviour determining. This is 
contrary to the view that investors can 'see 
through' accounting numbers. The implication 
being that it is in the interests of managers to 
make decisions which maximise EPS on the basis 
that the markets are functionally fixated. Rick 
Sopher, Head of Corporate Finance at Stoy 
Hayward, commented in September 1991, that firms 
tended to try to maximise EPS, 'which after all 
is what it's all about'. 
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2-9-Conclusions 
The main conclusion to arise f) 
considerably diverse literature on 
decisions is the absence of any universal 
consensus on optimal financial structure and the 
related problem of optimal methods of financing. 
It seems that the analysis of the. financing 
decision problem, in common with other areas 
dealt with in the finance literature, tends to 
focus, often in isolation, on a single analytical 
paradigm. As shown from the review of the 
literature above, a piece of analysis might be 
based on fundamental analysis or on tax effects, 
or on signalling theory, agency theory, etc. 
The main points in relation to the theoretical 
perspectives are as follows: 
(i) Fundamentalists 
- 
there is no real 
consensus on the 'optimal' course of action for 
management to follow when choosing between debt 
and equity. No one theory predominates, and 
hence no optimal financial structure is defined. 
When the taxation implications of debt are taken 
into account, the evidence is inconclusive with 
some studies arguing that debt is advantageous 
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whilst others argue that it is not. 
(ii) Agency 
- 
there are really two aspects, viz: 
the conflict between equityholders. and 
management; and the conflict between 
equityholders and debtholders. Debt may be used 
as a monitoring device, and the optimal capital 
structure obtained by trading off the agency cost 
of debt against the benefit of debt. 
(iii) 'Pecking order' 
- 
this is a surprisingly ad 
hoc idea, with little economic justification 
(except perhaps minimisation of issue costs). 
Proponents of this theory believe that firms 
should finance investment by retained earnings as 
first choice, then debt, and lastly equity. 
(iv) Signalling 
- 
information asymmetry is 
assumed between management and shareholders. The 
theoretical consensus would seem to favour debt 
over equity. The main arguments being that debt 
levels are seen as signals of management ability 
(Ross, 1977) ; and that the issue of new equity can 
be construed as a signal that equity is over- 
priced (Asquith and Mullins, 1986). 
(v) Functional fixation 
- 
on balance there would 
seem to be evidence of functional fixation on key 
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accounting data, the overwhelming impression 
being that this fixation is focussed on earnings. 
Certainly the influence of earnings and the 
emphasis on EPS is borne out by the review of the 
perception of earnings as documented in Sections 
2-7 and 2-8. 
The extent to which these ideas are supported 
empirically varies. 
(i) Fundamentalists 
- 
the empirical evidence is 
inconclusive, although the amount of debt 
employed would seem to be related to tax shields 
and bankruptcy costs, and tax exhausted companies 
would be less inclined to issue debt. 
(ii) Agency 
- 
As mentioned earlier it is 
difficult to formulate testable hypotheses in 
agency theory, so agency theory is not really 
capable of providing an empirically sound 
explanation of capital structure. 
(iii) 'Pecking order' 
- 
the empirical evidence is 
contradictory, and, as mentioned above, the 
theory itself ad hoc. 
(iv) Signalling 
- 
whilst a certain amount of 
empirical evidence is consistent with the 
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arguments mentioned in (iv) above, the findings 
may also be rationalised from a fundamental 
perspective in that equity provides a lower tax 
shield effect. 
(v) Functional fixation 
- 
on balance the 
empirical evidence is in support of a functional 
fixation on earnings, particularly short-term 
EPS. 
Whilst an emphasis on EPS is not justified on 
theoretical grounds, it may be justified on 
narrow financial reporting criteria. The 
emphasis on EPS can be evidenced in the financial 
statements of companies, an area which UBS 
Phillips and Drew (1991) and Smith (1992) drew 
attention to in their controversial publications. 
Indeed it is what David Tweedie (1992), Chairman 
of the Accounting Standards Board, and others 
have seen as the abuse of earnings per share 
which has led to the radical change in the format 
of the profit and loss account outlined in FRS3. 
At a simple level (simple because it does not 
consider risk) the EBIT-EPS relationship can be 
examined. The EBIT-EPS relationship ignores most 
of. the theoretical constructs discussed above but 
does concentrate on a measure - EPS - that 
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appears to have particular importance for 
investors. This is examined in Chapter 5. 
The review of the literature found 
EPS by analysts and other parties. 
next Chapter seeks to elicit the v: 
directors to determine which 
perceive as being important in 
capital issue that they make. 
an emphasis on 
Therefore the 
Lews of finance 
factors they 
the type of 
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CHAPTER 3: SURVEY OF FINANCE DIRECTORS 
3-1 Introduction 
An important prelude to the detailed empirical 
work on financial data was a field study to 
elicit the views of company finance directors. 
In addition to providing useful survey 
information on different financing patterns, this 
study provided a check to see if there were 
aspects of financing decisions which were of 
particular concern in practice. The qualitative 
data which were obtained also formed a valuable 
background for evaluation of the 'harder' factual 
data on frequency, amount and type of finance 
issues. For example, * the generally supportive 
responses concerning the value for money of 
financial intermediaries was particularly 
interesting in the light of recent unfavourable 
criticism in the press, and did not appear to be 
a factor adversely affecting the issue frequency. 
In forming the research questionnaire, the basic 
framework being modelled was effectively a 
triangular one encompassing three important sets 
of influences. The three apexes could be viewed 
as (i) firm specific factors, such as EPS, 
dividends, and firm's share price; (ii) external 
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economic factors, such as interest rates, stock 
market prices as a whole, and the state of the 
economy generally; and (iii) the influence and 
advice of financial intermediaries. This is 
illustrated below: 
Fig. 3.1 : Framework of Influences Affecting 
Capital Issue Choice 
Firm specific factors 
External economic Advice of finan. 
factors 
- 
intermed. 
The responses in relation to these factors are 
analysed in Sections 3-4 and 3-5. 
3-2 Methodology and Sample Selection 
3-2-1 Sample Selection 
The finance directors of a sample of companies 
which had made capital issues in the five years 
1986-1990 were sent a questionnaire on capital 
issues (a copy of the questionnaire is shown in 
0 
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Appendix 3.1). 
The period 1986-1990 was chosen as the 
information is more readily accessible on both 
the databases used (Extel and Datastream), and 
from the point of view of the finance directors 
surveyed, to go even further back than 1986 would 
not have been viable in many cases. Also it is 
useful to have at least one year after the date 
of the issue to follow up the subsequent 
financial history of the company. 
The sample for the capital issues questionnaire 
consists of companies chosen from the Extel Index 
of Prospectuses and from the Datastream Rights 
Issues Service, for the five years from January 
1986-December 1990. 
Both of these sources were required as the Extel 
Index of Prospectuses does not include rights 
issues as, in contrast to public issues, these do 
not require a full prospectus. The rights issues 
were therefore obtained from Datastream, but this 
source was not viable for all the types of issue 
as whilst it has its own capital changes 
programme, this could not be targetted 
selectively enough to encompass the issues that 
were of interest. 
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TABLE 3.1 CAPITAL ISSUES 1986-1990 
Rights' Prospectuses2 Total 
1986 163 699 862 
1987 196 656 852 
1988 146 596 742 
1989 122 420 542 
1990 123 440 563 
750 2811 3561 
'Source: Datastream Rights Issues Service 
2Source: Extel Index of Prospectuses 
The totals for rights issues and for prospectus 
issues are shown in Table 3.1. From the yearly 
totals, it can be seen that approximately 20% of 
the issues each year are rights issues. 
Therefore, the sample of companies for the 
questionnaire was chosen from the two sources in 
the same proportion, i. e. 80% from thq Index of 
Prospectuses, 20% from the Rights Issues Service. 
It is somewhat surprising that the proportion of 
rights issues is not higher than 20% given the 
pre-emptive rights of shareholders in U. K. 
company law (s. 89 Companies Act 1985). This 
section gives the existing shareholders of a 
company the right to have the first opportunity 
to subscribe for any further equity which is 
issued for cash. The supposed advantages of pre- 
emptive rights are that they protect shareholders 
against involuntary dilution of their stake in 
the company and allow companies to raise cash in 
difficult markets. However, a significant 
disadvantage is the 'value for money' aspect of 
underwriting. Marsh (1980) concluded that 
British issuers were paying underwriters about 
twice the true cost of insurance, and this still 
seems to be the case today, with companies 
typically paying underwriters' fees of 1.25% 
plus a further 0.75% to its merchant bank and 
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broker. The shares are also generally offered at 
a discount of 15%-20% on the market price. 
Davidson and Mallin (1992) confirmed these 
findings in a study of rights issues over the 
period 1984-1991. 
One apparent disadvantage of rights issues is 
that there is a limited group, i. e. existing 
shareholders, from whom additional funds can be 
raised. This argument was put forward forcefully 
in 1989 in the Government initiative on wider 
share ownership but in fact the proposal to 
modify pre-emptive rights was never implemented. 
The prospectus figures also include issues of 
bonds, notes and warrants, as well as issues of 
shares (both ordinary and preference). The 
reasons cited above may help to explain the 
difference in overall terms between the number of 
full prospectus and rights issues. 
The companies to be surveyed were chosen on a 
pseudo random basis ('1 in k' random sample 
[k=10, with a randomly selected starting point). 
Once a particular company's name had been 
selected, it was necessary to obtain the 
company's address and other details. For most 
companies, this was obtained from Datastream, but 
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several proved to be elusive in this respect, and 
details for most of these were found from Kelly's 
Directory of Company Information, Kompass, or 
Dunn and Bradstreet's Company Information 
Service. 
Finally a total of 342 companies were, sent the 
questionnaire on capital issues (Appendix 3.2 
shows the sample of companies to which the 
questionnaire was sent). 
3-3 Questionnaire Design 
The questionnaire was designed to minimise bias 
through leading or value-laden questions. 
Questions were of four types: 
(i) dichotomous 'yes' 'no' answers, 
(ii) non-parametric Likert scale, 
(iii) parametric numeric (for example, the amount 
of an issue) or 
(iv) descriptive 1. 
The questions focussed not just on the capital 
issues themselves but on qualitative factors such 
'Various marketing texts were referenced including 
A. Parasuraman 'Marketing Research' (1986) Addison Wesley, 
and R. Worcester & J. Downham (Eds) 'Consumer Market Research 
Handbook'(1986) McGraw Hill. 
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as the influence of stock market prices on the 
timing and amount of the issues made. 
The first group of questions in the questionnaire 
(Section A) were concerned with general 
background information about the company 
- 
its 
age, turnover and industry sector. 
Section B of the questionnaire aimed. to elicit 
information about the perceptions of the finance 
directors concerning financial intermediaries 
- 
how they rated their advice and what sort of 
value for money they thought it represented. 
Section C requested information about the most 
recent capital issue of the company 
- 
the type of 
issue, the total amount of the issue in terms of 
both the nominal amount and the actual amount 
raised, the nominal value and issue price per 
share or per bond issued, coupon rate and 
redemption date (if applicable), the total costs 
and, where available, a break-down of the costs. 
The respondents were then asked to state how 
important they thought a number of factors were 
in choosing their particular method of raising 
capital by ranking the factors on a scale, 
ranging from 1 (not at all important) to 5 (very 
important). 
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The respondents were also asked whether they had 
raised finance significantly through increasing 
bank borrowing; the primary purpose of the issue; 
and their merchant bankers/advisors for the 
issue. 
Section D asked for similar information to that 
in Section C, but relating to all capital issues 
in the last five years (but not the most recent 
issue which would already have been dealt with in 
Section C) 
. 
The respondents were then asked to score a number 
of factors with regard to their perceived 
importance in relation to making capital issues 
or acquisitions. 
Finally, respondents were asked to cite any 
significant differences in the reasons that they 
might have given for choosing a particular method 
of raising finance and those given by the 
financial intermediary involved. 
Section E was available for respondents to make 
any comments about their company's capital 
issues, or any financial advice they had received 
in this connection. In the event, most companies 
did not choose to make any further comments on 
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these areas. 
3-4 Analysis of Responses 
3-4-1 General 
The replies to the questionnaire were analysed 
using SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences). The version used being the latest 
revision for the mainframe computer SPSS-X, 
release 3.0. The system file written for the 
analysis of the questionnaire is shown in 
Appendix 3.3. 
3-4-2 Detail of Respondents 
62 companies returned a completed questionnaire. 
Of the remaining companies, 31 finance directors 
replied but did not complete the questionnaire. 
Reasons given (numbers in brackets) were: 
(i) they were too busy to do so (12) 
(ii) it was company policy not to do so (12) 
(iii) the information requested was felt to 
be of a confidential nature or (6) 
(iv) the company was in the hands of the 
receiver (1) 
A follow-up letter was sent (see Appendix 3.4) 
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and, as a result, another 13 completed 
questionnaires were received and another 13 
companies replied stating that they did not wish 
to complete the questionnaire. The reasons for 
nqt replying fell into the categories outlined 
above (in relation to [i] 4 replies, [ii] 5 
replies, [iii] 3 replies; and [iv] 1 reply) 
.A 
total of 117 replies was therefore received. 
On analysing the responses it was found that 
there were a large number of rights issues 
- 
the 
inference from this being that many companies 
which had issued debt in the period 1986-1991, 
and were chosen from the index of prospectuses as 
having issued debt, had subsequently made a 
rights issue and so their most recent issue is an 
equity issue and not a debt issue. 
A further selection of companies was therefore 
made 
- 
Datastream was used to obtain details of 
all outstanding debentures at the start of 1992, 
and from this list 59 companies were chosen which 
had not featured in the original sample and the 
capital issues questionnaire was sent to them. 
12 completed questionnaires were returned and 
another 11 were returned stating that the 
companies concerned were unable to help for the 
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reasons stated above. The breakdown of these 
figures was in relation to [1] 4 replies, [2] 6 
replies, [3] 1 reply, and [4] 0 replies). A 
follow-up letter was sent, 2 further completed 
questionnaires were received, whilst a further 6 
companies replied stating that they were unable 
to complete the questionnaire for reasQns stated 
above (the breakdown of these figures was in 
relation to [1] 2 replies and [2] 4 replies). 
The analysis of the replies showed that replies 
had been received from 33 manufacturing 
companies, 22 service companies (including 
financial, media and leisure companies), 13 
retail and distribution companies, and 21 
property companies. 
The composition of the sample in terms of the 
number of companies in each industry sector was 
compared to the proportions of companies in the 
various industry sectors in the Financial Times, 
Table 3.2 highlights this information. As a 
formality a chi-square test was carried out to 
test to see if the sample categorisation was out 
of line with the population. The chi-square 
statistic was: x2 = 19.555, whilst the critical 
value of x2 at the five per cent level for 3 
degrees of freedom was 7.81473. Thus the sample 
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TABLE 3.2 INDUSTRY SECTORS IN FINANCIAL TIMES AND IN SAMPLE 
Sector Total per F. T. Sample (Actual) Sample (Expected) 
Manufacturing 1,354 33 47 
Service (including 
Finance) 
686 22 24 
Retail & 
Distribution 
233 13 8 
Property & 
Construction 
287 21 10 
2,560 89 89 
x2 statistic = 19.555 
Degrees of freedom =3 
a=0.05 
Critical value of XZ = 7.81473 
Note: There were 7 USM companies: 2 in manufacturing, 1 in service and 4 in retail and 
distribution, 7 in total, included in the total sample of 89. 
is not quite representative of the distribution 
of industrial sectors in the F. T., but this does 
not appear to have any material bearing on the 
conclusions reached. 
3-4-3 Financial Intermediaries 
The first part of the questionnaire dealt with 
the finance directors attitudes towards financial 
intermediaries. The results of this part of the 
questionnaire are dealt with in Table 3.3. This 
shows that, contrary to what one might expect, 
the finance directors' opinions of financial 
intermediaries are generally supportive. The 
advice received tends to be viewed overwhelmingly 
as 'neutral' or 'good'. However, in relation to 
the fees charged for this advice, the responses 
are not quite so favourable (Table 3.4). The 
merchant bankers are viewed in the main as 
'expensive', the brokers as 'neutral', 
accountants as 'expensive' or 'neutral', and the 
other advisors (mainly solicitors) as generally 
'expensive'. 
3-4-4- Financial Instruments Used For Capital 
Issues 
Analysis of the capital issues details given by 
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the respondents is shown in Table 3.5. It can be 
seen that for the most recent issue, new issues 
of ordinary shares accounted for 33% of the total 
issues, rights issues of ordinary shares for 38%, 
issues of preference shares 9%, and debt issues 
20%. Debt includes both secured and unsecured 
debt, Eurobonds, senior and guaranteed notes and 
bonds. 
Details supplied by respondents in relation to 
the financial instrument used for earlier issues 
do tend to tail off quite rapidly in the replies. 
However, it is interesting to note the decline in 
debt issues as the more recent issues approach, 
and the increase in rights issues. New issues of 
ordinary shares tend to account for broadly the 
same proportion of total issues over time, whilst 
there would appear to have been an increase, in 
overall terms, of preference share issues. 
3-4-5 Reasons for Capital Issues 
The primary purpose of the capital issue was 
divided into categories, viz: 
(i) to fund an acquisition 
(ii) to fund an internal expansion 
(iii) capital restructuring 
(iv) other 
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The primary purposes of the capital issues are 
analysed in Table 3.6. 
The most frequently cited reason for the most 
recent capital issue was capital restructuring 
(38%),, followed by funding an acquisition (32%) 
and to fund internal expansion (28%). Two 
respondents, accounting for the remaining 2%, 
cited other reasons (both issues were related to 
a flotation). Given the high proportion of 
rights issues (38%), the findings corroborate 
Davidson and Mallin (1992) who found for 1990 
that the majority of rights issues were made for 
the purposes of capital restructuring. 
A reasonable prior assumption in the present 
recessionary climate would be that capital 
restructuring would be cited as a reason by 
companies which had issued equity (to pay off 
excessive past borrowings). As is discussed more 
fully in section 3-5-10, this view is 
oversimplistic and capital restructuring was 
actually cited as the most important reason for 
issue by the majority of debt issuers. 
Examining the earlier issues (which occurred over 
the period 1986-1990), funding an acquisition is 
the most frequently cited reason, followed by 
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capital restructuring, and lastly funding an 
internal expansion. 
3-4-6 Factors Affecting the Method of Finance 
The questionnaire included sections on factors 
which might be perceived as being important to 
the choice of finance in the capital issue 
decision. 
(A) Factors Affecting the Most Recent Issue 
The factors perceived as being the most important 
in the choice of the particular method chosen for 
the most recent capital issue can be seen from 
Table 3.7. 
- 
The ranking was on a scale of 1 to 5, 
with 1 being 'Not at all important' through to 5 
being 'Very important' (whilst '3' is' neutral'). 
The factors fall into the following areas: 
(a) Influence of stock prices 
The response to 'firm's share price was 
considered to be high' and 'firm's share price 
was considered to be low' was mixed. 26% in 
total ranking the former statement as 'very 
important' and 23% in total ranking it as 'not at 
all important'; whilst 23% in total ranked the 
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latter statement as 'very important' and 30% as 
'not at all important'. 
The level of stock market prices did not 
generally seem to be an important influence. 
'Stock market prices as a whole were high' was 
ranked as point 3 on the scale by a total of 30% 
of respondents and as point 1 'not at all 
important' by 28%. 'Stock market prices as a 
whole were low' was ranked on point 3 of the 
scale by 26% in total and on point 1 by 41%. 
If the responses to 'stock market prices being 
high' and 'stock market prices being low' are 
added together, then the 'not at all important' 
category accounts for 32% of total responses; 
whilst 'neutral' accounts for another 32%. 
It would seem that the level of stock market 
prices is not perceived as an important factor in 
the capital issue decision. The responses in 
relation to the influence of the individual 
firm's share price were, as discussed above, much 
more mixed. 
(b) Influence of interest rates 
The influence of interest rates seems to be more 
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apparent when the interest rate is low, with 46% 
of respondents scoring 'the level of interest 
rates being low' as a4 or 5 (where 5 is 'very 
important') on the scale. The level of interest 
rates was high' had more of a mixed response from 
respondents with 28% ranking it as point 1 'not 
at all important' but 23% ranking it as point 4 
on the scale. 
(c) Leverage 
'Leverage would have been too high' seemed to be 
an important factor with 38% of respondents 
ranking this factor as 'very important' point 5 
on the scale. However, 27% of respondents ranked 
this factor as 'not at all important'. 2 
'Meeting the target debt-equity ratio' was ranked 
as 'not at all important' by 29% of respondents. 
However 23% ranked it as point 4 on the scale, 
and 16% as point 5 'very important'. There 
appears to be a mixed reaction to this one, 
perhaps implying that those companies which issue 
debt do not tend to view the target debt-equity 
ratio as being important, or indeed do not have 
a target debt-equity ratio. 
2There may have been an implicit response bias to this 
question as it really only applies to equity issues. 
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(d) Signalling aspect 
The method of capital issue being seen as a 
'signal of the firm's strength' is ranked as 
point 3 on the scale by a total of 37%, and as 
point 4 by a total of 24%. However, 17% of 
respondents scored it as point 1 on the scale. 
On balance, the type of capital issue does not 
seem to be perceived as a signal of the firm's 
strength. 
(e) Financial advisors' recommendation 
As one might expect 'the merchant bank or other 
advisors recommendation' is ranked as point 3 on 
the scale by 36% in total and as point 4 by 33% 
in total, probably reflecting the fact that 
having perceived that they have paid a lot for 
this advice, the respondents feel that they ought 
to take note of it in their capital issue 
decisions! 
The last two factors mentioned in Table 3.7 were 
to be answered if certain conditions were met: 
(f) Tax Exhaustion 
If the company were tax exhausted and so unable 
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to use tax relief on debt interest, then the 
finance director's perception of this situation 
was requested. Replies to this question 
indicated that 77% of respondents viewed tax 
exhaustion as 'not at all important'. This would 
seem counter-intuitive in view of the potentially 
restrictive set off of debt interest. AN probable 
explanation is that this question was answered by 
respondents whose companies were not tax 
exhausted and therefore were not experiencing 
first-hand 
situation. 
the full implications of this 
(q) EPS Dilution 
If companies did not issue equity, the importance 
of the factor 'did not want to dilute EPS by 
issuing more equity' was of interest. 'Non- 
dilution of EPS' was viewed as 'not at all 
important' by 36% of the respondents. However 
20% did score it as 4, and 8% as 5, indicating 
that a sizeable subset considered it to be a 
significant reason for companies to issue debt 
and not equity. 
There was space left at the end of this section 
for respondents to indicate any other factors 
which had influenced their capital issue 
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decision. No further factors were in fact 
mentioned by the respondents. 
From the above analysis it appears that there is 
a complex interaction of factors with no single 
factor being dominant. This is borne out by the 
analysis in Table 3.7b which lists the factors 
discussed above and indicates how influential 
each one is perceived to be. The factor 
perceived to be marginally more influential is 
the 'leverage' factor with a mean response of 
3.35. This is followed by the level of interest 
rates being low (3.10), the firm share price 
being high (3.04) j, the merchant bank or other 
advisor's recommendation (3.02), and the type of 
issue as a signal of the firm's strength (3.01). 
Perceived as being of least influence is the tax 
exhaustion factor (1.55) but it should be borne 
in mind that the responses to this factor were 
thought to be counter-intuitive (see (f) above). 
None of the factors has a mean score of more than 
3.35 (3=neutral). In Chapter 4, the precise 
statistical interactions are investigated using 
factor and discriminant analysis. 
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TABLE 3.7b : SUMMARY OF PERCEIVED INFLUENCE OF FACTORS 
ON MOST RECENT CAPITAL ISSUE 
(5 point scale: 1= not at all important to 
5= very important) 
Mean Standard Rank 
Response Error 
1. Firm's share price was 
considered to be high 3.04 0.20 3 
2. Firm's share price was 
considered to be low 2.85 0.30 7 
3. Stockmarket prices as 
a whole were high 2.72 0.18 9 
4. Stockmarket prices as 
a whole were low 2.37 0.26 11 
5. The level of interest 
rates was high 2.87 0.18 6 
6. The level of interest 
rates was low 3.10 0.26 2 
7. Leverage would have 
been too high 3.35 0.19 1 
8. To meet target debt- 
equity ratio 2.83 0.16 8 
9. To signal the firm's 
strength 3.01 0.13 5 
10. Merchant bank or other 
advisors recommendation 3.02 0.12 4 
11. Company tax exhausted 
so unable to use tax 
relief on debt interest 1.55 0.17 12 
12. Company did not issue 
equity as did not want 
to dilute EPS 2.48 0.27 10 
(B) Factors Affecting Capital Issues & 
Acquisitions in General 
Table 3.8 shows the responses of the respondents 
to being asked to score certain factors in terms 
of their importance to capital issues or 
acquisitions in general. The choice 
, 
of scores 
was from 1 'Unimportant' to 5 'Very Important'. 
The factors are examined under the following 
headings: 
(a) Level of EPS 
The most important factor is 'maintaining or 
increasing earnings per share' with 42% scoring 
it as 4 on the scale of 1 to 5; and 32% scoring 
it as 5 'very important'. This factor is also 
the one with the least number of 1 'unimportant' 
(2%) and 2 (0%) scores. This would be consistent 
with the apparent emphasis on EPS by the market. 
(b) Dividend Levels 
Another factor which is viewed as very important 
is 'enhancing the capacity to maintain dividend', 
which was scored 4 by 32% and 5 by 11%. 
Companies try to maintain their dividend capacity 
over time, and sustain a constant, or- increasing, 
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payout ratio so that the emphasis on the effect 
of any capital issue on dividend levels is not 
surprising. 
(c) Prevailing Market Conditions 
The finance directors perceive 'prevailing market 
conditions' as an important factor, with 40% 
scoring it as 4, and 29% as 5. In the capital 
issue decision the state of the market, both in 
terms of share price and interest levels, must be 
taken into account. This factor scores more 
highly than the individual factors of firm share 
price, stock market prices, and interest rates, 
discussed previously probably because it 
encompasses the overall effect of all of those 
individual factors. 
(d) Attitude of Shareholders 
The factor 'attitude of shareholders' was scored 
4 by 43% and 5 by 30%. In general the finance 
directors of companies will be seeking to make 
decisions which enhance the company's position 
and which are consistent with the shareholders' 
wishes. This predisposition would tend to 
emphasise EPS, and dividend levels as discussed 
above. 
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TABLE 3.8b : SUMMARY OF PERCEIVED INFLUENCE OF FACTORS 
ON CAPITAL ISSUES IN GENERAL 
(5 point scale: 1= unimportant to 
5= very important) 
Mean Standard Rank 
Response Error 
1. Maintaining or 
increasing EPS 
2. Enhancing the capacity 
to maintain dividend 
3. Prevailing market 
conditions 
4. Behaviour of other 
companies in the 
industry 
5. Advice of financial 
advisors 
6. Attitude of 
shareholders 
7. Effect on leverage 
of company 
4.01 0.10 1 
3.15 0.12 6 
3.91 0.10 3 
2.15 0.09 7 
3.19 0.10 5 
3.95 0.10 2 
3.80 0.11 4 
(e) Effect of Leverage 
The scores in relation to 'the effect on 
leverage' show that this factor is also perceived 
as being of importance, being scored 4 by 42% in 
total and 5 by 26%. 
(f) Advice of Financial Advisors 
Again, the advice of financial advisors is viewed 
as important with 40% scoring it as 4 and 4% as 
a5 'very important'. Probably for the logical 
monetary reasons mentioned above! 
(g) Industry Behaviour 
'Behaviour of other companies in the same 
industry' is generally not considered to be 
important, with 24% scoring it as a1 
'unimportant' and 43% scoring it as a 2. 
From the factors analysed in Table 3.8, the one 
which scores most highly in terms of importance 
(i. e. 4's and 5's) and least in terms of 
unimportance (i. e. 1's and 2's) is 'maintaining 
or increasing earnings per share'. 
Table 3.8b lists the factors discussed above and 
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indicates how influential each one is perceived 
to be. The factor perceived to be the most 
influential is 'maintaining or increasing EPS' 
with a mean response of 4.01. This is followed 
by 'attitude of shareholders' (3.95), 'prevailing 
market conditions' (3.91), and the 'effect on 
leverage of the company' (3.80). PerceLved to be 
of less influence are 'advice of financial 
advisors' (3.19), 'enhancing the capacity to 
maintain dividend' (3.15), and 'behaviour of 
other companies in the industry' (2.15). 
Therefore the analysis above would tend to 
support the argument that there is functional 
fixation on short-term earnings per share. 
3-5 Cross-Tabulation of Data 
Standard cross-tabulation procedures were 
performed in SPSSX to investigate the 
relationships between responses to the questions. 
The crosstabulation tables are shown in Appendix 
3.5. 
It should be noted that the chi-square 
statistic's reliability is brought into question 
for some of these tables as there are a number of 
crosstabulations where 20% or more of the cells 
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have an expected frequency of less than 5 (this 
limitation would also apply if any cell had an 
expected frequency of less than 1). Chi-square 
is approximate in these circumstances because it 
is a continuous distribution (and therefore it 
can only provide an approximation to a discrete 
distribution). The reliability decreases the 
smaller the number of expected items in any 
particular category, since whole number 
approximations involve a proportionally greater 
degree of rounding-off. Nevertheless, the errors 
involved in the present study are on the whole 
relatively small given the cell populations. 
The relationship between the type of capital 
issue and various factors is examined below. 
3-5-1 Impact of Industry Sector 
Appendix 3-5-1 cross-tabulates the type of the 
most recent issue (new issue of ordinary shares., 
rights issue of ordinary shares, preference share 
issue and debt issue) against industry sector 
(manufacturing, service, retail and distribution, 
and property and construction). 
In each cell there are five values, for example, 
for the manufacturing sector, reading from the 
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top line in each cell downwards: 
(i) 9 the number of issues of new ordinary 
shares in manufacturing 
(ii) 10.8 : the expected number of issues of 
new ordinary shares in the manufacturing 
sector (calculated as the column total for 
issues of new ordinary shares of 29 
multiplied by the row total for total 
manufacturing capital issues of 33, this 
then being divided by the total row total 
of 89 being the total number of capital 
issues across all sectors) 
(iii) 27.3% : the proportion of issues of new 
ordinary shares in manufacturing (9) as a 
percentage of the total capital issues in 
manufacturing (the row total of 33) 
(iv) 31.0% : the proportion of issues of new 
ordinary shares in manufacturing (9) as a 
percentage of the total issues of new 
ordinary shares across all sectors (29) 
(v) 10.1% : the number of issues of new 
ordinary shares in manufacturing (9) as 
a percentage of total issues in all 
sectors (89) 
Outside of the cells, the row total figures 
against manufacturing on the right of the table 
indicate that there were a total of 33 capital 
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issues in the manufacturing sector, representing 
37.1% of the total capital issues across all 
sectors. The column totals on the bottom left 
indicate that there were 29 issues of new 
ordinary shares across all sectors and that this 
represented 32.6% of the total capital issues 
made across all sectors. 
From App. 3-5-1 the following can be deduced. 
The manufacturing sector has made more rights 
issues and debt issues than would have been 
expected, and fewer issues of preference shares 
and new issues of ordinary shares. 
The property and construction sector has made 
more preference share issues and debt issues than 
expected, and fewer issues of new ordinary 
shares. It has made the expected number of 
rights issues. 
Retail and distribution has made more new issues 
of ordinary shares than expected (accounting for 
53.8% of that sector's total issues), and fewer 
of the other types of issue. 
The service sector has made approximately the 
same number of the different types of issue as 
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would have been expected (of which 36.4 % were 
issues of new ordinary shares and 36.4% rights 
issues) 
. 
For the preference share issues, the property and 
construction sector accounted for 37.5% of total 
preference share issues, whilst the manifacturing 
and service sectors each accounted for 25%, and 
retail and distribution accounted for 12.5%. 
The debt issues were accounted for as follows: 
manufacturing 44.4%, property and construction 
27.8%, service 22.2%, and retail and distribution 
5.6%. 
In relation to the total number of rights issues 
across all sectors, manufacturing accounted for 
the highest proportion (41.2%), followed by the 
service sector (23.5%), and the property and 
construction sector (23.5%) and finally retail 
and distribution (11.8%). Manufacturing 
companies would therefore seem to have a greater 
propensity to make rights issues than the other 
industry sectors. 
Rights issues accounted for the majority of 
recent capital issues for both the manufacturing 
sector (42.4%) and the property and construction 
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sector (3 8.1%) ; for 3 6.4 % of the service sector' s 
capital issues (being equal with the issue of new 
ordinary shares as the most popular method for 
that sector) and for 30.8% of the retail and 
distribution sector's capital issues (the issue 
of new ordinary shares accounted for 53.8% of 
this sector's total new issues). 
The industry analysis, showing rights issues as 
the most frequent type of issue for 3 out of 4 
sectors, is in line with the increase in rights 
issues in recent years. 
The above analysis of the type of issue in 
relation to the industry sector is summarised in 
Table 3.9. 
Detailed analyses of the cross-tabulations in 
Appendix 3-5-2 to 3-5-24 are discussed below. 
However Table 3.12, at the end of these analyses, 
is derived from the cross-tabulations and is a 
summary of the perceived importance of various 
factors in relation to the types of issue. Table 
3.12 is discussed in more detail in 3-5-15, but 
it may also be a useful reference point during 
the more detailed analyses which follow. 
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TABLE 3.9 : TYPE OF ISSUE & INDUSTRY SECTOR 
Industry Total Ord. shares Ord. shares Pref. Debt 
Sector 
-new -rights shares' 
Manufacturing 33 (100%) 9 (27.3%) 14 (42.4%) 2 (6.1%) 8 (24.2%) 
Service 22 (100%) 8 (36.4%) 8 (36.4%) 2 (9.1%) 4 (18.1%) 
Retail & 
Distribution 13 (100%) 7 (53.8%) 4 (30.8%) 1 (7.7%) 1 (7.7%) 
Property & 
Construction 21 (100%) 5 (23.8%) 8 (38.1%) 3 (14.3%) 5 (23.8%) 
3-5-2 Influence of Firm's Share Price 
App. 3.5.2 and 3.5.3 analyse the cross-tabulation 
of the type of the most recent issue by the 
perceived importance of the share price being 
considered high (App. 3-5-2) or low (App. 3-5-3) 
in the capital issue decision. 
In overall terms the evidence is inconclusive as 
to whether the ' share price being low' and ' share 
price being high' are considered to be important 
factors in the choice of capital issue method. 
The perception does vary amongst the different 
types of issue, and it is in this context that 
the importance of share prices is discussed 
below. 
In relation to issues of new ordinary shares, 
62.6% of respondents scored the 'share price 
being high' as either 4 'quite important' (31.3%) 
or 5 'very important' (31.3%) to choosing their 
particular method, with another 25% scoring it as 
a 3. The responses here accounted for 83.3% of 
all scale 4s and 35.7% of all scale 5s. Also in 
relation to the issue of new ordinary shares, the 
responses scoring the importance of 'share price 
being low' were more diffuse, with 25% scoring it 
as 1 'not at all important', 25% scoring it as 5 
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'very important' and 50% scoring it as a 3! 
Interestingly, the share price does not seem to 
be so important in the context of rights issues 
of ordinary shares - with 28% scoring 'share 
price being high' as 5,28% as 3, and 20% as 1. 
Similarly with the 'share price being low', 40% 
scored it as 1, whilst only 10% scored it as 5, 
and 20% as 4. Indeed, the responses to the 
importance of the share price being high cross- 
tabulated with the rights issues of ordinary 
shares accounts for the 41.7% of the total score 
Is,, 62.5% of total score 2s and 53.8% of total 
score 3s. This could imply that companies are 
often 'forced' to make rights issues to repay 
existing high interest debt and that the share 
price is not, per se, a deciding factor in the 
choice of capital issue method. 
This is in line with the idea, certainly in 1990 
and 1991, that rights issues were used mainly for 
paying off excessive borrowings. The use of the 
discount on the rights issue means that terms can 
always be devised to make a rights issue 
effective, i. e. shareholders are really over a 
barrel. This is supported by the findings of 
Davidson and Mallin (1992). 
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In the case of preference share issues, opinion 
was fairly evenly split as to whether 'share 
price being low' or 'share price being high' was 
an important factor or not. For debt issues 
'share price being high' is scored as 1 'not at 
all important' by 62.5%, whilst 'share price 
being low'. is scored as 1 by 25%, 2 by 25%, and 
5 by 25%. Therefore, on balance the share price 
being high is viewed as unimportant in debt 
issues, whilst more weight appears to be given to 
the share price being low. 
This latter finding for debt issues is in line 
with the view that, when their share price is 
low, companies would prefer to issue debt rather 
than equity. 
3-5-3 Influence of Stock Market Prices 
As might be expected after reviewing the scores 
of the perceived importance of the firm's share 
price, the overall view of stock market prices' 
importance to the method of capital issue chosen 
does vary depending on the type of capital issue, 
although overall the stock market prices are not 
perceived as being that important. The figures 
are shown in App. 3-5-4 and 3-5-5, and they are 
discussed below in the context of the particular 
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type of issue. 
In the context of the issue of new ordinary 
shares, the importance of 'stock market prices as 
a whole being high' was scored as 4 by 26.3% 
(accounting for 45.5% of the total score 4s) and 
as 5 by 21.1% (accounting for 66.7%. of total 
score 5s). So considerably fewer respondents 
viewed stock market prices being high as 
important than viewed the firm's share price as 
being high as important. Indeed 21.1% scored the 
stock market price being high as 1 (i. e. 'not at 
all important'). The 'stock market prices as a 
whole being low' was scored 1 by 60%. As might 
be expected, it would seem that the respondents 
are less sensitive to the general level of stock 
market prices than to their firm' s share price in 
relation to the issue of new ordinary shares. 
Similarly for rights issues the overall stock 
market prices are not viewed as being as 
important as individual firm's share prices, with 
23.1% scoring 'stock market prices as a whole 
being high' as 1 'not at all important' 1 15.4% as 
2 and 38.5% as 3 (accounting respectively for 
37.5%, 57.1% and 58.8% of total responses as 1s, 
2s and 3s). The 'stock market prices as a whole 
being low' response was diffuse, although 45.5% 
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scored it as 1. 
As in Section 3-5-2, when companies are making a 
rights issue there may be pressures on them to do 
so, therefore the level of importance that is 
attached to the general level of stock market 
prices is not high. 
In the case of preference share issues and the 
importance of stock market prices as a whole, 
opinion is more or less evenly split across the 
1 to 5 scale. 
In the case of debt issues, the majority viewed 
stock market prices as a whole as 1 'not at all 
important', with 55.6% scoring high stock market 
prices as 1, and 33.3% scoring low stock market 
prices as 1. However, 16.7% did score 'stock 
market prices as a whole being low' as 5 'very 
important' (accounting for 50% of total score 5s) 
and 16.75% scored it as 4. 
Overall, the evidence provided in sections 3-5-2 
and 3-5-3, in relation to the perceived 
importance of both the individual firm's share 
price and stock market prices as a whole in the 
capital issue decision, indicates that low prices 
are given more importance in relation to issues 
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of preference shares and debt; whilst high prices 
are more important in the context of new issues 
of ordinary shares. These findings support 
Asquith and Mullins (1986) and Mikkelson and 
Partch (1986), who found that the market believes 
that companies issue equity when their share 
price is high. 
3-5-4 Influence of Interest Rates 
The cross-tabulations to the responses to the 
importance of the level of interest rates in 
capital issue decisions are shown in App. 3-5-6 
and 3-5-7. 
The 'level of interest rates being high' was not 
perceived as particularly important to the 
preference share issues although it was perceived 
as slightly more important to debt issues. 
However, there is an interesting distinction in 
the scoring of this factor in relation to issues 
of new ordinary shares and in relation to rights 
issues of ordinary shares. A score of 5 'very 
important' was given by 31.6% of respondents in 
relation to the issue of new ordinary shares - 
interestingly this accounted for 100% of 5s for 
this factor across all issue types i. e. there 
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were no 5 scores from respondents in relation to 
the other issue types. However, 36.8% of 
respondents in relation to the issue of new 
ordinary shares ranked it as 1 'not at all 
important', so there is some inconsistency of 
opinion here. A score of 4 was given by 34.6% of 
respondents in assessing the importance of 
interest rates being high in relation to rights 
issues. Again a reasonable percentage (23.1%) 
ranked it as 1 'not at all important' in relation 
to rights issues. 
By contrast when looking at the perceived 
importance of 'interest rates being low', this is 
scored 1 by 42.9% in relation to new issues of 
ordinary shares and by 44.4% in relation to 
rights issues of ordinary shares. 
The opposite is seen in the responses relating to 
the importance of low interest rates in relation 
to debt issues, where 40% score it 4 and 60% as 
5 (it is also scored as a4 by 60% in relation to 
preference share issues). The 5 scores in 
relation to debt issues account for 85.7% of the 
total of 5s, the remaining 14.3% is represented 
by the 14.3% of the total responses in relation 
to ordinary shares which ranked it as a 5. 
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In conclusion, it is not surprising that a low 
interest rate is perceived as particularly 
important for debt issues, as debt issues are 
more attractive when the associated interest is 
low. On the other hand, a high interest rate is 
a factor in favour of issues of equity and 
against debt issues. 
Low interest rates are not seen as an important 
factor for rights issues, whilst high interest 
rates are. This may be because the high interest 
rates are forcing the rights issue in the first 
place (for capital restructuring purposes). 
3-5-5 Influence of Prevailing Market Conditions 
Respondents were also asked to score the 
importance of prevailing market conditions to the 
making of capital issue decisions. It is shown 
in App. 3-5-8 that prevailing market conditions 
are scored 4 by the majority of responses in 
relation to ordinary shares (53.6%) and 
preference shares (62.5%), as 3 by the majority 
in relation to rights issues (39.4%), and as 5 by 
the majority in relation to debt issues (68.8%). 
This would seem to indicate that prevailing 
market conditions are perceived as being of some 
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importance in the capital issue decision. 
3-5-6 Influence of Financial Intermediaries 
The analysis of the influence of financial 
intermediaries is shown in App. 3-5-9 and 3-5-10. 
The majority response for each individual type of 
issue (except debt) is to score 'the advice of 
financial advisors' as 4; the respondents in 
relation to debt issues give a majority (43.8%) 
score of 3 (although 37.5% do score it as 4). 
With regard to the 'merchant bank or other 
advisors' recommendation', the majority of 
respondents in relation to preference share 
issues and debt issues score it 4; whilst the 
majority of respondents in relation to new issues 
of ordinary shares, and rights issues, score it 
3. 
Overall the respondents consider the advice 
received from financial internediaries to be 
fairly important to their decision, but it is by 
no means seen as an over-riding influence. 
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3-5-7 Influence of Leverage and Target Debt- 
Equity Ratio 
The effect of. whether or not ' leverage would have 
been too high' is examined in relation to the 
different types of issue in App. 3-5-11. 
In relation to the total number of responses 
within each category of capital issue, this 
factor is scored 5 'very important' by 42.3% of 
respondents in relation to new issues of equity, 
by 38.7% in relation to rights issues and by 50% 
in relation to preference share issues. It is 
scored 5 by 21.4% of debt issues ( this is higher 
than would have been expected, and in fact the 
question really applied to those issuing equity). 
In relation to the total of score 5s for this 
factor across all issue type responses, those 
relating to new issues of ordinary shares account 
for 36.7%, rights issues 40%, preference share 
issues 13.3%, and debt issues 10% - so in overall 
terms, the responses are as might be expected 
with the fact that leverage would have been too 
high if more debt had been issued being of 
importance to equity issues (including preference 
shares). 
App. 3-5-12 examines the perceived importance of 
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the effect on the leverage of the company of 
different types of capital issue. 
The most common scale categorisation of the 
importance of leverage across all finance issue 
types was 4. This response (of 4) was observed 
for 42.9% of responses in relation to new issues 
of ordinary shares; other responses (of 4) were 
36.4% of rights issues, 37.5% of preference share 
issues, and 56.3% of debt issues. There seems 
therefore to be a consensus that the effect of 
the issue on the leverage of the company is 
perceived as important. 
The responses in relation to the effect on 
leverage from those having made rights issues 
yielded some particularly interesting figures 
with 30.3% scoring it 5 (accounting for 45.5% of 
all score 5s), and scores 1 and 2 each receiving 
9.1% (accounting for 75% of all score is and all 
2s). This is supportive of the fact that rights 
issues are often made for the purpose of 
reconstructing the balance sheet. 
The effect of a target debt-equity ratio on the 
type of capital issue would seem to be perceived 
as. more important to those issuing equity 
(be it 
new issues of ordinary shares, rights 
issues of 
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ordinary shares or preference share issues) and 
less important to those issuing debt (App. 3-5- 
13). This is possibly because the issue of 
equity in order to avoid exceeding a target debt- 
equity ratio may be viewed as more critical than 
the issue of new debt to help achieve a target 
debt-equity ratio. 
3-5-8 Perception of Signalling Implications 
The perception of the type of capital issue as an 
indication of the firm's strength is examined in 
App. 3-5-14. The responses are well distributed 
across the 1 to 5 scale, with the majority 
scoring it 3. This would imply that there is no 
ready consensus as to the strength of signal that 
a particular type of capital issue conveys. 
3-5-9 Influence of Tax Exhaustion 
Respondents were asked to score this particular 
factor only if the company was tax exhausted and 
so was unable to utilise the tax relief on debt 
interest. In App. 3-5-15 it is shown that there 
were 40 replies to this question, and some doubt 
could be expressed as to whether all of these 
responses came from finance directors whose 
companies were in fact tax exhausted as 
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subsequent analysis in Chapter ,5 shows that this 
does not seem to have been the case. However, 
76.6% in total rated it 1 'not at all important'. 
Within each type of issue this response was 
fairly evenly distributed, with 76.9% of all 
responses relating to issues of new ordinary 
shares scoring 1,70% of rights issues, 75% of 
preference shares, and 90% of debt issues. 
At first sight this is a surprising result given 
arguments along the lines of MM (1963) and Ross 
(1977), but the earlier comments on the 
reliability of these data may be apposite. 
3-5-10 Influence of Industry Behaviour 
As analysed in App. 3-5-16, the importance of the 
behaviour of other companies in the industry in 
the choice of capital issue was not seen as that 
important. No respondents scored it 5, and only 
6% overall 4, the majority response scored it 2 
(42.9%). The majority of responses for the 1 and 
2 scores (indicating that industry behaviour was 
not perceived as important) were in relation to 
issues of new ordinary shares or rights issues of 
ordinary shares. 
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3-5-11 Influence of Attitude of shareholders 
In App. 3-5-17 it can be seen that, for each 
issue type, the attitude of the shareholders is 
perceived as an important influence, with the 
majority of responses for each issue type scoring 
4 or 5. This is particularly marked for the 
preference shares and debt issues, with 75% of 
preference share responses and 46.7 of debt 
issues responses scoring it 4. These scores are 
in line with expectations. 
3-5-12 Influence of Purpose of Issue 
It was decided to examine the possible 
relationship between the type of capital issue 
and the primary purpose of that capital issue. 
From App. 3-5-18 it can be seen that the highest 
proportion of issues of new ordinary shares 
(48.3%) are to fund an acquisition, and that new 
equity issues account for the largest proportion 
(50%) of all types of issue used for an 
acquisition. 
In contrast, the highest proportion of rights 
issues (44.1%) are for capital restructuring, and 
again these issues account for the largest 
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proportion (44.1%) of all types of issue used for 
capital restructuring. 
Both new issues of ordinary shares and. rights 
issues have, as their next most 'popular' reason 
for issue that of funding an internal expansion 
- 
28% of new issues of ordinary shares and 32.4% of 
rights issues. 
Regarding preference share issues, 37.5% are used 
for the purpose of internal expansion and 37.5% 
for capital restructuring, with 25% being used 
for funding acquisitions. 
Interestingly, for debt the most cited reason for 
the issue is capital restructuring 55.6% 
(accounting for 29.4% of all issues made for the 
purpose of capital restructuring); with funding 
an acquisition and funding internal expansion 
each accounting for 22.2%. 
Two respondents cited the primary purpose of the 
issue under the 'other' section. These related 
to the flotations mentioned in Section 3-4-5. 
3-5-13 Impact of Dividends 
The importance of 'enhancing the capacity to 
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maintain dividend levels' on the capital issue 
choice is shown by App. 3-5-19. 
There are no particularly strong opinions at the 
extreme ends of the scale, with 10.7% across all 
finance issue types scoring it 5 and 8.3% scoring 
it 1. 
However a substantial number of responses rated 
it 4. These comprised as follows: in relation to 
new issues of ordinary shares 32.1%, for rights 
issues 31.3%. for preference share issues 37.5%, 
and for debt issues 31.3%. 
This factor is much more likely to be scored as 
1 or 2 by finance directors of companies making 
issues of new ordinary shares or rights issues, 
than by those making issues of preference shares. 
Overall the effect of the capital issue on the 
company's ability to maintain or enhance dividend 
levels would seem to be more important to those 
issuing preference shares or debt. 
The relationship between the industry sectors and 
the perceived influence of the capital issue on 
enhancing dividend levels was examined to see if 
clearer opinions emerged (App. 3-5-20). Table 
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TABLE 3.98 : INDUSTRY SECTOR AND ENHANCING THE CAPACITY TO MAINTAIN DIVIDEND 
(5 point scale: 1= unimportant to 
5= very important) 
industry Total Score 
Sector 
--- -------- ---- --------- ---- -------- ---- -------- --------- 
1 2 3 4 5 
Manufacturing 33 (100%) 2 (6.1%) 8 (24.2%) 7 (21.2%) 11 (33.3%) 5 (15.2%) 
Service 21 (100%) 1 (4.8%) 4 (19.1%) 7 (33.3%) 7 (33.3%) 2 (9.5%) 
Retail & 
Distribution 11 (100%) 3 (27.3%) 2 (18.2%) 3 (27.3%) 2 (18.2%) 1 (9.0%) 
Property & 
Construction 19 (100%) 1 (5.3%) 4 (21.0%) 6 (31.6%) 7 (36.8%) 1 (5.3%) 
3.9B shows that 33.3% of the manufacturing 
responses scored 'enhancing the capacity to 
maintain dividend' as 4 (accounting for 40.7% of 
4s from all the sectors) ; 33.3% of service, 36.8% 
property and construction and 18.2% retail and 
distribution also scored it as 4.27.3% of the 
retail and distribution responses scored it as 1 
(accounting for 42.9% of score is from all the 
sectors). 
Overall it would appear to be a more important 
consideration to the manufacturing sector, and of 
less importance to the retail and distribution 
sector. 
3-5-14 Influence of EPS 
(a) EPS Dilution 
Respondents were asked to score the importance of 
not wanting to dilute the EPS by issuing more 
equity, only if their company had not issued 
equity. 3 
3The non-dilution of EPS caused by the issuing of debt 
instead of equity provides an attractive ex-post 
rationalisation. This question may therefore be 'leading', 
and the responses biased. 
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App. 3-5-21 shows that there were 25 responses in 
total but 3 of these were from companies where 
the most recent issue was one of new ordinary 
shares, and a further 3 from companies where the 
most recent issue was a rights issue. There were 
4 replies from companies where the most recent 
issue was of preference shares and 15 
, 
from debt 
issues. It would therefore seem that 6 of the 
replies, those from companies issuing equity, 
must be discounted. 
The 4 responses in relation to preference shares 
were split 2 scoring it 1,1 scoring it 2 and 1 
scoring it 4. Given the small number of 
responses in relation to preference share issues, 
it is difficult to draw conclusions from this. 
The responses relating to debt issues and EPS 
dilution are quite spread across the scale, but 
scores of 5 and 4 (given by respondents in 
relation to debt issues) account for 100% and 80% 
of 5s and 4s respectively across all the finance 
issue types. The non-dilution of EPS would 
therefore seem to be important in the context of 
debt issues. 
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(b) Maintaining or increasing EPS 
Respondents (all) were asked to score the 
importance of 'maintaining or increasing earnings 
per share' to their chosen method of raising 
finance (App. 3-5-22). 
In total 32.1% of respondents scored 'maintaining 
or increasing EPS' as 5 'very important' and 
41.7% scored it 4 (the total of 4s and 5s 
accounting for 73.8% of responses from all issue 
types). 
In relation to the different types of issue, 
43.8% of debt issues scored it 5, and it was also 
scored 5 by 31.3% of rights issues, 28.6% of new 
issues of ordinary shares, and 25% of preference 
share issues. 
46.9% of rights issues scored it 4, as did 43.8% 
of debt issues, 42.9% of new ordinary shares and 
12.5% of preference shares. No responses scored 
it as a 2. 
From the large proportion of 5 and 4 scale 
ratings, it can be seen that overall maintaining 
or increasing the EPS level is seen as one of the 
most important factors influencing the capital 
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issue decision. As mentioned earlier, this seems 
to be particularly important in the context of 
debt issues. 
An interesting question is whether there would be 
a different emphasis placed on the importance of 
maintaining or increasing the EPS level by 
different industry sectors. 
(c) Influence of Industry sector on EPS 
App. 3-5-23 contains the analysis of the 
perceived importance of 'maintaining or 
increasing the EPS level' in relation to industry 
sector. From the manufacturing sector, 48.5% 
scored it 5 (accounting for 59.3% of the total of 
5s from all sectors). From the service sector, 
28.6% scored it 5, whilst 21.1% from the property 
and construction sector scored it 5. In retail 
and distribution 9.1% scored it 5. All sectors 
gave a high proportion of 4s (36.4% for 
manufacturing, 47.6% for service, 36.4% for 
retail and distribution, and 47.4% from property 
and construction). This analysis is summarised 
in Table 3.10. 
The impact of a capital issue on maintaining or 
increasing EPS would therefore seem to be of 
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TABLE 3.10 : INDUSTRY SECTOR AND MAINTAINING/INCREASING EPSLEVEL 
(5 point scale: 1= unimportant to 
5= very important) 
Industry Total Score 
Sector 
--------------------------------------------- 
1345 
Manufacturing 33 (100%) 2 (6.0%) 3 (9.1%) 12 (36.4%) 16 (48.5%) 
" 
Service 21 (100%) 0 (0.0%) 5 (23.8%) 10 (47.6%) 6 (28.6%) 
Retail & 
Distribution 11 (100%) 0 (0.0%) 6 (54.5%) 4 (36.4%) 1 (9.1%) 
Property & 
Construction 19 (100%) 0 (0.0%) 6 (31.6%) 9 (47.4%) 4 (21.0%) 
Note : No sector scored 'maintaining/increasing Epslevel' as '2'. 
importance to all sectors, but particularly the 
manufacturing sector. 
(d) Effect of Reason for Issue on EPS 
A cross-tabulation of the primary reason for 
issue and maintaining or increasing EPS (App. 3- 
5-24) shows that there is more importance (i. e. 
scale 5) attached to EPS in relation to an issue 
being made to fund an acquisition (53.6%, 
accounting for 55.6% of the total of 5s for all 
reasons) and in relation to an issue being made 
for capital restructuring (33.3%, accounting for 
37% of the total of 5s for all reasons). Funding 
an internal expansion does not score 'maintaining 
or increasing EPS' as highly on the 5s (8.3%, 
accounting for 7.4% of all 5s), however 50% of 
respondents for this reason for issue (funding an 
internal expansion) do score it as 4. This 
analysis is summarised in Table 3.11. 
Maintaining or increasing EPS is an important 
influence for all capital issues, but would seem 
to be particularly important for funding an 
acquisition, whilst being of lesser importance, 
comparatively speaking, 
capital restrcuturing. 
for issues used for 
This could be explained 
by the fact that companies making issues to fund 
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TABLE 3.11: REASON FOR ISSUE AND MAINTAINING/INCREASING EPSLEVEL 
(5 point scale: 1= unimportant to 
5= very important) 
Reason for Total Score 
Issue 
------------------------------------------------ 
1345 
To fund an 
acquisition 28 (100%) 1 (3.6%) 2 (7.1%) 10 (35.7%) 15 (53.6%) 
To fund internal 
expansion 24 (100%) 0 (0.0%) 10 (41.7%) 12 (50.0%) 2 (8.3%) 
Capital 
restructuring 30 (100%) 1 (3.3%) 8 (26.7%) 11 (36.7%) 10 (33.3%) 
Note: The two capital issues made for 'other reasons' were flotations 
Note : No sector scored 'maintaining/increasing Epslevel' as '2'. 
acquisitions are usually in a'stronger position, 
and are able to make 'positive' decisions (for 
example, to increase EPS), whereas companies 
making issues for the purpose of capital 
restructuring are usually not in such a strong 
position and may therefore be unable to place the 
same emphasis on EPS growth (i. e. they may be 
concerned more with just surviving! ). 
(e) EPS Level and Dividend Level 
Finally any relationship between maintaining or 
increasing EPS and enhancing the capacity to 
maintain dividend levels is shown in App. 3-5-25. 
88.9% of respondents who scored EPS Level as a5 
also scored dividend level as a 5, and 63% who 
scored EPS level as a4 also scored dividend 
level as a 4. One would expect this relationship 
given that the level of earnings has a direct 
impact on the ability of the company to pay 
dividends, at least in an accounting sense (high 
EPS does not necessarily mean high liquidity). 
Companies try to maintain their dividend 
capacity/capability over time, and earnings must 
be maintained (or increased) if the company is to 
be successful in this policy. Therefore the 
implications of the type of finance issue, and 
its effect on earnings, must also be considered 
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TABLE 3.12 : TYPE OF ISSUE & PERCEIVED INFLUENCE OF FACTORS 
(5 point scale: 1= unimportant/not at all important to 
5 = very important) 
Factor Ord. shares Ord. shares Pref. Debt 
-------- 
-new 
---------- ------- -- ------- 
-rights 
----------- 
----- 
shares 
Mean Standard Rank Mean Standard 
--- 
Rank 
- --------- 
Mean 
--------- 
Standard 
------=- 
Rank 
- -------- 
Mean 
---------- 
Standard 
--------- 
Rank 
Response 
-------- 
Error 
---------- ------- 
Response Error 
-- ------------------ 
-------- 
Response 
- --------- 
Error 
-------- --------- 
Response 
- 
Error 
Firm share 
-------- ---------- --------- 
price high 3.75 0.29 3= 3.00 0.29 9 3.25 0.89 8= 1.60 0.30 18 
Firm share 
price low 3.00 0.71 12 2.50 0.45 14 3.50 0.83 6 2.90 0.54 10 
Stock market 
prices high 3.16 0.33 8 2.65 0.22 13 3.00 0.94 12= 1.89 0.37 17 
Stock market 
prices low 2.00 0.57 17= 2.18 0.36 15 2.80 0.59 15 2.67 0.61 12= 
Interest 
rates high 2.95 0.38 13 2.85 0.22 12 3.00 0.00 12= 2.67 0.51 12= 
Interest 
rates low 2.43 0.53 15 1.78 0.26 18 3.40 0.36 7 4.60 0.15 2 
Prevailing 
market cond. 3.64 0.19 5 
- 
3.73 0.16 3 4.13 0.21 2 4.63 0.15 1 
Advice of fin. 
advisors 3.32 0.21 7 3.21 0.12 6 2.88 0.37 14 3.06 0.24 7= 
Merchant bank/ 
other adv. recom. 3.08 0.23 11 2.94 0.18 11 3.13 0.45 10= 3.06 0.24 7= 
Leverage would 
be too high 3.58 0.31 6 3.42 0.29 5 3.75 0.58 4 2.57 0.43 14 
Effect on 
leverage 3.75 0.18 3= 3.70 0.22 4 3.88 0.28 3 4.06 0.16 4 
To meet target 
debt-equity ratio 2.85 0.27 14 3.13 0.25 8 3.25 0.42 8= 2.00 0.34 16 
To signal firm's 
strength 3.12 0.18 9 3.15 0.21 7 2.63 0.53 16 2.75 0.34 11 
Company tax- 
exhausted 1.38 0.23 19 1.80 0.30 17 2.00 0.87 18= 1.10 0.09 
19 
Behaviour of other 
co. 's in the ind. 2.07 0.15 16 2.03 0.16 16 2.50 0.31 17 2.38 0.20 
15 
Attitude of 
shareholders 3.79 0.21 2 4.03 0.13 2 4.25 0.15 1 3.93 0.22 
5 
Enhancing capacity 
to maintain div. 3.11 0.20 10 2.97 0.20 10 3.13 0.33 10= 
3.63 0.30 6 
Co. did not want to 
dilute EPS 2.00 0.47 17= 1.00 0.00 19 2.00 0.61 18= 3.00 
0.34 9 
Maintaining or 
increasing EPS 3.93 0.17 1 4.09 0.13 1 3.63 0.30 
5 4.19 0.25 3 
in the context of dividends. 
up again in chapter 7. 
3-6 Conclusions 
This issue is taken 
The analysis of the cross-tabulations above 
provides a great deal of information. As 
mentioned earlier, Table 3.12 summarises the 
perceived importance of the factors in relation 
to the types of issue. The mean response, the 
standard error and the ranking, are shown for 
every factor for each type of issue. 
The factor ranked '1' (out of 19) in relation to 
issues of new ordinary shares is 'maintaining or 
increasing EPS'. This factor is also ranked '1' 
in relation to rights issues. Interestingly, it 
does not appear to be the most important factor 
for issues of preference shares and debt. It is 
ranked '5' in relation to issues of preference 
shares, and '3' in relation to debt issues. The 
factor ranked Ill in relation to preference share 
issues is 'attitude of shareholders' (this factor 
being ranked '2' in relation to issues of new 
ordinary shares and rights issues, and '9' in 
relation to debt issues). The factor ranked '1' 
in relation to debt issues is 'prevailing market 
conditions' (ranked '5' in relation to issues of 
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new shares, '3' in relation to rights issues, and 
'2' in relation to preference share issues). 
A common core of factors can be identified 
- 
the 
three most important factors in relation to each 
type of issue are discussed below. 
The factors perceived to be the most important in 
relation to issues of new ordinary shares are 
'maintaining or increasing Epslevel' (ranked 1), 
'attitude of shareholders' (ranked 2), and 
'effect on leverage' and 'firm share price high' 
(jointly ranked 3). The same two factors 
('maintaining or increasing Epslevel' and 
'attitude of shareholders') are ranked 1 and 2 in 
relation to rights issues, although 'prevailing 
market conditions' is ranked 3. 
The factors perceived to be the most important in 
relation to preference shares are 'attitude of 
shareholders' (ranked 1), prevailing market 
conditions (ranked 2), and 'effect on leverage' 
(ranked 3). Whilst in relation to debt issues, 
'prevailing market conditions' is ranked 1, 
'interest rates low' ranked 2, and 'maintaining 
or increasing Epslevel' is ranked 3. 
'Maintaining or increasing Epslevel', 'attitude 
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of shareholders', and 'prevailing market 
conditions' are therefore ranked 1,2, or 3 in 
each of three out of the four issue types. 
'Effect on leverage' is ranked 3 in relation to 
two types of issue (issues of new ordinary shares 
and rights issues). Two factors are ranked as 
1,2 
, 
or 3 by only one type of issue 
-. 
' the f irm 
share price being high' is ranked 3 in relation 
to issues of new ordinary shares; whilst 
'interest rates being low' is ranked 3 in 
relation to issues of debt. 
Referring back to the hypothesised 'triangle' of 
influences affecting capital issue choice, it can 
be seen that generally the firm specific factors 
seem to be viewed as being of more importance 
than the 'wider' factors. All issue types rank 
a firm specific factor as Ill except for debt 
issues which rank 'prevailing market conditions' 
as '1'. 
Issues of new ordinary shares, rights issues, and 
(to a lesser extent) preference shares would 
therefore seem to be influenced more by firm 
specific factors than by external economic 
factors; whilst debt issues appear to be 
influenced more by external economic 
considerations than by firm specific ones. 
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The next Chapter uses multivariate analysis to 
determine whether the variables above point to 
the existence of underlying elements affecting 
capital issue decisions. 
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CHAPTER 4: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF SURVEY 
4-1 Introduction 
The analysis in Chapter 3 revealed that certain 
variables were perceived as being more important 
in the capital issue decision than others. 
One useful line of enquiry is to investigate 
whether or not the responses can be grouped in 
such a way that they are all indicative of a 
small number of underlying influences. 
The technique used to investigate this is factor 
analysis which is based on the concept of 
'rotation' of the data into orthogonal (i. e. 
independent) factors, these factors being linear 
combinations of the data, the weights being 
determined by a suitable algorithm. 
4-2 Factor Analysis 
In Chapter 3 (Appendix 3-6), it was shown that 
there is a sigificant relationship between some 
of the variables. It would therefore be expected 
that these variables would together form one or 
more factors. Factor analysis can determine the 
factors underlying the set of variables, and will 
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show which variables are most closely associated 
with each factor and weigh those variables most 
heavily in calculating the factor scores. 
Factor analysis also helps in dealing with any 
multicollinearity problems, as one way of dealing 
with multicollinearity is to combine the highly 
correlated variables into a composite variable. 
The variables used in the factor analysis were 
Epslevel, Divlevel, Prevmkt, Indbehav, Advfinad, 
Attsharh and Leverage. These variables comprise 
the variables in Question 11 of the Capital 
Issues Questionnaire. Question 11 listed various 
items which might be perceived to be important in 
making capital issues or acquisitions, and asked 
respondents to score them on a scale ranging from 
1 'unimportant' to 5 'important'. The majority 
of respondents answered this section, depending 
on the variable there is a range from 83 to 85 
out of the total questionnaires returned of 89. 
As high a number of subjects per variable as 
possible is desirable. These variables are also 
representative of the triangular framework of 
influences discussed in Chapter 3. 
The variables Firmshph, Stmktph, Firmshpl, 
Stmktpl, Highlevg and Targetde were not included 
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for several reasons, firstly, the number of 
respondents to these varied widely from 26 to 78; 
secondly, the high correlations of 0.66,0.74 and 
0.90 were indicative of severe multicollinearity, 
and the variables would have had to have been 
dropped from the subsequent discriminant analysis 
(see Section 4-3 below); thirdly, they Ore fairly 
well proxied by other variables mentioned above. 
4-2-1 Initial Statistics 
Table 4.1 details the initial statistics. The 
first factor that is extracted is the linear 
combination of variables which accounts for the 
largest amount of variance shared by the 
variables. The second factor consists of the 
next largest amount of variance which is not 
related to or explained by the first one, etc. 
It should be noted that the factors are unrelated 
or orthogonal to one another. 
The communality statistic for each variable is 
the proportion of the variance in the variable 
explained by all the factors - it can range from 
0 indicating no association, to 1 indicating a 
perfect association. The communality of each 
variable in the initial statistics is 1 as the 
initial analysis has as many factors as there are 
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TABLE 4.1 : FACTOR ANALYSIS - INITIAL STATISTICS 
: IN IT IAL 'STAT ISTICS 
VARIABLE CO'"HUNALITY ", = FACTOR -EIGENVALUE PCT OF VAR CUrt PCT 
EPSLEVEL 1.00000 1' 2.42441 34.6 34.6 
OIVLEVEL 
- 
1.00000 2. 
.-1.154! 9 * 16.5 51.1 PREVill KT 
.. . 
1.00000., x_ 
" "3 
. . 
94781 13.5 64.7 
INiSEHAV 1.00000 4 
. 
80207 11.5 76.1 
ADVFINAD 1.00.000 'M. 5 
. 
60053 8.6 84.7 
ATTSi1ARH 1.00000 6 
. 
55909 8.1 92.8 LEVERAGE 1.00000 Y 7 
. 
50120 7.2 100.0 
variables. 
The statistics to the right of the third column, 
which lists the factors, apply to the factor 
number not the variable named on the far left. 
The eigenvalues (i. e. amount of variance 
accounted for) therefore refer to the, factors.. 
not the variables. 
The 
-eigenvalue of 2.42441 in the f irst row 
indicates that the amount of variance underlying 
all the variables associated with factor 1 is 
2.42441, representing 34. 6% of the total 
variance. For factor 2 the eigenvalue is 
1.15489, which accounts for 16.5% of the total 
variance; for factor 3 the eigenvalue is 0.94781, 
which accounts for 13.5% of the total variance, 
etc. 
A scree plot, as proposed by Cattell (1966), 
based on the initial statistics is shown in Fig. 
4.1. The plot shows the descending variance 
accounted for by the factors initially extracted. 
There is a break between the steep slope of the 
initial factors and the gentle one of the later 
factors. Factors 1 and 2 would be retained as 
they are the factors which lie before the point 
at which the eigenvalues seem to level off. 
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Also, according to the Kaiser criterion, the 
factors to be retained in the further analysis 
are those with eigenvalues of greater than 1, 
again factors 1 and 2. 
4-2-2 Results of First Extraction 
Following the initial statistics, the Factor 
Matrix, Table 4.2, gives more information about 
the first extraction. The loadings of each 
variable on each factor are produced, the factor 
loading being a correlation of a variable with a 
factor. The factor loading of EpsJevel on factor 
1 is 0.55965, this means that factor 1 accounts 
for 31% (0.55965)2 of the variance in Epslevel. 
Similarly, factor 1 accounts for 52% (0.72286)2 
of the variance in Divievel. Factor 1 also 
accounts for the majority of the variance in 
Attsharh and Leverage, being 49% for each. On 
the other hand, factor 2 accounts for 35% of the 
variance in Prevmkt, but does not account for 
more than 35% of the variance for any individual 
variable. Epslevel has a negative loading with 
factor 2 of 
-0.58884 (35%). 
4-2-3 Final Statistics 
The final statistics are displayed in Table 4.3, 
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TABLE 4.3 : FACTOR ANALYSIS 
- 
FINAL STATISTICS 
FIr4AL STATISTICS: 
VARIABLE COMMUNALITY * 
-FACTOR EIGENVALUE PCT' OF VAR CU; i PCT 
EPjLE-VEL 
. 
65994 1 2.42441 
.. 
34.6 34.6 DIVLEVEL 
. 
63376 Y21.15489 
- 16.5 51.1 
PREVMKT 
. 
61095 T 
INi)BEHAV 
. 
31974 T 
ADVFINAD 
. 
31655 
ATTSHARH 
. 
50803 
LEVERAGE 
. 
53033 Y' 
TABLE 4.4 : FACTOR ANALYSIS 
- 
ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX 
VAR*IMAX ROTATION 1 FOR. EXTRACTION *1.. I'N' ANALYSIS 1- KAISER NnR4ALIZATION. 
VARIMAX CONVERGED IN 3 ITERATIONS. 
ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX:. 
FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 
EPSLEVEL 
. 
80384 
. 
-. 
11742 
-"UIVLEVEL* 
. 
77449 
. 
18419. 
PREV, iiKT 
. 
0345°.. 
. 
73037 
INDSEHAV 
. 14375. 
.. 
5.4637 
ADVFINAD 
. 
03963 
. 
1,6123 
ATT5HARH 
. 
L6S40 
. 
'53725 
LEVERAGE 
. 
67177 
. 
28115 
and they are based only on factors with an 
eigenvalue greater than I. The table shows that 
43.55% -(0.65994)2 of the variance for Epslevel 
has been accounted for by factor 1, and. 40.16% 
(0.63376) 2 of the variance for Divlevel by factor 
2. 
However, the first factors extracted from an 
analysis are those which account for the maximum 
amount of variance. In using this procedure, the 
factor may have distorted in order to accommodate 
some of the variance of variables that are not 
really part of the factor. In order to correct 
for this distortion and thereby increase the 
interpretability of factors, they are rotated to 
maximise the loadings of some of the variables. 
These variables can then be used to identify the 
meaning of the factors. 
4-2-4 Varimax Orthogonal Rotation 
A varimax orthogonal rotation was used, which 
produces calculations to maximise the tendency of 
each variable to load highly on only one factor. 
This converged in three iterations. The results 
are shown in Table 4.4. 
Each factor is now more clearly identified by a 
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subset of variables that load high on it but low 
on other factors. This is the case for all the 
variables except 'Attsharh' which loads 0.4684 on 
factor 1 and 0.53725 on factor 2. In trying to 
ascertain what the factors could represent, the 
convention was followed of omitting variables 
correlating less than 0.3 with a factqr as they 
account for less than 9% of the variance. 
Epslevel, Divlevel, and Leverage load heavily on 
Factor 1; whilst Prevmkt, Indbehav and Advfinad 
load more heavily on factor 2 (Attsharh, as 
mentioned above, loads fairly evenly on both 
factors). The variables' loadings are actually 
quite well split across the two factors, being 
generally high on one factor and low on another. 
In analysing the factor components it transpired 
that the factors had quite distinct 
characteristics. Factor 1 was related to firm 
specific financial items, viz, the level of 
earnings per share, the level of dividends, and 
the leverage of the firm. Factor 2 was related 
to market influences, viz, prevailing market 
conditions, behaviour of other companies in the 
industry, and also the advice of financial 
advisors. Therefore, Factor 1 could be defined 
as 'Firm Specific' and Factor 2 as 'Market 
4-7 
Influences'. 
This fits in very neatly with the prior 
hypothesis that the influences underlying capital 
issue choice can be split into three. The 
triangular set of influences outlined previously 
comprised of firm specific effects,. external 
economic effects, and advice of financial 
intermediaries. There would appear to be one set 
of factors, the internal firm specific effects, 
which are related; and a second set of factors, 
the external influences, which are related. The 
third apex of the triangle is represented by the 
financial intermediaries, and the implication is 
that the advice of the financial intermediaries 
reflects the external influences (because of its 
association with factor 2). 
The amount of variance that each of the 
orthogonally rotated factors accounts for can be 
calculated as follows: 
02 s 
alr2 +a2r2 +.... anr2 
x 100 N 
where 
a, = variable 1 
a2 = variable 2, etc 
r= correlation for variable 
4-8 
N= number of variables 
For factor 1, this is 27.7% and for factor 2 
23.4%. The 'Firm Specific' factor therefore 
accounts for marginally more variance than the 
'Market Influences' factor. 
A plot of the variables and the two factors is 
shown in Fig. 4.2. Factor 1 is on the. horizontal 
and is strongly associated with the variables 
Epslevel and Divlevel, also Leverage. Factor 2 
on the vertical is strongly associated with the 
variables Prevmkt, Advfinad and Indbehav. 
Attsharh exhibits association with both factors. 
4-2-5 Summary of Factor Analysis Results 
A crucial point about the above factor analysis 
is that Factor 1 contains financial variables of 
the firm, whilst Factor 2 emphasises the 
background aspects of market information. These 
factors converged after only three iterations, 
which is quite quick, and indicates that the data 
are stable in pointing to that dichotomy. 
Factor 1 accounts for most of the variance, 
albeit just slightly more than Factor 2, and 
Epslevel is the variable most heavily loaded on 
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FIG. 4.2 : FACTOR PLOT 
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11742) 2" DIVLEVEL 
. 
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3 PR_V? T ( 
. 
034.58. 
. 
78Oä7) 4 Ir4': 3EHAV ( 
"1 375, . 
54687) 
5 AJVrI1A) ( 
.. 
03963. 
. 
56123) 
.6 ATTSHAR, 1 ( . 46-840. . 53725) " 7. LEVEPAGE ( 
. 
67177, 
. 
25116) 
Factor 1, with Divlevel loaded the second most 
heavily. Epslevel is the most heavily loaded of 
any of the variables on either factor. The 
analysis is therefore supportive of the commonly 
held belief that EPS is perceived as an important 
influence when making a capital issue decision, 
and it gives justification for further, study of 
EPS. 
4-3 Discriminant Analysis 
The foregoing analysis identified two factors 
(each encompassing several variables) which are 
important for capital issue decisions. Either of 
these two factors may have more influence on one 
type of capital issue vis-a-vis another. This 
question is pursued below by means of 
discriminant analysis. 
Discriminant analysis is a useful technique for 
looking at the associations between a set of 
independent variables and a dependent variable 
(particularly when the dependent variable has a 
limited number of values). The results can help 
in deciding into which category of a variable a 
case is most likely to fall. 
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4-3-1 Advantage of Discriminant Analysis 
It is not possible to use regression-based linear 
regression techniques, such as logit and probit 
to investigate the influences on the capital 
issue choice because such techniques only allow 
dichotomous classification. Di$criminant 
analysis, on the other hand, enables a number of 
classifications of the dependent variable. 
However increasing this number reduces the power 
of the discriminant function to partition the 
sample accurately. 
For the discriminant analysis undertaken the 
dependent variable, representing the debt/equity 
choice, has the four categories: 'Ordinary 
shares-new issue', 'Ordinary shares-rights 
issue', 'Preference shares', and 'Debt'. 
The following analysis is therefore 
discriminating between the most commonly used 
forms of equity: new ordinary shares, rights 
issues, preference shares; and debt. 
4-3-2 Running the Discriminant Analysis 
The discriminant analysis was run with a prior 
probability for each group of 0.25, i. e. it was 
assumed that each dependent variable was equally 
4-11 
likely, not that the probability was proportional 
to the group size. When group sizes are unequal, 
small groups can have a low percentage of correct 
classifications even though the overall correct 
classification percentage is high. This problem 
can be exacerbated if the discriminant analysis 
is run with the probabilty for each group being 
based on prior knowledge of the proportion in 
each category of the sample, as it may result in 
the classification of a disproportionately large 
number of cases into the category that has the 
highest proportion of the cases. To ensure that 
prior assumptions were not affecting the results, 
the discriminant analysis was run with prior 
probabilities based on the number in each 
category as well. No differences were apparent 
- 
the tables obtained being the same as previously. 
4-3-3 Results of Discriminant Analysis 
The outcome of the discriminant analysis is shown 
in Tables 4.5 
- 
4.9. 
Table 4.5 shows a table of classification 
function coefficients which can be used to 
classify a target sample. One set of 
classification coefficients is produced for each 
group. A case would then be classified into the 
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TABLE 4.5 : DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS - CLASSIFICATION FUNCTION 
COEFFICIENTS 
CLASSIFICATION FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS 
(FISHER'S LINEAR. DISCRI`"INA`. T FUNCTIONS 
RCISTYPE= 1 2 
Crd'inary Ordinary 
- new 
- rights 
EP, SLEVEL 4.199103 4.510243 
0IVLEVEL 
,: 
-0.4005602 
-0.6927108. 
PREVMKT- 3.062581 3.003914 
INOSEHA'/ 0.8980444 0.? 651800 
ADVFINAD 2.090870 1.946945 
ATTSMARH 1.4364? 7 2.036165 
LEVERAGE 0.9752640 0.8018763 
(C0'43TANT) 
-23.63529 
-24.75490 
0 
3 
Pref 
shares 
3.584343 
.. 
=0.4480282 
3.474519 
1.485094 
1.313579 
2.146146 
1.078903 
-24.74463 
Debt 
4.327293 
-0.1967666E-01 
4.565260 
0. °022404 
1.534173 
0.9816172 
1.068652 
-28.28131 
TABLE 4.6 : DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS 
- 
CANONICAL DISCRIMINANT 
FUNCTIONS 
CANOMICAL DISCRI"! IMAMT FUNCTIOýMS 
PCT OF CUM CAl1D`IICAL AFTER ' WILKS' 
FCN EIGENVALUE VARIANCE PCT CORR FCN LAMBDA CHIS^sUARE DF SIG 
.0 " 
0.6328 
- 
29.189 21 0.1095 
. 
1T 0.2946 69.77" 69.77 0.4771 :1 
" 
0.6840 9.434. 12 0.6655 
2T 0.0856 20.26 9Ö. 03 
. 
0.2907 2 0.9596 3.154 5 0.6762 
3r 0.0421 9.97 100.00 0.2010 
, MARKS THE 3 CANONICAL D ISCRIMINANT FUNCTIONS REM AINING IN THE 
. 
ANALYSIS. 
group which produces the highest classification 
score. As in this case there are four groups, it 
would be necessary to compute four linear 
combinations for each case in the target sample. 
Epslevel has the highest coefficient for groups 
1,2 and 3, and the second highest for group 4. 
Classification of a target sample based on the 
above coefficients has not been pursued in this 
thesis, all of the questionnaire replies having 
been used to generate the discriminant analysis 
itself 
. 
The discriminant analysis technique aims to 
maximise the between-groups differences on 
discriminant scores, and to minimise the within- 
groups differences. Therefore one can see how 
well the discriminant analysis has worked by 
comparing the between-groups variance to the 
within-groups variance. In the discriminant 
analysis the eigenvalue is the between-groups 
variance divided by the within-groups variance, 
so the higher the eigenvalue the better. An 
eigenvalue of 0 would mean that the discriminant 
analysis had no discriminating value, whereas an 
eigenvalue above 0.40 is considered excellent. 
From Table 4.6, it can be seen that Function 1 
has the highest eigenvalue of 0.2946, whilst 
functions 2 and 3 are 0.0856 and 0.0421 
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respectively. Function 1 accounts for 69.77% of 
the variance, whilst functions 2 and I account 
for 20.26% and 9.97% respectively. 
The canonical correlation squared (being the 
ratio of the between-groups variance in scores on 
the function to the total variance in scores) is 
a good measure of how well the function 
discriminates between groups. The scale can 
range from 0.0 to 1.0, and function 1 scores 
highest at 0.4771, whilst functions 2 and 3 score 
0.2807 and 0.2010 respectively. 
A standard diagnostic for discriminant analysis 
is the Wilks' lambda statistic which indicates 
how well the discriminant function explains data. 
The lambda for 'After Function (Fcn) 1' indicates 
the proportion of the variance accounted for by 
group differences after the effects of function 
1 are removed. 
Wilks' lambda is calculated as the within-groups 
sum of squares divided by the total sum of 
squares, and can vary between 0 and 1.0 (the 
lower Wilks' lambda, the better the 
discriminating power of the model). The Wilks' 
lambda for when all the functions are in the 
analysis is 0.6828, indicating that the 
4-14 
differences between groups account for 29% of the 
variance in the predicting variables. So the 
lambda of 0.8840 indicates that the proportion of 
accounted for variance remaining after the 
effects of function 1 are removed is 0.1160. 
Similarly, the lambda of 0.9596 indicates that 
the proportion of accounted for 
, 
variance 
remaining after the effects of function 2 are 
removed is 0.0404. The effects of function 1 are 
therefore much greater than the effects of 
functions 2 or 3. When all the functions are in 
the analysis the significance is 0.1095, when 
function 1 is dropped from the analysis it is 
0.6655, and when function 2 is dropped it is 
0.6762. 
It is useful to examine the association of the 
variables with the functions, using the 
standardized canonical discriminant function 
coefficients. These are shown in Table 4.7. 
The coefficients of the first function are the 
most important as the first function accounts for 
the largest amount of variance. The variables 
with the greatest effect on the type of capital 
issue are Prevmkt (0.96441), Divlevel (0.45451), 
Attsharh (-0.49572), and Advfinad (-0.38020). 
Function 
.2 
is heavily loaded with 
. 
Attsharh (- 
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TABLE 4.7 : STANDARDIZED CANONICAL DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION 
CFICIENTS 
STANDARDIZED CA;: OMICAL DISC°IMPNANT FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS 
FU'; C 1 FUAC 2 Fu'IC 3 
EPSL"EVEL -0 
. 
12951 0.51994 0.13104 
DIVLEVEL 0.45451 U. 2p39U -0.44239 
pREV; iKT 0.96441 0.1°. d90 0.31790 
1 MU°6ý-- HAV 0.07474 -0.47837 -1.27610 
AD VF I! IAD -0.38020 0.54096 -0.18296 
ATTSHARH -0.49572 -0. äL974 0.52942 
LEVERAGE 0 
.7 7327 -0.03195 -0.36536 
TABLE 4.8 : DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS - STRUCTURE MATRIX 
9 
ST; ZUCTURC MATRIX: 
POOLED WITHIN-G: JU? S CORRELATIONS BETWEEN DISCRIMINATING VARI43L_S 
AND CAN0ýýICAL D. ISCRIi1I; A,., T FJ"`ICTIOi4S 
(VARIA3LES CRDE.. Et PY SIZE CF CORRELATION WITHIN FUNCTION) 
F J, lC 1 FUNC 2 FU C3 
PR EVM T 0.7ö56: ß 
-0.10290 0.33383 
DIVLEVEL 0.320d1* 0.15353 
-0.08545 
LEV_P, A'E 0.20523: 
-0.00363 -0.0664? 
ATTSHARH 0.00933 
-O. 4°499= 0.45188 
AD VF INAD 
-0.17333 0.35595: -0.12172 
INJSEHAV 0.2.3723 
-0.35096'=". : -0.17929 
EPSLEVEL 0.01946. 0.38741 
- 
0.62131* 
TABLE 4.9 : DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS - GROUP CENTROIDS 
CANONICAL DISCRIMINANT FUNCTIOUS EVALUATED AT GROUP MEANS (GRQUP CENTPOID5) 
GROUP 
. 
FUNC 1 FUNC 2 
-, 
FUNC 3 
1ý -0.22249' 0.18112' 
.' 
-0.23555 
2 
-0.37Z65 -0.03920 0.20634 
3 0.33287 
-0.31437 -0.18293 
4 1.04599 0.17985 0.0969.3 
0.84974) 
, 
Epslevel (0.51994) 
, 
Advfinad (0.54096) 
, 
and Indbehav (-0.47887). Function 3 is also 
heavily loaded by Epslevel (0.83804), with 
Attsharh (0.52942) and Divlevel (-0.44239) also 
loading on it. 
In the structure matrix, shown in Table 4.8 the 
pooled within-groups correlations between the 
discriminating variables and the canonical 
discriminant functions show that Prevmkt, 
Divlevel and Leverage are correlated the most 
within function 1; Attsharh, Advfinad and 
Indbehav within function 2; and Epslevel within 
function 3. Correlations for variables below 0.2 
with functions are considered to have only a weak 
association, and their effects tend to be 
regarded as unstable. 
Finally, the canonical discriminant functions are 
evaluated at group means (group centroids), and 
are shown in Table 4.9. 
Group centroids are the means of each group on 
each function. The predicted group membership, 
i. e. which of the dependent variable's four 
values the analysis allocates each case to, is 
the one whose centroid is closest to the case's 
discriminant function score. 
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4-3-4 Summary of Discriminant Analysis Results 
The classification results are shown in Table 
4.10. The percentage of grouped cases correctly 
classified is 48.19%, i. e. of the 83 cases used 
in the discriminant analysis, 40 were correctly 
classified. Whilst not as high as one light have 
hoped, this is considerably better than a chance 
classification which would be 25%. 
The analysis is most successful in classifying 
capital issues from group 3, the preference 
shares group, where 75% were correctly 
classified; and capital issues from group 4, the 
debt issue group, where 66.7% were correctly 
classified. It was least successful in analysing 
issues from group 1, the new issues of ordinary 
shares, where 39.3% were correctly analysed. 
28.6% of group 1 were misclassified as group 2, 
(rights issues of ordinary shares), which is 
understandable as the group 1 issues would 
presumably resemble the group 2 issues very 
closely (although the implication here is that 
28.6% of group 1 issues resemble group 2 issues 
more than group 1 issues! ). 
These results would suggest a greater diversity 
amongst issues in group 1 in terms of the 
4-17 
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discriminating variables (i. e. there is more 
divergence amongst group 1 issues). 
Incidentally, 40.6% of group 2 issues were 
correctly classified as such. The results do 
show the majority of issues for each group being 
correctly classified, although the analysis is 
most successful in analysing issues from groups 
3 and 4. Some further analysis of the 
classification has been carried out and is 
mentioned below after the various classification 
plots for the analysis detailed above have been 
discussed. 
4-3-5 Classification Plots 
Classification plots are useful for examining the 
relationship of groups to each other and 
graphically depicting misclassification. The 
axes of the scatterplots are the discriminant 
scores calculated from the first two discriminant 
functions extracted during the analysis. 
A territorial map, outlining the general 
territory for each group, is shown in Fig. 4.3. 
The territorial map can be compared with the all- 
groups plot, shown in Fig. 4.4, and the 
misclassified cases identified as these are the 
cases not falling within the outline boundaries 
4-18 
FIG. 4.3 : DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS - TERRITORIAL MAP 
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on the territorial map (this is done most easily 
by making a transparency of the scatterplot and 
placing it over the territorial map). In each 
plot, the new issues of ordinary shares are 
represented by the symbol '1', rights issues of 
ordinary shares are represented by '2', 
preference-share issues by '3', and debt issues 
by '4' 
Separate-groups scatterplots show a scatterplot 
for each individual group. These are shown for 
new issues of ordinary shares (Fig. 4.5), rights 
issues of ordinary shares (Fig. 4.6), preference 
share issues (Fig. 4.7) and debt issues 
(Fig. 4.8). 
It was mentioned above that some further analysis 
of the classification results was done to 
investigate whether the discriminating variables 
would be better at classifying equity or debt. 
This involved running the discriminant with 
groups 1 and 2 only, and then with groups 3 and 
4 only. In each case only one canonical 
discriminant function was produced. For groups 
1 and 2, the percent of groups correctly 
classified was 55%; whilst for groups 3 and 4, 
the percent of groups correctly classified was 
69.57%. 
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FIG. 4.4 : ALL GROUPS SCATTERPLOT 
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From the discriminant analysis carried out, there 
would appear to be a greater diversity amongst 
cases from groups 1 and 2 in terms of the 
discriminating variables. The discriminant 
analysis is most successful in analysing cases 
from groups 3 and 4. 
The implication of the above analysis is that 
issues of preference shares and debt seem to be 
capable of being more easily classified. 
4-4 Mann-Whitney Test 
A further way in which the hypothesis that some 
variables are perceived as influencing the type 
of capital issue more than other variables might 
be investigated is by means of the Mann-Whitney 
test (also known as the Wilcoxon test). 
This test investigates the hypothesis that two 
independent samples come from populations having 
the same distribution (which need not be 
specified). It compares the number of times a 
score from one of the samples is ranked higher 
than a score from the other sample. If the two 
groups are similar, then the number of times this 
happens should also be similar for the two 
groups. 
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4-4-1 Results of Mann-Whitney Test 
The mean rank of the ratings for the 4 categories 
of capital issue: new ordinary shares, rights 
issues of ordinary shares, preference shares, and 
debt issues, is shown in Table 4.11. The table 
shows, for each pair, the mean rank; the number 
of cases on which this is based; the Mann-Whitney 
U statistic, together with its significance level 
in SPSSX; and the Wilcoxon W. 
The statistics are not significant for issues of 
ordinary shares (either by a new issue or by a 
rights issue) when paired against the variables 
which are perceived. as possibly having an 
influence on capital issue decisions ( epslevel, 
divlevel, prevmkt, indbehav, advfinad, attsharh, 
leverage, firmshph, f irmshpl, stmktph, stmktpl, 
intrateh, intratel, highlevg, targetde, signal) 
nor when paired with Factor 1 and also Factor 2 
from the factor analysis detailed in Section 4-2. 
By contrast, there are several significant 
results with relation to the above variables and 
issues of preference shares and debt. 
The variable ' Epslevel' results in a mean rank of 
9.25 for preference share issues and 14.13 for 
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TABLE 4.11 : SUMMARY OF MANN-WHITNEY TEST RESULTS ON CAPITAL ISSUES 
Type of No. of Mean Rank U W 2 2 Tailed 
Cap. Issue Cases Score Score Score P 
Epslevel New ords 28 29.30 414.5 820.5 -0.5324 0.5945 
Rights ords 32 31.55 
Divlevel New ords 28 31.70 414.5 887.5 -0.5147 0.6068 
Rights ords 32 29.45 
Prevmkt New orris 28 31.21 456.0 874.0 -0.0919 0.9268 
Rights ords 33 30.82 
1. dbehav Now orris 28 30.57 446.0 856.0 -0.0380 0.9697 
Rights orris 32 30.44 
Advfined New ords 28 32.96 407.0 923.0 -0.8437 0.3988 
Rights orris 33 29.33 
Attsharh New ords 28 29.61 423.0 829.0 
-0.7036 0.4817 
Rights orris 33 32.18 
Leverage Now ords 28 30.43 446.0 852.0 
-0.2426 0.8083 
Rights orris 33 31.48 
Firmshph Now orris 16 24.69 141.0 395.0 
-1.6206 0.1051 
Rights orris 25 18.64 
Firmshpl New orris 4 8.38 16.5 33.5 
-0.5134 0.6077 
Rights oros 10 7.15 
Stmktph New orris 19 25.92 191.5 492.5 
-1.3122 0.1894 
Rights orris 26 20.87 
Stmktpl New orris 5 8.20 26.0 41.0 
-0.1974 0.8435 
Rights orris 11 8.64 
Intrateh New orris 19 23.61 235.5 448.5 
-0.2746 0.7836 
Rights oroh 26 22.56 
Intratet New orris 7 9.57 24.0 67.0 -0.8452 0.3980 
Rights orris 9 7.67 
Nighlevg New orris 26 29.04 402.0 755.0 
-0.0190 0.9848 
Rights orris 31 28.97 
Targetde New orok 27 28.20 383.5 761.5 
-0.7558 0.4498 
Rights orris 32 31.52 
Signal New orris 25 28.94 398.5 723.5 -0.2318 0.8167 
Rights orris 33 29.92 
TABLE 4.11 (CONT'D): SUMMARY OF MANN"WMITNEY TEST RESULTS ON CAPITAL ISSUES 
Type of No. of Mean Rank u w z2 Tailed 
Cap. issue Cases Score Score Score P 
Epolevel Profs 8 9.25 38.0 74.0 -1.6820 * 0.0926 
Debt 16 14.13 
Divlevel Prefs 8 10.44 47.5 83.5 -1.0436 0.2%7 
Debt 16 13.53 
Prevmkt Profs 8 9.06 36.5 72.5 -1.8957 * 0.0580 
Debt 16 14.22 
1. %**1av Prefs 8 13.00 60.0 104.0 -0.2836 0.7767 
Debt 16 12.25 
Advfinad Profs 8 11.75 58.0 94.0 -0.3890 0.6973 
Debt 16 12.88 
Attsharh Prefs 8 14.00 44.0 112.0 -1.5717 0.1160 
Debt 15 10.93 
Leverage Prefs 8 11.38 55.0 91.0 -0.5995 0.5489 
Debt 16 13.06 
Firmshph Prefs 4 8.50 8.0 34.0 
-1.4591 0.1445 
Debt 8 5.50 
Firmshpl Profs 4 7.38 12.5 29.5 
-0.6118 0.5407 
Debt 8 6.06 
Stmktph Profs 3 8.17 8.5 24.5 
-0.9948 0.3198 
Debt 9 5.94 
Stmktpl Prefs 5 6.30 13.5 31.5 
-0.3162 0.7518 
Debt 6 5.75 
Intrateh Prefs 2 4.50 6.0 9.0 0.0000 1.0000 
Debt 6 4.50 
Intrstel Prefs 
-5 4.20 6.0 21.0 -2.5428 * 0.0110 
Debt 10 9.90 
Hightevg Prefs 8 14.75 30.0 118.0 
-2.0555 * 0.0398 
Debt 14 9.64 
Targetde Prefs 8 16.56 31.5 132.5 
-2.0813 * 0.0374 
Debt 16 10.47 
Signal Prefs 8 12.06 60.5 %. 5 
-0.2196 0.8261 
Debt 16 12.72 
* indicates significant z score. 
debt issues. This suggests that more debt issue 
responses rated 'Epslevel' higher on the 1-5 
scale of importance, in relation to the type of 
capital issue made, than did preference share 
responses. The z score is -1.682, significant at 
the 9% level (2 tail test). 
'Prevmkt' (importance of prevailing market 
conditions), appeared to show some association 
with a higher mean rank for debt issues (14.22 
for debt as against 9.06 for preference shares), 
with az score of 
-1.8957, significant at the 6% 
level. 'Intratel' (effect of the level of 
interest rates being low) was given a higher mean 
rank for debt issues (9.90 for debt compared to 
4.20 for preference shares), with az score of - 
2.5428, significant at the 1% level. 
'Highlevg' (where leverage would have been too 
high if more debt were issued) was given a higher 
mean rank for preference shares (14.75 for 
preference shares compared to 9.64 for debt), 
indicating that this was ranked higher on the 1-5 
scale more frequently for the preference shares 
responses, than for the debt responses. The z 
score was 
-2.0555, significant at the 4% level. 
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, 'targetde' 
(importance of meeting a target debt-equity ratio 
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to capital issue decisions) was also given a 
higher mean rank for preference shares (16.56 for 
preference shares compared to 10.47 for debt), 
with az score of -2.0813, significant at the 4% 
level. 
4-4-2 Summary of Mann-Whitney Results 
. 
The Mann-Whitney test showed that prevailing 
market conditions, maintaining or increasing the 
level of EPS, and low interest rates are 
important influences in relation to debt issues. 
In relation to preference shares issues, the 
important issues are not wanting to increase 
leverage to too high a level by issuing more 
debt, and meeting a target debt-equity ratio 
(perhaps the target would have been exceeded if 
more debt were issued? ). 
None of the variables was found to be significant 
in the context of issues of ordinary shares. One 
explanation, as mentioned earlier in Chapter 3, 
could be because rights issues of ordinary shares 
are often made out of necessity in order to carry 
out a financial reconstruction of a business 
which is too highly geared and over-burdened with 
large interest payments. 
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4-5 Conclusions 
In this Chapter multivariate ai 
out to see whether or not 
variables were indicative of 
underlying influences which 
capital issue choice. The 
follows: 
ialysis was carried 
groupings of the 
a small number of 
might influence 
findings, were as 
(i) Factor analysis using SPSSX3 converged after 
three interations to produce two significant 
factors. Factor 1 is linked to financial 
variables of the individual firm, whilst Factor 
2 places more emphasis on the background aspects 
of market information. 'Epslevel' is the 
variable most heavily loaded on Factor 1, whilst 
'Prevmkt' is the variable most heavily loaded on 
Factor 2. Interestingly, 'Epslevel' is the 
variable most heavily loaded of any of the 
variables on either of the two factors. 
(ii) The discriminant analysis was most 
successful in classifying preference share issues 
(75%) and debt issues (66.7%). The discriminant 
analysis was less successful in classifying 
issues of new ordinary shares and rights issues 
of. ordinary shares. This would suggest a greater 
diversity amongst cases in groups 1 and 2 in 
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terms of discriminating variables. It would 
therefore appear that the variables used in the 
discriminant analysis are perceived as being of 
greater importance in the context of preference 
share issues and debt issues. 
(iii) The Mann-Whitney test results showed that 
'Epslevel' (maintaining or increasing the level 
of EPS), 'Prevmkt' (prevailing market 
conditions), and 'Intratel' (the importance of 
low interest rates) are important influences in 
relation to debt issues; whilst in relation to 
preference shares, 'Leverage' (not wanting to 
increase leverage to too high a level, by issuing 
more debt), and 'Targetde' (meeting a target 
debt-equity ratio) were important. None of the 
variables was of statistical significance for new 
issues/rights issues of ordinary shares. 
The multivariate analysis of the questionnaires 
carried out in this Chapter has shown that EPS is 
viewed as having a significant influence on 
capital issues, particularly those of preference 
shares and debt. It is the variable which most 
consistently appears to be of significance. This 
is supportive of the view that there is 
functional fixation on short-term EPS, although 
this might not be the only explanation. The 
4-25 
relationship between methods of issue and EPS is 
examined in the next Chapter. 
4-26 
CHAPTER 5: FURTHER ANALYSIS OF EBIT-EPS 
5-1 Introduction 
None of the analyses done so far suggests that 
the theoretical paradigms covered in Chapter 2 
are very useful in practice. However the survey 
that has been carried out does seem to show that 
EPS is very important, and this would suggest 
that there may be some functional fixation effect 
of the type as suggested by (inter alia) Hand 
(1990), and Harris and Ohlson (1987 and 1990). 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) stated 'the hypothesis 
of functional fixation maintains that individual 
investors interpret earnings numbers the same way 
regardless of the accounting procedures used to 
calculate them. If all investors acted this way, 
there would be a mechanical relation between 
earnings and stock prices..... ', page 160. 
The basic premise is that EPS is given particular 
prominence by financial analysts and therefore as 
a consequence by the firm's managers, i. e. there 
is functional fixation on EPS and this is 
reflected in the financing decisions of 
companies. 
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It is therefore useful to extend the EBIT-EPS 
analysis as posited by Van Horne to obtain a 
ranking, for methods of finance based on their 
effect on EPS. 
5-2 EBIT-EPS Analysis 
Van Horne (1989) stated that 'one widely used 
means of examining the effect of leverage is to 
analyze the relationship between earnings before 
interest and taxes (EBIT) and earnings per share 
(EPS) ', page 3 05. 
EBIT-EPS analysis involves comparing various 
methods of finance under different assumptions of 
EBIT. The EPS under each method can be shown for 
a given level of EBIT 
- 
this shows the EBIT 
break-even or indifference points for each 
financing alternative. 
A break-even chart can be constructed, with EBIT 
on the horizontal axis and EPS on the vertical 
axis. EPS for a given level of EBIT are plotted 
on the vertical axis, and the EBIT necessary to 
cover all fixed financial costs for a particular 
financing plan (for example, interest charges on 
debt) is plotted on the horizontal axis. 
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5-3 Development of EBIT-EPS Analysis 
Under simplifying assumptions concerning the 
linear proportional nature of the tax charge, it 
is a straightforward matter to determine which 
method of finance should produce the highest EPS. 
Initially the analysis will be restricted to 
simple debt versus equity choice. 
The analysis contains a number of simplifying 
assumptions, for example: 
(i) the rate of corporation tax is assumed to 
be constant 
(ii) the company is not tax-exhausted (i. e. it 
can offset the tax relief on debenture 
interest against its profits) 
(iii) issue costs are the same for all sources of 
finance 
(iv) there are no restrictions on the company's 
choice of raising finance 
(v) risk is not incorporated into the model 
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(i) Debt versus equity 
EBIT 
less int. 
Debt Alternative 
I+AI 
Equity Alternative 
EBIT 
(EBIT-I-AI) 
less tax T(EBIT-I-AI) 
I 
. 
(EBIT-I) 
T (EBIT-I) 
after tax (1-T)(EBIT-I-AI) (1-T)(EBIT-I) 
where T= corporation tax rate 
EBIT = earnings before interest and tax 
I= interest payable 
AI 
= 
increase in interest payable 
n= number of ordinary shares 
An 
= 
increase in number of ordinary shares 
To decide whether debt is to be preferred to 
equity, the EPSd should be greater than the EPSe1 
where EPSd is the EPS under a debt financing 
alternative and EPSe is the EPS under an equity 
financing alternative. Therefore from the model 
above: 
(1-T) (EBIT-I-DI) 
> 
(1-T) (EBIT-I) 
n (n+An) 
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then: 
On 
ný AI 
1+ (On) (EBIT-I) 
n 
Let DI-rD 
where r= rate of interest 
D= total nominal value of debt 
then (An) rD (n+An) (EBIT-I) 
EBIT> rD (n+An) +I (An) 
To interpret this result, it is best expressed 
as: 
(5.1) (EBIT-I) (An) >rD (n+An) 
This allows an intuitive explanation, namely that 
debt finance is preferable where the proportion 
of earnings after interest attributable to the 
increase in shares under the equity option, 
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exceeds the new interest that would be payable 
under the debt option. Note that interest has a 
cash flow effect, whereas earnings do not 
necessarily. 
Alternatively, it can be expressed as: 
(rD) 
< 
(On) 
(EBIT-I) (n+On) 
i. e. for debt finance to be preferred, the ratio 
of new interest to 'profit after interest' (i. e. 
existing interest) must be less than the equity 
dilution effect. 
Example: 
The 'equity' column below illustrates the 
situation where a firm originally had share 
capital of 100 £1 ordinary shares, but it needed 
to raise more finance and chose to do so via 
equity, so it now has 120 £1 ordinary shares. It 
also has to pay debenture interest of £400. 
In the ' debt' column, the firm has to pay a total 
of £600 debenture interest, of which £200 relates 
to finance raised recently. However, as the 
'debt' firm raised the finance via new debt, it 
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still has only 100 £1 ordinary shares. 
Equity Debt 
£ £ £ £ £ £ 
EBIT 0 1600 2000 0 1600 2000 
Debt Int. 
-- 
-400 
------- 
-400 
----------- 
-400 
-------- 
-600 
------- 
-600 
- 
-600 
EAI 
-400 1200 1600 -600 
---------- 
1000 
------- 
1400 
Tax 2 40% 
-- 
-160 
------- 
480 
----------- 
640 
-------- 
-240 
------- 
400 560 
EAT 
-240 720 960 -360 
----------- 
600 
------- 
840 
No. ord. 
shares 120 120 120 100 100 100 
EPS 
-2.00 6.00 8.00 -3.60 6.00 8.40 
Using the expression 5.1 in its equation form 
gives the level of EBIT at which the finance is 
indifferent, and EPS is 6.0p under each 
alternative: 
EBIT-rD ( An) +I 
EBIT = £200(120/20) + £400 
= £1600 
From Fig. 5.1 it can be seen that equity is to be 
preferred below an EBIT of £1600, whilst debt 
is 
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FIG. 5.1 : EPS-EBIT GRAPH 
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to be preferred above an EBIT of £1600 (equity 
resulting in a higher EPS for EBIT levels below 
£1600, whilst debt results in a higher EPS for 
EBIT levels above £1600). 
Other examples of similar analysis that can be 
carried out to identify the point at which debt 
is preferable to say, preference share capital as 
a source of finance are shown algebraically 
below. The first example deals with the choice 
of debt versus preference shares, the second 
deals with the choice between ordinary shares and 
preference shares, although the analysis could be 
extended to cover most different sources of 
finance 
. 
(ii) Debt versus preference shares 
less int. 
less tax 
EAT 
less pref. div. 
EAT-pref. div. 
Preference shares alternative 
EBIT 
() 
EBIT-I 
T (EBIT-I ) 
(1-T) (EBIT-I) 
(PD) 
f (1-T) (EBIT-I) 1-PD 
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For debt to be pref erred to preference shares the 
EPSd would be greater than the EPSpref (where EPSPref 
is the EPS under a preference share alternative). 
Therefore, given that PD=preference dividend, 
(1-T) (EBIT-I-AI) [ (1-T) (EBIT-I) ] 
-PD 
nn 
and 
(1-T) (EBIT-I) 
_ 
(1-T) DI 
> 
(1-T) (EBIT-I) PD 
nnnn 
This can be simplified to: 
(5.2) (1-T) DI<PD 
This shows that, for debt to be preferred to 
preference shares as a source of finance, the new 
after tax interest must be less than the 
preference dividend. In practice, this is likely 
to be the case, except for tax-exhausted 
companies, so preference shares do not appear to 
be an attractive alternative to debt finance. 
However, passing a preference dividend does not 
lead to the appointment of a receiver, as in the 
case of passing a debenture interest payment, and 
so there is less risk of failure. 
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(iii) Ordinary shares versus preference shares 
For ordinary share capital to be preferred to 
preference shares, requires EPSord > EPSprefs 
" 
(1-T) (EBIT-I) (1-T) (EBIT-I) 
-PD (n+An) n 
:. PD> (1-T) (EBIT-I) 
- 
(1-T) (EBIT-I) (n 
n+On 
PD> (1-T) (EBIT-I) (1- 
n+n An 
(5.3) PD> (1-T) (EBIT-I) (nAn ) 
+An 
Thus for ordinary shares to be preferred to 
preference shares, the preference dividend would 
have to exceed the proportion of earnings 
'belonging' to the new ordinary shares. This is 
of interest since the preference dividend is 
compared to ordinary earnings (i. e. not dividend 
for ordinary shares). This relationship means 
that ordinary shares may be preferred even when 
the ordinary share dividend is very low. There 
is also a cash flow implication arising from 
this, in as much as low ordinary dividends are 
less onerous on the business' cash flow 
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requirements. Again, preference shares are seen 
to be an unattractive means of raising finance 
(an exception to this, for reasons specific to 
their sector, is for banks where preference 
shares rank as class 2 capital). 
5-4 Degrees of Financial & Operating Leverage 
The EBIT-EPS relationship can be extended to 
incorporate some measure of risk. 
One approach is to look at the elasticity of EPS 
with respect to EBIT, a measure sometimes 
referred to as the 'degree of financial leverage' 
(DFL) 
. 
Since this is defined in terms of the key 
variables of the analysis above it is potentially 
a useful measure. An additional elasticity 
measure of interest is the degree of operating 
leverage (DOL) which captures the sensitivity of 
EBIT to changes in operating volume. These can 
be combined to give a composite 'degree of 
combined leverage' (DCL) that, in essence, 
combines both operating and financial risk. 
These variables have potentially useful 
explanatory value and are investigated 
empirically in Chapter 8. 
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5-4-1 Degree of Financial Leverage (DFL) 
DFL can be defined as the percentage change in 
earnings (EPS) that takes place as a result of a 
percentage change in earnings before interest and 
taxes (EBIT), that is: 
DFL = percentage change in EPS 
percentage change in EBIT 
It is therefore an elasticity measure and the 
financial leverage reflects the amount of debt 
used in the capital structure of the firm. It 
relates to the financing side of the business not 
the operating side. 
The derivation of DFL is as follows: 
DFL = depsleps 
d7r/n 
= deps 
. 
It 
d71 eps 
given, 
eps = (1r - I) (1 - T) 
N 
=1 [Tr(1-T)-I) 
N 
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and deps= 1-T 
dir N 
Therefore: 
DFL = (1-T) 
. 
IT 
N eps 
= (1-T) 
. 
IT xN 
N (it-I) (1-T) 
that is, DFL = IT 
n-I 
Example of Degree of Financial Leverage (DFL): 
The following data apply to company X plc: 
Equity Alt. Debt Alt. 
£000 £000 
Earnings before int. 4000 4000 
and tax (EBIT) 
Interest 200 800 
Earnings before tax 3800 3200 
Corporation tax @ 33% 1254 1056 
Earnings after tax (EAT) 2546 2144 
(avail. to ord. s/holders) 
No. of ord. shares ('000) 1200 800 
Earnings per share (EPS) £2.12 £2.68 
Using the above result, the DFL under each 
financing alternative is as follows: 
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(i) For equity: 4000 
4000-200 
= 1.05 
(i i) For debt: 4000 
4000-800 
= 1.25 
Therefore at the EBIT level of £4,000,000, a 1% 
increase in EBIT would produce approximately a 
1.05% increase in EPS under the equity 
alternative; whilst under the debt alternative, 
there would be an increase in EPS of 
approximately 1.25%. As a check on these 
calculations, the revised figures based on an 
EBIT of £4,040,000 are shown below: 
Equity Alt. Debt Alt. 
£000 £000 
Earnings before int. 4040 4040 
and tax (EBIT) 
Interest 200 800 
Earnings before tax 3840 3240 
Corporation tax @ 33% 1267 1069 
Earnings after tax (EAT) 2573 2171 
(avail. to ord. s/holders) 
No. of ord. shares ('000) 1200 800 
Earnings per share (EPS) £2.14 £2.71 
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On the equity alternative the EPS has increased 
from £2.12 to £2.14; whilst on the debt 
alternative EPS has increased from £2.68 to 
£2.71. Therefore the EPS under the equity 
alternative has increased by 1.05%, and under the 
debt alternative by 1.25%, as previously 
calculated. 
For the example above, the DFL may be. calculated 
for any level of EBIT. As with most 
elasticities, it is only locally valid and 
changes as a function of EBIT. However the debt 
alternative would always give the higher increase 
in EPS for any given increase in EBIT. 
5-4-2 Functional Properties of DFL 
The functional properties of DFL are illustrated 
in Fig. 5.2, which shows a DFL-EBIT chart with 
EBIT on the horizontal axis and DFL on the 
vertical axis. 
Elasticity measures are as much to do with profit 
fluctuations as with the capital gearing of the 
business. It can be seen that a significant 
feature of DFL is that it is not linear in the 
conventional balance sheet gearing sense as there 
is a discontinuity at the point where EBIT=I. It 
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asymptotically tends to +ao or 
-oo at that critical 
value. Also it approaches unity from below. 
Three sectors can be identified in the DFL-EBIT 
chart, viz Sectors 1,2, and 3: 
(i) sector 1 
In Sector 1 EBIT has the following 
characteristics: 
(i) EBIT <I and EBIT <0 
Therefore DFL is positive and lies between 0 and 
1. 
(ii) Sector 2 
In Sector 2 EBIT has the following 
characteristics: 
(i) EBIT <I but EBIT >0 
This results in DFL being negative. 
(iii) Sector 3 
In Sector 3 EBIT has the following 
characteristics: 
(i) EBIT >I 
The DFL is therefore positive and greater than 1. 
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When the amount of interest is small in relation 
to EBIT (or EBIT is large in relation to 
interest), DFL tends towards 1 from above. 
Conversely, the larger the interest in relation 
to EBIT, the higher the DFL. As explained above, 
a DFL of less than 1 arises when the interest is 
more than EBIT and EBIT is less than 0 (i. e. a 
loss); whilst a negative DFL arises when the 
interest is more than EBIT but EBIT is greater 
than 
- 
0. 
This helps to explain some of the calculated 
values for DFL in Section 5-5 which initially may 
seem somewhat counter-intuitive. 
5-4-3 Degree of Operating Leverage (DOL) 
DOL can be defined as the percentage change in 
operating income that takes place as a result of 
a percentage change in units sold for a one 
product firm, 
DOL 
= percentage change in operating income 
percentage change in unit volume 
= Q(P_VC) 
Q (P-VC) 
-FC 
where Q= quantity at which DOL is computed 
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P= price per unit 
VC = variable costs per unit 
FC = fixed costs 
Operating leverage reflects the extent to which 
fixed assets and fixed costs are utilised in the 
business. The more assets are utiljsed, the 
higher DOL is likely to be. 
The derivation of DOL is as follows: 
DOL = dir n 
dQ/Q 
d7T Q 
dQ 'ir 
Given that v= Q(p-v)-F 
then DOL =Q (p-v) 
Q (p-v) 
-F 
or DOL = gr +F 
lt 
i. e. DOL =1+F 
IT 
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Example of Degree of Operating Leverage 
The following data on operating income and unit 
volume relates to companies X plc and Y plc: 
Operating income £000 
X plc Y plp 
Unit volume 
0 (14000) (80000) 
10,000 (3000) (35000) 
20,000 8000 10000 
30,000 19000 55000 
40,000 30000 100000 
The expression for DOL will be applied with 
reference to operating income as volume moves 
from 30,000 to 40,000 units, for both companies. 
Given that DOL is the elasticity measure obtained 
from dividing the percentage change in operating 
income by the percentage change in unit volume, 
then for X p1c, 
DOL 
= (11000/19000) x 100 
(10000/30000) x 100 
= 1.74 
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and for Y plc, 
DOL = (45000/55000) x 100 
(10000/30000) x 100 
= 2.45 
The DOL of 1.74 for X plc indicates that a 1% 
increase in unit volume would produce a 1.74% 
increase in operating income; whilst the DOL of 
2.45 for Y plc indicates that a 1% increase in 
unit volume would produce a 2.45% increase in 
operating income. As is evident from Fig. 5.2 
this measure is not 'linear' in gearing although 
it captures similar influences provided EBIT 
exceeds I. 
5-4-4 Degree of Combined Leverage (DCL) 
Operating leverage and financial leverage can be 
combined to give the degree of combined leverage 
(DCL), which utilises the entire income statement 
and shows the impact of a change in sales or 
volume on EPS: 
DCL 
= percentage change in EPS 
percentage change in sales 
=0 (P-VC) 
Q (P-VC) 
-FC-I 
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For which the derivation is: 
DCL = depsleps 
dQ/Q 
= deps 
.Q 
dQ eps 
= deps 
. 
dir 
. 
dir dQ eps 
= deps 
. 
7r dir 
.0 
dir eps dQ 'ir 
i. e DCL = DFL x DOL 
Example of Degree of Combined Leverage (DCL) 
Company Z plc has a DFL of 1.6 and a DOL of 2.2. 
Given that DCL = DFL x DOL, 
DCL = 1.2 x 1.6 
= 1.92 
This indicates that a 1% increase in sales would 
result in a 1.92% increase in EPS. - 
A more highly geared firm with a DFL of 1.8 and 
a DOL of 2.2 would have a correspondingly higher 
DCL of 3.96, indicating that for a 1% increase in 
sales, there would be a 3.96% increase in EPS. 
Incidentally, a dissenting voice to the above 
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calculation of DCL is L. Huffman (1983) who 
provides an alternative view using the Brennan 
(1979) option pricing model. She suggests that 
the accepted measure of DCL is not correct for 
the following reasons: 
(i) DCL varies with the time-related. arguments 
of the option pricing model probability density 
functions (these arguments change with variations 
in the firm's output capacity); 
(ii) given that optimal capacity is also a 
function of debt, DCL is a more complex function 
of debt than captured in the traditional DCL; 
(iii) DCL is not independent of revenue risk. 
She posits that the direct effect of an increase 
in debt on equity risk is offset partially by an 
attendant change in operating capacity (although 
this offset is lost above a critical debt level). 
Also the effect of an increase in revenue risk on 
equity risk is partially offset by changes in 
capacity in response to the increased revenue 
risk (however capacity changes lose their ability 
to mitigate equity risk if revenue is below a 
critical level, or if debt is above a critical 
level) 
. 
Li and Henderson (1991) compare test results of 
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DCL, based on both L. Huf fman' s revised DCL and 
the traditional definition (DFL x DOL). Their 
findings are inconclusive, with some aspects 
showing support for L. Huffman's theory, but 
others supporting the traditional view. 
In the absence of any seriously viable 
alternative, DCL is therefore calculated on the 
traditionally accepted basis of DFL x DOL. 
5-4-5 Usefulness of Elasticity Measures 
The elasticity measures discussed above in 
Sections 5-4-1 to 5-4-4 only capture sensitivity 
effects, they do not incorporate measures of risk 
per se. 
The DOL leverage is of limited usefulness as in 
reality firms have a range of products. However 
the DFL is of potentially more value as it gives 
a direct quantification of proportional changes 
in EPS with changes in EBIT irrespective of the 
firm's product portfolio. 
DCL is a 'flow' measure of gearing and is 
arguably more direct. Given that financial 
gearing takes no account of operating gearing, it 
could be argued that, since DCL = DOL X DFL (and 
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both DOL and DFL can be estimated), DCL is a 
better overall risk measure. However, whilst it 
is possible to synthesise a composite (holistic) 
gearing measure which takes account of operating 
and financial leverage, certain technical 
difficulties remain. Calculated measures of DFL 
over time which are persistently less. than 1 do 
not make sense as over time a firm must make a 
profit, however this would seem to be the nature 
of estimation in stochastic measures. 
5-5 Estimation of DFL and DOL 
5-5-1 Data Required for Estimation 
Estimation of DFL is reasonably straight forward 
as the data required 
- 
Earnings before interest 
and tax (EBIT) and Interest (I) - are readily 
available. However, once the data are obtained 
there are several different ways of actually 
calculating DFL which are discussed below. 
Estimating DOL is much more problematical, as its 
pure definition would require knowledge of 
changes in operating income and changes in unit 
volume, and also firms do not just produce one 
product. Given that the quantity produced and 
sold is not available from the financial 
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statements, the alternative is to proxy it with 
annual sales, following Lev (1974) and Mandelker 
and Rhee (1984). 
Data were obtained from Datastream using programs 
190Y and 190V for the components of both DFL and 
DOL for a sample of companies (those fqr which a 
reconstruction is subsequently to be carried out 
in Chapter 6). The intention was to use the DFL 
and DOL estimates in a probit model detailed in 
Chapter 8, to examine whether they have an 
influence on a company's capital issue decision. 
The aim was to obtain 15 years data for each 
company for the DFL and DOL calculations. 
However, the required data were not generally 
available for this period of time for the 
majority of companies. Therefore, DFL and DOL 
estimates are based on between 6 and 12 years 
data. 
5-5-2 Estimation Procedures for DFL and DOL 
In the finance literature there is some diversity 
in the approaches employed to estimate the degree 
of operating leverage. 
For example, Ferri and Jones (1979) used the 
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ratio of net fixed assets to total assets as a 
proxy for the degree of operating leverage. The 
main criticism of this proxy is that it is based 
on the ratio of one balance sheet stock variable 
to another, whereas DOL is an elasticity measure 
reflecting the percentage change in one flow 
variable to the percentage change in anQther flow 
variable. 
Kim and Sorensen (1986) used the coefficient of 
variation (the ratio of a variable's standard 
deviation to its mean) of EBIT as a proxy for the 
degree of operating leverage. However this 
measure results in operating leverage being 
calculated solely on the basis of variability in 
EBIT; it- fails to take into account any 
relationship between variability in EBIT and 
variability in sales. Also the standard 
deviation will become higher as the asymptotic 
condition is approached (as discussed earlier in 
Section 5-4-2). 
The best known estimation procedures are those 
employed by Mandelker and Rhee (1984), and 
subsequently replicated by S. Huffman (1989). 
Mandelker and Rhee used time series regressions 
to find estimates of DFL and DOL as follows: 
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LnX, 
t = a, + c, LnS, t + µjt 
and 
Ln7r, t = bj + d, LnX1t + Eft 
where: 
ci = degree of operating 
leverage 
dj 
= degree of financial 
leverage 
7T it = earnings after interest 
and taxes at 
Xit = earnings before interest 
and taxes at 
Sit = sales (in dollars) 
Eft = disturbance term 
µßt = disturbance term 
a, 
, 
bi = constants 
It should be noted that the estimates based on 
the above regressions rest on the restrictive 
assumption of stationary elasticity over the 
estimation period. 
O'Brien and Vanderheiden (1987) alleged that one 
shortcoming of the Mandelker and Rhee technique 
was that it failed to adjust for secular growth 
in sales and EBIT. The latter's estimates of DOL 
were therefore dominated by the effect of secular 
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growth. They suggested employing trend 
regressions, using time as the independent 
variable, to adjust for growth in sales and EBIT. 
The trend regressions took the form: 
In EBITjt = In EBITjo + gjXt + Ajt, 
in Sit = In Sao + gjSt + µßt, 
where 
EBIT, t = earnings before interest and tax 
for f irm 
, 
in year t 
EBITjo = beginning level of earnings 
before interest and tax for 
firm j 
Sit = sales for firm 
, 
in year t 
Sao = beginning level of sales for 
firm ý 
gjX = earnings before interest and 
taxes growth 
gjs = sales growth 
The residuals from these trend regressions were 
then used in the following time-series 
regression: 
jt 
= Dýµot + E7t 
where 
e= the lo E trend regression residual ýit q ýt 
for firm j in year t 
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Di = the nth firm's degree of operating 
leverage 
Aft = the log Sit trend regression residual 
for f irm j in year 
Eft = the disturbance term 
Dugan and Shriver (1992) employed both the 
Mandelker and Rhee, and the O'Brien and 
Vanderheiden techniques and were of the opinion 
that the O'Brien and Vanderheiden estimates 
appeared to be more consistent with the classical 
ex ante model of degree of operating leverage 
coefficients. However, both methods produced a 
substantial number of DOL coefficients below one. 
S. Huffman (1989) also found that both DOL and 
DFL estimates were often below one. In a sample 
including firms with losses, industry estimates 
of average DOL ranged from 0.105 to 0.320; whilst 
average DFL ranged from 0.460 to 1.152. When 
loss-making firms were excluded these figures 
increased with average DOL ranging from 0.780 to 
1.008; whilst average DFL ranged from 0.896 to 
1.101. These results are to some extent puzzling 
and counter-intuitive. Possible explanations of 
these lower than expected estimates from all the 
studies are problems with the estimation 
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techniques, and noise in the accounting data used 
in the regressions. 
It should be noted that the Mandelker and Rhee, 
and the O'Brien & Vanderheiden estimation 
procedures use a different approach 
(transformation) when earnings are negative. 
Their DOL and DFL estimates would therefore be 
based on the results of two different methods. 
However S. Huffman (1989) hypothesised that 
measurement error might arise by combining two 
different methods (i. e. one for positive earnings 
and one for negative earnings) when computing DOL 
and DFL. 
Mandelker and Rhee also found evidence for the 
tradeoff hypothesis as they found a statistically 
significant negative correlation between DOL and 
DFL. However there was not enough consistency in 
S. Huffman's results for him to be able to 
support the tradeoff hypothesis. 
For regression-based estimates of DOL and DFL, 
the estimation technique used by Mandelker and 
Rhee (1984), and described above, will be used in 
the probit analysis in Chapter 8. Its definition 
would appear to be the most conceptually 
appropriate. 
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As outlined above there are real difficulties 
encountered in estimating DOL. DFL is not so 
problematic, and it has been possible to 
calculate DFL on several bases: 
(i) the Mandelker and Rhee estimation procedures 
(DFL) 
(ii) the average DFL over a period of time 
(iii) the actual DFL for the year prior to the 
capital issue 
(iv) the actual DFL for the year of the capital 
issue 
The DFL ratio does have undesirable properties, 
especially when used in regression analysis, as 
most regression models are linearly articulated 
and this elasticity measure does not have good 
linear properties (even in log form). 
Of the above bases, the averaging procedure is 
favoured over estimations from regression 
analysis. A priori there is no real reason to 
reject averaging as it is a ratio which is non- 
linear with EBIT. Therefore given that "acute 
non-linearities and discontinuities can arise, 
DFL calculated on an average basis may well be 
the better estimator. 
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DFL has been included in the probit analysis in 
Chapter 8 (using all four estimation bases in 
turn) as it is a measure of gearing which relates 
more closely to a measure of risk. It has 
intuitively appealing properties, its elasticity 
reflecting proportional changes. 
5-5-3 DFL, DOL and DCL Estimates Based On 
Regression Analysis 
The Mandelker and Rhee estimation procedures as 
outlined above were followed for the data that 
had been obtained from Datastream for the sample 
companies. The data were entered into LIMDEP, a 
program used for estimating limited dependent 
variables. Two time-series log-linear 
regressions were then run for each company in the 
sample to obtain estimates of DFL and DOL. 
It should be mentioned that all available 
relevant data were run for each regression, even 
where some of the data related to a period after 
the year of the capital issue made by a 
particular company. This is unlikely to be 
particularly distortionary since the overlap in 
general was fairly small. It was also necessary 
in the present work to ensure that there were 
enough degrees of freedom to obtain estimates. 
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The results are shown in Table 5.1. 
The DFL and DOL estimates are, as one might 
expect, generally positive, although perhaps 
smaller than envisaged. The average DFL for 
those companies issuing equity is 1.24, whilst 
for those issuing debt it is 0.99,, and for 
convertibles 1.18. It would generally be 
expected that the DFL would be > 1. Similarly, 
much larger DFLs can be explained by the 
functional properties of DFL as discussed 
earlier. 
The subsequent reconstruction work in Chapter 6 
goes some way to explaining this. Table 6.11 in 
Chapter 6 shows that the average capital gearing 
ratio for the companies which chose to issue 
equity was already higher (35.26%) than for those 
which chose to issue debt (28.43%). The 
companies which chose to issue equity were 
therefore already, on average, more highly geared 
than those which chose to issue debt. 
Conversely, the DOL is largest for those 
companies which issued debt, being 2.12; for the 
equity issuing companies it is considerably less 
at 1.32; whilst for those issuing convertibles it 
is 0.76. A value of less than unity is rather 
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TABLE 5.1: ESTIMATES OF DFL, DOL AND DCL BASED ON 
TIME SERIES REGRESSION 
Company DFL DOL DCL 
1 Anglia Secure Homes 0.92 
-1.67 -1.54 
2 Bimec 0.95 1.40 1.34 
3 Bowater 1.32 1.17 1.54 
4 Bowthorpe 1.03 1.13 1.16 
5 Casket 0.71 0.86 0.61 
6 Cater Allen n/av n/av n/av 
7 Community Hospital Grp n/av n/av n/av 
8 Cookson Grp 0.94 1.15 1.08 
9 De La Rue 1.67 0.40 0.67 
10 Domino Printing 1.09 0.59 0.64 
11 Eurotunnel n/av n/av n/av 
12 Jeyes 0.81 1.73 1.41 
13 Kwik Fit 0.92 1.20 1.11 
14 Lovell, Y. J. 1.23 1.57 1.92 
15 Midland Bank 0.92 n/av n/av 
16 Regalian 0.34 n/av n/av 
17 RenoLd 2.62 6.15 16.11 
18 Richards 0.32 1.95 0.62 
19 Sketchley 4.50 
-0.12 -0.55 
20 Tay Homes 1.16 1.21 1.40 
21 Tibbet & Britten 1.02 0.83 0.85 
22 Westbury 1.07 
-0.11 -0.12 
23 Allied Lyons 0.83 2.18 1.81 
24 Asda 
-0.39 1.19 -0.46 
25 Asda 
-0.39 1.19 -0.46 
26 Bass 1.00 1.48 1.48 
27 Blue Circle 1.08 1.85 1.99 
28 British Land 1.30 n/av n/av 
29 British Land 1.30 n/av n/av 
30 British Steel 5.60 20.47 114.54 
31 City Site Estates 
-0.26 n/av n/av 
32 Dares Estates 0.75 n/av n/av 
33 Forte 0.96 0.88 0.84 
34 Land Securities 1.11 n/av n/av 
35 Lasmo 0.12 
-0.95 -0.11 
36 Lasmo 0.12 
-0.95 -0.11 
37 MEPC 1.32 n/av n/av 
38 Taylor Woodrow 0.99 
-4.37 -4.35 
39 Vaux 1.20 1.40 1.68 
40 Whitbread 1.29 1.14 1.46 
41 Helical Bar 1.96 n/av n/av 
42 Next 0.77 0.68 0.53 
43 Worcester Grp 0.81 0.84 0.68 
Avg. for equity issues: 1.24 1.32 1.93 
Avg. for debt issues: 0.99 2.12 9.86 
Avg. for cony. issues: 1.18 0.76 0.60 
Note: n/av indicates that an estimate could 
not be calculated for that particular item. 
difficult to explain in elasticity terms, but as 
shown in the diagram of the DFL estimates, the 
properties of these measures are rather unusual. 
The implication is that for the companies which 
issued equity, the percentage change in EPS for 
a percentage change in EBIT is more, marked; 
whereas for the debt issuing companies, the 
percentage change in operating income for a 
percentage change in unit volume (proxied by 
sales) is more marked. 
The DFL estimates in particular are slightly 
different to prior expectations. Therefore it was 
felt that it would be useful to compare the DFL 
estimates obtained from the time-series 
regressions to other DFL estimates. 
5-5-4 DFL Estimates Based On Average and Actual 
Figures 
A second DFL estimate was obtained by taking 
EBIT/(EBIT-I) for each year over the period for 
which data was available (as mentioned above this 
varied between 6 and 12 years for different 
companies) and then averaging the results to find 
one DFL estimate for each company. The estimates 
obtained by the second method are shown in Table 
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TABLE 5.2 : COMPARISON OF DFL ESTIMATES 
Company DFL DFL2 DFL-DFL2 
I Anglia Secure Homes 0.92 0.76 0.16 
2 Bimec 0.95 0.99 
-0.04 
3 Bowater 1.32 1.57 
-0.25 
4 Bowthorpe 1.03 1.06 
-0.03 
5 Casket 0.71 2.63 
-1.92 
6 Cater Allen n/av n/av n/av 
7 Coaaunity Hospital Grp n/av 1.02 n/ov 
8 Cookson Grp 0.94 1.56 
-0.62 
9 De La Rue 1.67 1.28 0.39 
10 Domino Printing 1.09 1.04 0.05 
11 Eurotimel n/av -458.33 n/av 
12 Jeyss 0.81 1.29 
-0.48 
13 Kwik Fit 0.92 1.23 
-0.31 
14 Lovell, Y. J. 1.23 1.39 
-0.16 
15 Midland Bank 0.92 3.26 
-2.34 
16 Rogation 0.34 n/av n/av 
17 Renold 2.62 3.64 
-1.02 
18 Richards 0.32 1.43 
-1.11 
19 Sketchley 4.50 0.73 3.77 
20 Tay Homes 1.16 1.29 
-0.13 
21 Tibbet & Britten 1.02 1.09 
-0.07 
22 Westbury 1.07 0.88 0.19 
23 Allied Lyons 0.83 1.36 
-0.53 
24 Asda 
-0.39 1.06 -1.45 
25 Asda 
-0.39 1.06 -1.45 
26 Bass 1.00 1.16 
-0.16 
27 Blue Circle 1.08 1.28 
-0.20 
28 British Land 1.30 n/av n/av 
29 British Land 1.30 n/av n/av 
30 British Steel 5.60 0.83 4.77 
31 City Site Estates 
-0.26 n/av n/av 
32 Dares Estates 0.75 n/av n/av 
33 Forte 0.96 1.46 
-0.50 
34 Land Securities 1.11 n/av n/av 
35 Lasmo 0.12 2.42 
-2.30 
36 Lasmo 0.12 2.42 
-2.30 
37 MEPC 1.32 n/av Nov 
38 Taylor Woodrow 0.99 0.44 0.55 
39 Vaux 1.20 1.18 0.02 
40 Whitbread 1.29 1.25 0.04 
41 Helical Bar 1.96 n/av n/av 
42 Next 0.77 1.19 
-0.42 
43 Worcester Grp 0.81 1.10 
-0.29 
Mote: 1-22 a Equity issues 
23-40 a Debt issues 
41-43 = CovertibLe issues 
OFL = DFL calculated using M&R estimation 
technique 
DFL2 2 OFL based on averaging method 
Nov a data not available 
ft 
5.2, and compared with the DFL estimates obtained 
from the Mandelker & Rhee estimation procedure. 
Over half of the estimates are smaller for the 
DFL estimated using the time series regression 
(DFL) than for the DFL using a straight average 
(DFL2) calculation. This would seem to confirm 
that the DFL estimates obtained following the 
Mandelker and Rhee methodology may be 
understated. Conversely, some of the DFL 
estimates are larger on the Mandelker and Rhee 
methodology than on the straight average, so it 
is difficult to say which method gives the most 
reliable estimates. 
Further estimates of DFL were calculated by 
taking EBIT/(EBIT-I) for the year prior to the 
capital issue (DFLPY) ; EBIT/ (EBIT-I) for the year 
of the capital issue (DFLO); and EBIT/(EBIT-I) 
for the year following the capital issue (DFL+1) 
. 
These estimates are shown in Table 5.3. The 
resulting estimates are closer to the DFL 
calculated on an average basis. (DFL2), than they 
are to the estimates based on Mandelker and-Rhee 
(DFL) 
. 
As mentioned earlier, some DFL estimates are 
negative, and some are very large. For example, 
5-35 
TABLE 5.3: DFL FOR YEAR PRIOR TO CAPITAL ISSUE, YEAR OF CAPITAL ISSUE 
AND YEAR FOLLOWING 
Canpany Year Year DFLPY DFLO DFL+1 
0 +1 
1 Anglia Secure Nasses 90 91 
-0.07 0.17 0.63 
2 Bimec 92 93 1.13 1.20 n/av 
3 Bowater 90 91 1.41 1.49 1.48 
4 Bowthorpe 87 88 1.04 1.03 1.03 
5 Casket 91 92 0.04 12.98 1.94 
6 Cater Allen 91 92 n/av n/av Nov 
7 Community Hospital Grp 91 92 1.03 1.01 n/av 
8 Cookson Grp 91 92 1.69 1.78 n/av 
9 De La Rue 92 93 1.25 1.14 n/av 
10 Domino Printing 91 92 1.11 1.06 n/av 
11 Eurotunnel 90 91 72.37 834.45 -3199.00 
12 Jayes 89 90 1.47 1.19 1.22 
13 Kwik Fit 
. 
89 90 1.07 1.06 1.32 
14 Lovell, Y. J. 91 92 1.70 0.67 n/av 
15 Midland Bank 87 88 1.46 0.62 1.28 
16 Regalian 92 93 n/av n/av n/av 
17 Renold 85 86 0.00 2.02 1.49 
18 Richards 89 90 1.03 1.21 1.08 
19 Sketchtey 91 92 
-3.38 -0.21 1.50 
20 Tay Homes 87 88 1.23 1.09 1.08 
21 Tibbet & Britten 89 90 1.12 1.13 1.14 
22 Westbury 92 93 
-0.10 0.65 n/av 
23 Allied Lyons 89 90 1.33 1.29 1.30 
24 Asda 87 88 1.01 1.00 1.01 
25 Asda 89 90 1.01 1.01 1.34 
26 Bass 89 90 1.10 1.15 1.34 
27 Blue Circle 88 89 1.26 1.20 1.24 
28 British Land 87 88 n/av n/av Nov 
29 British Land 92 93 n/av n/av n/av 
30 British Steel 92 93 1.09 0.18 Nay 
31 City Site Estates 87 88 n/av n/av n/av 
32 Dares Estates 87 88 n/av n/av n/av 
33 Forte 90 91 1.26 1.38 1.53 
34 Land Securities 87 88 n/av n/av n/av 
35 Lasmo 86 87 1.28 9.34 1.95 
36 Lasmo 89 90 3.01 1.64 1.69 
37 MEPC 86 87 n/av n/av Nov 
38 Taylor Woodrow 89 90 1.11 1.18 1.31 
39 Vaux 89 90 1.13 1.17 1.23 
40 Whitbread 91 92 1.27 1.17 1.24 
41 Helical Bar 88 89 Nov n/av n/av 
42 Next 88 89 1.04 1.08 1.41 
43 Worcester Grp 90 91 1.02 1.21 1.28 
Note: DFL has been calculated as EBIT/EBIT-I 
Yr 0= year of capital issue 
Yr +1 i year following capital issue 
DFLPY 
  
DFL for the year prior to capital issue 
DFLO a DFL for the year of capital issue 
DFL+1 s DFL for year following capital issue 
n/av 8 data was not available for this calcn. 
-0.07 - the impact of a small profit divided by 
a loss (loss after deducting interest from 
earnings before tax); 834.45 
- 
the impact of a 
large interest figure divided by a small profit; 
and -3199.00 - the impact of a large interest 
figure divided by a small loss. As discussed 
earlier these results are attributable to the 
undesirable asymptotic properties of the DFL 
measure. 
5-5-5 Regression Analysis of the Various DFL 
Estimates 
Classical regressions were performed regressing 
the various DFL measures against each other in 
turn. For each particular pair of DFL 
estimations, cases were included only where data 
was available for both estimation methods. The 
results are shown in Table 5.4. 
When the regressions are run without a constant, 
there is a strong association (t-ratio of 4.005) 
between DFL and DFL2, i. e. between DFL estimates 
based on the Mandelker and Rhee estimation 
procedures, and DFL2, i. e. DFL estimates based on 
the averaging procedure. This is therefore 
supportive of the Mandelker and Rhee estimation 
technique providing viable estimates of DFL. 
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TABLE 5.4 : SUMMARY OF REGRESSIONS OF DIFFERENT MEASURES OF DFL 
Dependent Coefficient T-ratio Mean Std Std Value of 
Variable (Indep. Var. ) (Indep. Var. ) Error Dev'n Constant 
Independent 
Variable 
DFL2 DFL 0.6228 (-0.1961) 4.005 (-0.635) 1.4347 0.1555 (0.3088) 0.7292 1.4683 
DFL DFL2 0.5719 (-0.0724) 4.005 (-0.635) 1.1869 0.1428 (0.1140) 1.2002 1.5206 
DFLPY DFL 0.2896 (-0.5989) 1.332 (-3.093) 0.9687 0.2174 (0.1937) 1.0111 1.7671 
DFL DFLPY 0.1992 (-0.4251) 1.332 (-3.093) 1.1869 0.1495 (0.1375) 1.2002 1.4732 
DFLO DFL 0.1361 (-0.1074) 1.416 (-1.289) 1.7330 0.0962 (0.0833) 2.6458 1.3730 
DFL DFLO 0.4749 (-0.5219) 1.416 (-1.289) 1.1869 0.3354 (0.4048) 1.2002 2.3525 
DFL2 DFLO 1.3089 (1.7131) 4.882 (2.834) 1.4347. 0.2681 (0.6044) 0.7292 
-0.7248 
DFLO DFL2 0.3446 (0.1301) 4.882 (2.834) 1.7330 0.0706 (0.0459) 2.6458 1.2091 
DFLO DFLPY 0.1690 (-0.0041) 2.216 (-0.056) 1.7330 0.0763 (0.0722) 2.6458 0.9757 
DFLPY DFLO 0.8571 (-0.2778) 2.216 (-0.056) 0.9687 0.8571 (0.4945) 1.0111 1.7599 
DFL2 DFLPY 0.5872 (0.2348) 4.974 (0.909) 1.4347 0.1181 (0.2582) 0.7292 0.6319 
DFLPY DFL2 0.7840 (0.1221) 4.974 (0.909) 0.9687 0.1576 (0.1343) 1.0111 1.3164 
Note : Figures in () indicate the values obtained 
when the regression was run with a constant (one) 
: DFL = DFL based on Mandelker & Rhea calc'n 
DFL2 = DFL based on (straight) averaging 
DFLPY = DFL for year prior to capital issue 
DFLO = DFL for year of capital issue 
As might be expected, there is also a strong 
association (t-ratio of 4.882) between DFL2 and 
DFLO (the DFL for the year of capital issue) ; and 
between DFL2 and DFLPY (the DFL for the year 
prior to the capital issue), with a t-ratio of 
4.974. 
When a constant is included in the regression, 
the associations are strongest between DFL and 
DFLPY (t-ratio 
-3.093), although not in the 
expected direction. There is also a strong 
association between DFLO and DFL2 (t-ratio 
2.834) 
. 
It would therefore seem that the estimates are 
very sensitive to the method of estimation used. 
The estimates of DFL, DOL, and DCL will be used 
in the subsequent probit analysis in Chapter 8 to 
determine if any of these leverage measures are 
statistically significant in determining the 
choice between debt and equity in the capital 
issue decision. 
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5-6 Relationship between Beta and DFL, DOL, and 
DCL 
5-6-1 Variation in Beta and DFL, DOL, and DCL 
The empirical findings of Mandelker and Rhee 
(1984) suggested that the degrees of operating 
and financial leverage explain a large proportion 
of the variation in beta. 
Classical regressions were ran of the various 
measures of DFL, DOL, and DCL, against beta. The 
results are summarised in Table 5.5. 
5-6-2 Analysis of Regressions of Beta and DFL, 
DOL, and DCL 
In looking at the relationship between beta, DFL, 
DOL, and DCL, the following was noted: 
(i) the signs of the coefficients are as 
expected, i. e. there is a positive relationship 
between beta and the measures of risk. This is 
as anticipated, given that beta captures 
systematic risk, and systematic risk increases 
with leverage measures. 
This would suggest that an even better explanator 
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TABLE 5.5 : SUMMARY OF REGRESSIONS OF DFL, DOL, DCL, AND BETA 
Dependent Coefficient T-ratio Mean Std Std 
Variable (Indep. Var. ) (Indep. Var. ) Error Dev'n 
Independent 
Variable 
BETA DFL 0.9687 5.988 1.1104 0.1618 0.2805 
BETA DFL2 1.1509 9.341 1.1060 0.1232 0.3023 
BETA DFLPY 0.8104 4.773 1.1060 0.1698 0.3023 
BETA DFLO 1.4442 3.226 1.1060 0.4477 0.3023 
BETA DOL 1.4009 2.172 1.1060 0.6450 0.3023 
BETA DCL 5.2759 1.548 1.1060 3.4089 0.3023 
Note : DFL = DFL based on Mandetker & Rhee calc'n 
DFL2 = DFL based on (straight). averaging 
DFLPY = DFL for year prior to capital issue 
DFLO = DFL for year of capital issue 
DOL = DOL based on Mandelker & Rhee calc'n 
DCL = DCL based on DFL x DOL (Mandlker & Rhee calc'n) 
BETA = BETA obtained from Datastream 
of beta could be obtained by combining DFL and 
DOL into DCL (alternatively, one could view DFL 
and DOL as components of DCL). 
One would expect to capture the decomposition of 
beta into operating and financial risk, since: 
beta =f (DCL) 
, 
and therefore: 
beta =f (DOL x DFL) 
, 
if that is the case then DCL would outperform 
both of them in the regression, i. e. there should 
be a better relationship between beta and DCL, 
than between beta and DFL, or beta and DOL. 
(ii) As can be seen from Table 5.5 this is not 
supported 
-by the results of the regressions of 
DCL on beta. It does not show such a strong 
relationship as either DFL or DOL on beta. 
There is a strong relationship between beta and 
DFL (t-ratio 5.988), and between beta and DFLPY 
(t-ratio 4.773), but the strongest relationship 
is between beta and DFL2 (t-ratio of 9.341). 
This latter is a very strong relationship indeed; 
whilst the relationship between beta and DCL is 
weak (t-ratio of 1.548). 
There are several possible explanations for this: 
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(i) the DCL measure is not properly specified. 
It may be that (DFL x DOL) is not appropriate 
where those estimates have been generated by 
averaging or regression. The functional form of 
the model assumes proportionality (in sales, 
etc. ) but these variables are non-linear. 
(ii) operating and financial leverage are 
perhaps to some extent substitutes 
(iii) the non-linear elasticity proportions. of 
DCL do not relate well to the more linear 
attributes of beta. 
5-7 Conclusions 
EBIT-EPS analysis is in essence a simplistic, 
deterministic method of arriving at the preferred 
financing alternative. Although it has been 
extended in this Chapter to 'preference versus 
ordinary shares' and 'preference shares versus 
debt' choices, these limitations remain. 
It is generally accepted that the stochastic 
process that best characterises EBIT over time is 
a martingale. In such a process, the uncertainty 
that attaches to the value of EBIT at time t 
into 
the future is amt, where a is the instantaneous 
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variance of the process. The smaller the value 
of t, the better the current (realised) value of 
EBIT approximates the value at time t. To this 
extent, the omission of explicit consideration of 
uncertainty is tantamount to a 'short-termist' 
approach to the finance choice problem. 
The analysis of this Chapter is subsequently 
picked up empirically in two ways. 
First, the 'preferred' method is analysed by 
means of hypothetical reconstructions in Chapter 
6. Although of interest to look directly to see 
if companies appear to use the finance method 
that maximises EPS, this information is also 
captured in the form of a dummy variable which is 
used in the probit analysis in Chapter 8. 
Second, the sensitivity of EPS to changes in EBIT 
and output volume is captured by the elasticity 
measures DFL and DOL, which are potentially 
informative risk measures that are estimated in 
this Chapter prior to their inclusion in the 
probit model of Chapter 8. A priori, the nigner 
the DFL, the less likely a company is to finance 
with debt because this would add further 
variability to the EPS. 
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The next Chapter deals with the first task 
- 
the 
use of financial reconstructions to determine the 
preferred finance method based on EPS-EBIT 
analysis. 
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CHAPTER 6: FINANCIAL STATEMENT RECONSTRUCTION 
6-1 Introduction 
The purpose of the financial statement analysis 
is (i) to investigate whether the method of issue 
chosen appears to be that which maximises EPS, 
and (ii) to derive a dummy variable which will be 
used in subsequent regression analysis, this 
variable indicating which method of finance gives 
rise to the higher EPS. The main benefit of this 
approach is that, given that all companies are 
different, and therefore it is impossible to find 
two companies which are perfect substitutes other 
than that one has issued debt and one equity, 
this approach allows one to hold everything 
constant except for the method of issue. 
The reconstruction proceeds as follows. Those 
companies which issued debt had their financial 
statements reconstructed to see what the effect 
would have been if they had issued equity, and 
vice versa. The reconstructions are carried out 
for the year of the capital issue, and the year 
following. The year of issue may be the focus 
point for those people who have a very short-term 
outlook, whilst the year following represents the 
'steady state'. 
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The results of the reconstructions provide 
evidence that is consistent with functional 
fixation on EPS (the performance of the firm 
tends to be judged to an irrational extent on 
EPS). This was particularly apparent for the 
companies which had originally issued debt, when 
in most cases, the reconstructions showed that a 
lower EPS would have resulted had they issued 
equity. 
6-2 Methodology 
6-2-1 Choice of Methodology 
There are several methodological approaches which 
could be undertaken, viz: 
statistical, 
case study, 
questionnaires/field work. 
The standard statistical analysis looks for 
variables which partition the data in such a way 
that the determinants of debt-equity choice can 
be explained. This approach is adopted 
subsequently, however the difficulty with it is 
in trying to work out the appropriate form for 
the model and what the appropriate variables 
6-2 
would be. As discussed in Chapter 2, there is no 
consensus view as to the appropriate theoretical 
paradigm, let alone the appropriate model 
specification. 
Reconstruction offers a number of advantages in 
the present context: 
(i) given the absence of close substitutes for 
any given company, reconstruction is the only 
technique that enables all other factors (other 
than the debt-equity choice under consideration) 
to be held constant. 
(ii) the data required to perform the 
reconstructions in this context are relatively 
'hard'. For example, as is shown later, a debt 
issue hypothesised as the alternative to an 
actual equity issue can be fairly accurately 
modelled with reference to merchant banking 
procedures which make use of the benchmark gilt 
mechanism. 
It is slightly more difficult to infer the terms 
of equity issues although certain assumptions in 
line with the empirical findings of Davidson and 
Mallin (1992) can be used. 
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(iii) 'knock-on' effects such as taxation can be 
dealt with satisfactorily given knowledge of 
taxation rules and accounting procedures. In the 
case of taxation, a note of caution is 
appropriate. In the event of tax-exhausted 
companies, it is not easy to work out from 
conventional published information the. extent to 
which a company is tax-exhausted. Although 
evidence was collected from Datastream on 
companies with certain tax problems 
- 
for 
example, irrecoverable ACT, it is difficult. to 
deal with this problem satisfactorily but the 
margin of error on overall EPS calculations is 
unlikely to be significant. 
The reconstruction work has two clearly defined 
categories, viz: 
(i) those companies which had issued equity - 
for these companies the reconstruction 
investigates the implications had debt been 
issued instead of equity, and 
(ii) those companies which had issued debt - for 
these companies the reconstruction investigates 
the implications had equity been issued instead 
of debt. 
6-4 
The main sample comprised 'simple' issues, i. e. 
straight debt for straight equity and vice versa. 
A small number of more complex financial 
instruments available to companies are also 
examined. The sample was chosen from the 
companies which were sent questionnaires on 
capital issues (see Appendix 3.2 for, list of 
these). 
The problems of reconstruction are discussed 
below. 
6-2-2 Complications Encountered in the 
Reconstruction Procedure 
There were a number of complications experienced 
in the reconstruction procedure. Some 
complications apply only in the case of debt 
reconstructions for companies originally issuing 
equity, whilst others apply only to equity 
reconstructions for companies originally issuing 
debt. These specific complications are dealt 
with in the relevant sections (6-2-3 and 6-2-4). 
Complications which affected all reconstructions 
are discussed below. 
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(a) Calculation of number of shares 
On the reconstructions, there is a section which 
shows the following items: 
(i) The total number of ordinary shares in 
issue at the start of the year 
(ii) Weighted average number of ordinary 
shares in issue at the start of the year 
(iii) The number of new ordinary shares 
issued during the year (i. e. increase in the 
year) 
(iv) The number of new ordinary shares used 
in the EPS calculation (i. e. increase in the 
year in weighted average number of shares) 
(v) The total number of ordinary shares in 
issue at the end of the year 
(vi) The weighted average number of 
ordinary shares in issue at the end of the 
year. 
In trying to arrive at the original figures for 
the total number of ordinary shares in issue and 
for the weighted average ordinary share capital, 
the initial view taken was that the former could 
be arrived at by dividing the Datastream figures 
for total ordinary share capital by the EPS (with 
EPS calculated on the year end number of ordinary 
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shares) and the weighted average share capital 
could be inferred by the EPS figure (with EPS 
calculated on the average number of ordinary 
shares in issue). However Datastream adjusts the 
EPS figure to take account of rights and scrip 
issues subsequent to the year end, e. g. the EPS 
figure for 1987 would be adjusted to tale account 
of a rights issue in 1990. So if the Datastream 
EPS figure as given had been used this would have 
been referring to the number of shares in issue 
in 1987 plus any new shares from subsequent 
rights or scrip issues. Expressions were 
therefore set up on Datastream to derive the 
number of shares in issue at any specific year 
end, both in total and also for the weighted 
average number of shares. This involved 
stripping out any subsequent adjustment for new 
shares to arrive back at the 'raw' figure for a 
particular year. For the total number of shares 
the expression was Datastream item 246/item 245, 
whilst for the weighted average number of shares 
the expression was Datastream item 248/item 245. 
These item numbers are not generally available, 
but were provided by Datastream to facilitate the 
above calculation. 
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(b) Implications of SSAP3 on Reconstructions 
One particular problem that had to be dealt with 
was the calculation of EPS when there is a rights 
issue during the accounting period. This 
affected both those cases for which the actual 
issue was a rights issue, and those where the 
hypothetical comparative was a rights issue in 
the equity for debt reconstructions. 
(i) SSAP 3 and Rights Issues 
Statement of Standard Accounting Practice (SSAP) 
3 on Earnings per Share states 'most issues for 
cash in this country are in the form of rights 
issues rather than at full market price', para 
14. SSAP3 then deals with the effect of a rights 
issue on the calculation of EPS: 
(i) Earnings per share for prior years : Where 
equity shares are issued by way of rights 
during the period it is recommended that the 
factor for adjustment of past earnings per 
share after a rights issue be based on the 
closing price on the last day of quotation 
of the shares cum rights. The factor is 
therefore: 
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Theoretical EX-RIGHTS price 
Actual CUM RIGHTS price on the last day 
of quotation cum rights 
Where a rights issue is made during the year 
under review, the earnings per share for the 
previous year, and for all earlier years, 
will need to be adjusted by the factor, 
calculated as above, to correct for the 
bonus element in the rights issue, (para 17) 
. 
(ii) Earnings per share for the year in which a 
rights issue is made: For the current year 
in which a rights issue is made it would be 
undesirable to split the earnings into two 
periods, one before the rights issue and one 
after this event. It is necessary to adjust 
the weighted average share capital by taking 
the proportion of the capital in issue 
before the rights issue, applying to this 
figure the reciprocal of the factor set out 
above, i. e., 
Actual cum rights price 
Theoretical ex rights price 
and adding the proportion in issue after the 
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rights issue. 
Example: 
On 1st January 1991, X plc had an issued share 
capital of 720,000 ordinary 25p nominal value 
fully paid shares. 
A rights issue was announced on 1st June 1991 of 
1: 4 at E1 per share. Market value per share on 
30th June 1991 was £2 (the closing price on the 
last day of quotation of the share cum-rights). 
On 1st July, the rights issue took place. 
The rights issue on ist July 1991 can be split 
into (i) fresh issue at market value and (ii) 
bonus issue. 
(i) fresh issue at market value 
Total proceeds from rights issue = 180,000 shares 
at £1 per share = £180,000. 
The market price = £2 per share. 
Fresh issue at market value = £180000 = 90,000 
£2 
shares. 
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(ii) bonus issue 
Total number of shares issued = 180,000 
Less fresh issue at market value = (90,000) 
Bonus issue = 90,000 
Bonus issue of 90,000 shares is based on: 
(i) 720,000 shares in issue on ist Jan. 1991 
(ii) 90,000 shares (fresh issue) on ist Jul. 
1991 
i. e. a total of 810,000 shares. 
The bonus ratio is therefore 90,000: 810,000 = 1: 9 
This gives a factor of 9/10. 
Shares Actual Weighted Av. 
1/1/91 
1/7/91 
Fresh iss. 
1/7/91 
Bonus iss. 
720,000 x10/9 x6/12 400,000 
90,000 
810,000 
90000 
31/12/91 900,000 
X10/9 x6/12 450,000 
850,000 
If the earnings available for ord. shareholders 
were £300,000, then the EPS would be 35p/share: 
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i. e. E300,000 
850,000 
If the previous year's earnings had been 
£220,000, giving an EPS of 31p/share 
(£220,000/720,000), then this would be adjusted 
as follows-to take account of the bonus element 
in the 1991 rights issue: 
31p x 9/10 = 27.9p/share. 
The effect of these requirements is discussed 
more fully in the relevant 'equity to debt' or 
'debt to equity' scenarios. 
Two further points should be mentioned in 
relation to SSAP3 and the calculation of EPS. 
(ii) SSAP3 and Part-Paid Shares 
The first concerns part-paid issues, where SSAP3 
states "where some of the shares are not fully 
paid, the earnings should be apportioned over the 
different classes of shares in accordance with 
their dividend rights or other rights to 
participate in profits", para 10. Therefore if 
a E1 nominal share (having a right to participate 
in profits) were 40p paid up, then in the 
weighted average number of shares calculation for 
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EPS, 5 such shares would count, not as 5 shares, 
but as the equivalent of 2 fully paid shares, 
i. e. they are included pro rata to the amount 
paid up. This is based on the assumption that 
shareholders of partly paid shares are to receive 
such proportion of the dividend entitlement due 
to fully paid shareholders so as to reflect the 
extent and period that the shares are partly 
paid. 
(iii) SSAP3 and Convertibles 
Secondly, SSAP3 states "where a listed company 
has outstanding debentures or loan stock (or 
preference shares) convertible into equity shares 
of the company.... in addition to the basic 
earnings per share, the fully diluted earnings 
per share should be calculated", para 20. It 
further states "the fully diluted earnings per 
share should be calculated on the assumption that 
the maximum number of new equity shares had been 
issued on conversion and that this conversion had 
taken place on the first day of the period (or on 
the date of issue of the convertible loan stock 
if later) 
. 
The earnings for the period should be 
adjusted by adding back the assumed saving of 
interest on the stock so converted, net of 
corporation tax", Para 30. 
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These points also affect certain reconstructions. 
6-2-3 Debt Reconstructions for Companies 
Issuing Equity 
The main problems to be encountered in the 
reconstruction of debt for those companies which 
originally issued equity were as follows: 
(a) Appropriate Coupon Rate 
For those companies which had issued equity, a 
central question was if they had issued debt what 
would the coupon on the debt have been? 
In order to address this question, discussions 
were held with major merchant banks, namely 
representatives from James Capel, S. G. Warburg, 
Smith New Court, Barclays de Zoete Wedd (BZW) and 
Cazenove, and also the Bank of England. The 
consensus was that when a company plans to issue 
debt, the debt is normally issued at par or very 
close to par and the rate of interest is set with 
reference to the 'benchmark gilt'. The benchmark 
gilt is set via an informal mechanism between the 
main brokers. It tends to be a large stock which 
is a very liquid issue, is well-traded and has a 
close spread (is traded close to par). Its 
6-14 
coupon must be reasonably current in the 
particular year for which it is a benchmark. For 
example, the 5 year benchmark gilt in 1992 is 
10.5% Exchequer 1997, the alternatives are a 
13.25% stock and a 15% stock (both of which are 
too high) and an 8.75% stock (which is too low). 
Table 6.1 shows the benchmark gilts, for the 
period 1986-1991 for debt issued for five years, 
ten years and over ten years. The number by the 
side of each gilt has been used to cross-refer to 
that particular gilt subsequently in Table 6.3 
(when comparing the coupons on debt issues to the 
relevant benchmark gilt). 
The redemption yield on the benchmark gilt 
provides the initial reference point for setting 
the coupon on an individual company's debt. A 
number of other factors are then taken into 
account, viz: 
(i) the credit rating as per Standard & Poor' s 
or Moody's 
(ii) level of interest cover 
(iii) impact on company 's gearing 
(iv) effect on company 's financial statements 
(v) security for the debt 
(vi) existing issues for a particular company 
(vii) similar issues in existence for other 
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TABLE 6.1 : BENCHMARK GILTS 1986-1992 
Year Maturity Gilt 
(years) 
(1) 1986 5 11 % Exchequer 1991 
(2) 10 10% Conversion 1996 
(3) 10+ 11.75% Treasury 2003-2007 
(4) 1987 5 13.5% Exchequer 1992 
(5) 10 8.75% Treasury 1997 
(3) 10+ 11.75% Treasury 2003-2007 
(6). 1988 5 10% Treasury 1993 
(7) 10 12% Exchequer 1998 
(8) 10+ 9% Treasury 2008 
(9) 1989 5 10% Treasury 1994 
(10) 10 12.25% Exchequer 1999 
(8) 10+ 9% Treasury 2008 
(11) 1990 5 12% Treasury 1995 
(12) 10 9% Conversion 2000, 
(8) 10+ 9% Treasury 2008 
(13) 1991 5 10% Conversion 1996 
(14) 10 10% Treasury 2001 
(8) 10+ 9% Treasury 2008 
(15) 1992 5 10.5% Exchequer 1997 
(16) 10 9.75% Treasury 2002 
(8) 10+ 9% Treasury 2008 
TABLE 6.2 : RATINGS USED BY STANDARD AND POOR & MOODY'S 
Standard and Poor's rating 
A raung of the standing of the bond. The following raungs are used: 
Rating Explanation 
A. Capacity to pay interest and repay principal is extremely strong. 
AA Very strong capäcity to pay interest and repay principal. diffenng from 
AAA only to-a small degree. 
A Strong capacity to pay interest and repay principal, but more susceptible 
to adverse changes in economic conditions than AAA or AA. 
BBB Adequate capacity to pay interest and repay principal. 
B8, B, CCC, Regarded on balance as predominantly speculative with respect to 
CC capacity to pay interest and repay principal in accordance with the terms 
of the obligation. 
C Reserved for income bonds on which no interest is being paid. 
D In default and payment of interest, and/or repayment of principal is in 
defaulL 
The ratings from AA to BB maybe modified by the addition of a "+" or "-" sign to show 
relative standing within the stated categories. 
Moody's rating 
This is a rating of the risk of investing in the company. The following ratings are usedL. 
Aaa Judged to be of the best quality. 
Aa Judged to be high quality by all standards. 
A Possess many favourable investment attributes and are considered as 
upper medium grade obligations. 
Baa Considered as medium grade obligations. 
Ba Judged to have speculative elements 
B Generally lack characteristics of a desirable investment. 
Caa Of poor standing. 
Ca Represent obligations which are speculative in a high degree. 
C The lowest rated class of bonds. 
The ratings from Aa to B may be modified by numerals 1.2 and 3 in order to give a more 
precise indication of relative debt quality in each of the categories. 
Source: Datastream 
companies 
(viii) company's reputation and how it is 
perceived by the market 
Some aspects of the above factors will now be 
discussed in more detail. 
The credit rating may use either Standard and 
Poor's (S & P) rating or Moody's rating. S&P 
rating is a rating of the standing of a 
particular bond, whereas Moody's rating is a 
rating of the risk of investing in the company. 
An explanation of the ratings used by both firms 
is shown in Table 6.2. 
Factors such as the level of interest cover, the 
capital gearing, effect on the company's 
financial statements and the security for the 
debt are often covered by debt covenants. For 
example, a typical fixed charge debenture 
agreement might stipulate that the interest 
should be covered 1.66 times, and that there 
should be capital cover of between 1 and 1.66. 
However, as might be expected, a debenture with 
a floating charge would have more severe 
restrictions in the form of covenants. These 
might stipulate the following: 
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(i) the borrowing limit covering the total 
borrowings of-the company, 
(ii) all loans to be covered 1.75 times (total 
capital and reserves - goodwill), 
(iii) prior charges should not exceed 20% of 
total tangible net assets, 
(iv) borrowings ranking 'pari passu' should not 
exceed 2/3 of tangible net assets, 
(v) prevention of disposal of assets without 
prior approval, 
(vi) interest payments must not exceed a certain 
percentage of the previous year's profit before 
interest and tax. 
Existing issues for a particular company are 
taken into account 
-a company issuing more debt 
would usually have to pay a higher rate of 
interest or offer the new issue at less than par 
in order to make it attractive enough to 
investors. 
Issues which are in existence for similar 
companies may also influence the terms of any new 
issue coming to the market. 
Finally the company's reputation and how it is 
perceived by the market both have an effect on 
the terms. For example, Hanson has a 'good' 
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reputation at present and any issue coming to the 
market tends to be viewed in a favourable light. 
The above factors all 
of the issue. Conta 
the merchant banks 
that, in practical 
setting the coupon 
follows. 
clearly influence the terms 
ct with senior personnel in 
mentioned above, revealed 
terms, the procedure for 
on debt securities is as 
The redemption yield on the benchmark gilt is 
taken as the starting point in setting the 
interest rate and then the following percentages 
are added: 
(i) 1% 
- 
high quality issues which are well 
covered, with the debt secured by a fixed 
charge 
(ii ) 2% 
- 
better quality floating charge debt, 
and poorer quality fixed charge debt 
(iii) 2%+ 
- 
less secure debt, preference shares 
and deeply subordinated debt 
For example, the appropriate benchmark gilt for 
a particular issue might have a redemption yield 
of 9%, the margin above that yield for the 
particular issue might be 1.2%, this therefore 
offers a yield of 10.2%. The debt might be 
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issued at 100 with a coupon of 10.2%, but there 
is a tendency to issue at a round coupon with a 
price fairly close to par, so for example, issue 
the debt at 99.7 with a coupon of 10.25%. 
In order to examine the link between the 
benchmark gilt and the coupon on individual debt 
issues made by companies, a sample of debt issues 
from the period 1986-1991 was examined. The 
sample comprised all debt issues brought to the 
market by companies in the capital issues 
questionnaire sample (whether they had responded 
to the questionnaire or not) where the debt 
issues were 'simple' i. e. non-convertible and 
issues fully paid not part paid. 
The coupon on these was compared to the 
redemption yield on the benchmark gilt 
appropriate for that particular issue. It was 
expected that the coupon would be the yield on 
the benchmark gilt plus 1% to 3%. The results in 
Table 6.3 show that the coupon rates on the debt 
issues examined are based on the benchmark gilt 
redemption yield plus a percentage falling in the 
range 0.535% to 2.805%. 
Therefore, when reconstructing the financial 
statements and looking at the implications had 
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debt been issued instead of equity, the debt was 
assumed to be issued at par and the coupon was 
taken as the redemption yield on the benchmark 
gilt relevant to the date of issue and the length 
of debt, plus a certain percentage. This 
percentage was examined for the range 1% to 3%, 
so that the sensitivity to coupon rates could be 
ascertained as well. 
(b) Tax Relief on Debt Interest 
Another complication which may arise in the debt 
instead of equity situation is the problem of tax 
relief on debt interest. A company might be 
unable to relieve additional tax relief against 
its current year's profits if they have 
insufficient to allow offset of the additional 
relief. In this case the assumption has been 
made that the company would either carry the 
amount back and relieve it against earlier year's 
profits or carry it forward and relieve it 
against the profits of future years. 
(c) ACT on Dividends 
Where a company has an issue of equity and this 
is substituted by debt, then the Advance 
Corporation Tax (ACT) attributable to the 
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dividends on the new shares will not arise. This 
has been viewed as a timing difference, so that 
the ACT which would have been payable at one of 
the quarter endsl is deemed to be payable in the 
form of mainstream corporation tax 9 months after 
the company's year end. 
(d) Date Interest to Accrue From 
When- a rights issue is made there are various 
significant dates in a typical rights issues 
timetable. Table 6.4 shows that there is an 
average period of 18 days between the 
announcement of the issue and the ex-rights date, 
and then an average of a further 20 days between 
the ex-rights date and the last date for payment 
in full for the rights by the shareholders. 
When reconstructing a rights issue with debt, the 
debt interest has been assumed to accrue from the 
date representing the last date for payment in 
full on the original rights issue. 
'ACT becomes due within 14 days of the end of the return 
period in which the distribution was made. Companies usually 
make quarterly returns to the Inland Revenue for the quarters 
ending 31 March, 30 June, 30 September and 31 December. If the 
company's accounting period ends on a different date, then a 
return is also made on that date. In contrast, Mainstream Corporation Tax is due 9 months after the company's year end. 
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6-2-3 Equity Reconstructions for Companies 
Issuing Debt 
The main problems to be encountered in the 
reconstruction of equity for those companies 
which originally issued debt were as follows: 
(a) Issue Price of Equity 
Firstly, the issue price of any new shares that 
would have been issued instead of debt has to be 
considered. 
By far the most common form of equity issue in 
the U. K. is a rights issue, due in part to the 
pre-emption clause appearing in the 1980 
Companies Act (s17-19) and subsequently in the 
consolidating 1985 Companies Act (s89). However, 
Stock Exchange regulations had effectively 
mandated pre-emption for a number of years prior 
to this. The statutory pre-emption clauses 
require that, unless the Articles of Association 
state otherwise, new shares must first be offered 
pro-rata to existing shareholders bef ore they can 
be offered generally. A special resolution 
requring a 75% majority is required to disapply 
pre-emption rights. 
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Given that rights issues are the most common form 
of equity issue in the U. K., the price to be 
inferred for equity was based on a rights issue. 
Davidson and Mallin (1992) carried out an 
extensive review of all 'simple' U. K. rights 
issues over the period 1985-1992. They found 
that the average discount of the rights in 
relation to the market price was close to 20%. 
This figure has been used when calculating the 
number of ordinary shares to be issued to equal 
the same monetary amount as the debt raised. 
(b) Calculation of Weighted Average Number 
of shares 
A pivotal problem encountered in the 
reconstructions was how to calculate the weighted 
average number of shares for use in the EPS 
calculation. It was clear that for any attempt 
at reconstruction using a hypothetical rights 
issue, it would be necessary to arrive at a 
figure for the weighted average number of shares 
using the adjustment recommended in SSAP3. As 
noted above, for rights issues this involves an 
adjustment requiring the actual cum-rights price 
and the theoretical ex-rights price. 
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A formula was set-up to try to calculate the ex- 
rights and cum-rights prices, utilising the 
results of Davidson & Mallin (1992) who found 
that, on average, there is approximately a 20% 
discount on the offer price of a rights issue 
compared to the share's current market value. 
Example: 
A company has a share capital of 2000 fl 
ordinary shares. The current share price is 
£4 per share. 
The company requires £2000 for a project. 
The company could raise the funds through a 
debt issue, at say 10% p. a., and the share 
price- would remain at £4. Alternatively, 
the company could raise the money via a 
rights issue. 
In order to find the theoretical ex-rights 
price that would be required to calculate 
the weighted average number of ordinary 
shares to be used in the EPS calculation if 
a rights issue were made, the following 
calculation can be made. 
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Assuming that: 
Po = price before rights issue (0.8Pc) 
Pc = price during the period of the 
rights issue (i. e. cum rights price) 
PX = theoretical ex-rights price 
£B = amount of bond issue to be replaced 
then: 
assume Po = 0.8Pc 
= 0.8 x £4 
_ 
£3.20 
N= 2000 shares (given) 
M= £B = 2000 
Po £3.20 
= 625 shares 
The terms of the rights issue are: 
M: N (= m: n) 
625 : 2000 
5: 16 
Px = mP + nP 
m+n 
=5x3.20 + 16 x4 
21 
= 16 + 64 
21 
= £3.81 
Therefore, the theoretical ex-rights price is 
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£3.81. This could then be used in the SSAP3 
calculation discussed above. 
The formula outlined above has been used for all 
the debt to equity reconstructions in order to 
work out the ex-rights price. 
The share price for Pc was taken as the share 
price on the announcement date of the debt. 
For many companies which had made a debt issue, 
there was also an actual increase in the number 
of ordinary shares in issue during the year. It 
would not have been practical to exclude these 
companies from the reconstruction exercise, given 
that the majority of companies were affected. The 
date of the equity issue was ascertained from 
Extel cards. 
When calculating any bonus element arising from 
the rights, it was necessary to determine whether 
the increase in shares during the year arose 
before or after the rights issue. In the former 
situation, i. e. if the issue took place before 
the rights issue, then two figures were 
calculated in order to be able to work out the 
bonus element in the rights issue. These were 
(i) the number of shares in issue at the start of 
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the year up to the date of the actual issue and 
then (ii) the figure calculated in (i) to which 
is added the number of shares in the new issue, 
taken up to the date of the rights issue. The 
bonus element is therefore worked out on (i) the 
number of shares in issue for the whole period 
before the-rights issue and (ii) those in issue 
for only some of the period before the rights 
issue. Straight time apportionment is used to 
calculate the weighted average number of shares. 
In the latter situation, i. e. where the increase 
in ordinary shares occurs after the rights issue, 
then no bonus element arises on the new shares. 
The bonus element calculation still needs to be 
done for the shares in issue before the rights 
issue. For the final figure for the weighted 
average shares, the amount of any new issue 
(after the rights issue) is calculated on a 
straight time apportionment basis, and added to 
the figure worked out previously as a result of 
the rights issues calculation. 
(c) Irrecoverable ACT 
Another consideration is that of irrecoverable 
ACT. When more shares are issued the total 
amount of the dividend paid will almost 
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invariably be higher. This may lead to 
irrecoverable-ACT as the ACT set-off in any year 
is limited to the amount of ACT that would relate 
to a dividend that, when grossed up for the ACT, 
would absorb all the taxable income. A company 
is therefore only entitled to offset a maximum 
amount of ACT currently equal to 25. % of the 
aggregate of the company's profits including 
chargeable gains. 
The individual company's accounts details were 
checked to Datastream to check whether there was 
any existing irrecoverable ACT. Datastream item 
164 'Irrecoverable Advance Corporation Tax' was 
checked for all companies, and the results are 
shown in Table 6.4A. Only one debt issue is 
affected by irrecoverable ACT (although one 
company which originally issued debt does have a 
write-back of irrecoverable ACT). The assumption 
was then made that any additional equity issue 
would not give rise to irrecoverable ACT - this 
would seem to be a reasonable assumption given 
the ACT carry back and carry forward reliefs 
discussed below. 
Unrelieved ACT can be carried back for six years 
or forward indefinitely against other years' 
corporation tax liability. The assumption has 
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TABLE 6.4A : COMPANIES WITH IRRECOVERABLE ACT 
Company Amount Year 
£mn 
Bowater (1.8) * 1990 YI(E) 
Bowater (0.4) * 1991 YF(E) 
Casket 0.053 1991 YI(E) 
Cookson Group 5.6 1991 YI(E) 
Renold 0.5 1986 YF(E) 
Blue Circle (18.5) * 1988 YI(D) 
British Steel 35.0 1992 YI(D) 
Note: YI(E) = year of capital issue (equity) 
YF(E) = year following year of capital issue (equity) 
YI(D) = year of capital issue (debt) 
YF(D) = year following year of capital issue (debt) 
* = negative irrecoverable ACT (i. e. a write-back) 
therefore been made that any additional ACT which 
cannot be relieved against the profits for the 
year will be either carried back or carried 
forward against future years' profits. 
(d) Corporation Tax Implications 
Thirdly, as the amount of relief in respect of 
debt interest will be reduced, then the tax 
associated with this must be added back to the 
tax charge for the year. 
(e) Interest Capitalised 
A note was also made of any interest capitalised. 
Some companies with large interest payments 
choose to capitalise the interest associated 
with, for example, a loan that has financed the 
purchase of a building. This interest does not, 
per se, pass through the profit and loss account, 
although it may indirectly through depreciation 
(amortisation) charges. However, it would not 
have the same impact because the associated 
capital asset would generally be depreciated over 
a much longer period than the term of the loan, 
so the impact of the interest charges on profits 
would be diluted (and would not show at all for 
income gearing measures). 
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TABLE 6.4B : COMPANIES WITH CAPITALISED INTEREST 
Company Amount Year 
£nn 
Anglia Secure Homes 0.522 1990 YI(E) 
Bowater 7.6 1990 YI(E) 
Bowater 3.1 1991 YF(E) 
Community Hospital 1.074 1991 YI(E) 
Allied Lyons 2.0 1989 YI(D) 
Allied Lyons 3.0 1990 YF(D) 
Asda 17.5 1987 YI(D) 
Asda 17.4 1988 YF(D) 
Asda 
. 
27.9 1989 YI(D) 
Asda 38.1 1990 YF(D) 
Bass 1.0 1989 YI(D) 
Bass 3.0 1990 YF(D) 
Forte 11.2 1990 YI(D) 
Forte 12.0 
-1991 YF(D) 
Lasmo 1.2 1986 YI(D) 
Lasmo 1.4 1987 YF(D) 
Taylor Woodrow 5.2 1989 YI(D) 
Taylor Woodrow 8.7 1990 YF(D) 
Vaux Group 1.302 1989 YI(D) 
Vaux Group 2.775 1990 YF(D) 
Whitbread 9.0 1991 YI(D) 
Whitbread 8.8 1992 YF(D) 
Next 3.459 1988 YI(C) 
Next 6.5 1989 YF(C) 
Note: YI(E) = year of capital issue (equity) 
YF(E) = year following year of capital issue (equity) 
YI(D) = year of capital issue (debt) 
YF(D) = year following year of capital issue (debt) 
YI(C) 
= year of capital issue (convertible bonds) 
YF(C) = year following year of capital issue (convertible bonds) 
When carrying out a reconstruction of equity for 
a debt issue on which the interest had been 
capitalised, there was usually little or no 
interest to be added back on the equity 
reconstruction. Although the full amount of 
interest on the debt could have been added back 
(even though the company itself had capitalised 
the interest arising from the original issue of 
debt) it was felt that this would have been 
distortionary. Table 6.4B shows that many of the 
companies which issued debt originally chose to 
capitalise the interest 
-a policy which would 
have resulted in a higher EPS. 
(f) Timing Problems 
Occasionally debt is issued in two 'tranches', 
say, six months apart. On the reconstruction, 
the whole amount of the equity issue is deemed to 
have been made on the date of issue of the first 
tranche of debt. The rationale being that when 
the debt was issued in two stages, it would have 
been known that the money from the second tranche 
would be available within a fairly short time 
period, therefore the whole amount has been 
included from the first date for the equity. A 
part-paid equity issue could have been used for 
the reconstruction but in practice this is not 
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generally very popular, particularly for the 
short time span (between the first part of the 
issue and the second) being discussed. 
6-3 Reconstruction Procedure 
6-3-1 Obtaining the Data 
The procedure followed in order to reconstruct 
the statements will now be considered in detail. 
In all cases the original data were obtained from 
Datastream (using program 190A for the profit and 
loss account data) 
. 
This included details of the 
operating profit, interest charges, published 
pre-tax profit, taxation charges, preference 
dividends, minority interest and tax rate. All 
of the accounts items for a published set of 
financial statements were checked from Datastream 
to published accounts of several companies, to 
ensure that Datastream's definition of any 
particular item was in agreement with the 
published accounts figure. This led to several 
detailed discussions with analysts at Datastream, 
to ensure that the resulting data items used were 
in agreement with the usual definitions of the 
various account items. 
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Examples of the areas discussed were: 
(i) the calculation of the tax charge to ensure 
that the Datastream figure had not been adjusted 
(for the effects of SSAP15 [withdrawn] for 
example) by the Datastream analysts so that it no 
longer mirrored the tax charge per the. published 
accounts; and 
(ii) to ensure that the 'earnings for ordinary 
shareholders' figure was as published by the 
company. The Datastream analysts may 
occasionally reclassify, for example, an 
exceptional gain as an extraordinary gain if they 
feel that, within the definitions of SSAP6 (now 
superseded by FRS3) it is an extraordinary gain 
rather than an exceptional one. In other words, 
they try to adjust f or any perceived manipulation 
by companies in their financial statements. 
6-3-2 Data Relating to Equity Reconstructions 
for Companies Issuing Debt 
The details of bonds were obtained using the 
Datastream bonds programs 145A and 145K. This 
gave the date of issue, the amount issued, the 
coupon, the issue price, the redemption date, the 
due dates for interest. Unfortunately the 
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Moody's and Standard and Poor's ratings were 
given only in a few cases. Details of each 
bond/debenture were checked to Extel cards to 
verify the Datastream data. 
The initial statement was constructed, splitting 
out the interest attributable to the, new debt 
issue and the tax associated with it. In the 
situation where the debt was issued part way 
through the accounting period, the amount of 
interest paid/payable for the period was 
determined by time apportionment of the annual 
interest and that was the amount entered in the 
statement. The tax rate was checked to 
Datastream for the individual companies. 
The 'what if, equity scenario was then 
constructed. Any debt interest attributable 
to the new issue was deducted from the total 
interest charge, whilst any tax relief that would 
have been obtained against the new debt interest 
was added back. The overall effect on the total 
of earnings for ordinary shareholders is often a 
decline. If new debt were not issued then equity 
would be and the assumption is made that the new 
ordinary shares would be issued via a rights 
issue at a discount of 20% on their current 
market price (see earlier reference to Davidson 
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and Mallin 1992). The share price was obtained 
from Datastream. The total raised from the debt 
issue was divided by the discounted share price 
(80% of current market value) to arrive at the 
number of new shares that would have been issued 
if equity had been issued instead of debt. This 
was added to the original number of shares in 
issue to arrive at the total number of ordinary 
shares and then a weighted average. number of 
shares was used to calculate a revised EPS figure 
(see below for details of calculation). 
6-3-3 Data Relating to Debt Reconstructions 
for Companies Issuing Equity 
Details of equity issues were obtained from Extel 
and Datastream. Companies in the reconstruction 
sample which had made rights issues were 
contacted and the majority provided a copy of the 
circular which would have been sent to 
shareholders. Details of the issue were noted in 
each case: the announcement date, the ex-rights 
date, the cum-rights price, the last date for 
full payment, and the amount raised by the issue 
and the number of shares issued. These important 
dates in typical rights issue timetables are 
shown in Table 6.5 which outlines the principal 
events for a number of rights issues (these are 
6-34 
TABLE 6.5 : RIGHTS ISSUES TIMETABLES 
Company 
1 Anglia Sec. Homes 
2 Bimec 
3 Bowater 
4 Bowthorpe 
5 Casket 
6 Cater Allen 
7 Comm. Hosp. 
8 Cookson Group 
9 De La Rue * 
10 Domino Printing 
11 Eurotunnel 
12 Jeyes 
13 Lovell, Y. J. 
14 Midland Bank 
15 MountLeigh ** 
16 Regalian 
17 Renold 
18 Richards 
19 SketchLey 
20 Tay Homes 
21 Tibbet & Britten 
22 Westbury 
Totals 
Averages 
Ann. date Ex-rights Last date for Ann. 
- "Ex-rts. - Ann. - date pymt. in full Ex-rts. Last pymt Last pymt 
(A) (B) (C) 
270490 240590 150690 27 22 49 
190791 160891 050991 28 20 48 
300590 040690 240690 5 20 25 
200987 300987 221087 10 22 32 
030590 220590 110690 19 20 39 
140690 180690 090790 4 21 25 
200291 110391 020491 19 22 41 
210391 110491 110491 21 0 21 
250991 141091 041191 19 21 40 
021190 121190 031290 10 21 31 
011289 041289 221289 3 18 21 
250491 210591 100691 26 20 46 
070787 110887 030987 35 23 58 
050791 300791 190891 25 20 45 
120691 010791 220791 19 21 40 
250185 120285 060385 18 22 40 
091288 090189 300189 31 21 52 
180690 120790 030890 24 22 46 
080587 020687 240687 25 22 47 
220389 230389 140489 1 22 23 
230591 110691 030791 19 22 41 
388 422 810 
18 20 38.5 
Note: * = Unable to obtain copy of the rights issues document 
** = Mountleigh is now in administrative receivership 
(A) = Number of days from announcement date to ex-rights date 
(B) = Number of days from ex-rights date to date for last payment 
(C) = Number of days from announcement date to date for last 
payment 
the equity to debt sample for which the 
reconstructions are shown in Appendix 6.1). 
The main dates of concern in the reconstructions 
are the date of announcement of the rights issue, 
the ex-rights date and the date for payment in 
full of the monies relating to the rights issue. 
From the date of announcement, the effect on the 
share price of any particular issue can be seen; 
the ex-rights date is used to determine the last 
cum-rights price which is used in the SSAP3 
adjustment, and the date for payment is taken as 
the date that the money is actually received by 
the firm, and so in equity to debt 
reconstructions, is taken as the date from which 
interest would be payable on the hypothetical 
debentures. 
The amount of debt to be raised was taken to be 
the proceeds of the equity issue. The date of 
announcement of the equity issue was taken as the 
reference point for the redemption yield on the 
relevant benchmark gilt, which was obtained from 
Datastream, using program 301V. Statements were 
then constructed for each of three coupons - 
being 1%, 2% and 3% on the redemption yield on 
the benchmark gilt. Additional interest was 
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accounted for in each case, with interest being 
deemed payable from the 'last date for full 
payment' of the rights issue which the debt was 
serving to reconstruct. This date was chosen on 
the basis that interest would usually accrue from 
when the money is received. The total interest 
charge would increase with the additional 
interest, whilst the associated tax relief would 
reduce the total tax charge. A revised total 
earnings for ordinary shareholders was arrived 
at, and this was divided by the revised weighted 
average number of ordinary shares (i. e. the 
weighted average number of ordinary shares at the 
year end less the increase in the number of those 
shares attributable to the latest issue of equity 
now being reconstructed with debt) to find the 
revised EPS. This was rather a messy calculation 
and the mechanics are discussed below. 
There were often increases in the ordinary share 
capital of the company, in addition to the rights 
issue. Relatively small changes, for example due 
to options being taken up, were included in the 
debt reconstruction as though they had been in 
issue for the whole year. Any capitalisation, or 
bonus issues, ranking for dividend were, as per 
SSAP3, included as though they had been in issue 
for the whole year. For any other issues, the 
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date of issue was ascertained and a similar 
exercise to that described in 6-3-2 above was 
carried out, with appropriate time apportionment 
in order to arrive at a final figure for the 
weighted average number of shares. 
Share prices were scrutinised during thp- whole of 
this period for each company to ensure that there 
were no unusual movements. 
Any ACT associated with the equity issue and any 
change in this that might have arisen as a result 
of substituting the equity with debt was treated 
as a timing difference which would have had no 
effect on the reconstructions. Similarly, any 
additional tax relief arising from the issue of 
debt was assumed to be capable of offset, either 
in the current year or via carry-back or carry 
forward. 
6-4 Reconstruction Layout 
The companies for which reconstructions were 
carried out are shown in Table 6.6. The detailed 
reconstructions of the capital issues are in 
Appendix 6.1. 
In all of the reconstructions, the first set of 
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TABLE 6.6 : SUMMARY OF CAPITAL ISSUES FOR WHICH RECONSTRUCTIONS PERFORMED 
Company Nth YrO Yr+1 Type of Amount 
issue £000 
1 Anglia Secure Homes Sep 90 91 Rights 8400 
2 Bimec Mar 92 93 Rights 11360 
3 Bowater Dec 90 91 Rights 143370 
4 Bowthorpe Dec 87 88 Rights 44480 
5 Casket Mar 91 92 Rights 5660 
6 Cater Allen Apr 91 92 Rights 14430 
7 Community Hospital Grp Jun 91 92 Rights 10970 
8 Cookson Grp Dec 91 92 Rights 83000 
9 De La Rue Mar 92 93 Rights 160300 
10 Domino Printing Oct 91 92 Rights 15800 
11 Eurotunnel Dec 90 91 Rights 568000 
12 Jeyes Dec 89 90 Rights 7450 
13 Kwik Fit Feb 89 90 Rights 34400 
14 Lovell, Y. J. Sep 91 92 Rights 30900 
15 Midland Bank Dec 87 88 Rights 698800 
16 Regalian Mar 92 93 Rights 20786 
17 Renold Mar 85 86 Rights 9370 
18 Richards Sep 89 90 Rights 3678 
19 Sketchley Mar 91 92 Rights 21700 
20 Tay Homes Jun 87 88 Rights 6100 
21 Tibbet & Britten Dec 89 90 Rights 16400 
22 Westbury Feb 92 93 Rights 21590 
23 Allied Lyons Feb 89 90 Debt 350000 
24 Asda Apr 87 88 Debt 100000 
25 Asda Apr 89 90 Debt 125000 
26 Bass Sep 89 90 Debt 250000 
27 Blue Circle Dec 88 89 Debt 150000 
28 British Land Mar 87 88 Debt 12560 
29 British Land Mar 92 93 Debt 150000 
30 British Steel Mar 92 93 Debt 150000 
31 City Site Estates Sep 87 88 Debt 25000 
32 Dares Estates Dec 87 88 Debt 35000 
33 Forte Jan 90 91 Debt 100000 
34 Land Securities Mar 87 88 Debt 200000 
35 Lasmo Dec 86 87 Debt 50000 
36 Lasmo Dec 89 90 Debt 150000 
37 MEPC Sep 86 87 Debt 75000 
38 Taylor Woodrow Dec 89 90 Debt 80000 
39 Vaux Sep 89 90 Debt 60000 
40 Whitbread Feb 91 92 Debt 135000 
41 Helical Bar Jan 88 89 CCRPrefs 19600 
42 Next Jan 88 89 Cnv. Bonds 100000 
43 Worcester Grp Dec 90 91 Cu. RPrefs 5049 
Note: YrO = Year of capital issue for which reconstruction 
carried out 
Yr+1 = Year following year of capital issue 
CCRPrefs = Cumulative convertible redeemable preference shares 
Cu. RPrefs = Cumulative redeemable preference shares 
Cnv. Bonds = Convertible bonds 
figures on the left represent the original issue, 
subsequent columns to the right represent the 
'what if' substitutions. 
In the equity to debt reconstructions, there are 
4 sets of data for each of two years, i. e. 8 sets 
in total. These are the original issue. plus debt 
reconstructions on benchmark +1%, benchmark +2% 
and benchmark +3%, for each of the two years (one 
year's data only was available in some cases 
where the issue was quite recent). 
In the debt to equity reconstructions, there are 
2 sets of data for each of two years, i. e. 4 sets 
in total. The original debt issues have been 
reconstructed on the basis of a rights issue of 
ordinary shares. 
The statements have been reconstructed for two 
years,, i. e. the year of the capital issue and the 
following year. In many ways, the year following 
the year of issue gives a more complete picture 
of the effect of a particular issue as issues are 
frequently made part-way through the year. 
The operating profit figure given by Datastream 
is essentially trading profit less government 
grants. The operating profit was therefore used 
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as a starting point and the interest deducted to 
arrive at a net profit after interest figure, but 
it was then decided that the reconstruction 
should carry on with the published pre-tax profit 
figure, so that after deduction of tax, 
preference dividend and minority interest, the 
earnings for ordinary shareholders figure could 
be compared directly with the published accounts 
figure. It should be borne in mind that in any 
subsequent reconstruction there is a 'knock on' 
effect on the net profit after interest, taxation 
charge, earnings after tax and earnings for 
ordinary shareholders (caused by changes to the 
interest figure as a result of the 
reconstruction). 
Details of each issue are then shown clearly and 
any explanation about adjustments made are noted 
on the reconstruction. 
A note is also made of any irrecoverable ACT or 
any interest which has been capitalised. 
6-5 Analysis of the Reconstructions 
The original and reconstruction issues were 
compared to analyse the effect of different types 
of capital issue on certain key accounting 
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ratios. These included earnings per share (EPS), 
capital gearing, income gearing, and dividend 
cover. 
Implicit in the analysis of the reconstructions 
is the assumption that the finance raised will 
earn the same rate of return, no matter what the 
type of finance is. This assumption is not a 
trivial one in the context of a body of 
literature emanating from the 1970s. For 
example, Baucool, Heim, Malkiel and Quandt (1970) 
suggested that different forms of finance give 
different rates of return, in particular new 
equity capital generates a significantly higher 
return than either new debt or retained earnings, 
and that the return on retained earnings (or 
'ploughback', as they called it following an 
earlier paper by Little) was particularly low. 
They point to these findings being consistent 
with the transactions costs involved with the 
different types of issue, new equity incurring 
the highest transactions costs. They were partly 
motivated by Little (1962) in his notable 
"Higgledy Piggledy Growth" and his conclusion 
that the extent of retained earnings seemed to 
have no effect on subsequent earnings growth. 
Baumol et al conclude against the conventional MM 
idea that the type of finance is irrelevant to 
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real operating returns, but there are 
considerable problems with the study and their 
results cannot be viewed as persuasive. 
6-5-1 Effect of the Reconstructions on EPS 
The effect- of the reconstructions on the EPS of 
the companies is summarised in Table 6.7 
(reconstructing from equity to debt), Table 6.8 
(reconstructing from debt to equity), Table 6.9 
(comparison of the results shown in Tables 6.7 
and 6.8), and Table 6.10 (reconstructing from 
convertible preference shares and loans to 
equity) 
. 
In each of the above tables the first of the two 
years cited for each company is the year of issue 
of the particular capital issue being examined, 
whilst the second is the year following the year 
of issue. When only one year is given, then that 
is the year of issue and the following year's 
data was not available at the time of this study. 
As mentioned earlier the reconstructions have 
been carried out for two years where the data 
were available: the year of issue, and then the 
year following which provides an idea of the 
'steady state'. 
6-41 
The EPS on the original issue is shown and then 
the revised EPS on the reconstruction. The 
monetary amount and the percentage change on the 
original EPS are highlighted. 
6-5-2 Effect on EPS of Reconstructing Equity 
Issues with Debt 
Table 6.7 shows the effect of issuing debt 
for those companies which originally issued 
equity. The effect of the reconstruction is 
shown at the benchmark +1%, +2%, and +3%. 
Whether EPS increases or decreases in a 
particular reconstruction is generally not 
dependent on the increment chosen (1%, 2%, 3%) 
above the relevant benchmark gilt rate. However, 
on the reconstructions there is often an 
improvement in EPS for the year of issue, and 
then a deterioration in the year following issue, 
or vice versa. 
From Table 6.7, it can be seen that on 4 
reconstructions the EPS would decrease for both 
years; on 4 reconstructions, where data are 
available for only one year, the EPS would again 
decrease; on 6 reconstructions, the EPS would 
increase for both years; on 3 reconstructions, 
where data are available for only one year, the 
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EPS would again increase; on 4 reconstructions, 
the EPS increases on one year and decreases on 
one year (for the same company) ; finally, for one 
company, Domino Printing, data were only 
available for the year of issue, and the issue 
was so close to the year end, that no interest 
was provided for in the debt reconstruption. 
It would appear in the foregoing analysis that 
the effect on EPS was not the key influence for 
the choice of equity. As mentioned earlier, many 
companies have been forced into issuing more 
equity, generally by means of a rights issue, in 
order to reconstruct their balance sheets and 
avoid high interest charges. 
These results are summarised in Table 6.9 and 
discussed further below. 
6-5-3 Effect on EPS of Reconstructing Debt Issues 
with Equity 
Table 6.8 shows the effect of issuing equity for 
those companies which originally issued debt. 
For both the year of the issue and the year 
following, 11 of the companies would have 
experienced a decrease in EPS if they had issued 
equity; 1 company would have experienced a 
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TABLE 6.8': COMPANIES WHICH ORIGINALLY ISSUED DEBT 
-"WHAT IF" SCENARIO 
- EQUITY INSTEAD OF DEBT 
- 
EFFECT ON EPS 
Company Yr EPS on EPS Revised Change ; ERS 
original issue (p) 
(p) Amount (p) % 
Allied Lyons 1989 43.69 42.47 (1.22) (2.79) 
1990 47.72 44.67 (3.05) (6.39) 
Asda 1987 11.38 11.08 (0.30) (2.64) 
1988 12.64 11.47 (1.17) (9.26) 
Asda 1989 14.48 14.21 (0. a. $,; 
1990 10.48 10.29 (0.19) (1.81) 
Bass 1989 108.08 104.37 (3.71) (3.43) 
1990 109.60 104.25 (5.35) (4.88) 
Blue Circle 1988 56.96 55.16 (1.8) (3.16) 
1989 29.52 29.23 (0.29) (0.98) 
British Land 1987 15.70 15.41 (0.29) (1.85) 
1988 17.83 17.50 (0.33) (1.85) 
British Land 1992 11.46 12.99 1.53 13.35 
British Steel 1992 (1.70) (2.71) (1.01) (59.41) 
City Site Estates 1987 6.00 6.55 0.55 9.17 
1988 15.33 11.45 (3.88) (25.31) 
Dares Estates 1987 2.12 2.22 0.10 4.72 
1988 4.15 3.74 (0.41) (9.88) 
Forte 1990 22.98 22.81 (0.17) (0.74) 
1991 18.85 18.69 (0.16) (0.85) 
Land Securities 1987 17.78 17.52 (0.26) (1.46) 
1988 19.07 18.72 (0.35) (1.84) 
Lasmo 1986 9.63 9.05 (0.58) (6.02) 
1987 12.40 11.33 (1.07) (8.63) 
Lasmo 1989 23.65 23.71 0.06 0.25 
1990 21.14 21.52 0.38 1.80 
MEPC 1986 16.35 16.25 (0.10) (0.61) 
1987 19.20 19.12 (0.08) (0.42) 
Taylor Woodrow 1989 23.72 23.78 0.06 0.25 
1990 16.82 17.01 0.19 1.13 
Vaux 1989 18.61 17.72 (0.89) (4.78) 
1990 20.30 19.57 (0.73) (3.60) 
Whitbread 1991 47.29 47.17 (0.12) (0.25) 
1992 35.78 37.13 1.35 3.77 
decrease in EPS for the one year's data 
available; 3 companies would have had an increase 
in EPS one year and a decrease the next; 2 
companies would have experienced an increase in 
EPS for both years; whilst 1 company would have 
experienced an increase in EPS for the one year's 
data available. 
There is much more support here for the 
proposition that debt rather than equity may be 
issued, if it will result in a higher EPS figure. 
The results are summarised and compared with 
those of the equity to debt reconstructions in 
Table 6.9. 
6-5-4 Comparison of Effect on EPS of 
Reconstructions for Debt and Equity Issues 
Table 6.9 is organised into two sections: Yr 0 
(the year of the capital issue) and Yr 1 (the 
year following the capital issue). For each 
year, there is a comparison made between the 
actual issue (i. e. equity or debt) and the 
hypothetical reconstruction in each case (i. e. 
debt or equity) in terms of which issue (actual 
or hypothetical) produces the higher EPS. The 
figures in parentheses show the number of each 
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TABLE 6.9 : SUMMARY OF NUMBER OF FIRMS IN EACH CATEGORY 
Yr 0 
----- 
Actual 
------------- - 
Issue 
- - 
Equity 
-------------------- 
Debt 
Higher EPS 11 (9) 5 (2) 
equity actual hypothetical 
Higher EPS 11 (7) 13 (2) 
debt hypothetical actual 
Yr 1 Actual 
-- 
Issue 
------------------ - ----- ------------- - 
Equity 
- 
Debt 
Higher EPS 7 (4) 3 (0%) 
equity actual hypothetical 
Higher EPS 7 (4) 13 (5) 
debt hypothetical actual 
Note: Yr 0= year of issue 
Yr 1= year following year of issue 
Figure in () indicates the number representing 
a change of 5% or more. 
issue type representing a change of 5% or more. 
The effect of the reconstruction of debt for 
equity on EPS has been included in Table 6.9 at 
the benchmark +2% figure as most companies seem 
to issue debt at a coupon that is approximately 
equivalent to this (see Table 6.3 discussed 
earlier). 
For the year of the capital issue, it can be seen 
that there were 11 actual equity issues which 
resulted in a higher EPS than their corresponding 
reconstructions for debt, and similarly 11 
reconstruction debt issues which gave a higher 
EPS than the actual equity issues. Also, 9 of 
the 11 actual equity issues resulted in an EPS 
which was higher by 5% or more than would have 
been the case on the reconstruction debt issue; 
whilst 7 out of 11 reconstruction debt issues 
resulted in an EPS which was higher by 5% or more 
than would have been the case on the actual issue 
of equity. 
There is a similar pattern for this group-in Yr 
1 (the 'steady state'), with 7 actual equity 
issues giving a higher EPS when compared to the 
hypothetical debt reconstructions, and 7 
hypothetical debt reconstructions giving a higher 
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EPS when compared to the actual equity issues. 
Similarly, for the year of the capital issue, it 
can be seen that there were 13 actual debt 
issues which resulted in a higher EPS than their 
corresponding reconstructions for equity, and 
similarly 5 reconstruction equity issues which 
gave a higher EPS than the actual debt issues. 
Also, 2 of the 13 actual debt issues resulted in 
an EPS which was higher by 5% or more than would 
have been the case on the reconstruction equity 
issue; whilst 2 out of 5 reconstruction equity 
issues resulted in an EPS which was higher by 5% 
or more than would have been the case on the 
actual issue of debt. 
There is a similar pattern for this group in Yr 
1 (the 'steady state'), with 13 actual debt 
issues giving a higher EPS when compared to the 
hypothetical equity reconstructions (5 of which 
result in the EPS being higher by 5% or more than 
on the equity reconstructions). There are 3 
hypothetical debt reconstructions giving a higher 
EPS when compared to the actual equity issues 
(although the increase in each case would be 
relatively small, with none being higher than 
5%). 
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From Table 6.9 it would appear that debt issues 
tend to be chosen if they result in a higher EPS 
than an equity issue would have done. The 
results are less conclusive for equity issues. 
6-5-5 Effect on EPS of Reconstructing Convertible 
Issues with Equity 
Finally, Table 6.10 summarised the convertible 
issues, two for convertible preference shares, 
one for a convertible bond. The reconstruction 
examined the position if the convertibles were 
converted immediately into the relevant number of 
ordinary shares. It can be seen that for two 
companies, both of which issued convertible 
preference shares, there would have been a 
decrease in the EPS for both years. This would 
amount to a sizeable percentage drop in the case 
of the Worcester Group (20.13% in the year of 
issue, 57.97% in the year following). In 
relation to the convertible bond, an issue of 
equity would have resulted in a slight increase 
in EPS. Whilst there are only the three 
convertible issues (based on responses received 
to the questionnaire, for which all accounting 
data was available), it is widely accepted that 
convertible capital issues may be used to keep 
the gearing ratio within a reasonable limit, 
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TABLE 6.10': COMPANIES WHICH ORIGINALLY ISSUED CONVERTIBLE/REDEEMABLE 
PREFERENCE SHARES 
-"WHAT IF" SCENARIO - EQUITY (ORDINARY SHARES) 
INSTEAD OF CONVERTIBLE ISSUES 
- 
EFFECT ON EPS 
Company Yr EPS on EPS Revised Change it EPS 
Original (p) 
Issue (p) Amount (p) % 
Helical Bar 1988 21.92 21.56 (0.36) (1.64) 
1989 35.50 32.20 (3.30) (9.30) 
Next 1988 19.33 19.71 0.38 1.97 
1989 10.86 11.19 0.33 3.04 
Worcester Group 1990 9.59 7.66 (1.93) (20.13) 
1991 10.42 4.38 (6.04) (57.97) 
whilst not impacting adversely on EPS. The 
implications of the reconstructions support this. 
The overall conclusion from the reconstructions 
is that there is more support for debt and 
convertible issues being made with the view of 
increasing-or maintaining EPS, than there is for 
equity issues. Equity issues are, it would seem, 
often made out of necessity to reduce the debt 
burden. 
6-6 Error Bounds on EPS 
In performing the reconstructions, there were 
certain areas/ adjustments (discussed individually 
above) which required subjective judgement. 
It is useful to put some sort of error bounds 
around the EPS figures arising as a result of the 
reconstructions. The purpose of all the 
adjustments is to arrive at a reconstructed EPS 
figure accurate to within 1 or 2%. 
The individual error sources are identified below 
with respect to each type of reconstruction (debt 
reconstruction for original equity issue, and 
vice versa) and estimates made of the possible 
error associated with each. The individual 
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errors are then aggregated to give an overall 
error distribution. 
(a) Debt Reconstruction for Equity 
The following comments can be made: 
(i) the dilution adjustments are as per SSAP3, 
(therefore no error arises from those) 
(ii) the coupon on reconstruction debt has been 
calculated by looking at the relevant benchmark 
gilt plus 1%, 2%, and 3%. As mentioned earlier, 
most companies do appear to set a coupon on debt 
of approximately the benchmark gilt +2%, the EPS 
at the 2% figure has therefore been included in 
the summary Table 6.9 discussed above. 
In order to investigate the effect on variation 
in the coupon rate of the gilt, the EPS figures 
were computed for a coupon of benchmark +1%, and 
+3% (i. e. either side of the modal coupon rate of 
benchmark +2%) as well as at coupon +2% (see 
Table 6.6). The possible error is calculated as 
follows: 
(a) calculate for each company: 
(EPS at 1% 
- 
EPS at 3%) x 100 
EPS at 2% 
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(b) Sum the individual company figures 
calculated in (i), and then average them by 
dividing by the total number of companies. 
The results are shown in Table 6.11. For the 
year of issue, this led to an average. variation 
in EPS of 
-0.59%, therefore there may be 
approximately a maximum +/-0.6% error in EPS 
(i. e. effectively +/- 0.3%). Whilst for the year 
following the year of issue, this range increased 
to 4.89% (i. e. effectively +/-2.5%). The higher 
variation in the latter case is as expected since 
a full year's interest is deducted in the year 
following the debt issue. 
An interesting point to note in relation to the 
EPS percentage changes discussed above is the 
range of those changes. In the year of issue, 
whilst the majority are in the 0%-3% range, one 
is 
-38.46%, one is -16.67%, and a third at 
21.51%. Similarly, in the year following the 
year of issue, the majority are again in the 0%- 
3% range, but one is 33.33%, another 11.21%, and 
a third 
-15.46%. These distort the overall 
average, making it lower than might have been 
expected in the year of issue and higher than 
would have been expected in the year following. 
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TABLE 6.11 : ERROR BOUNDS - VARIATION IN EPS 
f 
EARNINGS PER SHARE 
- 
YEAR OF CAPITAL ISSUE 
Actual Benchmark Benchmark Benchmark indiv. Aggreg. 
% + 1% +2% +3% %% 
Anglia Sec. -35.61 -42.58 -42.65 -42.71 -0.3048 
Bimec 5.06 5.64 5.6 5.55 1.6071 
Bowater 51.46 55.68 55.28 54.89 1.4291 
Bowthorpe 13.16 13.47 13.44 13.4 0.5208 
Casket 0.35 
-0.32 -0.39 -0.47 -38.4615 
Cater Allen 7.96 5.4 5.03 4.66 14.7117 
Comm. Hosp. 15.56 16.9 16.85 16.8 0.5935 
Cookson Grp 1.83 1.03 0.93 0.83 21.5054 
De La Rue 30.63 32.55 X2.23 31.91 1.9857 
Domino Printing 28.84 28.84 28.84 28.84 0.0000 
Eurotunnel 0.05 
-0.99 -1.08 -1.17 -16.6667 
Jeyes 16.16- 17.23 17.23 17.23 0.0000 
Kwik Fit 7.64 8.1 7.96 7.83 3.3920 
Lovell 
-22.65 -36.22 -36.31 -36.39 -0.4682 
Midland Bank 
-1.25 -1.97 -1.98 -1.99 -1.0101 
Regalian 
-19.74 -25.68 -25.79 -25.89 -0.8143 
Renold 6.67 7.68 7.68 7.68 0.0000 
Richards 8.96 11.39 11.29 11.19 1.7715 
Sketchley 
- 
-6.92 -13.24 -13.5 -13.77 -3.9259 
Tay Homes 34.85 36.47 36.47 36.47 0.0000 
Tibbet & Brit. 18.74 19.33 19.06 18.79 2.8332 
Westbury 
-17.36 -23.57 -23.77 -23.96 -1.6407 
-0.5883 1.1910 
EARNINGS PER SHARE 
- 
YEAR FOLLOWING YEAR OF CAPITAL ISSUE 
Actual Benchmark Benchmark Benchmark Indio. Aggreg. 
% +1% +2% +3% %% 
Anglia Sec. 
-49.3 -83.66 -83.92 -84.19 -0.6316 
Bowater 47.59 51.25 50.45 49.65 3.1715 
Bowthorpe 15.33 15.44 15.23 15.01 2.8234 
Casket 1.85 2.4 2.3 2.21 8.2609 
Cater Allen 7.61 3.46 2.97 2.47 33.3333 
Eurotunnel 0 
-0.89 -0.97 -1.04 -15.4639 
Jeyes 16.3 16.27 15.82 15.37 5.6890 
Kwik Fit 5.98 5.97 5.79 5.61 6.2176 
Midland Bank 0.75 1.16 1.15 1.13 2.6087 
Renold 7.9 10.91 10.77 10.63 2.5998 
Richards 9.18 9.49 9.37 9.25 2.5614 
Sketchley 7.76 7.63 7.22 6.82 11.2188 
Tay Homes 47.21 55.75 55 54.26 2.7091 
Tibbet & Brit. 22.48 23.96 23.57 23.17 3.3517 
4.8893 1.9739 
A comparison can be drawn here with the 
properties of DFL which also has an unusual 
distribution. 
Calculating the variations in EPS on an aggregate 
basis rather than an individual basis as just 
discussed may provide a more robust. estimate. 
The aggregate figures were calculated as follows: 
(a) (EPS at 1%- EPS at 3 ö) x 100 
Total EPS 
From Table 6.11, it can be seen that using the 
aggregate basis the average variation in EPS for 
the year of issue is 1.19%, whilst for the year 
following, it is 1.97%. These figures would 
imply approximately a maximum +/-1.2% error in 
EPS (i. e. effectively +/- 0.6%) in the year of 
issue, and approximately a maximum +/- 2% error 
in EPS (i. e. effectively +/- 1% error in EPS) in 
the year following. 
(iii) as far as the tax treatment was concerned, 
checks (as outlined earlier) were made to ensure 
that companies did not have irrecoverable ACT, 
and were not tax-exhausted. However, due to the 
limited tax information that is publically 
available, the error may be 0% or alternatively, 
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it may be substantial. Given that checks were 
carried out as far as available information 
allowed, a nil error has been assumed. 
(iv) changes in issue costs. The issue cost may 
vary depending on the size and type of the issue. 
It has been assumed however that these changes 
would not be significant, and that most issue 
costs could be written off against a share 
premium account balance. Therefore no error 
arises from changes in issue costs. 
Therefore one would expect there to be a maximum 
2% overall error in EPS, i. e. +/- 1%, on the debt 
for equity reconstructions. 
(b) Equity Reconstruction for Debt 
In relation to the equity reconstructions for an 
original issue of debt, the following comments 
are made: 
(i) the main uncertainty in reconstructing debt 
with equity was the discount on a rights issue, 
which would affect the number of shares issued. 
The discount taken was 20%, based on Davidson and 
Mallin (1992). They also looked at the the size 
of the rights issue in terms of the equity market 
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capitalisation of the company, and found this to 
be approximately 20%. The maximum error that 
there is likely to be on the discount is +/- 5% 
(i 
.e. a range of 10%); and therefore a 2% error 
in the number of shares (20% x 10ö). A 2% error 
in the denominator would result in approximately 
a 2% error in the EPS calculation. This can be 
shown algebraically as follows: 
Error =E-E 
n 1.02n 
where E= earnings available for ordinary 
shareholders 
n= estimation of number of shares 
= 1.02E -E 
1.02n 
=E (1-0.98039) 
n 
= 0.0196 E 
n 
i. e. approximately 0.02 E 
n 
being a possible 2% error in the EPS calculation 
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(ii) again, as far as the tax treatment was 
concerned, checks (as outlined earlier) were made 
to ensure that companies did not have 
irrecoverable ACT, and were not tax-exhausted. 
Given that checks were carried out as far as 
available information allowed, a nil error has 
been assumed. 
(iii) changes in issue costs. As discussed 
above, it has been assumed however that these 
changes would not be significant, and that most 
issue costs could be written off against a share 
premium account balance. Therefore no error 
arises from changes in issue costs. 
(iv) the dilution adjustments are as per SSAP3, 
(therefore no error arises from those) 
(v) the occurrence of interest capitalised was 
found to affect several of the companies which 
originally made debt issues. As mentioned 
earlier, no attempt was made to add it back into 
the profit for the equity reconstruction of debt 
as this would have distorted the profit figure. 
No error allowance has therefore been made for 
this as the profit figure being used for the 
equity reconstructions is the profit figure 
actually available under the original debt 
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issues. This does though highlight the fact that 
capitalising interest is a means of effectively 
achieving a higher EPS as interest does not pass 
through the profit and loss account, and the 
number of ordinary shares in issue is not 
increased either. 
Therefore, taking into account factors (i) to (v) 
above, one would expect the reconstituted EPS in 
the equity reconstructions for debt to have a 
maximum 2% overall error, i. e. +/- 1%. 
6-7 Conclusions 
In this Chapter, the income statement of a sample 
of companies has been reconstructed with an 
alternative type of capital issue to identify 
what the effect on EPS would have been. The 
results are particularly striking for debt, 
whereby nearly all of the companies which 
originally issued debt would have seen a 
deterioration in their EPS if they had issued 
equity instead. 
In the next Chapter, a comparison is made of the 
effect on capital and income gearing ratios, and 
dividend cover, of both the original and the 
alternative issues. The rates of return are also 
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examined for the different types of issue. 
Also in the next Chapter, the formulae derived in 
Chapter 5 are used to classify the types of 
issue, based on which would be preferred on the 
basis of EBIT-EPS analysis. A comparison is made 
with the original and reconstructed income 
statements based on which type of issue gives the 
higher EPS. 
Finally, in Chapter 8a probit model is 
formulated with the debt-equity choice as the 
dichotomous dependent variable, and various 
factors which might affect the debt-equity choice 
are included as independent variables. 
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CHAPTER 7: FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE DEBT-EQUITY 
CHOICE 
7-1 Introduction 
In the previous Chapter analysis centered on the 
impact of different finance issues on EPS. In 
this Chapter, the objective is to investigate the 
extent to which the debt-equity choice can be 
better modelled by the inclusion of additional 
explanatory variables 
- 
particularly gearing 
measures which relate to the preissue financial 
state of the company. 
In addition to measures of capital and income 
gearing examined in this context, other financial 
variables which may impact on the debt-equity 
choice are also investigated. These include 
dividend cover, rate of return, tax flow ratio 
and cash flow ratio. 
In order to tackle this, the apparent influence 
of different measures are investigated initially 
on a 'univariate' basis. Whilst in the following 
Chapter, a multivariate approach is adopted using 
a limited dependent variable method - in 
particular probit analysis which is well suited 
to this application. 
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7-2 Impact on Capital Gearing Ratios 
7-2-1 Perceived Influence of Capital Gearing 
Ratios 
The level of gearing is often cited as one 
important influence on the debt/equity choice, 
for example, Marsh (1980) concludes this; and 
Bosworth (1971) and Taggart (1974) offer evidence 
that companies in aggregate seem to attempt to 
keep to a target debt-equity ratio. However, 
Stonehill et al (1973), in a study encompassing 
France, Holland, Japan, Norway and the U. S. A., 
found that executives viewed themselves as taking 
advantage of suitable financing opportunities as 
and when they arose, rather than aiming for a 
specific debt ratio. 
However it is argued that capital gearing is 
important as an explanator of the debt-equity 
choice as the issue of debt or equity allows a 
company to incrementally change its gearing. 
Such changes in gearing could be indicative of: 
(i) target debt-equity ratio - the firm is 
moving towards some target debt-equity ratio 
(ii) debt capacity 
- 
firms have a certain amount 
of debt capacity, and if they are not utilising 
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it, then they ought to be in order to obtain the 
tax relief 
(iii) mean reversion 
-a firm may be at the 
extreme end. of the distribution of capital 
gearing ratios, and is now moving towards the 
centre. There is a greater probability that a 
firm with a capital gearing ratio at the end of 
the distribution will raise finance which will 
result in the capital gearing going down rather 
than up. 
The actual definition to be used to calculate 
capital gearing is discussed below. 
7-2-2 An Analysis of Capital Gearing Ratios 
It was decided to examine the capital gearing of 
the companies, based on the original issue, the 
reconstruction (or hypothetical issue), and the 
industry sector capital gearing ratio. 
A summary balance sheet is outlined to help to 
highlight the items which may be included in a 
capital gearing ratio: 
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X Co. Balance Sheet as at 31 Dec 19-0 
£000 £000 
Fixed assets 
(1) Intangibles 
(2) Tangibles 
(3) Current assets 
Current liabilities 
(4) Creditors 
(5) 
-Short-term debt 
Net current assets 
(6) Total assets less curr. liab. 
(7) less Long-term debt 
(8) Total net assets 
Capital and Reserves 
(9) Ordinary shares 
(10) Reserves 
(11) Preference shares 
(12) Total equity 
200 
1500 
1700 
600 
(200) 
300 
100 
1800 
500 
1300 
1000 
100 
200 
1300 
There are several definitions for the capital 
gearing ratio. Datastream, for example, produces 
a capital gearing ratio which is calculated as: 
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Preference share capital + subordinated debt 
+ total loan capital + borrowings repayable 
within one year 
total capital employed + borrowings 
repayable within 1 year 
- 
total intangibles 
Referring to the items on the annotated proforma 
balance sheet on the previous page, this can be 
expressed as: 
(11) + (7) + (5) 
(6) + (5) 
- 
(1) 
then subtracting intangibles and short-term debt 
from the denominator: 
= (11) + (7) + (5) 
(1) + (2) + (3) 
-(4) -(5) 
= (11) + (7) + (5) 
(2) + (3) 
- 
(4) 
= (11) + (7) + (5) 
[(9) + (10) + (11) 
- 
(1) ]+[ (5) + (7) ] 
This definition was not considered to be the most 
suitable to use as (i) preference share capital 
is more often treated as equity than debt (ii) 
intangibles are assets of the business and should 
not be excluded. 
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In terms of the proforma balance sheet the more 
usual gearing ratio is: 
(7) + (5) 
[(9) + (10) + (11) ]+[ (5) + (7) ] 
The gearing ratio which appeared, on. a priori 
grounds, to capture the main influence on debt- 
equity choice was considered to be a ratio which 
combined the denominator of the Datastream ratio, 
except that the intangible assets should not be 
excluded, with the numerator of the more usual 
ratio as follows: 
(7) + (5) 
(9) + (10) + (11) + (7) + (5) 
Undoubtedly cases could be made for other capital 
gearing ratios depending on one's view of the 
determinants of the capital issue choice. It 
should also be noted that capital-based ratios 
under the historical cost convention are 
inherently flawed because the balances shown are 
recorded at their original input prices and are 
not adjusted to current values. 
The individual data items were 
extracted from Datastream for 
therefore 
individual 
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companies (using programs 190V and 190Y) and for 
industry sectors (for detail of programs used see 
below) to enable the capital gearing ratio to be 
calculated as follows: 
Long-term debt + 
-short-term debt x 100 
Equity + debt 
where equity comprises ordinary shares, 
preference shares and reserves; and debt 
comprises long-term debt and short-term debt. 
7-2-3 Capital' Gearing Ratios for Actual and 
Hypothetical Issues 
A comparison of capital gearing ratios for 
original issues and hypothetical, or 
reconstruction, issues is shown in Table 7.1 
. 
The capital gearing ratio is shown for the 
original issue for the year before the capital 
issue (Yr 
-1), the year of the issue (Yr 0), and 
the year following the year of issue (Yr +1). 
The hypothetical capital gearing can only be 
shown for Yr 0 and Yr +1. 
To calculate the hypothetical capital gearing 
ratio: 
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TABLE 7.1 : COMPARISON OF CAPITAL GEARING RATIOS FOR THE ORIGINAL ISS UE AND THE HYPOTHETICAL I SSUES 
- 
Congww Ind toe Nth year Year C.. CC Co. Ca NVp. CC D1ff. bst. Co. Co. CC Myp. CG D1ff. bet. Co. 0 "1 Tr-1(Z) Tr0 (z) Yro (: ) & Nyp. (Tro) Tr"1 c%) Trt (: ) & Nyp(Tri) 
I x I Anglin Secure Now House Sp 90 91 58.55 52.33 64.79 
-12.45 65.01 83.49 
-18.48 2 lust Missu Mar 92 93 30.43 41.23 91.96 
-50.69 Mw n/w n/w 3 11oratsr Packp Doe 90 91 53.73 42.00 58.52 
-16.53 41.51 57. " 
-16.13 4 Iowthorpo Lists Doe 87 88 IS. 03 8.58 45.39 
-36.81 16.31 53.86 
-37.53 S Casket Gantr Mar 91 92 57.07 42.46 72.64 
-29.59 33.74 64.70 
-30.96 6 Cater Allen Disct Apr 91 92 3.55 2.84 23.30 
-20.47 0.35 20.37 
-20.02 7 Community Nospital Grp Nlthc Jun 91 92 8.06 15.38 29.41 
-14.03 n ov M/w M/w 8 Cookson Grp Oind" Doc 91 92 37.45 23.40 35.05 
-11.66 Nw n/av n/w 9 Do La Rut Print Mar 92 93 25.70 20.85 53.36 
-32.51 Nav n/w rvsv 10 Domino Printing Print Oct 91 92 14.16 10.67 59.31 
-48.64 nJw n/w Nov 
11 Eurotunnel Trfrt Doc 90 91 51.56 59.61 74.06 
-14.46 69.21 80.46 
-11.25 12 joy" Psrsh Dec 89 90 36.55 5.23 50.57 
-45.34 26.33 62.51 
-36.18 13 Krik Fit Mdist Feb 89 90 26.85 13.52 54.26 
-40.74 41.49 72.35 
-30.86 14 Lovell, Y. J. Cnstr Sep 91 92 41.13 43.78 64.52 
-20.74 Nw Way Nw 
15 Midland Bank Rants Doc 87 88 52.53 45.28 59.16 
-13.87 39.96 52.38 
-12.42 16 Regal Ian Props Mar 92 93 43.21 49.78 57.73 
-7.95 New Mw Now 
17 Ronald Mr+B Nor 85 86 48.17 35.91 47.05 
-11.14 34.67 45.43 
-10.76 
18 Richards Tanis Sep 89 90 7.36 3.50 15.73 
-12.23 2.72 14.20 
-11.44 
19 Skstchloy Loud Mar 91 92 64.95 40.56 68.22 
-27.66 20.65 58.14 
-37.49 
20 Tay Noss Mouse Jan 87 as 29.78 0.00 53.16 
-53.16 32.35 61.46 
-29.13 
21 Tibbst t Britten Trfrt Doe 39 90 30.09 18.65 47.74 
-29.09 10.36 41.55 
-31.19 
22 Westbury Mouse Feb 92 93 39.76 13.55 33.05 
-19.50 New New n/w 
23 Allied Lyons Brown Feb 89 90 39.94 26.93 18.88 8.10 44.12 36.89 7.23 
24 Asds Fdrst Apr 87 88 14.74 28.76 16.38 12.38 18.80 9.90 8.82 
25 Ards Fdrst Apr 89 90 18.80 26.23 17.21 9.02 44.05 37.96 6.07 
26 Rasa Bros Sop 89 90 19.87 24.17 17.37 6.80 32.88 27.46 5.24 
27 Slue Circle Caisnt Doc 88 89 32.54 38.24 28.31 9.93 42.83 33.54 9.30 
28 British Land Prop Mar 87 88 50.12 43.37 41.95 1.41 28.42 27.30 1.12 
29 British Land Props Nor 92 93 50.38 59.18 50.95 8.23 Nw Nov n/w 
30 British Stool Stool Mar 92 93 6.57 10.86 7.85 3.01 n/w Nw n/w 
31 City Site Estates Props Sop 87 88 36.94 54.32 18.86 35.45 53.24 26.36 
. 
26.89 
32 Dares Estates Props Doc 87 88 51.21 55.79 20.38 35.42 50.26 28.99 21.26 
33 Forte Notol Jan 90 91 28.00 25.98 23.30 2.68 25.66 23.22 2.44 
34 Land Securities Props Nor 87 88 14.22 17.99 11.29 6.69 21.58 16.89 4.69 
35 Lasso Oilap Doc 86 87 48.82 46.01 39.54 6.47 44.78 38.05 6.73 
36 Lasso OfIsp Doc 89 90 29.98 35.12 24.76 10.36 42.21 33.82 8.39 
37 MEPC Props Sap 86 87 33.34 35.38 30.90 4.48 30.75 27.91 2.85 
38 Taylor Woodrow Cnstr Dec 89 90 17.34 23.72 17.23 6.49 29.15 21.58 7. S$ 
39 Vim Brow Sop 89 90 9.00 18.92 7.63 11.29 17.19 6.72 10.48 
40 Whitbread Brow Feb 91 92 9.96 14.40 10.15 4.25 17.04 12.88 4.16 
41 Nolical Bar Props Jan 88 89 37.42 63.71 63.71 0.00 64.84 64.84 0.00 
42 Next Mules ion 88 09 14.90 46.87 46.87 0.00 31.00 31.00 0.00 
43 Worcester Grp Mss Doe 90 91 30.59 42.26 42.26 0.00 31.19 31.19 0.00 
Avorsps capital gearing ratios: 
For equity issues: 35.26 26.78 52.65 -25.87 31.05 54.90 -23.85 
For debt issues: 28.43 32.52 22.39 10.14 33.94 25.61 8.33 
For canwrtiblp: 27.63 50.95 50.95 0.00 42.34 42.34 0.00 
Capital gearing has been calculated u: 
Cl) 321.309/322+309 x 100 (see below for Datastrnm codas) 
I. e. Long-term debt " short-term debt / Equity " debt 
W+srs equity " ordinary shares, preference shares and reserves 
debt " long-term debt and short-term debt 
(1tes 322 1s total capital rploysd and comprises putty and 
long-tars debt as defined sbovo). 
(i) for those companies which originally issued 
equity (and for which debt is the hypothetical 
alternative) the net effect is to increase the 
numerator by the amount of the issue but to leave 
the denominator unaltered since equity is reduced 
but debt is increased by an equivalent amount. 
(ii) for those companies which originally issued 
debt (and for which equity is the hypothetical 
alternative) the net effect is to reduce the 
numerator by the amount of the issue but to leave 
the denominator unaltered since debt is reduced 
but equity is-increased by an equivalent amount. 
There is no change in the capital gearing ratios 
of those companies issuing convertibles, as they 
would originally have been classified by the 
companies as equity, and in the reconstructions, 
the convertibles are replaced by equity. 
The companies numbered 1-22 are those which 
originally issued equity, 23-40 those which 
originally issued debt, and 41-43 those which 
made convertible issues. Average capital gearing 
ratios for equity issues, debt issues, and 
convertible issues have been calculated and are 
shown at the bottom of the table. Also shown are 
the capital gearing ratios for the same 
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categories (equity, debt, convertibles) for the 
reconstructions (i. e. the hypothetical issues); 
and also the differences between the original and 
hypothetical capital gearing ratios, both on an 
individual company by company basis and for the 
capital issue group as a whole. 
Examining the actual capital gearing ratios, 
for those companies which made an equity issue, 
the average capital gearing ratio (henceforth CG) 
in Yr 
-1 (year before the issue) averaged 35.26%; 
whilst for companies which issued debt their 
average CG in Yr 
-1 averaged 28.43%, and for the 
companies issuing convertibles, the CG in Yr 
-1 
averaged 27.63%. As discussed below this is 
supportive of the ideas of debt capacity, target 
debt-equity ratios, and mean reversion as 
mentioned above. 
The decrease in the average CG for companies 
which issued equity was from 35.26% (Yr -1) to 
26.78% (Yr 0), and there was an increase in the 
average CG for those issuing debt to 32.52%. 
There was also an increase in the average CG for 
the three companies issuing convertibles to 
50.95%. The hypothetical CG column for Yr 0 
shows how the CG would have been affected if the 
alternative issue had been made. For the 
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companies which originally issued equity, if they 
had issued debt, then the average CG would have 
been 52.65% (a substantial increase of 25.87% 
over the actual average CG) whilst for the 
companies which originally issued debt, if they 
had issued equity, the average CG would have been 
22.39% (a decline of 10.14% over the actual 
average CG). 
A review of the CGs for the year following the 
year of issue shows that the actual average for 
the equity issue companies was 31.05%, and that 
this would have been 54.90% if they had issued 
debt. The actual average for the debt issue 
companies was 33.94%, and this would have been 
25.61% if they had all issued equity. The actual 
average for the companies issuing convertibles 
declined slightly to 42.34%. 
Fig. 7.1 illustrates, for the companies which 
actually issued equity, the change that took 
place in the CG ratios for the actual issue, and 
the hypothetical change in CG for a debt 
reconstruction. Whilst Fig. 7.2 illustrates the 
corresponding changes in CG for the companies 
" which originally issued debt, and for which there 
is a hypothetical reconstruction with equity. 
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FIG. 7.1 : CAPITAL GEARING RATIOS FOR EQUITY ISSUING COMPANIES 
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FIG. 7.2 : CAPITAL GEARING RATIOS FOR DEBT ISSUING COMPANIES 
Capital Gearing % 
Actual issue (Debt) 
= Hypothetical issue (Equity) 
@D I 
iý 
60 
so- 
ýi 
b 
20 
\ý ý. 
\`y 
ý\ 
\_ 
ý` 
_ \_ a 
___ 
ý ý1_ 
ý_' 
, 
-0 
ZZ- -- -0 
'e 
V 'o 
--s 
1_ 
__ 
_ 
`, 
a0 
i 
Before issue After issue 
(Yr 
-1) (Yr 0) 
It can be seen that the companies which actually 
issued equity tended to have CGs before the issue 
which were higher than those companies which 
issued debt. Consequently if the equity. issuing 
companies had issued debt, many would have had 
significant increases in their CGs. Analysis of 
Figs. 7.1 and 7.2 would seem to support. the ideas 
of mean reversion and target debt capacity, with 
the majority of companies making a capital issue 
which results in a CG of 50% or less. 
This is borne out by looking at the overall 
averages. If the companies which issued equity 
had issued debt instead of equity, then their CGs 
would have been significantly higher than those 
companies which did actually issue debt 
- 
an 
average of 52.65% (hypothetical debt issues) 
compared to 32.52% (actual debt issues) in year 
0. The companies which did actually issue debt 
maintained an average CG ratio of 32.52%, and 
would be able to take advantage of any tax 
shields arising through the debt issue. 
Fig. 7.3 combines the information from Figs. 7.1 
and 7.2 and portrays it in a different way. It 
shows the change in CG for both companies issuing 
equity and those issuing debt. On the vertical 
axis is the CG for Yr-1 for all the companies, 
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FiG. 7.3 : CAPITAL GEARING RATIOS FOR EQUITY AND DEBT ISSUING 
COMPANIES 
Capital Gearing % 
Yr-1 
hoc 50 ý0 30 30 toQ 40 zO ' 30 
40 So bo 
Capital Gearing % 
YrO 
Issued debt 
Capital Gearing % 
Yr0 
Issued equity 
whilst the CG after the capital issue is shown on 
the horizontal axis, with equity issues on the 
right of the y axis and debt issues on the left. 
The pattern exhibits indications of mean 
reversion with more highly geared companies 
tending to issue equity, and less highly geared 
companies issuing debt. 
7-2-4 Capital Gearing Ratios for Actual Issues 
and Industry sector 
Companies may be influenced in their choice of 
debt or equity by the general behaviour of 
companies in their industry sector. The CGs of 
the individual companies are compared to their 
relevant industry sector CG in Table 7.2. The 
industry sectors are the Datastream industry 
sectors (level 6) for each company obtained from 
program 101S. The capital gearing ratios for the 
industry sectors were obtained by setting up the 
relevant expression on program 190Y for the data 
items making up the CG ratio discussed above, 
then running it on 190X. 
Taking the equity issuing companies as a group, 
in the year before the capital issue was made, 
the CG was 35.26% compared to 30.24% for the 
industry average; for debt issuing companies, the 
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TABLE 7.2 : COMPARISON OF CAPITAL GEARING RATIOS FOR THE ORIGINAL ISSUE 
AND THE INDUS TRY SECT OR 
CAM, Iv ssc Nth Year 
Year co. u lyd. u Dlff. b. t. co. u Ind. CG Dlff. b"t. Co. cG Ird. Cr. Diff. bot. 
0 +1 rr-1(X) Tr-1(X) CO. ilnd(r-1)rr0 (X) rr0 (X) Co. 4lnd(r0)rr"l (X) Trt (X) Co. &Ind(t1) 
X ; 
1 Anglia Secure Names House Sep 90 91 58.55 26.68 31.87 52.33 30.88 21.46 65.01 27.91 37.10 
21i"ac Missu Mar 92 93 30.43 30.71 -0.27 41.26 N"v flay n/w Nav n/av 
3 lowtar P"ckp Dec 90 91 53.73 42.90 10.83 42.00 30.63 7.37 61.51 35.23 6.27 
4 lorthorps Eletr Doc 87 88 15.03 14.23 0.80 8.58 12.67 -4.10 16.31 17.25 
-0.96 
5 Casket Gantr mar 91 92 57.07 25.89 31.18 42.46 28.99 13.46 33.74 n/ ow Nav 
6 cater Allen Disct Apr 91 92 3.55 1.15 2.60 2.84 0.81 2.03 0.35 n/sv Nav 
7 Cawanity Hospital Grp Mlthe Jun 91 92 8.06 45.61 -37.55 15.38 42.71 -27.33 n/av, n/ov Nav 
/ Cookson Grp 0indo Doc 91 92 37.65 33.46 3.99 23.40 40.29 -16.89 Nav Nav flay 
9 Do La Due Print Nor 92 93 25.70 32.73 4.03 20.85 New Nov Wow Nsv N"v 
10 Domino Printing Print Oct 91 92 14.16 27.12 -12.95 10.67 32.73 -22.06 n/w flay Nw 
11 Eurotvnsl Trfrt Dee 90 91 51.56 38.26 13.30 59.61 46.86 14.75 69.21 50.69 18.52 
12 Joyas Persh Doc 89 90 36.55 18.62 17.93 5.23 19.94 -14.71 26.33 33.89 "7.56 
13 Krik Fit Mallet Feb 89 90 26.85 48.85 -22.00 13.52 49.94 -36.42 41.49 43.26 
-6.77 
14 Lovett, T. J. Cnstr Sep 91 92 41.13 32.31 8.82 43.78 30.61 13.17 n/w n/w fly 
15 Midland tank stems Dec 87 88 52.53 34.41 18.12 45.28 33.15 12.13 39.96 34.38 5.5$ 
161palisn Props Nor 92 93 43.21 42.92 0.29 49.78 n/w n/ ow Nov Nw Wow 
17 Ronald Mmng Mar 8S 86 48.17 29.11 19.06 35.91 26.37 9.54 34.67 27.31 7.36 
II Richards Txais Sip 89 90 7.36 19.65 -12.29 3.50 24.04 -20.54 2.72 23.91 -21.19 
19 Skstehlsy Laurel Mar 91 92 64.95 44.97 19.96 40.56 29.20 11.36 20.65 Nw n/w 
_ý Toy Now House Jun 87 88 29.78 26.26 3.54 0.00 22.76 
-22.74 32.35 24.93 7.42 
'bbet S Britton Trfrt Dec 89 90 30.09 21.64 8.45 18.65 38.25 "19.60 10.36 44.86 -34.50 
22 wea; oury House Feb 92 93 39.76 27.91 11.85 13.55 Way Nay Nov n/av n/w 
23 Allied Lyons Brews Feb 89 90 39.94 24.44 15.50 26.98 32.31 
-5.33 64.12 32.70 11.42 
24 Asds Fdrat Apr 87 88 14.74 20.27 
-5.53 28.76 22.35 6.41 18.80 22.27 -3.47 
25 Aids Fdrst Apr 89 90 18.80 22.27 
-3.47 ' 26.23 29.60 -3.17 44.05 32.34 11.71 
16 lass Broom Sep 89 90 19.87 24.44 
-4.57 24.17 32.31 -8.14 32.83 32.70 0.18 
27 Blue Circle Cement Doc 88 89 32.54 28.96 3.58 38.24 33.58 4.66 42.83 34.37 8.66 
28 British Land Props Nor 87 88 50.12 29.32 20.80 43.37 28.37 15.00 28.42 27.06 1.36 
29 British Land Props Nor 92 93 50.38 42.92 7.46 59.16 Nsv M/ ow n/av Wow 
. 
Nov 
30 British Stool Steel Nor 92 93 6.57 8.62 
-2.05 10.86 Nov N"v n/w Nav - n/ov 
31 City Site Estates Props Sep 87 88 36.94 29.32 7.62 54.32 28.37 25.95 53.24 27.06 26.18 
32 Dares Estates Props Dec 87 88 51.21 29.32 21.89 55.79 28.37 27.42 50.26 27.06 23.20 
33 Forte Hotel Jan 90 91 28.00 35.94 
-7.96 25.96 31.41 1.43 25.66 32.62 -6.96 
34 Lard Securities Props M"r 87 88 14.22 29.32 
-15.10 17.99 28.37 -10.38 21.58 27.06 -5.68 
35 Law 01 Lop Dec 36 87 48.62 34.28 14.54 46.01 33.66 12.35 44.78 30.33 14.45 
36 Low 01 top Dec 89 90 29.98 31.56 
-1.58 35.12 37.17 -2.05 42.21 39.40 2.81 
37 MEPC Props Sep 86 87 33.34 26.69 6.65 35.38 29.32 6.06 30.75 28.37 2.38 
38 Taylor Woodrow Cnstr Dec 89 90 17.34 24.16 
-6.82 23.72 32.11 -8.39 29.15 32.31 -3.16 
39 Vita Srws Sep 89 90 9.00 24.44 
-15.4+4 18.92 32.31 -13.39 17.19 32.70 -15.51 
60 WhItbread Brun Feb 91 92 9.96 32.70 
-22.74 14.60 28.25 -13.85 17.04 n/av Nw 
61 Nahtet Bar Props Jan 88 89 37.42 28.37 9.05 63.71 27.06 36.65 64.86 30.02 34.82 
42 Mat Mutts Jan 88 89 14.90 16.49 -1.59 46.87 19.49 27.38 31.00 22.03 8.97 
43 Worcester Grp Im Dec 90 91 30.59 26.45 6.14 42.26 26.35 15.91 31.19 30.75 0.46 
Average capital paring ratios: 
For 
equity issue5[ 35.26 30.24 5.01 26.78 30.16 -4.40 31.05 33.51 1.03 
For debt 1 ssuss1 28.43 27.72 0.71 32.52 30.48 1.73 33.94 30.56 4.50 
For e0rnsrtibias: 27.63 23.10 4.53 50.95 24.30 26.65 42.34 27.60 14.74 
CAPIUI /Mrifr hu been calculated u: 
(1) 321.309/322+309 x 100 (see baler for Ostsstrsss codas) 
I. e. Lon 
. 
tos debt " short-torte debt / Equity " debt 
"Q! itY " ordinary shares, preference shares and reserves 
debt 
" long-term debt ind short-term debt (1to 322 is total capital orployed and eooprisos equity and 1°htore debt as defined show). 
actual CG was 28.43% compared to 27.72% for the 
industry average; and for convertibles the actual 
CG was 27.63% compared to 23.10% for the industry 
average. The equity issuing companies and the 
convertible issuing companies as groups therefore 
had average CGs about 5% and 4.5% higher than 
their industry averages respectively.. The debt 
issuing groups were more or less the same as the 
industry average. 
In the year of issue (Yr 0), the equity issuing 
companies fall slightly below the industry 
average, whilst the debt issuing group move 
slightly ahead of it. It is noticeable that the 
convertible group's average CG moves ahead of the 
industry sectors average substantially (it 
doubles). In Yr +1, the year following the year 
of issue, the equity issuing group's CG remains 
slightly below the industry average, the debt 
issuing group's CG is slightly ahead, and the 
convertibles are substantially ahead of their 
industry sectors average. 
Apart from the convertibles, it can be seen that 
on average, companies tend to make issues which 
push the gearing into line with the industry 
averages, or which bring them back into line with 
them. 
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FIG. 7.4 : CAPITAL GEARING RATIOS FOR INDUSTRY SECTORS 
FOR EQUITY ISSUING COMPANIES 
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Figs. 7.4 and 7.5 show the industry sector CG 
ratios for companies making equity and debt 
issues respectively. The change in CG ratios is 
shown for the year prior to capital issue and the 
year following. 
The range of values for the industry sector CG 
ratios is larger for those relating to the equity 
issuing companies than the debt issuing 
companies. This a similar pattern to that shown 
in Figs. 7.1 and 7.2. 
7-2-5 Capital- Gearing Ratios for Hypothetical 
Issues and Industry Sector 
An interesting adjunct would be to examine the 
effect of the hypothetical issues on CGS in 
relation to the industry CGs. This is discussed 
below with reference to Table 7.3. 
It can be seen that if the equity issuing group 
had issued debt, then the average CG would have 
been 52.65% in Yr 0 and 54.90% in Yr +1, compared 
to an industry average for all companies issuing 
equity of 30.16% and 33.51% in Yrs 0 and +1 
respectively. If the debt issuing group had 
issued equity, then their CGs would have been 
22.39% and 25.61% in Yrs 0 and +1 respectively, 
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TABLE 7.3 : COMPARISON OF CAPITAL GEARING RATIOS FOR THE HYPOTHETICAL ISSUE 
AND THE INDUSTRY SECTOR 
C 0, Ind See Nth Year Year Ind-CO Nyp-CC Ind-CG Diff-bet-Myp. Nyp-CG Ird. CG Diff-bet-Nyp. 0 "1 Yr-1(X) Yr0 (x) Yr0 (x) I lnd(Yr0) Trl (X) Yrl (X) & ind(Trl) 
X 
- 
X 
1 Angus Secure Maw Mouse Sep 90 91 26.68 64.79 30.58 33.91 83.49 27.91 55.58 
2Ilse Missu Mar 92 93 30.71 91. % NOW Nw Nw Vow Nw 
3 sowter Paekp Dec 90 91 42.90 58.52 34.63 23.90 57.64 35.23 22.41 
4 $orthorpe Eletr Dec 87 88 14.23 45.39 12.67 32.72 53.86 17.25 36.61 
5 Casket Gentr Mar 91 92 25.0 72.04 28.99 43.05 64.70 Nov Vow 
6 Cater Allen Diset Apr 91 92 1.15 23.30 0.81 22.49 20.37 Nav Nav 
7 Coommity Hospital Grp Nlthc Jun 91 92 45.61 29.41 42.71 "13.31 Now Nw rile, 
8 Cookson Grp 0inds Dec 91 92 33.46 35.05 40.29 
-5.24 Nav Nw Nev 
9 Of La Rus Print Her 92 93 32.73 53.36 Nw Nw 
. 
/ev nay Nw 
10 Dislno Printing Print Oct 91 92 27.12 59.31 32.73 26.54 " Nw Nov New 
11 Eurotand Trfrt Dec 90 91 39-26 74.06 44.86 29.21 80.46 50,69 29.77 
12 Jeyes Perih Dec 89 90 18.62 50.57 19.94 30.63 62.51 33.89 28.62 
13 Krik Fit Mdist Feb 89 90 48.85 54.26 49.94 4.32 72.35 48.26 24.09 
14 Lovell, Y. J. Cnstr Sep 91 92 32.31 64.52 30.61 33.91 Nw Nw Nav 
15 Midland Isnk Banks Dec 87 88 34.41 59.16 33.15 26.01 52.34 34.38 18.00 
16 negation Praia Mar 92 93 42.92 57.73 Nov Nov New Nov n/w 
17 Ronald Mssin1 Nor 85 86 29.11 47.05 26.37 20.68 45.43 27.31 18.12 
18 AIchard$ Tzais Sep 89 90 19.65 15.73 24.04 
-8.31 14.20 23.91 
-9.71 
19 Sketchley laud Mar 91 92 44.97 68.22 29.20 39.02 58.14 Nw n/w 
20 Tay Noses House Jun 87 88 26.24 53.16 22.74 30.42 61.48 24.93 36.55 
21 Tibbet & Britten Trfrt Dec 89 90 21.64 47.74 38.25 9.49 41.55 44.56 
-3.31 
22 Westbury Mouse Feb 92 93 27.91 33.05 New Nov Now Nw Nw 
23 Allied Lyons Brews Feb 89 90 24.44 18.88 32.31 
-13.43 36.89 32.70 4.19 
24 Aids Fdret Apr 87 88 20.27 16.38 22.35 
-5.97 9.96 22.27 -12.29 
25 Aids Fdret Apr 89 90 22.27 17.21 29.40 
-12.19 37.96 32.34 S. 64 
26 lau Brews Sep 89 90 24.44 17.37 32.31 
-14.94 27.64 32.70 -5.06 
27 slue Circle Caent Dec 88 89 28.96 28.31 33.58 
-5.27 -33.54 34.37 -0.83 
28 British Land Props Nor 87 88 29.32 41.95 28.37 13.58 27.30 27.06 0.24 
29 British Land Props Mar 92 93 42.92 50.95 Nw Nw Now Now nay 
30 British Stoat Steel Her 92 93 8.62 7.83 Nov Nov Nw Nov n/w 
31 City Site Estates Praia Sep 87 88 29.32 18.86 28.37 
-9.51 26.36 27.06 -0.70 
32 Dares Estates Props Dec 87 88 29.32 20.38 28.37 
-7.99 28.99 27.06 1.93 
33 Forte Hotel Jan 90 91 35.94 23.30 31.41 
-8.11 23.22 32.62 -9.40 
34 lard Securities Props Mar 87 88 29.32 11.29 28.37 
-17.08 16.89 27.06 -10.17 
35 loam Oilep Dec 86 87 34.28 39.54 33.66 5.88 38.05 30.33 7"n 
36 lasso oilep Dec 89 90 31.56 24.76 37.17 
-12.41 33.82 39.40 -5.58 
37 MEPC Props Sep 86 87 26.69 30.90 29.32 1.58 27.91 28.37 -0.46 
38 Taylor Woodrow Cnstr Dec 89 90 24.16 17.23 32.11 
-14.88 21.58 32.31 -10.73 
39 v" Brew Sep 89 90 24.44 7.63 32.31 
-24.68 6.72 32.70 -25.96 
40 uhitbread Iren Feb 91 92 32.70 10.15 28.25 
-18.10 12.88 Nov Nw 
41 Helical Bar Props Jan bs 89 28.37 63.71 27.06 36.65 64.84 30.02 34.82 
42 Neat Multi Jan 6S 89 16.49 46.87 19.49 27.38 31.00 22.03 8.97 
43 Worcester Grp Mwsno Dec 90 91 24.45 42.26 26.35 15.91 31.19 30.75 0"" 
Average capital gearing rati os: 
For equity Issues: 30.24 52.65 30.16 21.08 54.90 33.51 23.34 
For debt Issues: 27.72 22.39 30.48 
-8.97 25.61 30.56 -4.10 
For convertibleus 23.10 50.95 24.30 26.65 42.34 27.60 14.74 
Capital miry has been calculated as: 
(1) 321+309/322.309 x 100 (see balor for Datsstrsm codes) 
I. e. L q-tees debt " short-term debt / Equity " debt 
Whore quity 
  
ordinary shares, preform=@ shares and rssorws 
debt " loh-term debt and short-term debt 
(item 322 Is total capital rploysd and eosprisos equity and 
tGNI PM debt as defined stimm). 
compared to an industry average of 30.48% and 
30.56%. The convertible issues do not change on 
the hypothetical figures for the reasons 
discussed above. These findings show that had 
the alternative issue been made, then the 
companies would have moved a considerable way 
from their industry average. This is 
particularly significant for the companies which 
originally issued equity 
- 
if they had issued 
debt, their average CG would have been some 40% 
more than the industry average CG. 
The examination of the capital gearing ratios 
discussed above would lend some support to the 
premise that companies examine their capital 
gearing ratio when considering making a capital 
issue, and that the effect on the capital gearing 
ratio, both in terms of the absolute value and 
relative to the industry sector is taken into 
account. 
7-2-6 Capital Gearing and Size of Issue 
The size of the capital issue may also have an 
influence on the type of capital issue. It may, 
for example, be easier to raise smaller amounts 
by issuing debt and larger amounts by issuing 
equity. 
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In Fig. 7.6 the CG for all companies for the year 
prior to issue is shown on the y axis; whilst on 
the horizontal axis is the size of the issue, 
calculated as ((proceeds of issue/total assets) 
x 100). The latter proportion for equity issuing 
companies being on the right of the y axis and 
for debt issuing companies on the left, 
Except for two 'outliers' on the debt issues, it 
would appear to be the case that the amount of an 
equity issue tends to be a larger proportion of 
the total assets of the business. In general 
this seems to be true whatever the level of 
capital gearing. 
Fig. 7.7 combines the size criteria for both 
equity issuing and debt issuing companies, and 
shows the size of the issue ([proceeds of issues 
in relation to the total assets of the company] 
x 100) against total assets. The proceeds of the 
majority of issues are for less than 20% of the 
total assets of the company. 
7-2-7 Statistical Comparison of Capital Gearing 
Measures for Equity and Debt Issues 
The analysis above has highlighted some notable 
differences in CGs between companies which issued 
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FIG. 7.6 : CAPITAL GEARING AND SIZE OF CAPITAL ISSUE 
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equity and those which issued debt. 
The CGs for the year before the capital issue for 
the companies which subsequently issued equity, 
and those which subsequently issued debt, were 
found to be significantly different from each 
other at the 1% level (see Table 7.3B). 
Similarly, the industry sector CGs were also 
significantly different for these two groups at 
the 2% level (see Table 7.3B). 
The above findings would seem to imply that 
examination of a company's CG and its industry 
sector CG would provide a meaningful indication 
of the choice of capital issue at a particular 
point in time. 
7-3 Impact on Income Gearing & Interest Cover 
Ratios 
7-3-1 Perceived Influence of Income Gearing 
Income gearing is arguably of more relevance than 
capital based measures founded on unadjusted 
historical cost principles, because it reflects 
more clearly the 'economic reality' of the debt 
servicing costs over the reporting period. 
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TABLE 7.3B : STATISTICAL COMPARISON OF CAPITAL GEARING MEASURES 
FOR EQUITY AND FOR DEBT ISSUES 
Paired 't' Test 
------------------ 
Source Year Sd(E) Sd (D) Se Degrees of Sfgnif- 
Table 
-1 Freedom icance 
(based on 
2tt) 
Individual Companies 
-------------------- 
7.2 CG (orig. 
issue) 17.4720 14.9259 5.1237 38 0.01 
Industry Sectors 
7.2 CG (Ind. 
Sec. ) 11.1009 7.0277 2.8888 38 0.02 
Note : CG = Capital gearing ratio 
Sd(E) = standard deviation of CG (Yr-1) for all the companies 
which issued equity in the following year 
Sd(D) = standard deviation of CG (Yr-1) for all the companies 
which issued debt in the following year 
Se = standard error 
The income gearing ratio was defined as: 
Interest Payable x 100 
Earnings before interest and tax 
The income gearing ratios for the actual and 
hypothetical issues are discussed below. 
7-3-2 Income Gearing Ratios for Actual and 
Hypothetical Issues 
Table 7.4 compares the actual income gearing 
ratio with the hypothetical gearing ratio which 
would have arisen on a reconstruction. For all 
the income gearing comparisons (and the interest 
cover comparisons discussed below) the 
hypothetical reconstruction is based on the 
results obtained at the benchmark + 2% as the 
coupon on debt usually falls in the range +1% to 
+3%, with most in the +2% band (see Table 6.3, 
Chapter 6). 
For Yr 
-1, the average actual income gearing 
ratio was 41.71% for the equity issuing 
companies, 18.03% for the debt issuing companies, 
and 3.28% for the convertible issuing companies. 
In Yr 0, the equity issuing companies had an 
average interest gearing ratio of 17.98%; the 
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TABLE 7.4 : COMPARISON OF INTEREST GEARING RATIOS - ACTUAL COMPARED 
TO HYPOTHETICAL ISSUE 
Cosy Ind Sac Nth Year Year Co. 1G Co. 1G Nyp. lG DIff. bet. Co. Co. IG NyP. IG Dlff. bat. Ce. 
0 1 Yr-1(X) Yr0 (X) YrO(X) i Nyp. Yro Yr't(%) Tr+1(%) $ Nyp. (tr. 1) 
I Anglia Secure Nass House Sap 90 91 1493.73 -482.06 -501.38 19.32 
-59.83 -70.92 11.10 
2 Sim Missu map 92 93 11.57 16.59 25.97 
-9.39 Nav Nw Nsv 
3 iowter Packp Doe 90 91 29.25 33.08 38.64 
"' 
-5.57 32.39 43.65 
-11.25 
4 $owthorpe Elotr Doc 87 U 4.17 2.94 S. 68 
-2.74 3.28 16.34 
-13.06 
5 Casket Gentr Nor 91 92 -2371.93 92.29 113.60 -21.30 48.40 67.94 "19.54 
6 Cater Allan Disct Apr 91 92 Nw Nw n/av Mw n/w n/av , yav 
7 Coss*nlty Hospital Grp Nithe Jun 91 92 2.67 1.29 4.99 -3.70 Vey Nw n/av 
8 Cookson Grp Oini Doc 91 92 40.69 43.97 $4.69 -10.71 Nw 'V., n/ev 
9 Ds Le Rue Print Mar 92 93 19.78 12.31 21.34 -9.03 Nw nNv Nav 
10 Domino Printing Print Oct 91 92 9.57 6.09 6.09 0.00 Nw n/av n/w 
11 Eurotunnel Trfrt Doc 90 91 98.62 99.88 102.79 -2.91 100.03 121.21 
-21.17 
12 Jeves Persh Doc 89 90 32.12 30.34 30.34 0.00 16.14 37.13 
-20.99 
13 Krik Fit Mdist Feb 89 90 6.83 5.97 20.55 -14.58 24.45 43.51 
-19.06 
14 Lovell, Y. J. Cnstr Sap 91 92 41.15 -48.86 -55.54 6.69 n/av n/w Mw 
15 Midland bank Bents Dec 87 88 31.33 -60.83 -69.00 8.17 21.87 30.64 -8.77 
16 Rogation Props Mar 92 93 n/w n/w n/w n/w n/w flay n/w 
17 Ronald Mawq Mar 8S 86 100.00 50.55 S0.55 0.00 32.74 43.61 -10.17 
. 18 aIchords Tx is Sep 89 90 3.27 17.43 25.72 -8.30 7.58 21.21 -13.62 
19 Skotchloy kund Mar 91 92 129.54 571.68 740.14 -168.46 33.13 64.32 -31.20 
20 Toy Romas House Jun 87 88 18.88 8.25 9.25 0.00 7.42 19.12 -11.70 
21 TIbWt i Britten Trfrt Dec 89 90 10.50 11.76 23.61 -11.85 12.49 26.10 -13.62 
22 Westbury House Feb 92 93 1122.67 -53.02 -70.63 17.61 n/w n/w n/w 
23 Allied Lyons Brews Feb 89 90 24.93 22.65 22.65 0.00 22.92 19.59 3.33 
24 Aide Fdrst Apr 87 88 0.53 0.10 0.10 0.00 1.24 1.24 0.00 
25 Aide Fdrot Apr 89 90 1.26 0.76 0.31 0.46 25.65 20.06 5.61 
26 Bass Brews Sep 89 90 9.14 12.85 11.07 1.78 25.38 21.77 3.62 
27 talus Circle Cart Dec 88 89 20.47 16.66 16.11 0.55 19.40 13.80 5.61 
28 British Land Props mar 87 U n/av n/w flay n/w n/w n/w Mw 
29 British Land Props Mar 92 93 Wow n/w Nay n/ev Mw n/w n/w 
30 British Steel Steel Her 92 93 8.30 -450.00 -320.6; -129.38 May Nay Mw . 
31 City Site Estates Props Sap 87 U n/sf Nav n av n/av Nw n/w n/av 
32 Dares Estates Props Doc 87 88 n/av Nov n/w n/av n/av n/sv n/w 
33 Forte Hotel Jan 90 91 20.82 27.79 24.76 3.06 34.68 30.78 3.71 
34 lard Securities Props Mar 87 U Nw n/w Nw n/w Nav n/w n/w 
35 Lasoo eitop Doc 86 87 21.80 89.29 81.08 8.21 48.64 
41.42 7.22 
36 Laamo of top Dec 89 90 66.74 38.96 29.13 9.85 40.80 
32.48 8.32 
37 NEPC Props Sap 86 87 Nov New n/ev n/w n/w n/w n/w 
38 Taylor Woodrow Crotr Doc 89 90 9.70 15.60 14.22 1.37 23.42 
21.32 2.09 
39 Viet brew Sap 89 90 11.46 14.81 9.01 5.80 18.78 
4.16 14.62 
40 Niitbroad brow Feb 91 92 20.96 14.69 13.93 0.77 19.27 
13.56 5.70 
41 Helical Wer Props Jul 88 89 n/w rVw Wow n/w n/w 4 
Nw 
49 22 
n/w 
6 55 
42 Next Mutts Jon 88 89 4.19 7.76 5.71 
2.04 29.0 
. . 
43 Worcester Grp Malang Doc 90 91 2.37 17.58 17.58 0.00 
22.07 22.07 0.00 
Awry income zirp ratios: 
For 
. quity Isom: 
For debt issues: 
For ewwortibl. issues: 
41.72 17.96 28.82 -10.84 21.55 35.68 -14.14 
18.03 
-16.32 -11.19 -8.13 25.45 
20.01 5. u 
3.28 12.67 11.65 1.02 25.56 22.28 
3.27 
Int. rpt Wuring ha been e. lcul. tsd U: 
(Interest/Earnings before interest end tu) x 100 
debt issuing companies an interest gearing ratio 
of -16.32% (although this is +23.11%, if one 
company's unusual income gearing of 
-450.00 is 
excluded); and convertibles an average interest 
gearing ratio of 12.67%. This would compare to 
an average income gearing of 28.82% if the equity 
issuing companies had issued debt; 
-8.19% if the 
debt issuing companies had issued equity (+20.21% 
if the unusual income gearing of 
-320.62 is 
excluded). The only convertible to be affected 
by the hypothetical reconstruction would be Next 
plc, where a convertible loan would be replaced 
in the reconstruction by equity, so less interest 
would be payable, resulting in the interest 
gearing decreasing for Next from 7.76% to 5.71%. 
This pattern is also reflected in Yr +1. 
It can be seen that if the equity issuing group 
had issued debt, then the average interest 
gearing ratio for their group would have 
increased substantially. 
There are some extreme values for the equity 
issuing companies, particularly for the year 
prior to the capital issue (Yr-1) , although these 
do tend to average out to a certain extent (for 
example, values of +1493.73, +1122.67, and - 
2371.93). This makes a diagrammatic represent- 
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ation difficult; it should be noted that these 
extreme values seem to occur more often for the 
equity issuing companies. 
7-3-3 Income Gearing Ratios for Actual Issues 
and Industry Sector 
A comparison of the actual income gearing ratios 
with industry sectors is made in Table 7.5. In 
Yr 
-1, the income gearing for those companies 
which went on to issue equity in the following 
year was 41.72%, compared to an industry average 
income gearing ratio of 36.58%. When the 
companies subsequently issue equity in Yr 0, the 
income gearing ratio falls to 17.98% compared to 
an industry average income gearing ratio of 
40.52% in Yr 0,; and 21.55% compared to an 
industry average income gearing ratio of 54.01% 
in Yr +1. So the equity issuing group does end 
up having an income gearing ratio which is 
considerably less than the average income gearing 
for the industry sectors represented by those 
companies having made equity issues. 
The average income gearing ratio for the debt 
issuing group is 18.03% in Yr -1, comparing with 
an industry income gearing of 16.62%. In Yr 0, 
there is a 
-16.32% income gearing ratio, but 
this 
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TABLE 7.5 : COMPARISON OF INTEREST GEARING RATIOS - ACTUAL COMPARED TO INDUSTRY SECTOR 
C Ind Sec Nth Year Year Co. IG Ind. 19 Dl ff. bet. Co. Co. i ind. I0 Diff. bet. Co. Co. IG Ind-IG Diff. bet 0 1 Tr-1(X) Tr-1(X) Li nd. Yr-) Tr0 (X) Yr0(x) &Ind. YrO Tr+1(3) 1x"1(3) . Co. &Ind. (Yr"1) 
1 Anglia Secure M ON" Nauss Sep 90 91 1493.73 17.67 1476.06 -492.06 42.11 
-524.17 
-59.83 330.1 "389 93 
21iuc Missu Her 92 93 11.57 26.46 -14.89 16.5$ n/w 
. 
n/w Nw n/ev 
. 
3 Iowtsr Peckp Dec 90 91 29.25 18.45 10.80 33.08 21.13 " 11.95 32.39 24.1.1. 
Nw 
7.95 
4 /orthorpe Eletr Dec 87 88 4.17 6.85 -2.68 2.94 6.33 
-3.39 3.28 6.95 
-3-. 67 
5 casket Gentr Mer 91 92 -2371.93 19.66 -2391.59 92.29 20.20 72.09 68.40 Nov rv my 
6 cater Allan Diset Apr. 91 92 n/w n/w n/w Nw n/w Wow n/w n/w n/ev 
7 comity Hospital Grp Mlthc Jun 91 92 2.67 23.51 -20.84 1.29 23.59 -22.30 Nev new ryev 
e Cookson Grp Oir+d" Dec 91 92 40.69 19.34 21.33 43.97 17.65 26.52 n/w Nsv n/w 
9 De Ls Rue Print Her 92 93 19.75 21.46 -1.68 12.31 n! w n/w n/w ryw 
j/ 
10 Domino Printing Print Oct 91 92 9.57 18.17 -8.60 6.09 21.46 
-15.37 nIw n/w r4 ow 
11 EurotiJT4l Trfrt Dec 90 91 98.62 25.33 73.29 99.88 35.59 66.29 100.03 47.63 52.40 
12 Joyce Persh Dec 89 90 32.12 12.11 20.01 30.34 15.39 14.95 16.14 20.17 
-4.03 
13 Krik Fit Mdist Feb 89 90 6.83 23.49 -16.66 5.97 38.36 
-32.39 24.45 59.29 
-34.64 
14 Lovell, T. J. Cnstr Sep 91 92 61.15 33.86 7.29 
-48.86 291.87 -340.71 n/w n/ev Nev 
15 Midlsrd Bank tanks Dec 87 88 31.33 21.51 9.82 
-60.83 37.85 -96.68 21.87 15.4 6.47 
16lelslion Props Mar 92 93 n/w n/w Nrr Mw n/ev n/w Nrr Vow eyev 
17 Isnold VA" Nor 85 86 100.00 28.53 71.47 30.55 22.25 28.30 32.76 17.43 15.31 
18 Richards Tamis Sep 89 90 3.27 15.79 
-12.52 17.43 20.54 -3.11 7.58 26.50 
-18.92 
19 Skstchlsy Lard Nor 91 92 129.54 36.57 92.97 571.68 35.18 536.50 33.13 Nw n/w 
20 Toy Now House Jun 87 88 18.88 21.39 
-2.51 8.25 16.28 -6.03 7.42 10.63 
-3.21 
21 Tibbet 9 Britten Trfrt Dec 89 90 10.50 11.36 
-0.86 11.76 25.33 -13.57 12.48 35.59 
-23.11 
22 Westbury House Feb 92 93 1122.67 330.10 792.57 
-53.02 n/w n/w n/w Nw Nw 
23 Allied Lyons Breis Feb 89 90 24.93 16.40 8.53 22.65 22.56 0.09 22.92 24.44 
-1.52 
24 Aids " Fdret Apr 87 88 0.83 5.91 
-5.06 0.10 4.90 -4.30 1.24 5.21 
-3.97 
25 Aids Fdret Apr 89 90 1.24 5.21 
-3.97 0.76 8.45 -7.69 25.65 13.91 11.74 
26 Base Brew Sep 89 90 9.14 16.40 
-7.26 12.85 22.56 -9.71 25.35 24.44 0.94 
27 Ilus Circle Cunt Dec 88 89 20.47 15.18 5.29 16.66 14.21 2.45 19.40 15.91 3.42 
28 British Land Props Nor 87 88 n/w n/w n/w n/w n/w n/w Mw rvw n/ev 
29 British Lard Props - Mar 92 93 n/w n/w n/w n/w n/w n/ov n/w n/w rVw 
30 British Steel Steel Mer 92 93 8.30 13.27 
-4.97 -450.00 Wow Nw rVw n/ov n/w 
31 City Site Estates Props Sep 87 88 Nev n/sv n/ev' n/w n/w n/w n/w n/w n/w 
32 Dares Estates Props Dec 87 88 n/ev n/sv n/ov n/ev n/ev n/w Vow n/w n/w 
33 Forte Hotel Jan 90 91 20.82 26.97 
-6.15 27.79 28.80 -1.01 34.48 41.56 -7.08 
34 Land Securities Props Nor 87 88 n/ov rVw n/w n/w n/w n/ov Nw Nw n/w 
35 Was 01 top Dec 86 87 21.80 13.31 8.49 89.29 70.46 18.85 41.64 26.53 22.11 
36 Lumº 01 top Dec 89 90 66.74 31.93 34.81 38.96 28.43 10.55 40.80 26.91 13.89 
37 MEPC - Props Sep 86 87 Nw n/w n/ov Nev n/ov n/w n/w n/ov n/w 
38 Taylor Woodrow Cnstr Dec 89 90 9.70 13.99 
-4.29 15.60 19.96 -6.38 23.42 33.86 "10. " 
39 Viii Drew, Sep 89 90 11.44 16.40 
-6.96 14.81 22.56 -7.75 18.78 24.44 -9.66 
401hitbrnd brew Feb 91 92 20.96 26.44 
-3.46 14.69 26.16 -9.47 19.27 rVw n/ev 
41 Helical Bar Pry Jan 88 89 n/w n/mv n/sv Nw n/ev n/w n/w n/w n/ov 
42 Meat Mlults Jan 88 89 4.19 7.83 
-3.64 7.76 7.31 0.45 29.04 11.99 17.05 
43 Worcester Grp MrM 
. 
Dec 90 91 2.37 13.45 
-11.08 17.58 15.08 2.50 
22.07 23.21 
-1.14 
A "r@" IF'= marine ratios: 
For equity looms: 
For debt law: 
For convortlb(e looms: 
Incas sIinl has bin calculated u: 
41.72 36.58 5.14 17.98 40.52 -17.95 21.55 54.01 "35. % 
18.03 16.62 1.41 
-16.32 24.28 -1.17 25.45 23.73 2.34 
3.28 10.6E 
-7.36 12.67 11.20 1.47 
25.56 17.60 7. % 
iintxrNt/Exrninp before interest end tax) x 100 
is 23.11% if the unusual figure of 
-450.00 is 
excluded, this would then compare with an 
industry average income gearing of 24.28%. So 
these figures tend to be much more in line with 
industry average income gearing ratios. This 
would appear to suggest that the companies which 
issued equity tend to keep below industry average 
income gearing ratios, whilst those issuing debt 
tend to be slightly above industry average 
interest gearing ratios. Whilst it is of course 
dangerous to argue from the general to the 
particular given the relatively small differences 
in the averages, the view expressed in the 
previous sentence is supported by the statistical 
findings shown in Table 7.9B, and discussed 
below. 
7-3-4 Income Gearing Ratios for Hypothetical 
Issues and Industry Sector 
A comparison of industry income gearing ratios 
and income gearing ratios that would have arisen 
if the hypothetical issues had been made is shown 
in Table 7.6. 
The average income gearing ratio for the equity 
issuing group, if they had chosen to issue debt 
instead, is 28.82% for Yr 0 and 35.68% for Yr +1, 
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TABLE 7.6 : COMPARISON OF INTEREST GEARING RATIOS 
- 
HYPOTHETICAL ISSUE 
COMPARED TO INDUSTRY SECTOR 
Ca ry Ind Sae Nth Tr Yr Npp. IG Ind. IG Diff. bst. lnd. Nyp. 1G Ind. IG Offf. bst. Co. 
0 1 Yr0(X) YrO (X) & Nyp. TrO Yr. 1(Z) Tr+1(X) i Nyp. (Yr. 1) 
1 Anflis Secure Nass Nauss Sap 90 91 -501.31 42.11 543.49 
-70.92 
. 
'330.10 401.02 
2 Biore Missu Mar 92 93 25.97 Nw Now New Nw Now 
3 $owtar Packp Doc 90 91 38.64 21.13 
-17.51 43.63 24.44 
-19.21 
4 Wrthorps Elatr Doe 87 88 5.61 6.33 0.65 16.34 6.95 
-9.39 
5 casket Gantr Mar 91 92 113.60 20.20 
-93.40 67.94 Nw n/w 
6 cater Allan Diut Apr 91 92 Nw Nw Nw n/w Nw Nav 
7 Camnity Hospital Grp Nlthe Jun 91 92 4.99 23.59 18.60 New Nw Nsv 
1 Cookson Grp 0inde Doe 91 92 54.69 17.45 
-37.24 Nw Nw Nw 
9 Do La Rue Print Nor 92 93 21.34 Nw Nw NOV Nov Now 
10 Domino Printing Print Oct 91 92 6.09 21.46 15.37 Nw n/w Nav 
11 Eurotu rwt Trfrt 
- 
Doe 90 91 102.79 35.59 
-67.20 121.21 47.63 
-73.38 
12 Jsyss Psrsh Dec 89 90 30.34 15.39 
-14.95 37.13 20.17 
-16.96 
13 Krik Fit Mdist Fab 89 90 20.55 38.36 17.81 43.51 59.29 15.78 
14 Lowll, Y. J. Cnstr Sep 91 92 
-55.54 291.85 347.39 Nw Nw Nav 
IS Midland Rank tanks Doe 87 88 
-69.00 37.85 106.85 30.66 15.40 
-15.24 
16 Rgslian Props mar 92 93 Nw Nov n/w n/w rvsv Ivey 
17 Ronald Mmsn, Mar 85 86 50.55 22.25 
-28.30 43.61 17.43 
-26.18 
18 Richards Tiais Sap 89 90 25.72 20.54 
-5.18 21.21 26.50 5.29 
19 Skotehlsy Land Mar 91 92 740.14 35.18 
-704.96 64.32 n/w Nw 
20 Toy Home* Mau" Jim 87 88 8.25 14.28 6.03 19.12 10.63 
-8.49 
21 TiObst i Britten Trfrt Dot 89 90 23.61 25.33 1.72 26.10 35.59 9.49 
22 Westbury Nousa Feb 92 93 
-70.63 Nav n/w Nav Nw Nw 
23 Allied Lyons Brame Feb 89 90 22.65 22.56 
-0.09 19.59 24.44 4.85 
24 Aids Fdrst Apr 87 88 0.10 4.90 4.80 1.24 5.21 3.97 
25 Asds Fdrst Apr 89 90 0.31 8.45 8.14 20.04 13.91 
-6.13 
26 Nos Brews Sep 89 90 11.07 22.56 11.49 21.77 24.44 2.67 
27 Blue Circle Carnt Dec 88 89 16.11 14.21 
-1.90 13.80 15.96 2.18 
25 British Land Props Mar 87 88 Nw Nav Nw Nw Nw Nw 
29 British Land Props Mar 92 93 New Nov New Nw Nov Nw 
30 British Steel Steel Mar 92 93 
-320.62 Nov flay Nov N av Nov 
31 City Site Estates Props Sap 87 88 NOV Nw Nw Nw NOV Nw 
32 Dares Estates Props Doe 87 " Nw NOV n/w Nw Nw Nw 
33 Fort. Hotel Jan 90 91 24.74 28.80 4.06 30.78 41.56 10.78 
34 Land Securities Props Mar 87 88 n/w Nw Nw Nw Nav Nw 
35 Lasso 01 top Doe 86 87 81.04 70.44 -10.64 41.42 26.53 -14.89 
36 Lams 01 top Doe 89 90 29.13 28.43 -0.70 32.48 26.91 -5.57 
37 MEPC Props Sap 86 87 Nav Nw Nw Nw Nw n/w 
38 Taylor Woodrow Cnstr Doe 89 90 14.22 19.96 5.76 21.32 33.86 1234 
39 vaus gram Sap 89 90 9.01 22.56 13.55 4.16 24. U 20.28 
40Wh itbrsad Brous Feb 91 92 13.93 24.16 10.23 13.56 Nw Nw 
41 Helical ear Props Jan 88 89 New r. /&V Nrv Now Nov Nw 
42 Rast mutts Jan 88 89 5.71 7.31 1.60 22.49 11.99 -10.50 
43 Ysresster Grp va" Dee 90 91 17.56 15.08 -2.50 22.07 23.21 1.14 
AvOrM inea» 
. ring ratios: 
For equity tswma: 
For debt Iu 
For eanort i bi. taws: 
28. x2 40.52 5.24 35.63 54.01 23.87 
-6.19 24.28 4.06 20.01 23.73 
3.07 
11.65 11.20 
-0.45 22.28 17.60 -4.63 
Interest veering has been eMeulatsd as: 
(Intonst/E. rninM before interest and tu) a 100 
these compare with industry income gearing ratios 
for the group of 40.52% and 54.01%, which are 
considerably higher. For debt issuing companies, 
if they had reconstructed with equity, then the 
income gearing ratio would have been 
-8.19% for 
Yr 0 (20.21% if the income gearing for British 
Steel of 
-320.62% is ommitted) and 20.01% for 
Year +1, compared to 24.28% and 23.73% for the 
industry income gearing ratios for the group. 
The convertible issues group are very similar to 
the industry income gearing in Yr 0, differing 
slightly, being 4.68% more, in Yr +1. 
7-3-5 Interest Cover Ratios for Actual and 
Hypothetical Issues 
Another measure often used in relation to 
interest is the interest cover ratio, calculated 
as: 
Earnings before interest + Tax 
Interest 
A comparison of the interest cover on the actual 
and hypothetical issues is made in Table 7.7. 
It is interesting to note that the average 
interest cover in Yr -1 for those companies which 
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TABLE 7.7 : COMPARISON OF INTEREST COVER RATIOS - ACTUAL COMPARED 
TO HYPOTHETICAL ISSUE 
Coup w Ind Sac Nth Yr Yr Co. IC Co. IC Nyp. IC Diff. btt. Co. Co. IC Hyp. IC Diff. bet. Co. 01 Yr-I Yr0 Yr0 & Hyp. YrO Yr"1 Yr"I & Nyp. (Yr"I) 
1 Anglia Secure Molles 
2 BiSsc 
3 Boater 
4 Rowthorpe 
5 Casket 
6 Cater Allen 
7 Coalnity Hospital Grp 
8 Cookson Grp 
9 Do La Rue 
10 Domino Printing 
11 Eurotunnel 
12 Jeyss 
13 Kwik Fit 
14 Lovell, Y. J. 
15 Midland Bank 
16 Regalian 
17 Rsnold 
18 Richards 
19 Sketchley 
20 Tay Homes 
21 Tibbet & Britten 
22 Westbury 
23 Allied Lyons 
24 Ards 
25 Ards 
26 Bau 
27 Blue Circle 
28 British Land 
29 British Land 
30 British steel 
31 City Site Estates 
32 Dares Estates 
33 Forte 
34 Land Securities 
35 Lasso 
36 Los= 
37 MEVC 
38 Taylor Woodrow 
39 Vaux 
40 Whitbread 
41 Neliul Bar 
42 Next 
43 Worcester Grp 
Hause Sep 90 
. 
91 0.07 
-0.21 -0.20 -0.01 -1.67 
Missu Mar 92 93 8.64 6.03 3.85 2.18 Way 
Packe Dec 90 91 3.42 3.02 2.59 0.44 3.09 
Eletr Dec 87 88 23.96 33.99 17.59 16.40 30.46 
Gentr Mar 91 92 -0.04 1.08 0.88 0.20 2.07 
Disct Apr 91 92 n/av n/av NOV NOV NOV 
Hlthc Jun 91 92 37.51 77.50 20.03 57.47 Nov 
0inds Dec 91 92 2.46 2.27 1.83 0.45 n/av 
Print Mar 92 93 5.06 8.12 4.69 3.44 NOV 
Print Oct 91 92 10.45 16.43 16.43 0.00 Nov 
Trfrt Dec 90 91 1.01 1.00 0.97 0.03 1.00 
Persh Dec 89 90 3.11 3.30 3.30 0.00 6.20 
Mdist Feb 89 90 14.65 16.75 4.87 11.88 4.09 
Cnitr Sep 91 92 2.43 -2.05 -1.80 -0.25 Nov 
Banks Dec 87 88 3.19 -1.64 -1.45 -0.19 4.57 
Props Mar 92 93 n/av Nav n/av n/ev n/sv 
Msmq Mar 85 86 1.00 1.98 1.98 0.00 3.05 
Txais Sep 89 90 30.58 5.74 3.89 1.85 13.19 
Laund. Mar 91 92 0.77 0.17 0.14 0.04 3.02 
House Jun 87 88 5.30 12.12 12.12 0.00 13.47 
Trfrt Dec 89 90 9.52 8.50 4.24 4.27 8.01 
House Feb 92 93 0.09 -1.89 -1.42 -0.47 NOV 
Brew Feb 89 90 4.01 4.41 4.41 0.00 4.36 
Fdret Apr 87 88 119.86 961.00 961.00 0.00 80.74 
Fdret Apr 89 90 80.74 130.79 323.99 -193.20 3.90 
Brews Sep 89 
-90 10.95 7.78 9.03 -1.25 
3.94 
Cment Doc 88 89 4.88 6.00 6.21 -0.21 5.15 
Props Mar 87 88 n/av n/sv Nov n/av n/ev 
Props Mar 92 93 n/av Nav n/ev Nov n/av 
Steel Mar 92 93 12.04 -0.22 -0.31 - 0.09 n/ev 
Props Sep 87 88 Nov n/av Nov n/av n/av 
Props Dec 87 88 n/av Nov n/av NOV NOV 
Motel Jan 90 91 4.80 3.60 4.04 -0.44 2.90 
Props Mar 87 88 n/av NOV Nav n/av Nav 
Oilep Dec 86 87 4.59 1.12 1.23 -0.11 2.06 
Oilep Dec 89 90 1.50 2.57 3.43 -0.87 2.45 
Props Sep 86 87 Nov Nav Nav Nav NOV 
Cnstr Dec 89 90 10.31 6.41 7.03 -0.62 4.27 
Brew Sep 89 90 8.74 6.75 11.10 -4.35 5.32 
Brew Feb 91 92 4.77 6.81 7.18 -0.37 5.19 
Props Jan 88 89 n/av n/av n/av n/av Nov 
Mutts Jan 88 89 23.88 12.89 17.51 -4.62 
3.44 
Mme 00 Dec 90 91 42.24 5.69 5.69 
0.00 4.53 
Averaos incamis cover ratios: 
For equity issues: 
For debt issues: 
For convertible issues: 
Interest cover has been calculated as: 
Earnings before interest and tax /Interest 
-1.41 
Nav 
2.29 
6.12 
1.47 
NOV 
Nov 
Way 
n/av 
Nav 
0.83 
2.69 
2.30 
n/av 
3.26 
NOV 
2.29 
4.72 
1.55 
5.23 
3.83 
Nav 
5.10 
80.74 
4.99 
4.59 
7.25 
n/av 
NOV 
Nov 
n/av 
NOV 
3.25 
n/av 
2.41 
3.08 
n/av 
4.69 
24.05 
7.37 
NOV 
4.45 
4.53 
8.16 9.61 4.73 4.89 6.96 2.71 
22.27 94.75 111.53 -16.78 10.94 13.41 
33.06 9.29 11.60 -2.31 3.99 4.49 
-0.26 
n/av 
0.80 
24.34 
0.59 
Nav 
n/av 
Nav 
Nav 
Nsv 
0.17 
3.50 
1.79 
Nav 
1.31 
n/av 
0.76 
8.47 
1.46 
8.24 
4.18 
n/av 
-0.74 
0.00 
-1.09 
-0.65 
-2.09 
Nav 
NOV 
NOV 
Nav 
n/av 
-0.35 
n/mv 
-0.36 
-0.63 
NOV 
-0.42 
-18.75 
-2.18 
n/Sv 
-1.00 
0.00 
4.26 
-2.48 
-0.50 
(including any change in interest for hypothetical issues). 
subsequently issued equity is the lowest of all 
types of issue, being 8.16 compared to debt 22.27 
and convertibles 33.06. The average interest 
cover for those companies which made. equity 
issues is nearly double the value it would have 
been on a reconstruction for debt in Yr 0, and 
over double in Yr +1. 
The average interest cover for those companies 
which issued debt actually increased in Yr 0, 
jumping from 22.27 in Yr 
-1, to 94.75. This 
increase in average interest cover is 
attributable to Asda which capitalised much of 
its interest in this period, thus reducing the 
amount of interest passing through the profit and 
loss account, and hence increasing interest 
cover. Interest cover would have increased 
slightly for the convertible issues if equity had 
been issued instead. 
The caveat should be made that the average 
interest cover ratios should be interpreted with 
caution due to possible aggregation problems. 
The averaging of individual companies' interest 
cover ratios may not produce representative 
results due to scale problems. This is 
illustrated in the example below: 
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Example: 
Firms 
(A) (B) (C) AGGREG. 
£££ 
EBIT 1000 100 10 
INTEREST 100 15 
INTEREST 
COVER 10 100 2 
AVERAGE 
INT. COVER 37.33 
1110 
106 
10.47 
10.47 
The average interest cover ratios for each of 
equity, 
_debt and convertible 
issues were 
recalculated on an aggregate basis and the 
results are shown in Table 7.7B. 
Whilst the absolute figures are different for the 
average interest cover ratios shown in Table 7.7B 
(aggregate basis) compared to those in Table 7.7 
(non-aggregate basis), the overall trend of the 
ratios is the same with the interest cover being 
lowest in Yr-1 for those companies which 
subsequently issued equity. 
Figs. 7.. 8 and 7.9 show the distribution of 
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TABLE 7.7B : AVERAGE INTEREST COVER RATIOS BASED ON AGGREGATE DATA 
Co. IC Co. IC Hyp. IC Co. IC Hyp. IC 
Yr-1 Yr0 YrO Yr+1 Yr+1 
Equity issues 2.71 0.50 0.44 2.42 1.85 
Debt issues 6.68 5.62 6.81 4.51 5.79 
Corny. issues 25.56 12.21 18.85 3.50 4.45 
Interest cover has been calculated as: 
Total earnings before interest and tax/Total interest 
(including any change in interest for hypothetical issues) 
Mote: Co. IC = actual interest cover 
Hyp. IC = interest cover incorporating the hypothetical 
reconstruction 
Yr-1 = year prior to capital issue 
Yr 0= year of capital issue 
Yr+1 = year following capital issue 
interest cover ratios for the equity issuing 
companies 
respectively. 
and debt issuing companies 
Fig. 7.8 highlights that many of the equity 
issuing companies have low interest cover; and 
that for some companies a debt issue would have 
resulted in a substantial drop in interest cover. 
Fig. 7.9 illustrates that the interest cover 
ratios for the debt issuing companies are mainly 
'bunched' between 2 and 12 times, with a couple 
of extreme outliers. 
Fig. 7.10 combines the 
. 
information from Figs. 7.8 
and 7.9. It shows the change in interest cover 
ratios for both companies issuing equity and 
those issuing debt. On the vertical axis is the 
interest cover for Yr-1 for all the companies, 
whilst the interest cover after the capital issue 
is shown on the horizontal axis, with equity 
issues on the right of the y axis and debt issues 
on the left. 
The interest cover ratios for the equity issuing 
companies. would seem to be more variable than 
those for the debt issuing companies. The lower 
interest cover of the equity issuing companies 
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may be indicative of financial distress, and 
would be in accord with the premise mentioned in 
earlier chapters, that companies tend to issue 
equity when they are experiencing financial 
difficulties. 
7-3-6 Interest Cover Ratios for Actual. Issues 
and Industry Sector 
A comparison of the actual interest cover ratios 
compared to the industry sector interest cover 
ratios (Table 7.8) shows that the companies in 
the sample tended to have an average interest 
cover ratio in excess of the average industry 
interest cover. This was particularly the case 
for debt issues. 
This would seem to imply that the debt issuing 
companies in particular do not wish to have an 
interest cover ratio below their industry 
average. 
7-3-7 Interest Cover Ratios for Hypothetical 
Issues and Industry Sector 
Finally, Table 7.9 compares the hypothetical 
interest cover to the industry sector. The 
average interest cover for the debt remains high, 
7-26 
TABLE 7.8 : COMPARISON OF INTEREST COVER RATIOS - ACTUAL COMPARED TO INDUSTRY SECTOR 
Cary Ind Sac Nth Year Year CO. IC 1M. IC Diff. bet. Co. Co. IC Ird. IC Diff. bst. Co. Co. IC 1nd. IC Diff. bet. 
0 1 Yr-1 Yr-1 Lind. Yr-1 YrO Yr0 Lind. Yr0 Tr+1 Tr. 1 Co. tlnd. (Tr"t) 
I Anglia Sean Mows Nose SOP 90 91 0.07 5.66 -5.59 -0.21 2.37 -2.58 
-1.67 0.30 
-1.97 
2 Nisac Nissu Mir 92 93 8.64 3.78 4.86 6.03 Nw n/w rVev WOW Nw 
3 grater Packp Dec 90 91 3.42 5.42 -2.00 3.02 4.73 -1.71 3.09 4.09 
-1.00 
4 WhOrPS Eletr Dec 87 U 23.96 14.60 9.36 33.99 15.79 18.20 30.46 14.39 16.07 
5 Casket Gsntr Nor 91 92 -0.04 5.09 -5.13 1.08 4.95 -3.87 2.07 Nav Nw 
6 cater Allen Disct Apr 91 92 Nw Nw Nw Nw Nw Nw ryav Nw Nw 
7 CawanitY Hospital Grp lithe dun 91 92 37.51 4.25 33.26 77.50 4.24 73.26 Nav Nw Nw 
e Cron Grp 0inds Dec 91 92 2.46 5.17 -2.71 2.27 5.73 -3.46 Nov New Nw 
9 De La Rut Print Mar 92 93 5.06 4.64 0.40 8.12 Nw Nav Way Nav Nav 
10 Dosino Printing Print Oct 91 92 10.45 5.50 4.95 16.43 4.66 11.77 Nw Nav Nw 
11 Eurotunel Trfrt Dec 90 91 1.01 3.95 -2.94 1.00 2.81 -1.81 1.00 2.10 
-1.10 
12 J" Per" Dec 89 90 3.11 8.26 -5.15 3.30 6.50 
-3.20 6.20 4. % 1.24 
13 Krik Fit Mdist Feb 89 90 14.65 4.31 10.34 16.75 2.65 14.10 4.09 1.70 2.39 
14 Lovell, Y. J. Cnstr Sep 91 92 2.43 2.95 -0.52 -2.05 0.34 -2.39 Nw Nw Nw 
15 Midland Bank Banks Dec 87 88 3.19 4.65 -1.46 -1.64 2.64 -4.28 4.57 6.49 
-1.92 
16 kept Ion Preps Mar 92 93 Nw Nw Nw rVev Nw Nw Nw Nw Nw 
17 Ronald M sr Mar 85 86 1.00 3.51 -2.51 1.98 4.49 
-2.51 3.05 5.74 
-2.69 
18 Richards Twis Sep 89 90 30.58 6.33 24.25 5.74 4.87 0.87 13.19 3.77 9.42 
19 Sketchley Laird Mir 91 92 0.77 2.73 -1. % 0.17 2.84 
-2.67 3.02 Nw Nw 
20 Tay Nasss Messe Jun 87 88 5.30 4.68 0.62 12.12 7.00 5.12 13.47 9.40 4.07 
21 Tibbet i Britten Trfrt Dec 89 90 9.52 8.80 0.72 8.50 3.95 4.55 8.01 2.81 5.20 
2Z Westbury mouse Feb 92 93 0.09 0.30 -0.21 -1.89 rVev Nw Way Nw Nw 
23 Allied Lyons Brew Feb 89 90 4.01 6.10 
-2.09 4.41 4.43 -0.02 4.36 4.09 0.27 
24 Aids Fdret Apr 87 88 119.86 16.92 102.94 961.00 20.41 940.59 80.74 19.19 61.55 
25 Auk Fdret Apr 89 90 80.74 19.19 61.55 130.79 11.84 118.95 3.90 7.19 
-3.29 
26 Bass Brew Sep 89 90 10.95 6.10 4.85 7.78 4.43 3.35 3.94 4.09 
-0.15 
27 Blue Circle Ceant Dec . 88 89 4.88 6.59 
-1.71 6.00 7.04 -1.04 5.15 6.26 
-1.11 
28 British Land Props Mar 87 88 Nw Nav rVev Nw Nw Nw Nw Nw Nw 
29 British Land Props Her 92 93 Nw Nw Nw Nw Nw Nw Nw rVev Nw 
30 British Steel Steel Mar 92 93 12.04 7.54 4.50 
-0.22 Nw Nw Nw Nw Nw 
31 City Site Estates Props Sep 87 U Nw Nw Nw rVev Nw rVev Nw Nw Nay 
32 Dsrss Estates Props Dec 87 88 Nw Nw Nw Nw rVev Nw rVev Nw Nw 
33 Forte Botel Jan 90 91 4.80 3.71 1.09 3.60 3.47 0.13 2.90 2.41 0.49 
34 Land Securities Props Isar 87 88 Nw Nav Nw Nw Nw Nw Nw rV*v "law 
35 Lasso Of top Dec 86 87 4.59 7.51 
-2.92 1.12 1.42 -0.30 2.06 3.77 -1.71 
36 Lasso 01 top Dec 89 90 1.50 3.13 
-1.63 2.57 3.52 -0.95 2.45 3.72 -1.27 
37 MEPC Props Sep 86 87 New NOV Nov Nw Nw Nw rVev Nw rVev 
38 Taylor Woodor Cnstr Dec 89 90 10.31 7.15 3.16 6.41 5.00 1.41 4.27 2.95 1.32 
39 Vow Brew Sep 89 90 8.74 6.10 2.64 6.75 4.43 2.32 5.32 4.09 1.23 
40 AIthread Brews Feb 91 92 4.77 4.09 0.68 6.81 4.14 2.67 5.19 New Nw 
41 Nelial Bar Props Jan 88 89 Nw Nw Nw Nw Nw Nw Nw Nw Nw 
42 Next Nutts Jan 88 89 23.88 12.77 11.11 12.89 13.68 -0.79 3.44 8.34 -4.90 
43 Worcester Grp No" Dec 90 91 42.24 7.44 34.80 5.69 6.63 -0.94 4.53 4.31 0.22 
Average interest cover ratios: 
For equity issues: 8.16 5.23 2.93 9.61 4.74 5.85 6.96 5.07 2.70 
For debt lame: 22.27 7.84 14.42 94.75 6.38 97.01 10.94 5.78 5.73 
For convertible issues: 33.06 10.11 22.95 9.29 10.16 -0.87 3.99 6.33 -2.34 
If the tssnuslly large interes t cover figures for Aids of 
961 and 130.79 are"eactuded, then the interest cover i s: 4.52 
IM. nst oowr has been calculated as: 
EWMn9, before interest wrd taz/Int. rat 
TABLE 7.9 : COMPARISON OF INTEREST COVER RATIOS - HYPOTHETICAL ISSUE 
COMPARED TO INDUSTRY SECTOR 
Ccsparry Ind Sac Nth Yr Yr Ind. IC Hyp. IC Ind. IC Diff. bet. ind. Nyp. IC Ind. IC Diff. bet. lnd. 0 1 Yr-1 (%) YrO(X) Yr0 (X) IC & Nyp. YrO Yr+1(%) Yr+1(X) IC i Nyp. (Y r1) 
I Anglia Secure Noses House Sep 90 91 5.66 
-0.20 2.37 2.57 
-1.41 0.30 1.71 
2 Bi. sc Missu Mar 92 93 3.78 3.85 Nav Nav Nov n/ev Nav 3 Bowater Packp Dec 90 91 5.42 2.59 4.73 2.14 2.29 4.09 1.80 
4 Borthorpe Eletr Doc 87 88 14.6 17.59 15.79 
-1.80 6.12 14.39 8.27 
5 Casket Gentr Mar 91 92 5.09 0.88 4.95 4.07 1.47 flay n/ev 
6 Cater Allen Disct Apr 91 92 Nov n/ev lay n/av Nav n/av n/ev 
7 Community Hospital Grp Htthc Jun 91 92 4.25 20.03 4.24 
-15.79 jay n/av n/ev 
8 Cookson Grp Oinds Doc 91 92 5.17 1.83 5.73 3.90 n/av lay n/ov 
9 Do La Rue Print Mar 92 93 4.66 4.69 n/av n/ev n/ev n/ev n/av 
10 Domino Printing Print Oct 91 92 5.5 16.43 4.66 
-11.77 flay n/sv n/ev 
11 Eurotumsl Trfrt Dec 90 91 3.95 0.97 2.81 1.84 0.83 2.10 1.27 
12 Jeyes Persh Dec 89 90 8.26 3.30 6.50 3.20 2.69 4.96 2.27 
13 Krik Fit Mdist Feb 89 90 4.31 4.87 2.65 
-2.22 2.30 1.70 
-0.60 
14 Lovell, Y. J. Cnstr Sep 91 92 2.95 
-1.80 0.34 2.14 n/av n/ev n/ev 
15 Midtw Bank Banks Dec 87 88 4.65 
-1.45 2.64 4.09 3.26 6.49 3.23 
16 Rogation Props Mar 92 93 n/ev Nov n/av n/av n/av n/av n/av 
17 Renold Mweng Nor 85 86 3.51 1.98 4.49 2.51 2.29 5.74 3.45 
18 Richards Txwis Sep 89 90 6.33 3.89 4.87 0.98 4.72 3.77 
-0.95 
19 Sketchley Lard Mar 91 92 2.73 0.14 2.84 2.70 1.55 n/av n/ev 
20 Tay None House Jun 87 88 4.68 12.12 7.00 
-5.12 5.23 9.40 4.17 
21 Tibbet & Britten Trfrt Dec 89 90 8.8 4.24 3.95 
-0.29 3.83 2.81 
-1.02 
22 Westbury House Feb 92 93 0.3 
-1.42 Nav n/av n/av n/ev n/ev 
23 Allied Lyons Brews Feb 89 90 6.1 4.41 4.43 0.02 5.10 4.09 
-1.01 
24 Aids Fdret Apr 87 88 16.92 %1.00 20.41 
-940.59 80.74 19.19 -61.55 
25 Asds Fdret Apr 89 90 19.19 323.99 11.84 
-312.15 4.99 7.19 2.20 
26 Be" Brews Sep 89 90 6.1 9.03 4.43 
-4.60 4.59 4.09 -0.50 
27 Blue Circle Cment Dec 88 89 6.59 6.21 7.04 0.83 7.25 6.26 
-0.99 
28 British Land Props Mar 87 88 n/av n/av n/av n/av n/av n/av n/av 
29 British Land Props Mar 92 93 Nav n/ov flay n/av Nav n/av - n/ev 
30 British Steel Steel Mar 92 93 7.54 
-0.31 Nov n/av n/av n/ev n/ev 
31 City Site Estates Props Sep 87 88 n/av flay n/av flay Nav n/av Nav 
32 Dares Estates Props Dec 87 88 n/av Nav Nav n/av flay n/ev n/ev 
33 Forts Hotel Jan 90 91 3.71 4.04 3.47 
-0.57 3.25 2.41 -0.84 
34 Land Securities Props Mar 87 88 Nov Nav Nov flay n/av n/av n/ev 
35 Lasso Oilep Dec 86 87 7.51 1.23 1.42 0.19 2.41 3.77 1.36 
36 Las Oilep Dec 89 90 3.13 3.43 3.52 0.09 3.08 3.72 0.64 
37 MEPC Props Sep 86 87 n/ev n/ev n/ev Nav n/av n/ev Nov 
38 Taylor Woodrow Cnstr Dec 89 90 7.15 7.03 5.00 
-2.03 4.69 2.95 -1.74 
39 Vaux Brews Sep 89 90 6.1 11.10 4.43 
-6.67 24.05 4.09 -19.96 
40 lliitbread Brews Feb 91 92 4.09 7.18 4.14 
-3.04 7.37 n/av Nav 
41 Nelicat Bar Props Jan 88 89 Nov Nay n/av Nav n/ev Nav n/av 
42 Next Mutts Jan 88 89 12.77 17.51 13.68 
-3.83 4.45 8.34 3.89 
43 Worcester Grp M Dec 90 91 7.44 5.69 6.63 0.94 4.53 4.31 -0.22 
Average Income cover ratios: 
For equity issues: 5.23 4.73 4.74 
-0.40 2.71 5.07 2.15 
For debtisaws: 7.84 111.53 6.38 
-115.32 13.41 5.78 -8.24 
For convertible issues: 10.11 11.60 10.16 
-1.44 4.49 6.33 1.86 
Interest cover has been calculated as: 
Earnings before interest and tax /Interest 
(Any changes In interest arising from the hypothetical issues 
have been taken into account). 
due to the large interest cover ratios of Asda 
which arise as a result of capitalising the bulk 
of its interest payments. Otherwise, for the 
equity and convertible issues, the average 
interest cover would be slightly more than the 
average industry interest cover in the year of 
issue, and then in the year following the year of 
issue, would drop slightly below it. 
As mentioned earlier, the average interest cover 
ratios based on aggregate data may be different 
to those calculated by averaging individual 
companies' interest cover ratios. Table 7.7B 
discussed previously shows that this is the case 
for the hypothetical issues, although the general 
trend is still the same, with the equity issuing 
companies having a lower average interest cover 
than the debt issuing companies. 
7-3-8 Statistical Comparison of Income Gearing 
Measures for Equity and Debt issues 
The analysis above has highlighted some notable 
differences in income gearing ratios (IGs) and 
interest cover ratios (ICs) between companies 
which issued equity and those which issued debt. 
The IGs for the year before the capital issue for 
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the companies which subsequently issued equity, 
and those which subsequently issued debt, were 
found to be significantly different from each 
other at the 1% level. The industry sector IGs 
were also significantly different for these two 
groups at the it level. 
Similarly, the IC ratios for the year before the 
capital issue for the companies which 
subsequently issued equity, and those which 
subsequently, issued debt, were found to be 
significantly different from each other at the 1% 
level. However, the industry sector ICs were not 
found to be significantly different for the two 
groups. The statistical analysis is summarised 
in Table 7.9B. 
The above findings would seem to infer that 
examination of a company's IG and IC is useful in 
determining whether that company will choose to 
issue equity or debt, particularly if the 
industry sector IG is used in conjunction with 
the individual company's IG. 
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TABLE 7.9B : STATISTICAL COMPARISON OF INCOME GEARING MEASURES 
FOR EQUITY AND FOR DEBT ISSUES 
Paired It' Test 
------------------ 
Source Year Sd(E) Sd (D) Se 
Table 
-1 
Individual Companies 
7.5 IG (Orig. 
issue) 644.2113 16.0216 137.3982 
7.8 IC (Orig. 
issue) 10.2107 31.1658 7.6616 
Industry Sectors 
7.5 IG (Ind. 
Sec. ) 
7.8 IC (Ind. 
Sec. ) 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
30 
30 
65.3908 9.9546 14.1374 30 
3.0672 5.3945 1.4298 30 
Note : IG = Income gearing ratio 
IC = Income cover ratio 
Sd(E) = standard deviation of IG, or IC, (Yr-1) for all the 
companies which issued equity in the following year 
Sd(D) = standard deviation of IG, or IC, (Yr-1) for all the 
companies which issued debt in the following year 
Se = standard error 
n/a = not significant 
Signif- 
icance 
(based on 
2tt) 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
n/a 
7-4 Impact on Dividend Cover 
7-4-1 Perceived Importance of Dividend Cover 
The analysis of the capital issues questionnaire 
in Chapters 3 and 4 showed that the effect of a 
capital issue on a company's ability to. maintain, 
or increase, its dividend level was considered to 
be an important factor in deciding on the type of 
capital issue. 
7-4-2 Actual Dividend Per share 
Table 7.10 shows the dividend per share for each 
company in the sample for the year before issue, 
the year of issue and the year following issue. 
It is then assumed that the dividend per share 
for each particular year is to be maintained on 
the reconstruction. 
7-4-3 Dividend Cover for Actual and Hypothetical 
Issues 
When calculating the dividend cover for the 
reconstructions, it has been assumed that the 
dividend per share is maintained, although (as 
explained below) this will lead to a change in 
the aggregate dividend. 
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TABLE 7.10 : DIVIDEND PER SHARE UNDER ORIGINAL ISSUE 
Company Nth Yr Yr Co. Div. P/ Co. Div. P/ Co. Div. P/ 
01 Sh., Yr-1 Sh., YrO Sh., Yr+1 
Anglia Secure Homes Sep 90 91 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Bimec Mar 92 93 0.05 0.05 NOV 
Bowater Dec 90 91 0.58 0.47 0.47 
Bowthorpe Dec 87 88 0.36 0.12 0.15 
Casket Mar 91 92 0.00 0.00 0.02 
Cater Allen Apr 91 92 n/av n/av NOV 
Corm inity Hospital Grp Jun 91 92 0.17 0.13 n/av 
Cookson Grp Dec 91 92 0.13 0.02 n/av 
De La Rue Mar 92 93 0.28 0.27 n/av 
Domino Printing Oct 91 92 0.21 0.29 n/av 
Eurotu net Dec 90 91 0.00 0.00 n/av 
Jeyes Dec 89 90 0.12 0.16 0.19 
Kwik Fit Feb 89 90 0.12 0.07 0.06 
Lovell, Y. J. Sep 91 92 0.25 0.00 n/av 
Midland Bank Dec 87 88 1.04 0.00 0.75 
Regalian Mar 92 93 0.08 0.00 n/av 
RenoLd Mar 85 86 n/av n/av n/av 
Richards Sep 89 90 0.13 0.09 0.09 
Sketchley Mar 91 92 0.00 0.00 0.08 
Tay Homes Jun 87 Be n/av 0.27 0.47 
Tibbet & Britten Dec 89 90 0.16 0.17 0.22 
Westbury Feb 92 93 0.00 0.00 NOV 
Allied Lyons Feb 89 90 0.38 0.43 0.48 
Asda Apr 87 88 n/av 0.11 0.13 
Asda Apr 89 90 0.13 0.14 0.10 
Bass Sep 89 90 0.87 1.08 1.09 
Blue Circle Dec 88 89 0.48 0.57 0.29 
British Land Mar 87 88 n/av n/av 0.17 
British Land Mar 92 93 0.11 0.11 n/av 
British Steel Mar 92 93 0.10 0.00 n/av 
City Site Estates Sep 87 Be n/av 0.04 0.15 
Dares Estates Dec 87 88 n/av 0.02 0.04 
Forte Jan 90 91 0.22 0.23 0.19 
Land Securities Mar 87 88 Nov n/av 0.19 
Lasso Dec 86 87 n/av 0.10 0.12 
Lasmo Dec 89 90 0.11 0.23 0.21 
MEPC Sep 86 87 n/av n/av 0.17 
Taylor Woodrow Dec 89 90 0.41 0.23 0.17 
Vaux Sep 89 90 0.40 0.18 0.20 
Whitbread Feb 91 92 11.38 12.64 9.64 
Helical Bar Jan 88 89 0.98 0.22 0.46 
Next Jan 88 89 n/av 0.16 0.11 
Worcester Grp Dec 90 91 0.14 0.09 0.10 
Average for equity issues: 0.18 
0.11 0.23 
Average for debt issues: 1.33 1.07 
0.83 
Average for convertible issues: 0.56 
0.16 0.22 
In a reconstruction from equity to debt, the 
aggregate dividend will be reduced (interest on 
debt being substituted for the dividend on the 
shares which the debt replaces). In a 
reconstruction from debt to equity, there will be 
an increase in the aggregate dividend (an 
increase in dividend now substituting for the 
interest on the debt which the share issue 
replaces)"1 
Table 7.11 shows the effect on dividend cover of 
the reconstruction issue 
- 
in nearly every case, 
the alternative financing instrument would have 
resulted in a drop in dividend cover. 
7-4-4 Statistical Analysis of Dividends and 
Dividend Cover 
Table 7.11B shows that there is no statistically 
significant difference between the dividend per 
share for the equity issuing companies and the 
debt issuing companies; nor is there a 
significant difference for the dividend cover for 
equity issuing companies and debt issuing 
companies. 
BAs expected the effect of a reconstruction of equity with debt results in an increase in expenses above the line (as interest is shown above the line) " whilst in a reconstruction from debt to equity the effect is below the line (as dividends 
are below the line) 
. 
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TABLE 7.11 : COMPARISON OF DIVIDEND COVER UNDER ORIGINAL ISSUE 
AND HYPOTHETICAL ISSUE 
calpr+y 
I Anglia Secure Na s 
2 11mc 
3 Soratsr 
4 Iowthorps 
5 Casket 
6 Cater Allen 
7 Commity Hospital Grp 
e Cookson Grp 
9 Of La RUG 
10 Domino Printing 
11 Eurotunol 
12 Jsyas 
13 Krik Fit 
14 Lovell, Y. J. 
15 Midland lank 
16 Rogation 
17 Ronald 
Is Richards 
19 Skatchlay 
20 Tay Mosiss 
21 Tibbst i Tritton 
22 Westbury 
23 Allied Lyons 
24 Aads 
25 Aids 
26 Bass 
27 slue circle 
28 British Land 
29 British Land 
30 British Steel 
31 City Site Estates 
32 Dares Estates 
33 Forte 
34 Leid SseuritiM 
35 Lassie 
36 Leas 
37 NEPC 
38 Taylor Woodrow 
39 vast 
40 Wi tbrsad 
41 NSlieal Mr 
42 Next 
43 Yere. stK CWp 
Nth Yr Yr Co. Div Co. Div Nyp. Div Diff. Ce. C.. Div Nyp. Div Dfff. Co. & 
0 1 Cov, Yr-1 Cov, YrO Cov, YrO & Nyp. YrO Cav, Yr. 1 Cev, Yr+) Iyp. Yr+1 
Sep 90 91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Her. 92 93 3.49 3.11 1.09 2.02 n/. v Ntv n/w 
Doc 90 91 3.14 2.24 1.18 1.06 2.16 1.47 1.09 
Dec 87 as 4.62 3.81 1.12 2.69 3.83 1.02 2.81 
Mir 91 92 0.00 1.58 0.00 1.58 3.63 1.19 2.44 
Apr 91 92 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Jun 91 92 3.33 2.40 1.30 1.10 n/ev Nw r/w 
Doc 91 92 2.16 0.29 0.47 
-0.18 n/w Nw n/w 
Mar 92 93 2.03 1.89 1.16 0.73 Nw Nw n/w 
Oct 91 92 3.95 3.93 0.99 2.94 Nw Nw Nw 
D. e 90 91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Nw n/w Nw 
Dec 89 90 2.92 3.02 1.08 1.94 3.04 0.83 2.21 
Feb 89 90 6.23 3.02 1.11 1.91 2.49 0.94 1.55 
Sep 91 92 2.76 0.00 0.00 0.00 n/w Nw n/w 
Dec 87 80 3.84 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.27 1.52 1.75 
Mar 92 93 1.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 Nw n/w Nw 
Mar 85 86 0.00 0.00 " " 2.25 " 2.25 
Sep 89 90 2.62 2.28 1.01 1.27 2.29 1.03 1.26 
Mar 91 92 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.59 0.90 1.69 
Jun 87 88 4.02 4.75 1.35 3.40 5.90 1.17 4.73 
Dec 89 90 2.59 2.34 1.13 1.21 2.40 . 1.05 1.35 
Feb 92 93 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 n/w Way Nw 
Feb 
Apr 
Apr 
Sep 
Dec 
Nor 
Nor 
Mar 
Sep 
Dec 
Jon 
Mar 
Dec 
Dec 
Sip 
Dec 
SOP 
Feb 
Jan 
inn 
D. C 
AwnN for equity Issues: 
Avery for debt Issues: 
Aver. M for c iw. rtlbl" maus.: 
89 90 2.90 2.86 0.90 1. % 2.80 0.93 1.87 
87 88 2.81 3.26 0.93 2.31 3.06 0.88 2.18 
89 90 3.06 3.00 0.95 2.05 2.17 1.03 1.14 
89 90 3.71 3.84 0.92 2.92 3.48 0.95 2.53 
88 89 3.17 2.84 0.87 1.97 2.67 1.00 1.67 
87 88 3.00 3.55 " " 4.24 0.97 3.27 
92 93 1.85 1.78 1.14 0.64 Nav Nav Nav 
92 93 1.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 Nev Nav Nav 
87 88 flay 4.58 0. % 11.36 " 0.76 " 
87 88 Nav 3.29 0.90 2.39 3.20 0.94 2.26 
90 91 2.61 2.68 0.98 1.70 1.90 0.98 0.92 
87 88 Nav Nav 2 " 1.52 0.99 0.53 
86 87 Nav 1.37 0.86 0.51 1.61 0.94 0.67 
89 90 1.16 2.02 0.98 1.04 2.49 1.02 1.47 
86 87 n/av Nav " " 1.67 1.00 0.47 
89 90 2.73 2.57 0.98 1.59 1.76 0. % 0.80 
89 90 2.47 2.37 0.89 1.48 2.25 0.95 1.30 
91 92 2.89 2.89 0.04 2.85 2.10 0.06 2.06 
88 89 49.21 6.44 0.83 5.61 7. % 0.70 7.26 
88 89 2.30 2.72 0.95 1.77 1.46 1.01 0.45 
90 91 3.64 2.23 0.35 1.88 2.43 0. " 1.99 
2.15 1.58 0.62 1.03 2.60 0.89 1.78 
2.57 2.68 0.82 2.32 2.45 0.90 1.34 
18.38 3.80 0.71 3.09 3.95 0.71 3.24 
TABLE 7.11B : STATISTICAL COMPARISON OF DIVIDENDS AND DIVIDEND COVER 
FOR EQUITY AND FOR DEBT ISSUES 
Paired It' Test 
------------------ 
source Year Sd(E) Sd (D) Se Degrees of Sianif- 
Table 
-1 Freedom icance 
(based on 
2tt) 
7.10 Div. per 
share 0.2377 2.5737 0.6087 38 /1/a 
7.11 Div. 
Cover 1.6105 1.3119 0.4621 37 
. 
n/a 
Note : Sd(E) = standard deviation of Divs. (Yr-1) for all the companies 
which issued equity in the following year 
Sd(D) = standard deviation of Divs. (Yr-1) for all the companies 
which issued debt in the following year 
Se = standard error 
n\a = not significant 
7-5 Impact on Rates of Return 
7-5-1 Influence of Rate of Return 
The possibility that the rate of return may have 
a bearing on the finance issue question was 
raised briefly in Chapter 6. The study by Baumol 
et al (1970), for example, raised the possibility 
that funds from different sources may earn a 
different return, with new equity earning the 
highest return 
-a finding that was attributed by 
Baucool et al to the disciplining effect of the 
new issues market. 
In order to see the rate of return as a possible 
explanatory variable for the method of finance 
chosen it is necessary only to reverse this 
argument 
- 
i. e. one might conjecture that a 
company may look to the rate of return on the 
proposed investment project to guide them in 
their choice of finance. 
There are a number of problems with the Baumol et 
al analysis, in particular identifying the rate 
of return on the project rather than the firm as 
a whole. 
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The Baumol-type rate of return analysis has not 
been carried further as there are problems: 
(i) retentions - Baumol et al treated retained 
earnings as cash (when of course profit is often 
very different from cash) 
. 
If the earnings after 
tax are too high, then retained, earnings 
(capital) will be too high, and this leads to a 
lower inferred rate of return. This is 
illustrated in the extract below: 
Example: 
£ 
EBIT 1000 
EAT 500 
less dividends (300) 
Retained earnings 200 not cash} 
Return in cash = (Rate of return)(Capital) 
"I1 
= 12% x £1000 = £1200 or 
= 10% x £1200 = £1200 
(ii) comparing returns on debt and equity 
financed projects under conventional accounting 
makes the returns on debt look lower. An example 
will illustrate this point: 
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Via: 
Eaulty 
Existing earnings 1000 
New earnings 100 
Total earnings 1100 
less interest 0 
Profit before tax 1100 
Tax @ 50% (550) 
Net profit 550 
vmmý 
Capital Employed: 
Share capital 
(£1 shares) 800 
Debenture 0 
Rate of return 
(after int. & tax) 68.75% 
Debt 
1000 
100 
1100 
- 
10 
1090 
545 
545 
700 
100 
68.13% 
Of course the difference in rates of return would 
be accentuated when larger earnings and interest 
figures were involved. 
The rates of return for the companies in the 
sample were calculated as follows: 
r= Earnings before interest and tax x 100 
Capital employed 
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The rate of return is better calculated on a 
before tax basis when performing a time series of 
the profitability of one company as tax rates 
change over time, and one is looking at the 
profitability of the underlying assets and not 
the vagaries of the tax system. 
Perhaps for cross-sectional purposes tax should 
be included, as it is widely suggested in the 
literature that it may be an important factor in 
the debt-equity decision, for example, Modigliani 
and Miller (1963). 
However, it was decided to exclude it in this 
instance because the. object was to view the 
return on assets in the context of a steady state 
(since once put in place the finance would 
generally extend into the distant future) and 
incorporating the underlying current tax charge 
is likely to be distortionary since this is the 
product of past financial decisions. 
In other words, the current tax charge is not 
simply a function of the existing finance 
arrangements. It reflects a range of taxable 
transactions, for example, the purchase of plant 
and equipment over the preceding years. 
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Also calculating the rate of return before 
interest and tax overcomes the problem discussed 
above relating to the distortionary effect of 
conventional accounting on the rate of return on 
debt. 
7-5-2 Actual Rates of Return 
The rates of return for each company for the year 
prior to the issue, the year of issue, and the 
year following are shown in Table 7.12. 
The average rate of return for the equity issuing 
companies in Yr 
-1 is 16.10%, for debt issuing 
companies 14.13%, and for companies issuing 
convertibles 22.72%. For the year of issue, the 
equity issuing companies are still ahead of the 
debt issuing companies with an average return of 
12.19%, compared to 11.79% for debt issuing 
companies; whilst companies issuing convertibles 
earn a return of 21.03%. This situation would 
appear to change in the year following the year 
of issue, with the equity issuing companies 
earning an average rate of return of "8.31% 
compared to 12.06% for the debt issuing 
companies. However, the average return for the 
equity issuing companies is distorted by the - 
58.89% return for Anglia Secure Homes; if this is 
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TABLE 7.12 : RATES OF RETURN 
Coeiprny Ind Sec Mth Year Year Rate of Rate of Rate of 
01 Ret. Yr"1 Ret. YrO Ret. Y r1 
I Anglia Secure Homes House Sep 90 91 0.44 
-2.82 
-58.89 2 Bimec Missu Mar 92 93 56.45 36.58 n/av 3 Bowater Packp Dec 90 91 20.08 20.73 21.98 
4 Bowthorpe Eletr Dec 87 88 39.39 28.36 38.20 
5 Casket Gentr Mar 91 92 15.57 26.58 25.86 
6 Cater Allen Disct Apr 91 92 n/av n/av n/av 7 Community Hospital Grp Hlthc Jun 91 92 9.36 8.90 n/av 
8 Cookson Grp Oindn Dec 91 92 22: 72 11.48 n/av 
9 De La Rue Print Mar 92 93 36.05 20.91 n/av 
10 Domino Printing Print Oct 91 92 24.79 30.16 n/av 
11 Eurotunnel Trfrt Dec 90 91 6.33 4.91 6.86 
12 Jeyes Persh Dec 89 90 19.70 21.35 24.41 
13 Kwik Fit Mdist Feb 89 90 32.57 24.50 21.28 
14 Lovell, Y. J. Cnstr Sep 91 92 18.35 6.60 Nov 
15 Midland Bank Banks Dec 87 88 12.98 
-6.43 15.81 
16 Regalian Props Mar 92 93 n/av n/av n/av 
17 Renoid Mnieng Mar 85 86 7.22 12.04 12.58 
18 Richards Txmis Sep 89 90 23.26 11.29 9.59 
" 
19 Sketchley Laund Mar 91 92 5.99 8.63 20.04 
20 Tay Homes House Jun 87 88 56.93 28.72 38.95 
21 Tibbet & Britten Trfrt Dec 89 90 27.09 18.67 26.15 
22 Westbury House Feb 92 93 0.11 
-9.73 n/av 
23 Allied Lyons Brews Feb 89 90 17.77 14.63 14.98 
24 Asda Fdret Apr 87 88 33.06 24.01 19.31 
25 Asda Fdret Apr 89 90 19.31 18.25 14.46 
26 Bass Brews Sep 89 90 13.86 15.62 14.44 
27 Blue Circle Cment Dec 88 89 14.31 16.89 18.66 
28 British Land Props Mar S 87 88 n/av Nov n/av 
29 British Land Props Mar 92 93 n/av n/av n/av 
30 British Steel Steel Mar 92 93 10.05 3.07 n/av 
31 City Site Estates Props Sep 87 88 n/av n/av n/av 
32 Dares Estates Props Dec 87 88 n/av n/av n/av 
33 Forte Hotel Jan 90 91 8.41 7.82 7.42 
34 Land Securities Props Mar 87 88 n/av n/av n/av 
35 Lasso OiLep Dec 86 87 20.80 7.52 10.41 
36 Lasso Oilep Dec 89 90 5.94 9.26 9.99 
37 MEPC Props Sep 86 87 n/av Nov n/av 
38 Taylor Woodrow Cnstr Dec 89 90 9.41 7.93 8.06 
39 Vaux Brews Sep 89 90 6.46 6.82 7.52 
40 Whitbread Brews Feb 91 92 10.14 9.70 7.42 
41 Helical Bar Props Jan 88 89 n/av n/av n/av 
42 Next Mults Jan 88 89 12.81 23.80 16.78 
43 Worcester Grp Miaeng Dec 90 91 32.62 18.26 23.54 
Average rate of return for equity: 16.10 12.19 
8.31 
Average rate of return for debt: 14.13 11.79 
12.06 
Average rate of return for convertibles: 22.72 21.03 
20.16 
excluded, then the average return for equity 
issuing companies is 21.81%. It is interesting 
to note' that the companies issuing convertibles 
have a high rate of return, although the. sample 
for convertibles is too small to enable reliable 
conclusions to be drawn. 
The distribution of the rates of return is shown 
in Fig. 7.11 for equity issuing companies, and in 
Fig. 7.12 for debt issuing companies. In each 
figure, the rates of return are shown for the 
year prior to the capital issue (Yr-1), the year 
of the issue (Yr0), and the year following the 
issue 
The overall rate of return for the companies 
which issued equity tends to be (a) more volatile 
and (b) more widely spread, than the rate of 
return for companies which issued debt. 
From Table 7.12B it can be seen that there is a 
statistically significant difference between the 
rate of return for the equity issuing companies 
and the debt issuing companies at the 1% level. 
This would seem to be supportive of the Baumol et 
al view. 
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FIG. 7.11 : RATES OF RETURN FOR EQUITY ISSUING COKPkNIEB 
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FIG. 7.12 : RATES OF RETURN FOR DEBT ISSUING COMPANIES 
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TABLE 7.12B : STATISTICAL COMPARISON OF RATES OF RETURN 
FOR EQUITY AND FOR DEBT ISSUES 
Source Year 
Table 
-1 
Paired 't' Test 
------------------ 
Sd(E) Sd (D) Se Degrees of 
Freedom 
Signif- 
icance 
(based on 
2tt) 
7.12 Rates of 
Return 16.3517 8.9892 4.0796 30 : o. oi 
Note : Sd(E) = standard deviation of Rates of Return (Yr-1) for all the 
companies which issued equity in the following year 
Sd(D) = standard deviation of Rates of Return (Yr-1) for all the 
companies which issued debt in the following year 
Se = standard error 
7-6 Influence of Cash Flow Ratio and Tax Ratio 
7-6-1 Cash Flow Ratio 
The "cash f low ratio" of a business was defined 
as: 
Gross cash flow 
Total liabilities 
This ratio was found by Beaver (1966) to be the 
best single discriminator for failed companies. 
It should be noted that the top of the cash flow 
ratio can be high because the cash flow is high, 
or low because the cash flow is low, but the 
whole ratio can be affected by the denominator 
(if there is a high level of debt, then the ratio 
will be low, and vice versa). 
The results in Table 7.13 show that the average 
cash flow ratio for all the groups in the sample 
was below the corresponding industry sector cash 
flows. The group of companies which had the 
lowest cash flow ratio in the year prior to issue 
were those which subsequently issued debt, 
whereas one might expect that companies would not 
take on more debt if their cash flow ratio was 
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y 3LE 7.13 :c PARISON 
OF CASH FLOW RATIOS FOR THE ORIGINAL ISSUE 
AND THE INDUSTRY SECTOR 
COýý (rd. Sec. Mlonth 
rr Tr Co. CF Ind. s. e oitf. co. & C.. CF Ind. S. c Dlff. Co. & Co. u Ird. sýe oI/1 Co i 0 "1 Tr 
-1 CF Yr-1 Ind. Sm Tr-1 Tr 0 CF Tr 0 Ind. Sse Tr0 Tr "1 CF Tr+1 
. . 
led. Sec Tr"1 
I 118 M "as" 
Mouse Sep 90 91 
-0.03 0.09 
-0.12 
-0.12 0.04 
-0.16 
-0.32 
-0.01 "0 31 
10c: 21 Miau 
Nor 92 93 0.10 0.09 0.01 0.14 Nw Nsv VOW Nw 
. 
ryw 
7 motor 
PKkp Doe 90 91 0.10 0.11 
-0.01 0.10 0.09 0.01 0.10 0.09 0 01 
Samthorpe 4 Eistr Dec 
87 88 0.19 0.12 0.07 0.18 0.12 0.04 0.19 0.12 . 0 07 
5 casket et lt qtr Nor 91 92 -0.031 0.09 -0.12 0.04 0.09 
-0.09 0.0$ Nw 
. 
Nw 
6 Cater Allen 0isct Apr 91 
92 NOW n/w n/w "low VOW Nw Wow VOW Nw 
7 CWWltp Maepitil Grp Nitk Jun 91 92 0.09 0.13 -0.05 0.07 0.11 -0.04 Nw Nw VOW 
e Cookson Divide Doe 91 92 0.09 0.12 -0.03 0.07 0.1 
-0.03 n/w Nw n/w 
9 Do LM RuS Print Mir 92 93 0.14 0.13 0.01 0.12 NOV Nw VOW WOW N. v 
10 Dadno Printing Print Oct 91 92 0.14 0.12 0.02 0.17 0.13 40.04 N. v Way Nw 
ti Euroti+vel Trfrt Doc 90 91 0.04 0.06 -0.04 0.02 0.06 *-0.04 0.02 0.06 
-0.06 
12 JMs P*rsh Doc 89 90 0.11 0.16 -0.05 0.09 0.13 -0.04 0.11 0.15 
-0.04 
13 Wk Fit Malst Feb 89 90 0.15 0.13 0.02 0.12 0.11 0.01 0.07 0.09 
-0.02 
14 Lowell, T. J. Cnstr Sep 91 92 0.05 0.06 -0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.01 Nw Nw Nw 
is Midland l_- banks Doe 87 88 0.01 0.01 0 -0.01 0 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0 
16Nagel Ian Pro" Nor 92 93 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 n/w - even, VOW Nw Nw 
17 Ronald YAW%@ Nor as 86 0.03 0.07 -0.04 0.06 0.09 
-0.03 0.06 0.00 
-0.03 
is 11th. ds Tanis Sop 89 90 0.12 0.1 0.02 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.09 0.08 0.01 
19 ft*tchlw lwd Mar 91 92 0.10 0.13 -0.03 0.18 0.16 0.02 0.27 Nw Nw 
20 Toy Maas Neuss Jun 87 88 0.11 0.07 0.04 0.10 0.09 0.01 0.11 0.1 0.01 
21 Tihbot & Irittwn Trfrt Doe 89 - 90 0.18 0.06 0.1 0.14 0.08 0.06 0.17 0.06 0.11 
22 Westbury Nauss Feb 92 93 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.07 Nov WOW rvov Won, Nw 
23 A((i. d lyw $r., w Feb 89 90 0.09 0.09 0 0.08 0.08 0 0.07 0.09 
-0.02 
24 Aids " Fdrst Apr 87 88 0.15 0.12 0.03 0.13 0.12 0.01 0.12 0.12 0 
25 Aads Fdrot Apr 89 90 0.12 0.12 0 0.12 0.11 0.01 0.07 0.11 
-0.06 
26 14r Brow Sep 89 96 0.09 0.09 0 0.09 0.06 0.01 0.09 0.09 0 
27 Blut Circle anent Doe 88 89 0.11 0.11 0 0.11 0.12 
-0.01 0.10 0.12 -0.02 
2$ British Land Prop mar 87 88 0.03 0.03 0 0.03 0.03 0 0.03 0.03 0 
29 British Lud Prop Mar 92 93 0.01 0.01 0 0.01 Nw Wow WOW riw Nw 
30 British 11tat Steel Mar 92 93 0.10 0.09 0.01 0.06 NOW New n/w Nerv Nw 
31 City fite Estates Its$* Sep 87 88 
-0.01 0.03 -0.04 0.00 0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.04 
32 Data Estates Props Doe 87 84 0.02 0.03 
-0.01 0.03 0.03 0 0.03 0.03 0 
33 Forts Hotel Jon 90 91 0.0$ 0.05 0 0.04 0.05 
-0.01 0.05 0.04 0.01 
34 lwd fiewitiN Props Mar 87 88 0.03 0.03 0 0.03 0.03 0 0.02 0.03 -0.01 
35 Law 01 lop Doe 
_ 
86 87 0.16 0.17 
-0.01 0.10 0.12 -0.02 0.09 0.12 -0.03 
36 Law 01 top Doe 89 90 0.07 0.09 
-0.02 0.06 0.09 -0.01 0.06 0.09 "0.01 
37 MEºC Props Sap 86 87 0.02 0.02 0 0.02 0.03 
-0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.01 
38 Taylor woods am Cnotr Doc 89 90 0.04 0.08 
-0.04. 0.03 0.07" -0.04 0.03 0.06 -0.03 
39 wax Irwa Sp 89 90 0.05 0.09 
-0.04 0.05 0.08 -0.03 0.05 0.09 -0.04 
40 diitbrud Bros Feb 91 92 0.06 0.09 
-0.03 0.06 0.09 -0.03 0.06 Nw rVw 
41 N. llal Bar Props Jan 88 89 0.23 0.03 0.25 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.03 
42 Mut Mutts Jan 88 89 0.06 0.12 
-0.06 0.11 0.11 0 0.09 0.11 -0.02 
43 Worcester Grp P16rr D. c 90 91 0.14 0.11 0.03 0.09 0.11 -0.02 0.09 0.09 0 
Avery cash floc rMtiost 
(1) for s dity itaj 0.0795 0.0900 
-0.0105 0.0714 0.076 -0.0118 0.0713 0.07" -0.0209 (11) for debt Issues 0.0661 0.0733 
-0.00E13 0.0595 0.0729 -0.0100 0.0563 0.0720 -0.0160 
0 11) for Cow. 0.1600 0.0887 0.0733 0.0E133 0.0833 0.0000 0.0767 0.0733 0.0033 
Note (1) Ca flan ratio is defined as gross cash flow/total 
IfabiIIti.. 
(2) Tr 
"1 " rar before capital Isom (3) Tr 0a Year of capital isaua (4) Ir "1 " year after Capital iaa m (S) Now " cook flow ratio not avallabl" 
TABLE 7.138 : STATISTICAL COMPARISON OF CASH FLOW RATIO 
Paired 't' Test 
------------------ 
Source Year Sd(E) Sd (D) Se Degrees of Signif- 
TabLe 
-1 Freedom icance 
(based on 
2tt) 
Individual Companies 
-------------------- 
7.13 CF (Orig. 
issue) 0.0682 0.0492 0.0186 37 n/a 
Industry Sectors 
-------------------- 
7.13 CF (Ind. 
Sec. ) 
- 
0.0486 0.0413 0.0142 37 n/a 
Sd(E) = standard deviation of Cash flow ratio (Yr-1) for all the 
companies which issued equity in the following year 
Sd(D) = standard deviation of Cash flow ratio (Yr-1) for all the 
companies which issued debt in the following year 
Se = standard error 
n\a = not significant 
low. 
The cash flow ratios for the equity issuing and 
debt issuing groups are not statistically 
significantly different from each other (Table 
7.13B). 
7-6-2 Tax ratio 
Table 7.14 compares the tax ratios for the 
original issue and the industry sector. The tax 
ratio is defined as: 
Total tax charge 
Pre-tax profits 
In the year prior to issue, the average tax ratio 
for the equity group was 28.56%, for the debt 
group 35.58% and for the convertibles 36.90%. 
The average industry sector tax ratios for the 
preceding groups were 34.80%, 35.97%, and 33.87%. 
The equity group was therefore below the industry 
average, the convertibles group above, and debt 
issues almost in line. 
One possible explanation for the lower tax ratio 
of the equity issuing companies, given that this 
group had a higher average capital gearing ratio 
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TABLE 7.14 : COMPARISON OF TAX RATIOS FOR THE ORIGINAL ISSUE 
AND THE INDUSTRY SECTOR 
Cary 
Ind. SOc. Yr Yr Co. T&A Ird. SOe. T u Oiff. b. t. Co. Co. Toc Ird. Soe. Tac DIff. bst. Co. Co. Tu Ind. SVC. TU DIff. bot. Co. 0 "1 ROtio, Yr-1 ROtlo, Tr-1 ilnd. SOc. Yr-1 katio, ºrO ROti0, TrO Lind, 
, 
Tro Rotlo, rr+1 R"tfo, r rt &Ind. Soc. rr. 1 
1Anglia Secure Man" House 
90 91 39.45 35.84 3.61 1.83 36,23 
-34 40 0 00 
2 lla c Misw 
92 93 34.00 34.87 
-0.87 33.01 Nw . . -7.15 7.15 
3 lowtar Packp 90 91 
34.96 38.00 
-3.04 35.01 39.55 
Nev 
0 
'3 
Nev 
36 47 
Nav Nev 
4 Iorthorpa Etetr 87 88 40.47 39.70 0.77 38,94 35.93 
. 
3 01 . 32 47 
33.53 
-0.28 
S Casket Gentr 91 92 -9.76 35.65 -45.41 33.99 35. E 1 
. 
-1.51 
. 
32 83 
35.83 0.64 
6 Cater Allan Disct 91 92 NOV Nev Nov NOV 
" Nev Nav 
. 
NOV Nav 
7 Cawanity Nospitai Grp Hlthe 91 92 30.60 34.82 -4.22 33.75 32.87 0 88 
Nev Nov Nev 
Dock/On Grp O1ricks 91 92 35.17 35.01 0.16 33.33 33.06 . 0.27 
Nav 
NOV 
Nav Nw 
9 De La Rut  Print 92 93 34.00 34.84 -0.84 32.99 Nov Nw Nov 
N av n/av 
10 Domino Printing Print 91 92 35.79 40.01 -4.22 36.22 34.84 1 38 
NOV Nw 
11 Eurotumel Trfrt 90 91 0.00 32.92 -32.92 -0.01 34.61 
. 
-34.62 
NOV 
0.00 
NOV 
32.69 
Nw 
-32.69 
12 Joy" Persh 89 90 35.67 36.79 -1.12 39.48 36.19 3.29 35.33 33.72 1.61 
13 Krik Fit Mdist 89 90 32.42 36.53 -4.11 35.00 35.72 
-0.72 35.00 37.62 
-2.62 
14 towll, Y. J. Cnstr 91 92 35.00 34.78 0.22 803.61 92.45 711.16 Nw Nav NOV 
1S Midland Bank Banks 87 88 Nav NOV Nsv NOV Nw Nr rvsv Nw Nov 
16 Rogation Props 92 93 31.92 39.57 -7.65 -86.76 n/w ryav NOV Nw Nw 
17 Aenold Msae+i as 86 Nw 46.91 n/ev 45.00 43.04 1.96 39.68 38.96 0.72 
18 Richards Tmsis 89 90 34.21 33.54 0.67 28.04 32.67 
-4.63 28.10 32.95 
-4.83 
19 Sketehlay Laud 91 92 13.37 38.86 
-25.49 310.75 27.42 283.33 
"18.22 NOV n/w 
20 Tay Mons Mouse 87 88 39.52 37.42 2.10 35.58 35.07 0.51 35.16 35.12 0.04 
21 Titbet & Britten Trfrt 89 90 35.34 36.99 
-1.65 35.40 32.92 2.48 34.93 34.61 0.32 
22 wstt+ury House 92 93 10.56 
-7.15 17.71 27.17 Nov Nav Nw Nov NOW 
23 Allied Lyons Breams 89 90 35.00 35.04 
-0.04 35.08 34.44 0.64 34.93 33.79 1.14 
24 Aida Fdret 87 88 39.59 40.19 
-0.60 35.00 35.89 
-0.89 35.64 35.39 
-0.25 
25 Asd& Edict 89 90 35.64 35.89 
-0.25 35.01 35.01 0.00 34.98 34.55 0.43 
26 Bass grows 89 90 36.46 35.04 1.42 33.40 34.44 
-1.04 29.96 33.79 
-3.83 
27 slue circle Cartnt 88 89 34.99 35.00 
-0.01 35.01 34.71 0.30 35.02 34.02 1.00 
28 British Lard Props 87 88 39.81 34.60 5.21 35.00 31.22 3.78 35.00 31.42 3.58 
29 British Land Props 92 93 33.87 39.57 
-5.70 30.33 Nov Nw Nov Nsv Nw 
30 British Stott Stott 92 93 33.90 33.76 0.14 33.96 flay n/av Nov Nov. NOV 
31 City Site Estates Props 87 88 Nsv 34.60 Nov 91.47 31.22 60.25 
-161.40 31.42 -192.82 
32 Dares Estates Props 87 88 32.52 34.60 
-2.08 34.35 31.22 3.13 38.11 31.42. 6.69 
33 Forts Motel 90 91 35.08 35.13 
-0.05 34.82 34.55 0.27 34.08 37.68 
-3.60 
34 Land Securities Props 87 88 33.30 34.60 
-1.30 28.69 31.22 -2.53 28.67 31.42 -2.75 
35 Leona 01 top 86 87 41.21 40.54 0.67 36.14 44.19 
-8.05 35.06 37.26 -2.20 
36 Luso 01 top 89 90 35.05 37.03 
-1.98 35.06 25.29 9.77 34.97 31.26 3.71 
37 NEPC Props 86 87 34.69 38.01 
-3.32 34.42 34.60 -0.18 32.17 31.22 0.95 
38 Taylor Woodrow Cnstr 89 90 33.03 35.06 
-2.03 35.01 34.70 0.31 34.99 34.78 0.21 
39 Vaux Brews 89 90 36.14 35.04 1.10 34.78 34.44 0.34 34.90 33.79 1.11 
40 Whitbread Brows 91 92 34.63 33.79 0.84 34.19 32.82 1.37 37.26 NOV Nw 
41 Helical Bar Props 88 89 37.13 31.22 5.91 34.63 31.62 3.21 32.73 32.87 -0.14 
42 Neat Mutts 88 89 38.116 36.14 2.00 35.35 35.49 -0.14 36.04 35.39 0.65 
43 Worcester Grp Mmr>. 90 91 35.44 34.24 1.20 31.47 34.82 -3.35 33.19 35.83 -2.64 
Average tax ratios: 
(1) for equity issues 28.56 34.80 
-5.59 77.62 38.63 57.99 27.41 30.79 -3.00 (ii) for debt Issues 35.58 35.97 
-0.47 37.32 33.75 4.22 22.15 33.58 -12.44 
((i() for cony. - 36.90 33.87 3.04 33.82 33.91 -0.09 33.99 34.70 -0.71 
NOW (1) Tax ratio is defined as total tax charge/pro-tax profits (2) Tr 
-1 " year before the isws 
(3) Tr 0" year of capital issue 
(4) Yr +1 " year after capital issue 
(S) Nav 
  
tax ratio not available 
M1. If the u, typieslty lerge tax ratios are sxetuded (th(se for Lovett 803.61 end Skstch(sy 310.75) then the 
average tax ratio for equity issues (Yr 0) is: 
22.82 
than the debt issuing group, is that they have 
more debt interest to set-off against profits, 
and this results in a lower tax ratio. 
Alternatively, a greater proportion could be tax 
exhausted - hence a lower propensity to issue 
debt. 
The difference between tax ratios for the equity 
issuing companies and for the debt issuing 
companies is significant at the 1% level for the 
year prior to the issue; and for the industry 
sector groups for the equity issuing companies 
and the debt issuing companies the difference is 
significant at the 2% level, as shown in Table 
7.14B. 
In the year of the capital issue, the tax ratio 
for the equity group jumps up to 77.62%, caused 
by unusually large figures for Y. J. Lovell and 
Sketchley. If these are stripped out, then the 
tax ratio would be 24.33%, compared to an 
industry average of 38.63%. The tax ratios for 
debt and convertibles are fairly much in line 
with industry averages in the year of the capital 
issue. 
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TABLE 7.14B : STATISTICAL COMPARISON OF TAX RATIO 
FOR EQUITY AND FOR DEBT ISSUES 
Paired 't' Test 
------------------ 
Source Year Sd(E) Sd (D) Se Degrees of Signif- 
Table 
-1 Freedom icance 
(based on 
2tt) 
Individual Companies 
-------------------- 
7.14 TR (Orig. 
issue) 16.1432 8.4747 3.9794 34 0.01 
Industry Sectors 
-------------------- 
7.14 TR (Ind. 13.8689 2.1014 2.9981 36 0.02 
Sec. ) 
Note TR = Tax ratio 
Sd(E) = standard deviation of Tax ratio (Yr-1) for all the 
companies which issued equity in the following year 
Sd(D) = standard deviation of Tax ratio (Yr-1) for all the 
companies which issued debt in the following year 
Se = standard error 
7-7 EBIT-EPS in the Context of the Original and 
Reconstructed Capital Issues 
In Chapter 5 several expressions were developed 
for determining the preferred method of finance 
based on EBIT-EPS analysis under certain 
assumptions. These are utilised for the sample 
of companies for which reconstructions have been 
carried out above, and the results based on the 
expressions and based on the reconstructions are 
compared in Table 7.15. 
These expressions all capture binary comparisons. 
For equity to be preferred to debt, the following 
expression is used: 
(EBIT-I) (An ) >rD 
(n++n ) 
(The terms are defined in Section 5-3, Chapter 
5). 
This formula was also used for a convertible loan 
issue, where the reconstruction was for ordinary 
shares. 
Debt finance is preferable where the proportion 
of earnings after interest attributable to the 
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TABLE 7.15: EBIT-EPS ANALYSIS AND CAPITAL ISSUE CHOICE 
CaopanY 
I Anglia Secure Noses 
2 Bisst 
3 Bowater 
4 Bowthorps 
5 Casket 
6 Cater Allen 
7 Community Nospital Grp, 
8 Cookson Grp 
9 D" La Rue 
10 Domino Printing 
11 Eurotunnel 
12 J"yn 
13 Kwik Fit 
14 Lovell, Y. J. 
15 Midlad Bank 
16 Regalian 
17 Ronald 
18 Richards 
19 Sketchley 
20 Tay Males 
21 Tibbet i Britten 
22 Westbury 
EBIT I n an EBIT-I An/n i (E)*(F) rD (A)>(G) ACT. V. REC. SAME 
E000 E000 000 000 E000 000 E000 E000 DEBT"I DEBT=1 RESULT (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (A) (G) EQUITY=0 EQUITYc0 
-1527 7361 21020 12016 
-8888 0.3637 
-3233 295 0 0 r 
-10631 6360 21020 12016 
-14149 0.3637 
-5146 
' 1180 0 0 r 
7242 1201 82663 24179 6041 0.2263 1367 680 1 1 r 
Nov Nov n/av Nov n/av n/av Nov Nov Nov Nov n/av 169000 55900 119200 33734 113100 0.2206 24947 9405 1 1 r 
166700 54000 119200 33734 112700 0.2206 24859 18762 1 1 r 
33510 986 44490 22245 32524 0.3333 10841 919 1 1 r 
41427 1360 44490 22245 40067 0.3333 13356 5409 1 0 N 
2751 2539 37740 37740 212 0.5000 106 586 0 0 r 
3996 1934 37740 37740 2062 0.5000 1031 781 1 1 r 
Nov Nov n/av n/av Nov n/av n/av Nov n/av Nov Nov 
Nov Nov Nov Nov n/av n/av n/mv n/av Nov Nov Nov 
5890 76 24201 8067 5814 0.2500 1454 218 1 1 r 
Nov n/av n/av n/av Nov Nov Nov n/av n/mv Nov n/av 
61400 27000 364000 80900 34400 0.1818 6255 6579 0 0 r 
NOV n/av n/av n/av n/av Nov n/av Nov Nov n/av Nov 
86900 10700 140697 45800 76200 0.2456 18713 7843 1 1 Y 
n/av Nov n/av Nav Nov Nov n/av n/av Nov Nov Nov 
Nov Nov Nov NOV Nov Nov n/av Nav Nov n/av Nov 
Nov n/av Nov n/av Nov n/av n/av n/av n/av Nov Nov 
202772 202529 332392 199435 243 0.3750 91 5907 0 0 r 
348731 348840 332392 199435 
-109 0.3750 -41 73840 0 0 r 
3392 1029 10760 3240 2363 0.2314 547 0 1 1 r 
4250 686 10760 3240 3564 0.2314 825 892 0 0 r 
19626 1172 85670 34400 18454 0.2865 5287 2861 1 1 r 
20012 4892 85670 34400 15120 0.2865 4332 3815 1 0 N 
-13642 6665 58332 23766 -20307 0.2895 -5879 912 0 0 r 
n/av n/av n/av n/mv n/mv n/av n/av n/av n/av n/av n/av 
-314000 191000 232000 232926 -505000 0.5010 -253003 25666 0 0 r 
887000 194000 232000 232926 693000 0.5010 347190 77776 1 1 r 
-26804 n/av 87829 29276 -26804 0.2500 -6701 1698 0 0 r 
n/av n/av Nov Nov Nov Nov n/av n/av Nov n/av Nov 
9100 4600 40352 24048 4500 0.3734 1680 0 1 1 r 
11300 3700 40352 24048 7600 0.3734 2838 1228 1 1 r 
3351 584 13230 3344 2767 0.2018 558 278 1 1 r 
3046 231 13230 3344 2815 0.2018 568 415 1 1 r 
1116 6380 36223 21729 
-5264 0.3749 -1974 1880 0 0 r 
8995 2980 36223 21729 6015 0.3749 2255 2806 0 0 r 
3296 272 5325 1775 3024 0.2500 756 0 1 1 r 
5564 413 5325 1775 5151 0.2500 1288 651 1 1 r 
10270 1208 26260 6565 9062 0.2000 1812 1217 1 1 r 
13342 1665 26260 6565 11677 0.2000 2335 1817 1 1 r 
-9881 5239 49820 16613 -15120 0.2501 -3781 1740 0 0 r 
Nov n/av n/av n/av n/av n/mv Nov Nov n/av n/av n/av 
Notis: Using expression: if (EBIT-I)(^n/n*^n)), rO, then debt 
Is preferred to equity. 
where EBIT Earnings before interest and tax 
I= interest 
n= total number of shares 
L1n 
= change in rs. er of shares 
r= rate of interest 
0= total nominal value of debt 
31/33 y, 2/33=N (11 OF TOTAL 44 a NOT AVAILABLE In/. v)) 
TAkLE 1,15; EPIT"EPS ANALYSIS AND 
CAPITAL ISSUE CHOICE (cont'd) 
Cry EBIT I n an EBIT-I an/n+dn (E)"(F) rD (A))- (G) ACT. V. REC. SAME E000 E000 000 000 E000 000 £000 E000 DEBT=1 DEBT=1 RESULT (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (A) (G) EQUITYzO EQUITY=0 
23 Allied Lyons 649000 147000 72%12 86986 502000 0.1065 53474 0 1 1 733000 143625 72%12 86986 589375 0.1065 62782 24375 1 1 
r 
24 Asdo " 192200 200 1136000 86522 192000 0.0708 13588 0 1 1 
r 
* 218000 2700 1136000 86522 215300 0.0708 15238 0 1 1 
y 
25 Asdo 248500 767 1155000 107789 247733 0.0854 21146 1133 1 1 
r 
242500 48606 1155000 107789 193894 0.0854 16550 13594 1 1 
r 
r 
26 Bass 607000 67192 341673 34062 539808 0.0907 48936 10808 1 1 Y 
717000 156062 341673 34062 560938 0.0907 50851 25938 1 1 r 
27 Blue Circle 243700 39256 258861 41126 204444 0.1371 28028 1344 1 1 y 
287600 3%75 258861 41126 247925 0.1371 33989 16125 1 1 r 
28 British land 31419 Nov 139956 8845 31419 0.0594 1868 1319 1 1 r 
57719 n/av 139956 8845 57719 0.0594 3431 1319 1 1 r 
29 British land 50488 n/av 225535 66238 50488 0.2270 11462 17188 0 0 Y 
n/av n/av Nov n/av n/av Nov Nov n/av n/av n/av n/av 
30 British Steel 
-41939 32062 2000000 149364 
-74001 0.0695 
-5142 12938 0 0 r 
n/av n/av n/av flau n/av n/av Nov n/av n/ov n/ev nay 
31 City Site Estates 1884 n/av 8948 20038 1884 0.6913 1302 1094 1 0 N 
6303 n/av 8948 20038 6303 0.6913 4357 2625 1 1 r 
32 Dares Estates 7177 n/av 132560 84924 7177 0.3905 2803 2081 1 0 N 
16154 n/av 132560 84924 16154 0.3905 6308 3588 1 1 r 
33 Forte 322400 79746 782648 44580 242654 0.0539 13077 9854 1 1 r 
290000 89250 782648 44580 200750 0.0539 10819 10750 1 1 r 
34 Land Securities 137545 Nov 503400 75438 137545 0.1303 17926 16945 1 1 r 
152600 n/av 503400 75438 152600 0.1303 19888 19000 1 1 r 
35 Lasso 43700 33325 122364 44414 10375 0.2663 2763 3375 0 1 N 
72100 29037 122364 44414 43063 0.2663 11468 5063 1 1 r 
36 Lasso 133200 38331 193946 40249 94869 0.1719 16304 12969 1 0 N 
188500 60737 193946 40249 127763 0.1719 21957 15563 1 0 N 
37 NEPC 62244 n/av 237508 27574 62244 0.1040 6475 3844 1 1 r 
87888 Nov 237508 27574 87888 0.1040 9142 7688 1 1 r 
38 Taylor Woodrow 138500 19700 158257 16107 118800 0.0924 10974 1900 1 0 N 
108900 23220 158257 16107 85680 0.0924 7915 2280 1 0 N 
39 vaux 37059 3340 47417 26306 33719 0.3568 12032 2150 1 1 r 
44110 1834 47417 26306 42276 0.3568 15085 6450 1 1 r 
40 Whitbread 337000 47584 441744 11968 289416 0.0264 7634 2616 1 1 r 
272000 37306 441744 11968 234694 0.0264 6191 15694 0 0 r 
41 Helical Bar " 7164 n/av 3620 5027 7164 0.5814 8010 204 1 1 r 
12212 n/av 3620 5027 12212 0.3779 4615 994 1 1 r 
42 Next - 93742 5354 254590 23256 88388 0.0837 7398 1917 1 0 N 
87800 19750 254590 23256 68050 0.0837 5696 5750 0 0 r 
43 Worcester Grp ** 3553 758 23260 48089 2795 0.6740 1884 30 1 1 r 
5800 1280 23260 48089 4520 0.6740 3046 500 1 1 r 
Notes: Using expression: if (EBIT-I)(On/n dn)>r0, then debt is prefe rred. 
Where EBIT X Earnings before interest and t ax 
I= interest 
n= total nui er of shares 
An 
  change in number of shares 
r= rate of interest 
Da total nominal value of debt 
Asde capitalised the relevant interest 
"" Wiest Bar and Worcester Grp made issues of convertible 
preference shares. The EBIT-EPS expression for these is: 
if PO'(1-T)(EBIT-I)(An/r, n), then ordinary shares are preferred. 
Next side a convertible loan issue, the first expression has 
therefore been used. 
27/34. x, 7/3y1 (2 OF TOTAL 36 = NOT AVAILABLE (n/av]) 
5/6 
 T, 1/6N 
increase in shares under the equity option, 
exceeds the new interest that would be payable 
under the debt option. 
For the companies which had issued convertible 
preference shares and where the reconstruction 
was for ordinary shares, the following expression 
is used: 
PD> (1-T) (EBIT-I) (A An ) 
n+4n 
As discussed earlier in Section 5-3, Chapter 5. 
for ordinary shares to be preferred to preference 
shares, the preference dividend would have to 
exceed the proportion of earnings 'belonging' to 
the new ordinary shares. 
In Table 7.15 the 'preferred' method of finance 
is shown based on (i) the expressions discussed 
above, and (ii) whether the original method of 
finance or the reconstruction method results in 
the higher EPS. 
When debt is preferred to equity, then a Ill is 
coded against that company, whilst for equity a 
'0' is coded. Similarly, given that the 
convertible issues were reconstructed with 
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equity, then if convertibles are preferred to 
equity, a '1' is coded against that company, 
whilst for equity a 'o' is coded. 
A similar coding system was employed when 
referring back to Tables 6.7-6.10 (Chapter 6), 
where the EPS was compared both on the original 
issue and on a reconstruction. For whichever 
scenario gave the highest EPS, if debt, (or 
convertibles for companies 41-43), gave the 
higher EPS a '1' was coded, whilst if equity gave 
the higher EPS a '0' was coded. This is not 
stating that debt issues are the same as issues 
of convertibles, rather that a10' indicates that 
an equity issue (ordinary shares) resulted in a 
higher EPS, whilst a '1' indicates that it was 
another form of finance (debt, or convertibles) 
which resulted in a higher EPS. 
The results were then compared for each company 
for the year of issue and the year following 
issue. From the results of the classification on 
the EBIT-EPS method and the reconstructions, it 
was found that for those companies which 
originally issued equity and for which the 
reconstruction was for debt, the EBIT-EPS method 
exhibited the same preference for 31 out of 33 
cases (94%); for companies which originally 
7-42 
issued debt and for which the reconstruction was 
for equity, the EBIT-EPS method was in agreement 
for 27' out of 34 cases (79%); whilst for 
companies which originally issued convertibles 
and for which the reconstruction was for equity, 
the EBIT-EPS method was in agreement for 5 out of 
6 cases (83%). 
Summary of Table 7.15 
Actual Issue 
Equity Debt 
Preferred Equity 31 7 
on EBIT-EPS Debt 2 27 
Analysis 33 34 
(ignoring convertibles) 
For the companies where the two methods do not 
provide the same result, it may be partly 
attributable to the fact that in Table 7.15, the 
figure used for the increase in the number of 
shares (an) was taken as the whole amount of the 
new equity issue, rather than the f igure that 
would have been used in a weighted average share 
calculation for determining EPS. It was felt to 
be preferable to use the total number of ordinary 
shares associated with the new issue, so that a 
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consistent basis was used. Also, it should have 
only affected the year of issue, as by the 
following year, the new shares would be included 
in full in the weighted average. 
The findings outlined above provide further 
confirmation of the influence of EPS in capital 
issue decisions. It also shows that the 
expressions derived in Section 5-3 have good 
predictive ability regarding the debt-equity 
choice made by companies. 
7-8 Conclusions 
In this Chapter, the apparent influence of 
different measures which may affect the debt- 
equity choice is investigated, using a univariate 
approach. The findings, in brief, were as 
follows: 
(i) Arising from the comparison made of the 
capital gearing ratios for the companies making 
different types of finance issue, there would 
appear to be evidence of mean reversion and debt 
capacity with more highly geared companies 
tending to issue equity, and less highly geared 
companies issuing debt. 
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The capital gearing 
the capital issue 
subsequently issued 
subsequently issued 
significantly differ 
level. 
ratios for the year before 
for the companies which 
equity, and those which 
debt, were found to be 
ant from each other at the 1% 
It would also seem that companies tend to make 
issues which push the gearing into line with the 
industry averages, or which bring them back into 
line with them. 
There is also some evidence that the amount of 
equity issues tends to be for a larger proportion 
of the total assets of the business, than debt 
issues are. 
(ii) Income gearing and interest cover are 
examined. It was noted that if the equity 
issuing companies had issued debt, then the 
average interest gearing ratio for the equity 
issuing companies would have increased 
substantially. 
The interest cover for those companies which 
subsequently issued equity was lower than the 
interest cover for the other types of issue. 
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The income gearing ratios for the year before the 
capital issue for the companies which 
subsequently issued equity and those which issued 
debt, were significantly different from each 
other at the 1% level. The same was true of the 
interest cover ratios. 
(iii) An analysis of the effect of 
reconstruction (i. e. hypothetical issue) 
a 
on 
dividend cover shows that, in the majority of 
cases, the alternative financing instrument would 
have resulted in a drop in dividend cover. 
(iv) The rates of return for companies which 
issued equity would appear to be more volatile, 
and have a wider spread, when compared with debt 
issues. There is some evidence for the companies 
which issued equity earning a higher rate of 
return, a finding consistent with the premise of 
Baumol et al (1970) that different types of 
finance earn different rates of return. 
(v) In the year prior to the capital issue, the 
companies which subsequently issued debt, had the 
lowest average cash flow ratio. 
(vi) When analysing the tax ratios, it was found 
that, in the year prior to issue, the companies 
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which subsequently issued equity had a lower 
average tax ratio than those companies which 
subsequently issued debt or convertibles. 
(vii) The formulae derived in Chapter 5 are used 
to classify the types of issue, based on which 
would be preferred on the basis of. EBIT-EPS 
analysis. A comparison is made with the original 
and reconstructed income statements, based on 
which type of issue gives the higher EPS. The 
results confirm that the formulae derived in 
Chapter 5 could prove a useful guide to companies 
wishing to choose the type of finance which will 
maximise EPS. 
In the next Chapter, a multivariate approach is 
adopted to investigate further the apparent 
influence of the different measures discussed in 
this Chapter. 
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CHAPTER 8: REGRESSION MODEL (PROBIT) OF DEBT- 
EQUITY CHOICE 
8-1 Introduction 
In the previous Chapter various measures which 
might influence the debt-equity chpice were 
examined on a 'univariate basis'. In this 
Chapter, a multivariate approach is adopted using 
a limited dependent variable method 
- 
probit 
analysis. 
In this probit model, debt/equity choice is the 
dichotomous dependent variable, and various 
factors which might affect that choice were 
included as independent variables. The set of 
variables out of which the independent variables 
were selected included capital and income gearing 
ratios, and the elasticity measures of DOL, DFL 
and DCL which have certain potential benefits (eg 
DOL and DCL incorporate the operating risk of a 
firm which purely financial measures do not). The 
'cash flow ratio' (i. e. cash flow/total debt) 
found by Beaver (1966), to be the best single 
discriminator between failed and non-failed 
companies, is also investigated. 
The results of the probit model were supportive 
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of a fixation on EPS - whilst the final model 
included an industry sector variable, and a 
gearing variable, the independent variable with 
the most influence was a dummy variable which 
captured the effect of the debt-equity choice of 
finance on EPS. 
8-2 Probit Analysis 
8-2-1 Linear Probability Model 
It was decided to model the debt-equity choice by 
means of a linear probability model. This type 
of model is used when the dependent variable y is 
a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the 
event occurs and 0 if it does not. The debt- 
equity choice can be represented by y, being a 
dependent variable which can take only two 
values: debt (1) or equity (0). Y is therefore 
a dichotomous variable. 
The model takes the form: 
y=13 'xi +ui 
where E (u, ) =0 
The conditional expectation E (y1 1x; ) = 13'X1. In 
8-2 
this case this is interpreted as the probability 
that the event will occur given the X. The 
calculated value of y from the regression 
equation, y1=B'x1, then gives the estimated 
probability that the event will occur given the 
particular value of x. In practice, these 
estimated probabilities can lie outside the 
admissible range (0,1) 
. 
Given that yj takes only 
1 or 0 as a value, the residuals in the above 
equation can take only two values: 1-ß'x1 and 
-ß' x, 
. 
Also given that E (u1) =0, then there is a 
problem with heteroscedasticity, so the ordinary 
least squares (OLS) estimates of ß would not be 
efficient. 
Goldberger (1964) suggested a procedure, using 
OLS and weighted least squares, that he thought 
might overcome the problem. This technique was 
probit analysis. 
However, Maddala (1991) outlined various problems 
that might still arise, the most important of 
which concerned the formulation itself - that the 
conditional expectations E (y1 jxj) be interpreted 
as the probability that the event will occur, 
since in many cases the conditional expectations 
may lie outside the limits (0,1). 
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The technique of probit analysis as defined by 
Goldberger (1964) and Maddala (1991) assumes that 
there is an underlying response variable y, 
defined by the regression relationship: 
y1 = B'xi + u1 
In the model specified below, y, is the dummy. 
8-2-2 Formulation of Probit Model 
The following probit model was formulated and run 
in LIMDEP (a limited dependent variable package): 
(a) Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is represented by a dummy 
(DE), where debt = 1, and equity = 0. 
The independent variables were all factors which 
it was thought might influence the debt-equity 
choice. They are detailed below. 
(b) Independent variables 
There is no theoretical basis for some particular 
model form here; rather it is a case of trying to 
detect influential model variables. 
8-4 
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The set of potential explanatory variables is 
detailed below under the heads of 'dummy 
independent variables' and 'independent 
variables'. 
Dummy independent variables 
Three dummy independent variables were set up to 
represent the four industry sectors (i. e. n-1 
dummies), such that: 
(i) 0,0,0 (Z1) represented industry sector 1 
(manufacturing) ; 
(ii) 1,0,0 (Z2) industry sector 2 (service); 
(iii) 0,1,0 (Z3) industry sector 3 (retail and 
distribution); and 
(iv) 0,0,1 (Z4) industry sector 4 (property and 
construction). 
Another dummy was set up for whichever type of 
issue, be it on the original or the 
reconstruction figures, gave the higher EPS (D2). 
If debt gave the higher EPS is was coded 1; if 
equity gave the higher EPS it was coded 0. 
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Independent variables 
(i) the age of the company (AGE) ; 
(ii) the capital gearing of the company prior to 
the year of issue (CGPY); 
(iii) the capital gearing of the company for the 
year of issue (CGO) ; 
(iv) the income gearing of the company prior to 
the year of issue (IGPY); 
(v) the income gearing of the company for the 
year of issue (IGO) ; 
(vi) the interest cover of the company prior to 
the year of issue (ICPY); 
(vii) the interest cover of the company for the 
year of issue (ICO) ; 
(viii) the degree of operating leverage (DOL) 
based on the estimates obtained using the 
Mandelker and Rhee methodology; 
(ix) the degree of financial leverage (DFL) based 
on the estimates obtained using the Mandelker and 
Rhee methodology; 
(x) the degree of combined leverage (DCL) , 
estimated from (viii) and (ix) above; 
(xi) the beta of the firm (BETA) obtained from 
Datastream (calculated by performing a least 
squares regression between weekly adjusted prices 
of the stock and the corresponding Datastream 
market index, using five year's data); 
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(xii) the relative size of the issue (RS) 
calculated as the proceeds of the issue as a 
proportion of the total assets of the business; 
(xiii) the dividend cover of the company for the 
year prior to the capital issue (DCPY); 
(xiv) the dividend cover of the company for the 
year of issue (DCO) ; 
(xv) the cash flow ratio of the company (CF) 
. 
(xvi) following the analysis in Maddala, a 
constant (ONE) was included in the probit model. 
Most of these variables have been discussed in 
Chapter 7 (capital and income gearing measures, 
dividend cover, cash flow ratio and tax ratio); 
in Chapter 6 (EPS); and in Chapter 5 (degrees of 
financial; operating, and combined leverage; and 
beta). The age of the company might also be 
relevant in the debt-equity choice as older firms 
may find it easier to issue debt. The size of 
the issue may also be relevant, a large issue 
relative to the total assets of the business is 
probably more likely to be equity. 
The variables incorporated into the probit model 
are detailed in Table 8.1. 
Some of the variables are highly related and a 
correlation matrix is presented and discussed 
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8-3 Correlations of Variables in Probit 
Model 
B-3-1 Correlation Matrix 
Before the probit model was run, a correlation 
matrix of the independent variables was analysed. 
The correlations are shown in Table 8.2, as one 
might expect there are significant correlations 
between certain variables, notably the measures 
of gearing (capital gearing, income gearing, 
interest cover, degree of operating leverage, 
degree of financial leverage, and degree of 
combined leverage). The matrix is discussed more 
fully below. 
8-3-2 Correlations between Gearing Measures 
As mentioned above, there are strong correlations 
between the same measure of gearing for the year 
of capital issue and the year prior to issue. 
For example, the correlation between CGPY 
(capital gearing for the year prior to issue) and 
CGO (capital gearing for year of issue) is 0.756; 
between IGPY (income gearing for the year prior 
to capital issue) and IGO (income gearing for 
8-8 
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TABLE 8.2 : CORRELATION MATRIX OF VARIABLES IN PROBIT ANALYSIS 
1-IS1 2-IS2 3-IS3 4-AGE 5-CGPY 
1- I S1 1.0000000 
2-1S2 -. 1587768 1.0000000 
3-IS3 -. 2474358 -. 2750095 1.0000000 
4-AGE 
. 
2631072 
-. 
2226054 
-. 
1918304 1.0000000 
5-CGPY 
. 
1140399 
-. 
0966060 
. 
2601410 
-. 
1074252 1.0000000 
1-Isi 2-IS2 3-IS3 4-AGE 5-CGPY 
6-CGO 
-. 
0013664 
-. 
0143795 
. 
3156150 
-. 
1022900 
. 
7561614 
7-IGPY 
-. 
2801052 
. 
1308424 
-. 
1921926 
-. 
0254861 
-. 
0672277 
8-IGO 
. 
1036108 
. 
2170028 
-. 
6664493 
. 
1616496 
-. 
0150325 
9-DOL " -. 2754966 
. 
1015349 
-. 
4534071 
. 
1127681 
-. 
1391082 
10-DFL 
-. 
4655736 
-. 
1471244 
. 
1859494 
-. 
0109313 
. 
1896925 
6-CGO 7-IGPY 8-IGO 9-DOL 10-DFL 
6-CGO 1.0000000 
7- I GPY 
-. 
2217274 1.0000000 
8-IGO 
-. 
2688708 
. 
5315444 1.0000000 
9-DOL 
-. 
3890060 
. 
5271784 
. 
7609842 1.0000000 
10-DFL 
. 
0577319 
. 
0571575 
. 
0696428 
. 
4628101 1.0000000 
1-IS1 2-IS2 3-IS3 4-AGE 5-CGPY 
11-DCL 
-. 
2766833 
. 
0979575 
-. 
4542304 
. 
1082214 
-. 
1461734 
12-DFL2 
. 
0112060 
. 
1412144 
-. 
6078443 
. 
1373450 
-. 
1277027 
13-DFLPY 
-. 
0025744 
. 
2201965 
-. 
6287855 
. 
1071661 
-. 
0906112 
14-DFLO 
-. 
0169439 
. 
3098183 
-. 
6153774 
. 
0601190 
-. 
0310388 
15-BETA 
-. 
2298004 
. 
0161534 
. 
3203634 
-. 
2540307 
. 
2659883 
6-CGO 7-IGPY 8-IGO 9-DOL 10-DFL 
11-DCL 
-. 
3927890 
. 
5267099 
. 
7548681 
. 
9994661 
. 
4625519 
12-DFL2 
-. 
3635569 
. 
6397466 
. 
9212842 
. 
8567773 
. 
1960134 
13-DFLPY 
-. 
3041493 
. 
6537693 
. 
9430771 
. 
8023982 
. 
0794900 
14-OFLO 
-. 
2021055 
. 
6255746 
. 
9100697 
. 
6762987 
-. 
0809566 
15-BETA 
. 
2578715 
. 
1019706 
-. 
0772685 
. 
0480650 
. 
1595710 
11-DCL 12-DFL2 13-DFLPY 14-DFLO 15-SETA 
11-DCL 1.0000000 
12-D F L2 
. 
8561263 1.0000000 
13-DFLPY 
. 
8017942 
. 
9786162 1.0000000 
14 
-DFLO 
. 
675 7697 
. 
8846143 
. 
9616043 1.0000000 
1S-BETA 
. 
0532093 
-. 
0321721 
-. 
0271673 
-. 
0192129 1.0000000 
TABLE 8.2 (CONT'D) : CORRELATION MATRIX OF VARIABLES IN PROBIT ANALYSIS 
1-IS1 2-IS2 3-IS3 4-AGE 5-CGPY 
16-RS 
-. 
0809793 
-. 
0287275 
. 
2015955 
-. 
2108121" 
. 
0760686 
17-CF 
-. 
4237239 
. 
0673795 
. 
1046116 
-. 
2890386 
. 
2740290 
18-02 
. 
1720304 
-. 
0637337 
-. 
0993218 
-. 
0212257 
. 
1337540 
19-DCPY 
-. 
2173222 
. 
1079688 
-. 
2152733 
-. 
0240650 
-. 
3780649 
20-DCO 
-. 
3477146 
. 
0905738 
-. 
0461893 
-. 
2320638 
-. 
2983370 
6-CGO 7-IGPY 8-IGO 9-D0L 10-DFL 
16-RS 
. 
0343686 
-. 
1851058 
-. 
1424657 
-. 
1121502 
. 
0601434 
17-CF 
. 
2536236 
. 
2094236 
. 
3020863 
. 
2601610 
. 
5623633 
18-D2 
. 
2263056 
-. 
1449609 
-. 
0112715 
-. 
0747903 
. 
1398413 
19-DCPY 
-. 
3479379 
. 
1457845 
. 
2591334 
. 
2256818 
. 
2313515 
20-DCO 
-. 
2370483 
-. 
1293376 
. 
0455409 
. 
1602646 
. 
2597347 
11-DCL 12-DFL2 13-DFLPY 14-DFLO 15-BETA 
16-RS 
-. 
1160320 
-. 
1782232 
-. 
1800083 
-. 
1706668 
-. 
0942907 
17-CF 
. 
2599647 
. 
3152726 
. 
3202850 
. 
3055398 
. 
1186919 
18-D2 
-. 
0701654 
-. 
0168530 
-. 
0561420 
-. 
1023119 
. 
0696962 
19-DCPY 
. 
2195451 
. 
3251349 
. 
2716507 
. 
1784966 
-. 
1052331 
20-DCO 
. 
1518640 
. 
0507842 
. 
0021436 
-. 
0645760 
-. 
2620314 
16-RS 17-CF 18-D2 19-DCPY 20-DCO 
16-RS 1.0000000 
17-CF 
. 
0370153 1.0000000 
18-02 
-. 
0375117 
. 
1861941 1.0000000 
19-DCPY 
. 
0606684 
. 
2634692 
-. 
1018249 1.0000000 
20-DCO 
. 
4930366 
. 
2388163 
. 
0959770 
. 
5801362 1.0000000 
TABLE 8.2 (CONT'D) : CORRELATION MATRIX OF VARIABLES IN PROBIT 
ANALYSIS 
1-IS1 2-IS2 3-IS3 4-AGE 5-CGPY 
" 21-ICPY -. 0023049 
. 
2356109 
-. 
6330596 
. 
0988368 
-. 
1165485 
22-ICO 
-. 
0152203 
. 
3357954 
-. 
6142980 
. 
0477400 
-. 
1602860 
6-CGO 7-IGPY 8-IGO 9-DOL 10-DFL 
21-ICPY 
-. 
3194570 
. 
6516287 
. 
9407066 
. 
8104572 
. 
0924567 
22-ICO 
-. 
2966007 
. 
6111328 
. 
8867739 
. 
7700246 
. 
0903823 
11-DCL 12-DFL2 13-DFLPY 14-DFLO 15-BETA 
21-ICPY 
. 
8097623 
. 
9833682 
. 
9980272 
. 
9507273 
-. 
0322454 
22-ICO 
. 
7686234 
. 
9285932 
. 
9403830 
. 
8929594 
-. 
0391838 
16-RS 17-CF 18-D2 19-DCPY 20-DCO 
21-ICPY 
-. 
1827507 
. 
3199494 
-. 
0419985 
. 
2906841 
. 
0225553 
22-ICO 
-. 
1846012 
. 
3015783 
. 
0059112 
. 
2930772 
. 
0661874 
21-ICPY 22-ICO 
21-ICPY 1.0000000 
22-ICO 
. 
9554882 1.0000000 
year of capital issue) it is 0.532; between ICPY 
(income cover for the year prior to issue) and 
Ico (income cover for the year of issue) it is 
0.955; and between DFLPY (degree of financial 
leverage for the year prior to issue) and DFLO 
(degree of financial leverage for the year of 
issue) it is 0.962. 
There are fairly weak negative correlations 
between the measures of capital gearing and 
income gearing. This is contrary to what might 
have been expected, as a company with high 
capital gearing would usually have high interest 
payments and hence one would expect a positive 
correlation between capital and income gearing. 
The absence of the expected correlation could be 
explained by the fact that, as discussed in 
Chapter 6, many of the companies which issued 
debt* capitalised the interest relating to the 
debt. This could also explain the generally 
negative correlations that were found between 
capital gearing measures and the elasticity 
measures of degree of financial leverage. 
Another possible explanation is that there 
is 
some time effect involved. It may be that some 
companies take out debt when it is relatively 
cheap, i. e. when the coupon is low, whilst others 
8-9 
take debt out when it is expensive. The coupon 
therefore varies depending on when the debt is 
taken out. One would expect more debt to be 
taken out when the coupon is low, and this would 
lead to high capital gearing, whilst on the 
income gearing measure, the effect would be much 
less, resulting on lower income gearing, and 
degree of financial leverage measures. 
The income gearing measures have a very strong 
positive correlation with the degree of operating 
leverage (DOL) and the various measures of degree 
of financial leverage (except for DFL, calculated 
on the Mandelker and Rhee basis). This would 
seem to indicate that companies with higher 
degrees of operating and financial leverage are 
more likely to take on debt. 
The strong positive correlations between degree 
of operating leverage and the measures of degree 
of financial leverage indicate that operating and 
financial leverage elasticity measures are 
complements and not substitutes. 
The various correlations between different 
measures of gearing discussed above could 
be 
indicative of multi-collinearity between 
the 
variables; for this reason one measure of gearing 
8-10 
only is incorporated in the probit model for any 
one run. 
8-3-3 Correlations with Beta 
As expected beta is negatively correlated with 
age, indicating that older companies tend to be 
less 'risky'; whilst it is negatively correlated 
with capital gearing indicating that the more 
highly geared a company is, the more 'risky' it 
is perceived as being. 
The relationship between beta and the degrees of 
operating and financial leverage has already been 
discussed more fully in Chapter 5. 
8-3-4 Correlations with Cash Flow Ratio 
The correlations between the cash flow ratio and 
the measures of degree of financial leverage; and 
between the cash flow ratio and income gearing 
measures, and capital gearing measures, are 
Positive indicating that companies with higher 
cash flow feel comfortable with higher levels of 
debt. 
The cash flow ratio is negatively correlated with 
the age of the company indicating that the older 
8-11 
L", 
the company, the 
ratio. 
less healthy the cash flow 
There is also a substantial negative correlation 
between the cash flow ratio and the manufacturing 
sector, indicating that companies in the 
manufacturing sector do not appear, to have 
healthy cash flow ratios. This is as expected 
given the state of the UK manufacturing industry. 
The cash flow ratio is positively correlated with 
the dividend cover in the year of capital issue, 
and it is to be expected that a higher cash flow 
ratio would, ceteris paribus, lead to a higher 
dividend cover. 
8-3-5 Correlations with size of Issue 
The size of the issue is negatively correlated 
with the age of the company indicating that the 
older the company the smaller the size of the 
issue is likely to be. 
There is a positive correlation between the size 
of the issue and the property and construction 
industry sector, indicating that this sector 
tends to make larger issues. 
8-12 
There are negative correlations between the size 
of the issue and the degree of operating 
leverage, and most of the measures of degree of 
financial leverage. This could be explained by 
large issues being made by companies in distress 
for the purpose of financial reconstruction, in 
which case the issues would probably lot result 
in the increase in degree of operating leverage, 
and degree of financial leverage, that might be 
expected. 
The size of the issue is positively correlated 
with the dividend cover in the year of capital 
issue, indicating that the effect on dividend 
cover is likely to be an important consideration 
in the deciding on the size of the issue. 
8-4 Running the Probit Model 
The probit model was run many times. This was 
because there were a large number of possible 
explanatory independent variables, but only a 
certain number of these were included on any one 
run. This was necessary for the following 
reasons: 
(i) in order to ensure that there were enough 
degrees of freedom, and to try to avoid singular 
8-13 
hessian runs, 
(ii) to 
problems. 
help avoid any multicollinearity 
On each run several combinations of variables 
were included until some variables could be 
dropped completely as they did not appear to be 
significant. 
8-5 Results of Probit Analysis 
8-5-1 Initial Results 
Each time that the probit analysis was run, a 
different measure of gearing was used so that 
significantly correlated variables did not affect 
the regression. The results of these initial 
runs are shown in Appendix 8-1-1 to 8-1-8. 
The most significant variables arising from the 
runs were the gearing measure (CGPY, IGPY, etc); 
beta (BETA) ; the relative size. of the issue (RS) ; 
and the dummy variable representing the capital 
issue method which gave the higher EPS (D2). 
The regressions were therefore run again omitting 
in turn, the gearing measure, the beta factor, 
8-14 
the relative size of the issue, and the dummy 
variable for EPS. Beta and the relative size of 
the issue seemed to have less significance in 
these regressions, their t-ratios ultimately not 
being significant. Table 8.3 is a summary of the 
key independent variables in the PROBIT analysis, 
showing combinations of the gearing. measures 
which were found to have explanatory power and 
the dummy EPS variable. These combinations were 
all run with and without IS3, the dummy variable 
representing industry sector 4, which seemed to 
have most explanatory 
sector dummies. 
power of the industry 
8-5-2 Final Results 
The most important finding is that the 
independent variable with the highest t-ratio is 
D2, the dummy variable for the type of capital 
issue which gives the higher EPS. The model 
which provides the best predictors of capital 
issue choice would contain independent variables 
as follows: capital gearing ratio for the year 
prior to issue (CGPY) 
, 
the industry dummy for the 
property and construction sector (IS3), and the 
dummy variable for the type of capital issue 
giving the higher EPS (D2). This correctly 
classified 31 out of 40 (78%) of the sample. A 
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TABLE 8.3 : SUMMARY OF KEY INDEPENDENT VARIABLES IN PROBIT 
ANALYSIS 
N0. VARIABLES T-RATIOS NO. CORRECTLY 
, 
CLASSIFIED 
ý Tof4-0, a 
(1) ICPY -1.770 ) 
D2 2.251 25 
(2) ICPY -1.261 ) 
D2 2.268 ) 
IS3 0.367 ) 26 
(3) IGO 
-1.992 ) 
D2 2.309 ) 27 
(4) IGO 
-1.563 ) 
D2 2.284 ) 
IS3 0.116 ) 27 
(5) CGPY 
-1.780 ) 
D2 2.409 ) 29 
(6) CGPY 
-2.211 ) 
D2 2.666 ) 
IS3 1.942 ) 31 
(7) CGO 0.568 ) 
D2 2.083 ) 27 
(8) CGO 0.155 ) 
D2 2.296 ) 
IS3 1.280 ) 27 
t 
model specified as before but omitting the 
industry sector correctly classified 29 out of 40 
summary of the results for these two 
sets of variables is shown in Table 8.4. 
The implications of the model are discussed 
below. 
8-5-3 The Debt-Equity Choice Probit Model 
The following comments can be made regarding the 
debt-equity choice model, which includes an 
industry sector dummy, identified in the lower 
portion of Table 8.4 (it should be borne in mind 
that the debt-equity choice was represented by 
101 for equity and Ill for debt) : 
(i) D2 (the dummy variable representing the 
financing method which results in the higher EPS) 
has a coefficient value of 1.36696. This 
indicates that a debt issue tends to result in a 
higher EPS than an equity issue. 
(ii) CGPY (the capital gearing ratio for the 
year prior to issue) has a coefficient value of 
-0.0324. This indicates that companies with a 
high capital gearing ratio in the year prior to 
a capital. issue are more likely to issue equity. 
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TABLE 8.4: FINAL MODEL OF DEBT-EQUITY CHOICE 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Log-likelihood 
.............. 
-23.177 
Restricted (Slopes=0) Log-L. 
-27.526 
Chi-Squared ( 2)............ 8.6964 
Significance Level.. 
........ . 
12930E-01 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-ratio Prob°t°-x Mean of X Std. D. of X 
ONE 
-. 
952662E-01 
. 
492120 
-. 
194 
. 
84650 1.00000 
. 
00000 
CGPY 
-. 
222463E-01 
. 
131512E-01 
-1.692 
. 
09072 32.18600 16.93710 
D2 1.14950 
. 
449349 2.558 
. 
01052 
. 
57500 
. 
50064 
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes 
Predicted outcome has maximus probability. 
Predicted 
Actual TOTAL 0 1 
TOTAL 40 25 15 
0 22 18 4 
1 18 7 11 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Log-Likelihood 
.............. 
-20.994 
Restricted (Slopes=0) Log-L. 
-27.526 
Chi-Squared ( 3)............ 13.064 
Significance Level.......... 
. 
45009E-02 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-ratio Prob°t°-x Mean of X Std. D. of X 
ONE 
-. 
224956 
. 
521096 
-. 
432 
. 
66596 1.00000 
. 
00000 
IS3 1.08487 
. 
541074 2.005 
. 
04496 
. 
30000 
. 
46410 
CGPY 
-. 
323886E-01 
. 
149815E-01 
-2.162 
. 
03063 32.18600 16.93710 
D2 1.36696 
. 
483659 2.826 
. 
00471 
. 
57500 
. 
50064 
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes 
Predicted outcome has maximus probability. 
Predicted 
Actual TOTAL 01 
TOTAL 40 23 17 
0 22 18 4 
1 18 5 13 
(iii) IS3 (the industry sector dummy for property 
and construction) has a coefficient of 1.085. 
This indicates that companies in this sector are 
more likely to issue debt. 
The t-ratios are 2.826 (D2), 
-2.162 (CGPY), and 
2.005 (IS3). D2 therefore has the largest t- 
ratio, indicating that the effect on EPS of a 
particular financing method is one of the most 
important factors in the deciding on the type of 
finance. 
8-5-4 Testing the Debt-Equity Model 
It was decided to test. the model against half of 
the sample of 40, so that a block of observations 
(13 through to 32, representing 10 equity issues 
and 10 debt issues) was used as a hold-out 
sample. Using the model containing the 
independent variables CGPY, IS3 and D2,18 out of 
20 (90%) of the cases were correctly classified. 
Therefore the model containing the capital 
gearing ratio for the year prior to issue, the 
property and construction industry sector, and 
the dummy variable for the effect of the type of 
capital issue on the EPS would seem to be an 
efficient predictor of the debt-equity choice. 
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This is as expected given the findings in 
previous chapters which seem to show that 
(i) both company finance directors, and the 
wider financial sphere (in particular analysts), 
place great emphasis on EPS, and 
(ii) the effects on capital gearing of a proposed 
finance issue would appear to be considered in 
the context of industry 'norms', and that there 
is some evidence of mean reversion/debt capacity. 
8-6 Conclusions 
The purpose of this Chapter was to formulate a 
model using limited dependent variable 
techniques, to try to determine the influence of 
various variables on the debt-equity choice. 
A probit model was formulated and run for a 
sample of companies. The results show that the 
model which is the best predictor of the type of 
capital issue which might be made by a company is 
one which takes into account a gearing measure 
(the best results being obtained from the capital 
gearing ratio prior to the year of issue); an 
industry sector measure (though it is fairly 
robust without this); and the effect of the type 
of issue on EPS (i. e. which type gives the larger 
EPS). 
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The model appears to have useful implications for 
some of the findings discussed in earlier 
Chapters. Encouragingly, the factor which seems 
to have the most significance is the influence of 
EPS, i. e the effect on the EPS of the company of 
a particular finance method. This therefore 
provides support for the argument that EPS has an 
influence on the debt-equity choice, and that 
there is functional fixation on EPS. 
The next Chapter summarises the position reached 
based on the analysis in this thesis. 
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APPENDIX 8-1-1 
Maxima Likelihood Estiwstss 
Log-Likelihood 
.............. 
". 
31311E-06 
Restricted (Slopoa"0) Lod-L. -21.170 
Chi-Squared ( 9)... 
......... 
62.340 
Significance Level 
. ......... . 
18996E-06 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-ratio Prob"t"-x Mean of X Std. O. of X 
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CF 157.108 20368.1 
. 
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. 
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Fraqusncios of actual & predicted outcomes 
Predicted outcome has msxiý probability. 
Predicted 
Actual TOTAL 0 1 
TOTAL 32 20 12 
0 20 20 0 
1 12 0 12 
' Maxima likelihood Estimates 
Log-Likelihood 
.............. 
-. 
28930E-06 
Restricted CStopes+0) Log-L. 
-21.170 
Chi-Sgwred C 9)... 
......... 
42.340 
Significance Love(. 
......... . 
18996E-06 
Variabi. Coefficient Std. Error T-ratio Prob't'"x Mann of X Std. D. of X 
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CF 149.221 20276.4 
. 
007 
. 
99413 
. 
08531 
. 
05814 
Fr. quwnciss of actual & predicted outcowus 
Predicted outcome has maxims probability. 
Prodfcted 
Actual TOTAL 0 1 
TOTAL 32 20 12 
0 20 20 0 
1 12 0 12 
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F 
APPENDIX 8-1-2 
Muiiaai Likelihood Estfmtes 
Loo-Likelihood 
.............. 
-15.446 
Restricted (SIoph. O) Log-L. 
-26.917 
Chi-Squared ( 9).. 
.......... 
22.942 
Significance Level 
.......... . 
63286E-02 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-ratio Prob"t"-x Now of X Std. D. of X 
ONE 1.73749 1.66689 1.054 
. 
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98663 
. 
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. 
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. 
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. 
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. 
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. 
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. 
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. 
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. 
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Frpjsncios of . ctwt & predicted outcomes 
Predicted outca s hu mxiwai probability. 
Predicted 
Actual. TOTAL 01 
TOTAL 39 21 18 
0 21 1e 3 
1 13 3 13 
Maxicar Likelihood Estimates 
Loo-Likelihood 
.............. 
-12.973 
Restricted (Stop. s. 0) Loo-L. "26.917 
Chi-Squared ( 9)............ 27.888 
Significance Level 
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99179E-03 
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297378 1.04075 
. 
286 
. 
77508 
. 
15385 
. 
36552 
153 1.73983 1.29416 1.344 
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OCO 
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CF 
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Frequencies of actual & predicted outeosss 
Predicted outcom has msxi. a probobility. 
Predicted 
Actust TOTAL '01 
TOTAL 39 21 18 
0 21 I8 3 
1 16 3 13 
v 
APPENDIX $-1-3 
Haitiaa LikNihood Estimt. s 
log-likelihood 
.............. 
-14.093 
Restricted (StopN"0) los-l. 
-26.917 
Chi-Sgtarod ( 9)............ 2S. 6i6 
Sionificanc. lsvwt.......... 
. 
23319E-02 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-rKto Prob't'-x Now of X Std. D. of X 
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00000 
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. 
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Pr. sncies of KIWI & predicted cute or! 
Predicted outcome has maximum prob. bility. 
Predicted 
Actual TOTAL 01 
TOTAL 39 22 17 
0 21 19 2 
I 1S 3 1S 
Maximum Likelihood Estisstss 
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. 
299 
. 
76531 
. 
07333 
. 
05886 
Frequencies of octwl & predicted outcomes 
Predicted outcome has macimaa probobiIity. 
0 
Prsd$ctsd 
Actual TOTAL 01 
TOTAL 39 20 19 
0 21 16 5 
I 18 4 14 
v 
it APPENDIX 8-1-4 qw 
Nuii a Likelihood Estiras 
J., 
LoV-Lik. lihood 
.............. 
-. 
24715E-06 
Restricted (SIcpss. O) Loo-L. 
-21.170 
Chi-S¢ sr. d ( 9)............ 42.340 
Significance Low(.......... 
. 
18996E-06 
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aýsa Frequwcies of actual & predicted cute 
Predicted outcome has maximus probability. 
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Actual TOTAL 0 1 
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APPENDIX 8-1-5 
Maxima likelihood Estimates 
Log-likelihood 
.............. 
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Restricted (SLopesi0) Log-L. 
-25.633 
Chi-Squared ( 9)............ 20.149 
Significance level.......... 
. 
17017E-01 
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Maximum likelihood Estimates 
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APPENDIX 8-1-7 
Least Squa res Regression » 
Dependent Variable DE Number of Observations 32 
Mean of Dep. Var. 
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« Least Squares Regression » 
Dependent Variable DE Number of observa tions 32 
Mean of Dep. Var. 
. 
375000 Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 
. 
491869 
Std. Error of Reer. 
. 
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Least Squa res Regression » 
Dependent Variable DE Number of Observations 29 
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DOL 
-. 
116267E-02 
. 
223597E-01 
-. 
052 
. 
95853 1.54918 4.00032 
BETA 
-. 
385975 
. 
334543 
-1.154 
. 
24861 1.10597 
. 
30234 
RS 
-. 
858657E-02 
. 
288401E-02 
-2.977 
. 
00291 32.87897 34.76933 
D2 
. 
334631 
. 
200987 1.665 
. 
09593 
. 
55172 
. 
50612 
CF 1.62720 2.15771 
. 
754 
. 
45077 
. 
08966 
. 
05871 
<< Least Squares Regression 
Dependent Variable DE Number of Observations 29 
Mean of Dep. Var. 
. 
413793 Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 
. 
501230 
Std. Error of Regr. 
. 
428223 Sum of Sqrd. Residuals 3.484128 
R- squared 
. 
504707 Adjusted R- Squared 
. 
339610 
---------- 
Variable 
----------- 
Coefficient Std. Error T-ratio Prob't'-x Mean of X Std. D. of X 
ONE 
. 
833112 
. 
446340 1.867 
. 
06197 1.00000 
. 
00000 
IS1 
-. 
446069 
. 
359575 
-1.241 
. 
21477 
. 
06897 
. 
25788 
1S2 
. 
111119 
. 
234350 
. 
474 
. 
63539 
. 
17241 
. 
38443 
IS3 
. 
196597 
. 
333004 
. 
590 
. 
55494 
. 
17241 
. 
38443 
AGE 
-. 
772397E-03 
. 
136346E-02 
-. 
566 
. 
57105 64.51724 67.15420 
DCL 
. 
185758E-02 
. 
410587E-02 
. 
452 
. 
65097 5.35363 21.21498 
BETA 
-. 
403226 
. 
331137 
-1.218 
. 
22334 1.10597 
. 
30234 
RS 
-. 
837710E-02 
. 
290537E-02 
-2.883 
. 
00394 32.87897 34.76933 
D2 
. 
323370 
. 
199054 1.625 
. 
10426 
. 
55172 
. 
50612 
CF 1.57548 2.14904 
. 
733 
. 
46349 
. 
08966 
. 
05871 
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS 
9-1 Introduction 
In Chapter 1 it was argued that there is a widely 
held perception that excessive weight is given to 
the Earnings Per Share (EPS) figure by analysts 
and others. This leads to functional fixation on 
EPS 
- 
an implication of this fixation being that 
the directors of companies will make 'decisions 
which maximise EPS, particularly short-term EPS. 
It is argued that this emphasis on EPS extends to 
the capital issue choice between debt and equity, 
and that the relative effect of each type of 
finance on EPS is therefore relevant to the 
financing decision. 
At this point, it is helpful to review the 
development of the thesis. 
9-2 Review of Earlier Chapters 
In Chapter 2, after an extensive review of the 
literature, it was concluded that there is no 
consensus on optimal financial structure and the 
related problem of optimal methods of financing. 
The analysis tends to concentrate, usually in an 
9-I 
insular fashion, on a single analytical paradigm. 
The main theoretical perspectives 
- 
fundamentalist, agency, 'pecking order', 
signalling, and functional fixation, were 
discussed, and the empirical evidence relating to 
each view was examined. 
The empirical studies are often contradictory, 
and no one approach dominates. However, looking 
at what actually happens in practice, it would 
seem that there is an emphasis on EPS, and that 
the idea of functional fixation on EPS is 
supported by the hard evidence of company 
financial reporting procedures. Indeed, as 
Tweedie and Whittington (1990) state, it is 'the 
apparently excessive weight given by financial 
analysts to "bottom line" earnings figures', page 
97, which has led to the recent introduction of 
FRS3 'Reporting Financial Performance'. FRS3 is 
an attempt to remove this emphasis on EPS. 
There is much comment regarding the influence of 
EPS, both explicit and implicit, in finance 
decisions. It is therefore likely to be an 
important factor in the type of finance that is 
chosen by a company. 
It was decided to seek the opinions of company 
9-2 
finance directors, and a questionnaire was sent 
to them to elicit their views in relation to the 
factors affecting the debt-equity choice. This 
was discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. 
It was argued that there is a triangular set of 
influences (firm specific, external, economic 
factors, and advice of financial intermediaries) 
which influences the type of finance chosen. The 
firm specific factors (effect on EPS, dividend 
level, leverage, etc. ) seemed to dominate all the 
issue types except for debt, for which external 
economic factors (for example, the level of 
interest rates), is also perceived as important. 
The factor analysis of the questionnaires carried 
out in Chapter 4 identified two significant 
factors. Factor 1 is linked to the financial 
variables of the individual firm, whilst factor 
2 places more emphasis on the background aspects 
of market information. The effect of a 
particular type of finance on the company's 
ability to maintain or increase EPS ('Epslevel') 
is the variable most heavily loaded of any of the 
variables on either factor. 
Overall the finance directors appear to perceive 
EPS as one of the most important influences on 
9-3 
the type of finance chosen. 
In Chapter 5 EBIT-EPS analysis is extended to 
provide formulae to help a company to decide 
which method of finance is preferred on the basis 
of EBIT-EPS analysis. An attempt is made to take 
account of risk by looking at the 'elasticities' 
with respect to key risk variables. The degrees 
of operating and financial leverage were 
estimated using a variety of techniques. 
An original contribution is made in particular by 
the reconstruction of a sample of company's 
income statements to determine what the effects 
of an alternative form of finance would have 
been. The results are particularly striking for 
debt, whereby nearly all of the companies which 
originally issued debt would suffered a reduction 
in EPS if they had issued equity instead. 
In Chapter 7, the effects on key accounting 
ratios of the original issue and the 
reconstruction (alternative) issue are compared. 
There is evidence of mean reversion and debt 
capacity with more highly geared companies 
tending to issue equity, and less highly geared 
companies issuing debt. Companies would also 
appear to make issues which push their capital 
9-4 
gearing into line with industry averages. 
For the year prior to the capital issue, the 
interest cover of the companies which. issued 
equity in the subsequent year tended to be lower 
than the interest cover for the companies which 
subsequently issued debt. 
The formulae derived in Chapter 5 are used to 
classify the types of issue, based on which type 
would be preferred on the basis of EBIT-EPS 
analysis. The formulae would appear to be a 
useful guide in this area. 
Finally, in Chapter 8, a limited dependent 
variable model was developed. Probit analysis 
was used to model the debt-equity choice. The 
model which was the best predictor of the type of 
capital issue made by a company was one which 
incorporated a capital gearinmg measure; an 
industry sector measure; and the effect of the 
type of issue on EPS. The latter variable 
appeared to have the most significance in this 
model. 
9-3 Consistency of the Theory with the Evidence 
As mentioned earlier, the theories surrounding 
9-5 
the debt-equity choice are many and diffuse. As 
Myers (1984) stated 'our theories don't seem to 
explain actual financing behaviour'. 
The evidence presented in this thesis shows that 
an emphasis on EPS is apparent in the attitudes 
of analysts and, so almost inevitably, in the 
attitudes of company finance directors. This 
functional fixation on EPS also appears to impact 
on the debt-equity choice. 
9-4 Conclusions 
The perceptions of analysts and finance directors 
appear to be heavily influenced by the impact of 
any particular decision on the EPS of a company, 
particularly short-term EPS. 
The findings presented in this thesis show that 
there appears to be functional fixation on EPS, 
and that the debt-equity choice is subject to 
analysis in terms of the effect of a particular 
type of finance on EPS. 
In conclusion, the finance choice can be 
explained by, or at least is consistent with, the 
maximisation of EPS. Therefore evidence of 
functional fixation on EPS is apparent in 
9-6 
financing decisions. An interesting topic for 
future research is to try to determine the extent 
to which functional fixation on EPS impacts on 
other areas of finance and financial accounting. 
9-7 
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UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM 
CAPITAL ISSUES QUESTIONNAIRE 
Ref, Date issued 
_/_/_ 
The purpose of this questionnaire is to provide information to see if there 
are general opinions on company financing decisions. 
The information provided by you will be anonymous and will contribute to 
summary statistics only. 
SECTION A 
This section asks for background information on your company which will be useful in our analysis 
of the survey findings. Please answer if you are able to. 
1. (i) Age of Company years 
iI 
(ii) Turnover of Company £ 
(iii) Industry sector (eg Manufacturing, or SIC code) 
1 
SECTION B 
Please answer the following questions about your financial intermediaries and the service that 
they have provided in relation to any capital issues you have made. 
2. 
(i) How would you 
rate the advice 
Very Poor 
1 2 
Neutral 
3 
Very good 
45 
you have 
received from Merchant Banker 
intermediary 
the financial 
Broker Q a Q Q 
Q Q Q a Q Accountant Other (pkatt md#) 
..................... 
a Q Q Q Q 
(ü) In relation to 
the service 
Extremely 
Expensive 
Neutral Very 
Remooable 
provided, do 
you consider the 
! M h B k 
1 
0 
2 
Q 
3 
a 
4 
11 
5 
a 
ea were: erc ant an er 
Broker Q Q Q Q Q 
Accountant Q Q Q Q Other (pieaw apecip) E] E] Q Q Q 
SECTION C 
If more than one major capital issue has been made in the last S years, please answer this 
section regarding the most recent issue, and then give details of earlier issues in Section D. 
3. The most recent issue was: 
Ordinary shares 
- 
new issues 
Q 
riots Q 
Preference shares 
- 
new issue 
Q 
- 
rights issue 
Q 
Convertible debt 
Q 
Non-convertible debt 
Q 
Other 
-please specify 
................................................. 
2 
4. Please provide the following information if you are able to, regarding the most recent issue. 
(i) What was the total amount of the issue in (a) nominal value and (b) proceeds? 
(ü) What was the (a) nominal value and (b) issue price, per share or per bond (debenture) issued? 
(iii) What type of capital instrument was used? 
(iv) What was the coupon rate (if appropriate)? 
(v) What was the redemption date (if appropriate)? 
(vi) What were the total issue costs? 
(vii) What was the make-up of the issue costs in (v): 
Issuing house 
Accountants 
Legal fees 
Stamp duty 
Other costs (including printing) (please specify) 
5. How important were each of the following in choosing your particular method? 
Please rank on a scale from 1= not at all important to S= very important. 
Answer & her part (a) or part (b) Not at all Very 
for questions (i) 
- 
(iii) Important Important 
12345 
i) Firm's share price was considered 
to be a) high 
b) low 
ii) Stock market prices as a whole 
were a) high 
b) low 
iii) The level of interest rates was 
a) high 
b) low 
3 
Not at all 
Important 
12 34 
Very 
Important 
5 
iv) Leverage would have been too high 
if more debt were issued. 
QQQQQ 
v) To meet target debt 
- 
equity ratio. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
vi) To signal the firm's strength. Q Q Q Q Q 
vii) Merchant bank/other advisors 
recommendation 
Q Q Q Q Q 
If your company was tax exhausted: 
viii) Company tax exhausted, so unable 
to use tax relief on debt interest. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
If your company did not issue equity: 
ix) Did not want to dilute EPS by 
issuing more equity. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
x) Other 
-please specify 
........................................... 
6. Has your company also raised finance through significantly increasing bank borrowing? 
Not at all Slightly Moderately Substantially 
QQQQ 
7. Was the primary purpose of the most recent issue: 
[1] To fund an acquisition 
Q 
[2] To fund an internal project, investment or expansion 
Q 
[3] Capital restructuring or loan repayment 
Q 
Other 
- 
please specify 
........................................... 
8. Who were your merchant bankers/advisors for the issue? 
4 
SECTION D 
For companies which have made more than one capital issue in the last S years. 
O; 
J1 
1 
C2 
I 
Z 
A 
u 
O 
a 
Ti 
Ldr 
Ve' 
03 
O 
E 
O 
vl 
10. If you changed merchant bankers/advisors why was this? 
11. When making capital issues or acquisitions, please score the following factors in terms of 
their importance to the method chosen. 
Unimportant Very 
Important 
12345 
(i) Maintaining or increasing earnings 
per share QQQQQ 
(ii) Enhancing the capacity to maintain 
dividend levels QQQQQ 
(iii) Prevailing market conditions QQQQQ 
(iv) Behaviour of other companies in the 
industry 
QQQQQ 
(v) Advice of financial advisors 
QQQQQ 
(vi) Attitude of shareholders 00000 
(vii) Effect on leverage of company 
6 
00000 
4 
12. Were there significant differences in the reasons you would have given for choosing a 
particular method of raising finance and those given by the financial intermediary? 
Yes No 
QQ 
If there were such dife vnces, please outline them below. 
13. Would you be interested in taking part in a more detailed one-to-one discussion on your 
capital issues? 
Yes No 
a0 
If yes, please give your name, address and telephone number (including atension) 
By telephone 
Q 
In person 
Q 
7 
SECTION E 
This section is for any comments that you may wish to make about your company's capital issues, or any financial advice that you have received. 
A stamped address envelope is enclosed for your reply. Please return to: 
Ms CA Mallin BSc ACA, Lecturer in Accounting & Finance, School of Management & Finance, 
Social Sciences Building, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD. 
I look forward to your response and thank you for the time you have taken in completing this 
questionnaire. 
8 
APPENDIX 3-2 
LIST 4- ALL COMPANIES 
- 
ALPHABETICAL 
Abbey National Building Society Plc 
ABI Leisure Group Plc 
ACSIS Group Plc 
Adscene Group Pic 
Airtours Plc 
Aitken Hume International Plc 
Albert Fisher Group Plc 
Alexon Group Plc 
Allied Lyons Plc 
Alphameric Plc 
Amber Day Holdings Plc 
Anglia Secure Homes Plc 
Anglian Water Plc 
Anglo United Plc 
Appleby Westward Group Plc 
Appleyard Group Plc 
Argyll Group Plc 
Asda Group Plc 
Associated Farmers Plc 
Astra Holdings Pic 
ASW Holdings Plc 
Avesco Plc 
Avon Rubber Plc 
B Elliott Plc 
B. E. T. Plc 
Baker Harris Saunders Group Plc 
Barbour Index Pic 
Barclays Bank Plc 
Barlows Plc 
Barry Wehmiller International Plc 
Bass Plc 
BBA Group Plc 
BDA Holdings Plc 
Beckenham Group Plc 
Beltway Plc 
Bennett & Fountain Plc 
Benson Group Plc 
Benson Crisps Plc 
Betacom Plc 
BHH Group Plc 
BICC Plc 
BIMEC Industries Plc 
Bioplan Holdings Plc 
Birse Group Plc 
Blacks Leisure Group Plc 
BLP Group Plc 
Blue Circle Industries Plc 
Booker Plc 
Border Television Plc 
Bostrom Pic 
Bowater Plc 
Brandon Hire Plc 
Bredero Properties Plc 
Britannia Group Plc 
Britannia Security Group Plc 
British Gas Plc 
British Airways plc 
British Island Airways Plc 
British Petroleum Pic 
British Telecommunications Plc 
British Land Plc 
Brixton Estate Plc 
Brooks Service Group Plc 
Bryant Group Plc 
Bunzl Plc 
Burton Group Plc 
Business Technology Group Plc 
Calor Group Pic 
Campbell & Armstrong Plc 
Cannon Street Investments Plc 
Capital Radio Plc 
Capital and Counties Plc 
Caradon Plc 
Carbo Plc 
Carlton Communications Plc 
Casket Plc 
Caspen Oil Plc 
Cater Allen Ltd 
Chelsea Man Plc 
City Sites Estates Plc 
Clarke-Hooper Pic 
Clinton Cards Ltd 
Cluff Resources Pic 
Clyde Petroleum Plc 
Coats Viyella Plc 
Colefax and Fowler Group Plc 
Commercial Union Plc 
Community Hospitals Group Plc 
Conrad David (Sales) 
Control Techniques Plc 
Cook (William) Steel Castings Ltd 
Cookson Group Plc 
Copymore Plc 
Corton Beach Plc 
Courtaulds Textiles Plc 
Crossroads Oil 
Crown Eyeglass Plc 
Crown Communications Group Plc 
Cullen's Holding Plc 
Dagenham Motors Group Plc 
Dalepak Foods Plc 
Danbury Group Plc 
Dares Estates Plc 
Dawson Group Plc 
De La Rue Thomas & Co Ltd 
Debenham Tewson & Chinnocks Holdings 
Dencora Plc 
Dolphin Packaging Pic 
Domino Printing Sciences Plc 
Donelon Tyson Plc 
Downiebrae Holdings Pic 
Eadie Holdings Plc 
Eagle Trust Plc 
Edinburgh Fund Managers Plc 
Electronic Data Processing Plc 
Enterprise Oil Plc 
Epwin Group Plc 
ERA Group Plc 
Erskine House Group Plc 
Essex Furniture Plc 
Estates and General Investments Plc 
Eurotunnel Plc 
Evered Plc 
Federated Housing Plc 
Fenner JH (Holdings) Plc 
FII Group Plc 
First Technology Plc 
Fisons Plc 
Five Oaks Investments Plc 
Forward Technology Industries Plc 
Forwell Group Plc 
Freeman Group Plc 
Friendly Hotels Plc 
Geest Plc 
Gerrard & National Holdings Plc 
Gestetner Holdings Plc 
Goal Petroleum Plc 
Goldsmiths Group Plc 
Great Portland Estates Plc 
Greycoat Plc 
Guiness Plc 
GWR Group Plc 
Hadleigh Industries Plc 
Haemocell Plc 
Halls Homes & Gardens Plc 
Hampson Industries Plc 
Hanson Trust Plc 
Harding Group Plc 
Harland Simon Group Plc 
Hartons Group Plc 
Hawthorn Leslie Group Plc 
Hays Plc 
Helical Bar Pic 
Hewetson Plc 
Heywood Williams Group Plc 
Hi-Tec Sports Pic 
Hickson International Plc 
Holders Technology Plc 
Holmes & Marchant Group Plc 
Horace Clarkson Plc 
Hoskins Brewery Plc' 
Hoskyns Group Plc 
Hunterprint Group Plc 
Imperial Chemical Industries Plc 
INOCO Plc 
International Communications & Data 
International Communications Data Plc 
International Media Communications Plc 
Inver; ordon Distillers Group Plc 
Invicta Sound Plc 
ISA International Plc 
J Sainsbury Plc 
James Crosby Group Plc 
Jeyes Group Ltd 
John Foster & Son Plc 
John Lewis Plc 
Johnson Group Cleaners Plc 
Johnstone Press Plc 
Kembrey Plc 
Ketson Plc 
Kleinwort Benson Group Plc 
Kunwick Holdings Plc 
Kwik-Fit Ltd 
Ladbroke Group Plc 
Land Securities Plc 
Laporte Pic 
Lasmo Trading Ltd 
Lawrence (Walter) Plc 
Laws Stores Plc 
Legal & General Group Plc 
LGW Plc 
Life Sciences International Pic 
Lloyds Chemists Plc 
Lloyds Bank Plc 
Logitek Pic 
London Forfaiting Co Plc 
Low & Bonar Plc 
Lucas Industries Plc 
ML Laboratories 
ML Holdings Plc 
Mallett Plc 
Marks & Spencer Plc 
Marling Industries Plc 
Marshalls Plc 
McLaughlin & Harvey Plc 
Medminster Plc 
MEPC Plc 
Micklegate Group Plc 
Midland Bank Plc 
Midlands Electricity Plc 
MISYS Plc 
MMI Plc 
Morgan Crucible Plc 
Mountleigh Group Plc 
Mowat Group Plc 
National Westminster Bank Plc 
National Home Loans Corporation Plc 
Nestle Co. Ltd 
Nestor 
- 
BNA Plc 
Newman-Tonks Group Plc 
Next Plc 
NMC Group Plc 
Norfolk House Group Plc 
North Sea Assets 
Northumbrian Fine Foods Plc 
NSM Plc 
NWW Computers Plc 
Optim Group Pic 
P-E International Plc 
Parkfield Group Plc 
Peel Holdings Plc 
Penny & Giles International Plc 
Perkins Foods Plc 
Petrocon Group Plc 
Plateau Mining Plc 
Plc 
Polypipe Plc 
Portmeirion Potteries Pic 
Prism Leisure Corporation Plc 
Prowting Plc 
Psion Plc 
Quadrant Group Plc 
Queens Moat Houses Plc 
Rank Organisation Plc 
Ranks Hovis McDougall Plc 
Ratners Group Plc 
Rea Brothers Group Plc 
Readicut International Pic 
Reckitt & Colman Plc 
Record Holdings Pic 
Redland Plc 
Regalian Properties 
Resort Hotels Plc 
Richmond Oil & Gas Plc 
Rolls Royce Plc 
Rosehaugh Plc 
Royal Bank of Scotland Plc 
RTZ Corporation 
Saatchi & Saatchi Plc 
Savage Group Plc 
Scott Pickford Plc 
Scottish Television Plc 
Scottish Metropolitan Property Plc 
Sears Plc 
Security Archives Plc 
Security Services Plc 
Sedgwick Group Plc 
Senior Engineering Plc 
SEP Industrial Holdings Plc 
Serif Cowells Plc 
Shandwick Plc 
Shani Group Plc 
Sidlaw Group Plc 
Siebe Plc 
Singer and Friedlander Holdings Ltd 
Sketchley Plc 
South Western Electricity Plc 
South West Water Plc 
Spandex Plc 
Speyhawk Plc 
St Ives Group Plc 
St Modwen Properties Pic 
Standard Chartered Bank Plc 
Standard Platforms Holdings Plc 
Stat-Plus Group Plc 
Sterling Industries Plc 
Storehouse Plc 
Sun Life Corporation Plc 
Sunset & Vine Plc 
Sutcliffe Speakman Plc 
Swallowfield Plc 
Swanyard Studios 
TR Energy Plc 
Tate & Lyle Plc 
Tay Homes Plc 
Tesco Plc 
TGI Plc 
The Pelican Group Pic 
The Gardiner Group Pic 
The Weir Group Pic 
The Wensum Company Plc 
Thomson T-Line Plc 
Thornton Plc 
Tibbett & Britten Ltd 
Tiphook Plc 
Tomkins Plc 
Tops Estates Plc 
Torday & Carlisle Plc 
Trace Computers Plc 
Trafalgar House Plc 
Trilion Plc 
TSW 
- 
TV South West Ltd 
TT Group Plc 
UDO Holdings Plc 
UK Land Plc 
Ultramar Plc 
Unichem Plc 
Unilever Plc 
United Biscuits Plc 
Verson International Plc 
Vibroplant Plc 
Victaulic Plc 
Volvo Trucks Plc 
Vsel Consortium Plc 
Wace Group Plc 
Wagon Industrial Holdings Plc 
Walter Alexander Plc 
Warner Howard Group Plc 
Watmoughs (Holdings) Plc 
Wellcome Plc 
Wescol Group Plc 
Westbury Plc 
Westland Plc 
Wheway Plc 
Wickes Group Plc 
Wiggins Teape Plc 
Williams Holdings Plc 
Wilshaw Securities Plc 
Wilson Bowden Plc 
Wire & Plastic Products Ltd 
Worcester Group Pic 
WYKO Group Plc 
Wyndham Group Plc 
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PippENDIX 3-4 
Extension 3084 
Our reference 
'our reference 
D, « 7 January 1992 
The Financial Director 
\ Dear Sir 
.\ER1,, ý 
I recently sent you a questionnaire on Capital Issues asking for information about the 
financing decisions of your company. I asked for the questionnaire to be returned by 
6 December 1991, but so far I have not heard from you. 
I would be grateful if you could return the questionnaire in the reply paid envelope that 
was sent with it, as soon as possible. Should you have mislaid the questionnaire, please 
contact me on the above number and I will be happy to send you another copy. 
Thank you for your help. 
Yours faithfully 
School of 
Management 
and Finance 
Social Scir: Ice 
Building 
Universicý" Pari; 
N'occingham 
N G7 2P D 
Telephone 
Telex 
37346 
(Unino( G) 
Facsimile 
(0602) 790633 
l 
J 
CA Mallin BSc ACA 
Lecturer in Accounting 
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23.0': 23.5» x 45.5"; z 6f.. 7:; 
7.0.. » 3.5: It 7.0. » d. 6" : 7.0.; a 
+ 
-------- 
+ 
-------- 
+ 
------- -+-- ----- -+ ------- 
-+ 
2 6 4 x in » 5 M I. » 
Urinary 
- right '. It » 3.2 ti 7.8 tt 5.0 4 2.7 4 
23.1. x 15.4% Y 30.5=: a 2% 
37 
. 
s:: » 57.1': 4 5P. 1 » 45.5: » 16.7:; a 
" 10.5;; » 7.00: it 17.5:: x 8.8: 2 1.14 z 
+ 
-------- 
+ 
-------- 
+ 
------- -+-- ----- -+ ------- -+ 
3 = 1 ;. 
- 
s 
.. 
.1 4. - I' 1 z Pref shares :P » 
.4 = . 9" # .6 A .3 # 
» 33.3:: 4 
-. 
: 33.3': » 
- 
0 33.3:: a 
» 6.3:: w 
- 
= 5.96. 4 
- 
if 16.7:: x 
+ -------- + -------- + ------- -+-- ----- -+ ------- -+ 
4 5 z 1 = 2 » 1 = 
- 
a 
Oeot = 2.5 x 1.1 x 2.7 # 1.7 0 
.9 55.6,. ;; 11.1". » 22.2. x 11.1", ° if 
31.34 9 14.3': r 11. R:: # 9.1'= !! 
- 
» 
z A. °_: 
.t 1. S". = 3.5', » 1.8': » - » 
+ 
-------- 
+ 
-------- 
+ 
------- -+-- ----- -+ ------- -+ 
COLUMN 1A. 7 17 11 6 
TOTAL 2 8.1. 12 
. 
3': 29. I% 19.3'; 10.5: 
CriI 
-S; üUAPE D. F. 5IGINIF IC'. 1CE 
---------- ---- ------------ 
1i. 831P7.12 0.4552 
STATISTIC VALUE 
PA. 3r 1 Jý 1 
? ow 
TOTAL 
19 
33.3. 
6 
f- 5.6"= 
3 
5 
. 
3". 
9 
15d. 
57 
1ýo. o" 
iIN E. F. CELLS WITW F. F. < S 
-------- ------------------ 
0.31E 15 OF 20 ( 75.0': ) 
SIGNIFICANCE 
------------ 
CpA'ER"S v 0.2; Jzoc 
CO, iTIN3EiiCY CCEFFICTE'T 0.41533 
, 
NU, ý3cR OF MIiSI! G Q3V,; TiC: ýý = 32 
APPENDIX 3-5-5 
----------CRUSSTSvL ,ýTIJ rý Ur---------- 
.I, TV -, 
GY $TriK T° 
----- 
L oTJCK 
----- 
-iAPr. cT P 
---- 
S 
- 
I CFS AS 
---- 
A WH!; ýý 
-- 
VC ?2 Lß. 1 
ziTrIKT2L 
-- - --- - ---- 
CO JrI T 
tXz VAL n 
=Jº, ' OCT = JýIIM? '1ýT NOT I'IPG IMP( RT ^irITF VERY 
CUL °CT TA NT I1iPUQT I14 P0riT 
TGT PCT = l a 2 ' 3. 4r 
RC ISTYr'E 
--------+ -------- + -------- + ------- -+ ------- -+ ------- -+ 
1 = 3 rt 
- 
1 1 X 
- 
Uroinary 
- nea' tt 2.0) a 
.6 e 1.3 1 .7 y 
.4 ft 
e o4.0:: 9 
- 
20. ^:: x 20.0': x 
- 
z 
27.31: 
- 
14.3:. 25.0': a 
- 
a 
r 
- 
f , 3.7? 
", 
r 
- 
a 
+ 
-------- 
+ 
-------- 
+ 
------- -+ ------- -+ ------- -+ 
2 5 9 1 n 3 
.t 2 r - x 
Uruinary 
- ri? nt 4. ` ft 1.2 = 2.0 ; 1.6 r 
.a a tt 4c5,; , 4 9. l", " e 27.3*, " Z " 13.20. x 
45.5:: a 33.3': " 42.0': 50.0': x 
- 
ft 
1.5. tt 3.7'. = 11.1:: 4 7.4 ?: 
- 
+ 
-------- 
+ 
-------- 
-------- 
-+ ------- -+ ------- -+ 
-3 ft 1 
.1 tt 2 # - x 1 a 
? ref shares z 2. ) 4 
.6 2 1.3 x .7 ft .4 x 20.0:: ; 20.0: ý0"') a 
- 
20. C:; 
L, 9.1.: a 33.3: it 28.6:: ; 
- 
e 50.0:; 4 
3.7': a 3.7': 7.4:: z 
- 
-------- 
- 
-------- 
- 
------- -- ------- -- ------- -- 
4 a 2 
.1 n 1 w 1 x 1 X L)eot it 2.4 tt 
.7 0 1. A 4 . 9, z .4 x 
it 33.3: a 16.7': ° 1! }: 7:: 9 lo. 7': it 16.7-: ft 
"` 
1°.?:; ; 33.3: 9 14.3-: 4 25.0': 9 50. n:: ft 
.7., 4 :: 7 3.7 :: e 3.7 ;: ; 3.7': 9 3.7 -: ft 
+ 
-------- 
+ -------- + ------- -+ ------- -+ ------- -+ 
COLUMN 11 3 7 4. 2 
TOTAL 40 
. 
7:: 11.10: 25 
. 
°:: 14. d': 7 
. 
4:: 
Cr1I-SiUA°4 m- F. 
---------- ---- 
0.77754 12 
STATISTIC 
SI itIFT CA NCE 
------------ 
0.. 720 
VALUE 
A1 JF i 
oJu 
TTAL 
5 
13.5': 
11 
7': 
5 
18 
. 
5"; 
6 
22.2': 
27 
In 0 
.U% 
AMI' E. F. CELLS i! Tw 
-------- ------------------ 
0.370 20 OF 20 (100.0: ) 
SIGNIFICANCE 
------------ 
CRA`'cc'S V 0.28921 
CONT VJ ýýtJCY CýSFr I CI. NT 0.44794 
OF MISSING U (VATID 1! = o? 
APPENDIX 3-5-6 
C? 1>jT 
,ýöý, TIv .r0F 
; iC IS TYP-7 
Y I'! T'ATýP LFV_L J" 1. ', T EST RATES wAS HI w 
I'1TPATC" 
C0X. )T 
EX° VAL 
4; ju PCT 'J"AI"Pfl T 'JUT I: 1°0 IMPORT nUIT! VERY ý. 1 
CJL PCT 
"'= 
°TANT IMPORT I"PORT TOTAL 
TOT PCT n .» 2Y 3 4a Sr. 
KCISTYP_ 
--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
1e7541#. F» 19 
Urinary 
- new 4x 
.4=b. a 4 4.3 2.2 35.3: 
= 3G. °:: 
- 
It 26.3; x 5.3'; 9 31.6;: 
:. 5. '"; ;-2 26.310 a 8.3% : 1J0. ^:: » 
z 
. 
9.4,:: a 1.9'; tt 11.3;; 
+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
6 1= 1ý 49f-X 20 
Urjinary 
- right 7. L 
.5=9.3 # 5.9 s 2. Q 4 4,9. "1:: 
"?. in. 3?; 3I 
.5 
%i li 
34 
. 
6' f 
-n 
100.0 524 75.0: x-x 
11.3 9'f # 17.0'. 
+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
3-A- 2- s-. 
-a2 
Pref shares rh4 
.3 .7a .5x .2z3.3": 
#-r. 
-z -4- it 
. 
100.0 % 
--Y 14.5:. f-A 
Y- 1º - ýi 3.3 ". ii - :: -w 
f--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
42»- It 242Y. 
-a6 
De ot It 1.7 W" .122.? 4 1.4 .74 11.3': 33.3;; R- 33.3:. ; 33.3'; #- 
z 13.3: 10.5: 1o. 7': ft 
-x 
x- ft 3. g;; »-7.3'; 3.3% 
+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
CCLUM"I 15 1 10 12 F 53 
TJTAL 2°.. 3;; 1.9 35. S-: 22. o': 11.3:. 100.0'= 
CriI 
- 
SýUAP_ D 
. 
F. SIGNIFICANCE MIN E. F. CELLS 4ITH E. ý. < 
.5 
---------- ---- ------------ -------- ------------------ 
20'. 90960 12 0.0517 0.039 15 OF 20) ( 75.0""") 
STATISTIC VALUE SIGNIFICANCE 
--------- ----- ------------ 
CRAMER'S V 0.3626L 
CO. TIM6E. CY CCEFFICH'IT 0.53189 
NU, 16cý OF ; 1ISSI'ý6 U°ý=KVAT"'NS = 3S 
APPENDIX 3-5-7 
----------C :-JSSTAULATI0N0F---------- 
rtCiSTY? E 
dY IN TRATE L LFJ_L OF Ii4T. 'EST RAT=S L'D4 
--------------------. 
----------- 
PAQý 1 j= 1 
I`ITgATEL 
rr .rr ilk "+ 
EXP VAL a 
RUW PCT f. 'lI"jCJT ýhjT I: 100 IMPORT (UITE VERY PJta 
CUL OCT 2 2Ta; NT IMPJRT I"'PQRT Tr) TAL 
TJT oCT 49 Ss 
RC15TYPE 
--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
1r33#-9.17 
Ordinary 
- 
new 1.6 4 
.91.4 n 1.6 a 1.6 a 22. t a 42"0-. 42.9%: #- It 16.3?: ; 
"': 
4 2.9; i r#r -r 
50 
.00#-a 
14 
. 
3% 
r c! 
. 
7;; a-r9.7 :"a-a3.2'. 
ri 
+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
2 R' 1. w32; 
--9 
Jrainary 
- rignt a 1.7 # 2.0 e 2. n a 29.0': 
4c.. [.:: ? 3.3": it 22.2:: a-: 
-s 
"9 57.1': a 75.0': It 33.3%: 9-#- 
9 12.9; a 9.7% 9 6.5"o a-2-a 
+-----------------+--------+--------+--------+ 
3-a1t143x-a5 
Pref shares # 1.. 1 a 
.6=1.0 a 1.1 0 1.1 a 10.1% 
r-a 20.0: = 20.0: a 60.0 # 
a-a 25.0% 16.7:. a, 42.9% P- 
x-3.2% 3.2': 9.7': s-x 
---------------------------------------------- 
44 ii 6a 10 
Ueot r 2.3 a 1.3 a 1.9 st 2.3 # 7.3 a 32.3': 
4--a-I 40.00: x, oc. 0,; ,: 
a-a 57.1% 9 d5 
. 
7"t 9 
s-- 
--=-a 12.9': 9 10.44 a 
---------------------------------------------- 
C OLU-4! ' 74677 31 
TOTAL 2212.9': 19.4 : 22.0': 22.64 10 0.00 
CELLS 4ITH E. F. ( S CHI-SwUARc ý F. SIG r, Ir ICpN C: MIiJ E. F. 
--------=- ---- ------------ -------- ------------------ 
33.47202 12 0.000' . 0.645 20 OP 20 (100.01) 
STATISTIC V&L'JE SIGNIFICANCE 
------------ 
AMER'S v 0.5>? 93 
Co ITIüýrjCY CCEFFICI_`, T n. 7205. 
, 
vU: i3c%' OF MISSIfL3 UcSFRVATI')ý+S = 5! 
APPENDIX 3-5-8 
----------C". 0S 
. 
)T AULATIOvJF---------- 
mC 15 TYPE 
aY P7. EVA r. T PD_VAI_IN( "A: KFT COci7ITIO 1S 
-------------------------------- 
? ASE 1 OF 
P ZV.,. <T 
CCJ\'T 
EX" VAL r 
ROW PCT 3u"II: 'P7r<T ý! OT REAL I"PCriT QUITE VERY POW 
CUL PCT e LY IMPOR Ißt"URT I. -PFIRT TOTAL 
TOT PCT = 14 21 3# 
. 4=" 5x 
RC ISTYPE 
--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
=2x1e64 15 4 73 
: )rcina ry - new 
.'#1.0 z 6.9 4 11.2 4 A. 2 x 32.9': 7. '_:: 3. C) 21.4': # 53.61 : 16.3:: x 
= 10C. 0': x 33.3: 2 2!. 6!; 4 44.1! 4 16.0;; x 
r 2.44 4 1.2! " 7.1:: # 17.6': r 1.7:; a 
+--------+--------+--------+--------+-------- 
2 13 # '10 33 
Uroinary 
- ri: ht = 
.°1.2 8.2 # 13.2 r 0.7 z3,3.; 
39.4:; is 30.3'; r 21.. 2-; x 
66.7% e 61. °' # 29.4: # 32.17. 
A 2.4'; 1 15 
. 
3' # 11. ä`s 9.6iß x 
---------------------------------------------- 
3-#- #" 145#2x8 
Pref shares = 
.2x .3a2.0 # 3.2 4 2.4 x 9.4: 
z-4-4 12.51 a 62.5': 4 25.0:: x 
14.7': # 
1.2% # 5.9': 9 2.4': a 4- 
--------------------------------------------- 
4=-x-e144 it 9 16 
Ueot 
.4 .691.. ') # 6.4 # 4.7 # is. 8': 
-x-6.3:: # 25.0: 0 (R. R:: 
=-x-e4. qß 4 11.8% # 44.0: x 
-R-Y1. a 4.7: a 12.9! x 
---------------------------------------------- 
COLUMN 23 21 34 25 15 
TOTAL 2.4:; 3.50.24.740.0: 29.4"'. in 0.0! 
CHI-S, rUAPE O. F. SIGt-! FICA tCE " MIN E. F. CELLS WITH E. F. ( 5 
---------- ---- ------------ 
-------- ------------------ 
26.13623 12 0.0103 0.18 13 0ý 20 ( '5.0"=) 
STATISTIC VALUE SIGATFIC'ANCE 
----- ------------ 
L, M R' SV0.32015 
CC, 4TLNGENCY CO_FFICI '. "T 0.4d1.95 
, 
1IýSI`ýv ý? 
"ýýKv.: Ti')ý: S =4 wU, lSER OF 
APPENDIX 3-5-9 
----------CRJ55TA6ULATIJNJF---------- 
rrCISTY? E 
oY AD VF I4A^ A^VIC= ^F FI, '.?. 
------------- 
. 'CI 
-- 
AL A"V 
--- 
IS 
- 
)R5 
--- - - 
A: VFI"ºAr 
--- - ---- 
C^J1IT r 
ýX7 VAL = 
OCT sJ"lIº'PnrT N3 T Pr-4L I ''? Oi T TUITS VERY 
CUL OCT 1 LY I`+PO: t I'i OOT IM? CRT 
TOT OCT 41 4 2 1 49 5g 
KCISTYPE --------+-------- "-- ------ +- ------ -+ ------- -- ------- -+ 
i 2 » 6 4 4 13 3 
Urinary 
- new r 1.6 4 4.6 6 11.2 1. M 
= 7.1:: x 21.4': X0.4: 1n. 7:: 
40. O:; x 42.9%: 1 1!. 1:: x 3i. 2% t luo. o:: # 
= 2.4 » 7.1 t it 1.3': r 3.5 
+-------- +-- 
------ 
+------- 
-+ ------- -+ ------- -+ 
2 e- » 5 16 x 12 r 
- 
Uriinary 
- right = 1.9 » 5.4 4 11. '1 4 13.2 4 1.2 » 
15.2 4°. 5:; ? 0.4: » - x 
=- » 35.7: 55.2': 4 35.3'; 4 
- 
x 
e 5.9: 4 1?. 9: » 14.1: 4 
- 
» 
+-------- +-- 
------ 
+------- 
-+ ------- -+ ------- -+ 
3 41 » 2 4 2 x 3 » 
- a 
Prei shares 
-"' 
.5 # 1.3 2. ' » 3.2 e .3 4 12.5:: » 25.0: 25.0 a 
. 
37.5: # 
- 
W 
= 2! ). ": » 14.3 6.9ý 4 5.8: 
- 
X 
= 1.?:: » 2.4': 2.1--: » 3.5, 4 
- 
a 
--------- --- 
------ 
-------- 
-- ------- -- ------- -- 
4 2 4 1 4 7 4 6 
- 
Ueot 4° 2.6 ' 4 5.5 4 6.4 4 
.6 4 
e 12.5:: 4 6.3 fl 43. Q?; x 37.5: 4 
- 
z 
4 40.0:: a 7.1' : r 24.1: » 17.6': 4 
=2 
. 
'. ': 2% 3 p. 2: "is 7.1% « 
+--------+-- 
------ 
+------- 
-+ ------- -i ------- -+ 
COLUMN 5 14 2° 34 3 
TOTAL 5.0. 16 
. 
5'; 
. 
34.1 % 4 0.0': 3 
. 
5-: 
CrI 
- 
S. UARE ^ 
. 
F. 
---------- ---- 
1D. ß%lpý ý2 
STATISTIC 
SI ýrtIFICAN Ct 
0.115() 
V qL'Jý 
Paüý 1 Jý 1 
PJw 
TITAN 
2J 
31.9': 
33 
36.3': 
.. 9. r 
16 
1ES. 8': 
A5 
10 0.0~ 
; 1IN E. F. CELLS WITH E. ý. < 5 
-------- ------------------ 
0 
.? 82 13 OF 20 SIIAIFICANCE 
------------ 
CrPAM--: y'S V 0.20505 
CO TINuE: ICY 
-CC ICF_ý! T 0.413[5 AýF 
NUMEcR Cr iISSI"! '. ýZ6ER', TJII, ca =-4 
APPENDIX 3-5-10 
----------CR0>STA6uLATIür. UF---------- 
xCISTYP 
Y °. AOVFEC t'EriCHA T °A`: K 00 CTHE? AOVIS. 0°S r, EC^ýM`! cy 
------- 
--- --------------------r-- PALi 1 J= 1 
'1FADVoZC 
CC u"! T r 
EX VAL 
PUº; PCT rJ4INIPC, iT MUT IIPO I"P(. 'ir, T lUITE VERY PJlj 
CUL PCT »RTANTI. 1 )! T IMP^ T TOTAL 
TAT PCT r 1» 2e 3» 4 5a 
; 2CISTYPE --------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------* 
1=42 11 6r3 tt 26 
Jriinary 
- new r 3.7 4 3.1 1 9.3 » 6.7 » 1.2 ri 1.. 0% 
15.4;; 4 7.7': 42.3:: 23.1': » 11.5': 
:. » 3 3.3 .; 920.0: 3 6.7 :; 21.4': 4 75 
.0 4 
. 
':: a 2. a: 
. 
13 
.1: 47.1': 43 . 'S': z 
---------------------------------------------- 
24462 12 x 10 =1i 13 
Jrain3ry 
- ricnt = 4.7 » 3.9 9 11.3 4 11.0 4 1. » 31.3': 
» 12.1:: » 13.2': 4 36.4? a 3U. 3': 4 3.; 
33.3:; J. 0'ß r 4n. 0? x 35.7; 15.0. a 
» 4. ß:: » 7.1' 4 14.3?; 4 11.9', 0 
------------------ 
-------------- -- 
-+--------- 
3A2a-145e- 
.a6 Pref" shires 4 1.1 » 1.0 2.9 n 2.7 9 
.449.5 
12.5:: » 62.50: »-» 
4 16.77. »- tt 3.3': » 17.9"- »- 
-a 4 2.4: 
-x1.2: 4 6.0': It 
; 
--------; ---"----+-----"-"; -----""-+-- ------; 
442»216» 7» -4 17 
Deut = 2.4 x 2. U r 6.1 
-45.7 4 
.ßx ? U. 2'. 
-» 11. ß:: # 11.8: 4 35.31,41.2': it 
tf 16.7:: » 20.0': e 20.0 %x 25.0': 4-a 
2 2.4:. 2.4 ": » 7.1%: 4 6.3~ st 
+--------; 
--------+--------; --------+--------; 
CO... Ui1Nt 1? 10 31) 2d 4 e4 
TOTAL 14.3"o 11.9; 
. 
7% 33.3: 
CHI-S. UAPE D. F. SISNIFICANCE MIN- E. F. CELLS WITH E. F. < 5 
---------- ---- ---------- 
-------- 
------------------ 
11.98155 12 0.4471 0.361 14 0' 20 ( 70.0!: ) 
STATISTIC VALUE SIGNIFICANCE 
------------ 
CRAMc4'S V "). 21°_05 
CONTINGENCY C^EFFICI-"JT 0.35332 
tvUt13_R CF MISSING OQ5<RVATUThS =5 
APPENDIX 3-5-11 
C rt J$ TAJLATIJ t4 0F CIS TYP:. 
jY 'IIUyLE4v L7VTkA E L"yJL r. 'AVE dE=\l Tu' WIC. ri 
--------------------------------P 46E 1 JF 
hIüýLEVG 
C 'J -T 
., 
DJ OCT Oil-: I' PT NOT I'oO IUPrRT QUITE vEkY ow 
CUL OCT = 'TA. iT IrIPti PT IMPORT TOTAL 
TuT D(T 
." 
1" 2i =+s 42 51 
RC151YPE 
--------+--------+--------+--------+-------- 
1h-65x 11 ft" 26 
jruinary --new 6.0 1.6 =, 2.6 4 4.9 x 9.9 32. 
23 
. 
1:: 2 15 
. 
4': 19.2': 42 
. 
3. 
22.6'. x 5C. n:. 33.3:. ft 36.7:; # 
"7 
.'?. ft 5 .1: x 13.0 . 
+--------+--------+--------+--------+-------- 
27aY1 tt 7 It 12 x 31 
L, rüinarY - ri nt " R.? a 2.0 - ?. 1 w 5.2 11.! it 39.2. `. 
97 12.9: 3.2:; n 72.6M"'ß 3?. 7:: 
.i 33Fli. ý; 12.5:. ; 4o. 7%, r 40. (':: ; 
? 5.1% =1 
. 
3;: i5 
. 
7: # 
+-----------------+--------+--------+--------+ 
32--#2e43 
re shares " 2.1 
.5 "- .°z1.5 if 3.0 1u. 10, 
= 25. x:: o-e- 25. u!; x 50. )': a 
9.5:: ;-f-4 13.3" e 13.3': ; 
r 2.5" "-"-x2.5: ft 5.1., ; hw 
---------------------------------------------- 
4=61313x 14 
Jeot 3.7 
.9 "ft 1.4 # 2.7 = .34 17.7- 42 
.9:: 3 7.1": -" 21.4': R 7.1": z 21. L:; ft 
r 2: ? 0. u" 't 37 5.. 7! " '.. 
r 7.6': . 1. °': 1.3 : 3.8.. 
---------------------------------------------- 
COLUMN L1 58 15 30 79 
TuTAL 26. ' : 6.3": 10.119.0": 38.0: 0% 
CHI-SWUAP= D. ý. SI : 111F ICiNCE r; Ii4 E. F. CELLS iIT4 S. F. 5 
---------- 
---- - ------------ -------- ------------------ 
13.5? iPl 12 0.3282 0.506 14 Jý 10 ( 70.0'; ) 
STATISTIC VAL'! E SIC-NIFICA; 4'CE 
--------- ----- ------------ 
C A'4 "c V 
0r; TI' Y FF IC? ': T 
!: I MT SI`'5 ý`ý-r: V., TITh. c = In 
APPENDIX 3-5-12 
CrU5SJLATiUNOF 
r<C13TYPF 
ay LF"/ErZA. iE --FFECT TN LFVE-RAGE r1 C^r1. Ap": Y 
-------------------------------- rý. 1: iý 1 Uý 1 
COU": T 
EAP VAL 
OCT ;. tj'%1MP RT WUT REAL POPORT (UITE V_riV 4Uu 
CCL PCT N LY IMPOR IMPJ°T I'APCRT TnTAL 
TQ3T PCT e? A 2" z3 44 S: 
r2CiSTYPE --------+--------+--------+--------+-----------------+ 
101x141 
,t 12 6x 23 jr, 7inary - new 1.3 4 1.3 4 6.3 4 11.9 r 7.? 32.9 
Z , L.. 3 
. 
50, ? 20.6" 42.90: f 21.4., x 
25.0:: # ? 5.0: U 42.1': z 33.3" " 27.7% a 
+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
2e73e5x 11 
-- 
1') 73 
urinary -riahtt1.6 # 1.0 Y 7.4 A 14.0 2 8.5 3ö. 3': 
" V" 
9.! %: w 9.1': = 15.2': 0 3a. 4'= f' 30.3:: is 
75.0:: x 75. u': "u 26.3:: x 33.3': 45.5:: a 
4 3.5-: x 3.5% a 14.1"' = 1! 
. 
°-: 4 
+--------+--------+--------+--------4 
- --------+ 
3x-4-x343x2a8 
i'ref shares 4 
.44 .4 It 1.4 4 3.4 = 2.1 x 9.4% 
-4- 37.5 4' 37.5!: z" 25.0:: 
ý` 
-x- 15. p :4d. 3 : 9.1-: 
4 ". ., 
+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
4--4349 ft 49 16 
Oea t 
.°x .3z3.6 ýi 6.8 4 4.1 x 18.8': 
18.9:. a 56.3': "25.0 :: 9 
-x- 1S 
" 
4:: 'x 25.0'; r 18.24 x 
=-x-23.5: a 10.6': 9 4.7. 
+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
COLUMN 44 19 36 . 2? P5 
TOTAL 4.7M 4.7': 22.4 42.4"; 25. a: 100.0: 
rF CMI-S, ýUAPc 
,;. SIGNIFICANCE MIN E. F. CELLS '4ITH F. 
F. ( S 
---------- ---- ------------ -------- 
------------------ 
6.79907 12 0.7200 0.376 13 OF 20 ( 65.0': ) 
STATISTIC VALUE SIGNIFICANCE 
--------- ----- ------------ 
CRAMcR'! V 0.18575 
CONTINGENCY COEFFICIý`! T 0.30629 
NU0c? OF MISSING UA3=IZVATI7': 4S =4 
APPENDIX 3-5-13 
------ 
---- 
C1U 6 ,Tk3 U LAT I JJ F 
-- - ------- 
rcC IS TYPE 
Y TAriG 
-z 
TJ_ Tr 't cT Tar? -cT r' r-? T-_1U ITY °ATIT 
----- 
----- - --- - ---- - --- - ---- - 
.--- 
PA.: 7 
TA ri3E J) 
- CU', JT 
EA VAL 
POW ACT 'J JT T. tou I`! P^ZT ^ UTTS V ERY 
CJL PCT = ° TANT I mPJPT I "POiT TOTAL 
TJT PCT x 1 ; 2 t 3 a 4 a 50 
RC ISTYP_ 
--------+-- ------ +- -------+-- ------ +- ------- +- -------+ 
1 7 4 1 6 # 6 g 1. a 27 
Urainary 
- 
new 7. p » 3.6 "-' 5. '7 4 o. 2 e 4.2 z 32.5" 
9 25. °:: 14. 22. 1 22.2': x 14.9': x 
t 29.2:: ; 36.4? 37.5': x 31.6': 3h. 9'; : 
0 8.1.:; 4.3: 1 7.2% a 7.2': It 4. ° :. » 
+-------- +--------+-- ------ +- ------- +- -------+ 
2 7 4 "? t 5 10 r 6 » 32 
Urainary 
- right e 9.3 4.2 '-' 6.2 ; 7.3 e 5. h 76.6': 
21. Q;. 4 12.5 ": 4 15.6: ß 31.3'= it IF 
. 
F'. 
." 
20.2;. : 36.4'; e 31.3: 52.6: It 46.2-. 
" 
4. d": x 6.0: 12.0': 7.7:; 
+-------- +--------+--------+-------- +--------+ 
3 1 a 1 r 2 4 3 x 1 4 d 
Pref s'hares' 2.3 4 1.1 1.5 4 1. S if 1.3 a 9.6': 
12.5:: a 12.5"': 9 25. E : is 37.5': # 12.5". » 
p 4.2? 9.1.: 4 12.5:: if 15.8': it 7.7:: 4 
1.2'. it 2.4%: 4 3.6 ' z 
+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
4 4 9 ti 2 it 3 4 -, 0 2 ; 16 
Jest L. 6 » 2.1 
-4 3.1 3.7 9 2.5 ; 19.3": 
56.3:: 4 12.5% f 12.8:: w 
- 
x 12.5;: x 
if 37.5 e 13.26. e 1°. 5': x 
16.8 
-: 4 2.4: it 3.6': x - # 2.4 -: 4 
+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
COLU: IN 24 11 1'i 19 13 P3 
TOTAL 2p 
. 
°s: 13.3: 10 
. 
3» 2 2.9': 15.74 100.0 Y 
CHI 
-S UARý D. F. 
11.61743 1 
STATISTIC 
" 
SIGNIFICANCE 
------------ 
0.4'05 
VA L'. J E. 
MIN E. F. CELLS WITH E. F. ( 5 
-------- 
------------------ 
1.000 13 OF 201 
SIGNTFICA4CE 
CRAME 'S V Q. 217ý5 
CCVTI` GE. 4CY COEFF ICIEMT 0.35303 
iiU: i°E4 OF MISSING C EFVATLI IS =6 
APPENDIX 3-5-14 
---------- 
rrC1STY 
cY ý: "AL TO iC 44L TU- FIr", I-., T;, c, v-TLJ 
-------------------------------- 
pa: ic 1 ur 
.I Jý, AL 
CCuNT 
EAP `! AL 
4UW OCT =J`: I%OPC tT ,! UT I, 4? 0 I`'P0kT ^UITE vE'RY Q; JW 
CUL ? CT PTA1T Tr1°UPT I"PiPT rCTAL 
T., T PCT x 1u 20 34 4: c.. 
rCISTYPE 
--------+--------«--------«--------+--------+--------« 
1=2a2 13 a7 it 1x 25 
lircinary 
- new = <"3 a 2.7 ? 
"1 x 6.: 7.2.7 3u. 5% 
1 1Lýý: i n 22.2?: tp 4! 3: i 4 35.0: z 11.1%: a 
2.4'; . 15 
"o;. a? 
+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
2 tt 532 12 325ý 73 
3rcinary 
- ri? nt ' 5.6 3.9 e 12.1 4 6.0 3.6 a 40.2% 
15.2;: 9.1 ? It 3' 
.4 *9 24.2% 9 15.2'. x 4 35"?:: w ! 3.3'; 4 40.0:: x 4u. u': : 55.6: 
& 6.1:: 4 3.7': It 14 
. 
61: x 9.6% = A. 1% A 
+-----_---+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
3431 it 1*2: 1x3 
Pref shares 4 1.4 x 
.9 if 2.9 a 2.0 e .949.6% 9 37.5:: ; 12.5: 4 12.5: 1 a 25.0: 0 12.50: 
- 
4 
e 21.4:: 
.: 11.1: P 3.3:: z 10.0% if 11.1': 3.7:: a 1.2 4 1.2': 
.: 2.4?; x 1.21: 4 
+--------+--------""--------+--------+--------+ 
4=4a3443 it 2 16 
oec* = 2.7 ; 1.3 4 5.9 3.9 z 1. A 3 19.5: 
25.0:: ; 18.6: 25.0': » 15.5: r 12.5: 9 
2° 
.» 
35.3: 2 13.3:: a 15.0: = 22.2: 
'""9:: ; 3.7': " 4.0: 4 3.7': : 2.4': ; 
+--------t--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
COLUMN 14 9 30 20 9 °2 
"TJTAL 17.111.01= 3(+. ý": 24.4': 11. rß: 1'1o. u: 
CmI-S.. uJA? E ý. F. Si_NIFICAt"tCE I: 4 E. F. CELLS WITH E. F. < 5 
---------- ---- ------------ -------- ------------------ 
10.53415 12 0.5692 0.7! 14 0ý 2^ ( 70.01: ) 
. 
STATISTIC VALUE SIGNIFICANCE 
--------- ----- ------------ 
CRAMC°"S V 0.23 9' 
ONTI`1ýýri CY C4cRi=1CI=º'T 40 
;. UM! -: R OF MISSING 095_iiVATI1;: S = 
APPENDIX 3-5-15 
CR0 >$ TAdULATI0 `1 OF 
rrCISTYPE 
Y TAXET I= CJ. TAY EM A'J. TEC. SO U: iAeLE To '15E T 
-------------------------------- 
? 4vß 1 üý 1 
TAXEAH 
CO Ljt' Tx 
EXP VAL 
FUU PCT gj IMPOKT NOT IMPO I"'PCRT UITF VEiiY ojw 
C)L PCT e PTAt3T IMPO°T IMPORT TOTAL 
TJT PCT. 2 1x 28 34 41t 54 
KCISTYPE 
--------«--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
1= 10 #2n-#1-A 13 
ürcinary 
- 
new = 10.0 x 1.1 
.3ß1.1 .1ex 27.7': 
e 7. Q;; x 15.4 ": e-I7.7': x-x 
27. x:: s 50.0': x 
n 21.32'. 
.44.3': it -#2.1': e-x 
+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
2 1A #1x1a3z1a 20 
Jroina ry -ri2nt= 15.3 # 1.7 e 
.441.7 1°a 42.6` 
K 70.0:: 5.0': # 5.0-9 # 15.0?: x 5.0': a 
# 39 °:: # 25.0: " 10C. O.,: # 75.0: 50.! x:: x 
2Q.:: it 2.1': 4 2. i- x 6.4': # 2.1;; x 
+--------+--------+--------+--------+-"-------+ 
33x-x-a-x1a4 
P ref shares n 3.1 # 
.3e .1# .3# . 7.4 S"5': i5. ():: R-x-#-e 25.0 x 
P. 3: #-7-#-e 50. .... x 
6.4': #-Y-x-x2.1': x 
+--------+-----------------+--------+--------+ 
4#vx1e- ýx 
-z-# 1) 
Jeot x 7.7 x 
.9e .2x .9x .ýa 21.3': 
z 90.0:: a 10.0: #-x-#- 
4 
e1 
.1ZR2.1 : !s-#-e-x 
" --------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
COLUMM 31 4142 47 
TOTAL 76.6?: 8.5: 2.1^ 4.3: 100.0% 
CHI-SdUAPC Q. F. SIGNIFICA; 4Cc MIS! E. F. CELLS WITH E. F. ( 5 
-------------- ------------ 
-------- 
------------------ 
0.0d5 17 OF 20 95.0%) 1J. 31891 12' 0.5960 
STATISTIC VALIDE SIGNIFICANCE 
-_ -- 
- 
S-------i --_ -~--- ------------ ---- 
CRAMER'S V 0.27052 
CONTINGENCY COEFFICIENT 0.42430 
NUi43tR OF MISSING ü^3Er2VATIONS = 42 
APPENDIX 3-5-16 
----------C,. J>>T6JLTIvJr---------- 
: <C ISTY? E 
ýv i" A: ' HA. J: ý!! ý TIJ CJ"P =;. IZIZ ?A TUB I" )'J 
---- 
-- ----- - 
--- 
cNAV 
----- - --- -- --- - --- 
CO» `IT r 
EA' VAL 
; 0'"W OCT -"-j VP'P0xT NOT PEAL Im? O T ^U ITE 'Row 
COL OCT e LY I"'? IM IM MOOT TOTAL 
TOT OCT 1 
-2 " 3x 4 r 
riCIS'TYPE --------+-------- +-------- +------- -+-- ------ + 
1 7 13 Y 7 x 1 # 22 
Urainary 
- 
new = 6.7 12.0 e 7.7 if 1.7 tt 33.1.. 
25.0:: z 40.4°, e 25.0:: 3.6'; if 
-35. C:: 76.1': e 3n. ß # 20.0': is w 15.5 8.310 # 1.2'; 
--------- --------- 
-------- 
---- ------ 
- 
2 1 10 13 x 7 2 if 32 
)rainary 
- right ° 7.5 13.7 S 
. 
P. 1.9 r 3°. 1': 
31.3;; 4 40.6": = 21.9:; ; 6.3": if 
50.0;; a 35.1: it 30.4% s 40.0': It 
' it 15.5'; e p. 3::. 2.4:: if 
-------- 
+-------- +------- 
-+-- ------ + 
3 1 W3 3 if 
Pref shares. if 1.0 3.4 2.2 
.5 
1? 
. 
5:: 3 7.5': 37.5 12.5". z 
5 
. 
':; "1 V. 3': r ° 1 *1 
.0 2 0.0 ": i 3.58: a 1.2: r 
+--------+-------- t------- 
-+-- ------+ 
4 2 7 if "6 1 1 if 16 
Oeot 6.9 Y 4. & if 1.0 e 19 n:; 
12.5:: ;. t3. ß: 6-. 3": - = 
10 # 19.4"". if 26.1': i 20.05: A 
2. L:: n G. 3: x 7.1%; x 1.2?; #. ' 
------------------ 
-------- 
----------- 
C0L UM N 20 36 23 84 
TOTAL 23 
. 
°:: 4 2.9 : 27.4:: 6.0?; 100.0:: 
CriI 
-S-ýJAR-- D. ý. SICk IF! CANCE 
---------- ---- ------------ 
4.386,7 9 0.3A42 
jTAT1STIC JkLI)º 
CRAMiR"S V 0.13194 
COiiTIVGENCY C^SFFIC; _ý'T ! ). 22278 
NUii9jER OF MISSiN6 üý-'SErcVATIDNS =5 
PA6F 1 JF 1 
. 
41, N F. F. CELLS "+IT' E. r. < S 
-------- ------------------ 
C. 476 4 0c 16 ( 56.2: ) 
SIGNIFICANCE 
------------ 
APPENDIX 3-5-17 
J5STdULATIJvJr 
rrCIS TYPE 
,, 
Y 
.. 
TTcý 1i ATTIT'"1J'- ('F Sý; A, -HC, LJSRS 
--------------------------------F 
ATT51A: u. 
^: J"T = 
ExP VVAL 
-" 
00: ' rrj'1? O, tjT "'vT REAL I4PCr T Tu I TE VEKY Pý'a CvL OCT r LY 1"Pnr2 Ic1P02T Ik'PCxT TCT&L. 
T(; T OCT = 1; 2Y 30 4r # 
rrCIS TYPE --------+--------+-------------------------- 
11a36#9r9g 2d 
Urdinary 
- new I It 1.3 6.0 w 12.0 z p. 3 ; 33.3 
3.6:: 4 10.7': 21.4:: ; 32.1'. 2 32. 
; 75.4': h 33.7-:: # 7.5. u': f. 36. 'x.. ; 
.13. b? = 7.1.9 * 10.7': it 10.7°: 
+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
2=-r-x94 14 r 10 s 33 
ira inary - rignt t 1.6 7.1 ri 14.1 it °. 1 4 39.30. 
"1- 27.3: z 43.4: # 30.3:: 
- 
It 50.0:: w 33.90: e 40.0'.. 4 
n"-0- it 10.7': ; 16.7 "' a 11.0; ; 
"--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
3--I-2x2 
Nref shares r 
.? 4.. Y 1.7 4 3.4 V 2.4 4 9.5": 
4-4 75. O~ 4 25.0:: 
9-4 1a. 7': Of F. O:: 
y" 
-a-47.1?; " 2.4.. # 
--------------------------------------------- 
4r- 
.s1 ý" 3*7444 15 
. 
)eot = 
.2x .73.2 4 6.4 r 4.5 17.9: 
--"zS. 7» 9 20.0:: # 46.7': = 26.7: ; 
=- 'ý 25. 'x': = 16.7:: a 19.4 'Y 16.0:. 
3.6: 4 d. 3': r t. g: 
+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
CCLUr1"J 14 1a 36 25 F4 
TJTAL 1.2": 4. y': 21 
. 
41: 42.9': 2°. 8*. 10 L. 06: 
CriI 
-S -UAt, _ r,. F. SIGt. IrICA: 4Cc rUN E. F. CELLS . ''IT4 E. F. ( 5 
---------- ---- ------------ -------- 
------------------ 
0 12 0.5033 0.095 13 OF 20 ( 65.3: ) 
, 
ýTt, T1; TIC VALU- SIG 41FICANCE 
--------- ----- ------------ 
CRAMEP "SV0.21177 CONTI ENCY CO_FFICI_"; T 0.34436 
NU, iRc° OF : 1ISSI`: ü J=SFRVATI''NS =5 
APPENDIX 3-5-18 
----------CR05STAeULA T- I0N0F---------- 
NCISTY? E 
dY RCISPU. <1 PFI"A=Y PUr(°OSE JF MJST RECENT ISSUE "" 
-------------------------------- 
PAGE 1 0= 
RCISPUR1 
COUNT if 
EAF VAL if 
ROW PCT ; TO FUME) TO FUND CAPITAL OTHER ROJ' 
COL PCT #AC. UIS INT EX°M RE3TRUCT REASONS TOTAL 
TOT PCT = 14 2e z» 42 
RCISTYP_ 
--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
1 if 16 7 6» 2= 2 
0rainary- new = 9.1 » 6.1 11.1 w 
.7 if 32.64 
41.3Z if 24.1% = 20.7:. » 6.; `. x 
= 50 
-» 23 - if 17.62 s 100 - 
2 15.7: # 7.9: st 6.7:. x 2.2: 
+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
21 11 # 15 #- it 34 
Ordinary 
- rinnt 10.7 ß 9.6 = 13.0 if ". 8 = 3S. 2.. 
» 23.5» if 
. 
32.4It 44.1% if 
if 22.6:: » 44 
-= 
44.1- »-. 
r9-9" 12.4: At 
. 
16.9:: »-» 
+--------"--------+--------+--------+ 
3r23 if 3»-xR 
Pref shares z 2.5 » 2.2 » 3-. 1 # 
.2»°- 25 
- 
37.5: r 37.5: »-x 
7.1-. » 12 
-eR. 5: 
z 2.2:: x S. '4: 
------------------------------------- 
44»4 tý 10 »-I1? 
Ueotx5.7 5.1 if 6.9 i 
.4e 20.2» 
if 22.2:: # 22.2: e 55.6. if 
-r 
i 14.3. » 16 
- 
if 29.4: x 
e 4.5» if 4.5ý if 11.2 if 
+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
C0LU. ". M 2e 25 34 2 30 
TOTAL 31.5 
. 
23.1": 31 
. 
2:: 2.2: 100 
- 
CHI-SHA4c O. F. SIGNIFICANCE 
12.93204 9 0.1657 
STATISTIC VALUE 
MIN E. F. CELLS : +ITH E. F. < 5 
-------- ------------------ 
O. laO 7 JF 1A ( 43.7: ) 
EIC,, IF ICA, CE 
CRA. MtR"S V 0.2200_" 
CO: 1TIMGE:. CY C4ý=FICI-'JT 0.3.5619 
, tiUri3tR OF hISS"I'JG 'C! S_RVATIINS =0 
APPENDIX 3-5-19 
----------CzJ>STA3ULATI0 
.r0F---------- 
riCiSTYtE 
oY )IvLc'/ L T1c CAP'CITY T;; MAI\ITeI' VIVID 
-------------------------------- P1jý 1 Jc i JIVLE'/6-. L 
C0J': T = 
EAo VL 2 
°ü'/ PCT ! J'! I"'PO, T `; OT PEAL IMPORT QUITE 'V=RY oJy Ci)L DCT LY IMP()i I. '000T I4Pn? T T')TAL 
TOT OCT ý 1» 21 3x 4a 5a 
rCISTY? E 
--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
13»4/! 10 z92 26 Oroinary 
- new 2.3 a 6.0 It 7.7 » 9.0 if 3.0 x 33.3: 
e 1C. 7'. # 14.3: if 35.7» x 32.1': If 7.1:: a 
x 42.9:: x 22.2: 43.5^ # 33.3': e 22.2:: R 3.6: 4. ß": if 11.4:: a1 
+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
2z3»9eIx 10 if 2a 32 
Jroinary 
- ri; nt » 2.7 x 6.9 if Q. A » 10.3 It =. 1.4 a. 1% Y"N 25.0% 1; 
2.42.0:: a 50.0: 9 36. °0 x 37.0?; r 22. '-: a 
: 3. h: a 10.7" 9.5': » 11.9'» 2.4: ß 
+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
31a-»4x3 It 
-a8 Pref shares ý 
.7a1.7 it 2.7 » 2. o r 
.o»9.5': 
e 12.5:: »-r 50.0:: » 37.5: »-4 
1'. z-: »- tt 17.6:: a 11.1": #-x 
4 i. 2, -. »A4.1 ': » 3.6': »-» 
+--------+---- 
---+--------+--------+--------+ 
4 
.. 
r 
-a51145»5a 16 
Oeot 1.3 3.4 4 4.4 4 5.1 if 1.7 9 19.0': 
31.3: » 6.3'. # 31.3': » 31.3: x 
x-» 27.8% » 4.3., x 13 
. 
5': it 55.6's T 
r-»6.0: U 1.2ý x o. 0': 
+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
Co LUM'J 7 13 23 
. 
27 Q R4 
TOTAL 21.427.4': 32.1": 10 
.7.1^ O. U 
CriI-S, 'JAPE c. F, SIGNIFICANCE MIN E. F. CELLS 
. 
IITH F. F.. < 5 
---------- ---- ------------ -------- ------------------ 
13.550: 6 12 0.1000 0.667 13 OF 20 ( 65.00 
STATISTIC VALUE SI(NIFIC$NCE 
------------ 
CPAMERIS V 0.27131 
CONTINGENCY C(CFFICIE'tT 0.42531 
ioUt1Sc° OF MISSING V9,5E, YATID lS =5 
APPENDIX 3-5-20 
iv 
-------- 
Cu5TAuuATIv 
EC I`: ül!; TrtY E CT^rc 
, 
1I v! cVcL cº't; A. ýýCI':: i TN_ CAPA. CITY T. D ; iß PIT All. ' 1) IV In 
-------------------- 
i". J5_C 
--------------------- 
i. )IVLEV-: L 
CC W: T 
; 
--XP `/AL 
ROW PCT eU`'I! '? nRT '; 3T P624L I"P^RTA" ^", uITP IM VERY I12 
COL OCT 
. 
1JT LY ImPOR T P: }CTA T 4ý=T& 4T TOT ? CT ?. x 2 4Lb 53 
-------mai--------+--------4. 
-------------------------- 
12zö ýt 11 5s 
A; iUFACTJPIIG 2.0 7.1 10.6 t 3. ° 
9 
. 
l; x 24.2% n 21 
. 
2:. a 33.5'. 0 15.? 
2?. "-. ; 44.4* 1 r 3C. 4-. ; 40.7'; 9 55. x:: 
2. ý:. a 9.5". " 0.3'. x 
+- 
------- 
+- 
-------"- 
-------+- 
-------+- -------+ 
1 a 2 '? x 7 71 
3_RVICc = 1. ° a 4.5 °" 5. ° 140, 6.0 a 2.? a 
r t. ý:. a 19.: )': s S=. ': 4 33.3": r S. S:. x 
R : 4.3-.. - 22.2. x 30.4:. # 25.9': e 22.2.. 
1.2:: a 4.. It °.? °. a 3.3'= r 2. L.:: x 
- ------- 
+- 
-------+- -------+- -------+- -------+ 
3 a 2 = 3 a 2 a 1 x 
KETAIL AND DISTF = 0 2.4 a 3. r) x 3.5 z 1.2 x 
z 27.?:: a 13.2"; = 27.3:: z 13.2": r 9.1:: x 
42. Q:: a 1.1: 1 r 1i. 0 7.4': z 11.1:: x 
r 3.5': a 2.4: 1. 4 2.4'; $ 1.7:: a 
"- 
----- +- -------+- -------+- -------+- -------+ 
4 = 1 4 4 6 7 r 1 
.. 
PJP; TY A; J'D Cü'. 1 
_ 4.1 5.? 4 6.1 2.1 t 
'- 5.3.. a 21.1': s 31.5:: z 5. n'; x 5z 
14 
._-: 4 21.2 26 . ?.: a 2 5.9 ": a 11.1:; z 1.2::. 4 
.:: 
7 
.1 8.3% tt 1.2 "; 
- -------+- -------+- -------+- -------+- -------+ 
COLt! rl" 7 1i '23 27 
-0 
TOTAL E. 3; 21 
. 
4" 27.4:. 3 2.1": 10 
. 
7:; 
CmI 
-SyUAPý D. ý. SI,::: IFICA. ICE 
---------- ---- ------------ 
ö. 700 12 0.7391 
. 
STATISTIC AL'IE 
--------- ----- 
M UV 
T'1T4L 
33 
3". 
21 
2i. 0'; 
11 
13.1: 
19 
94 
1'10.0"; 
MI: t E. F. CELLj aITw F. F. ( 5 
-------- ------------------ 
0.017 13 OF 211 
S I7? 4I FI CA.; vCE 
------------ 
C-A-4 'S 
-V ^. 1ý442 
CO.. TIN. iEi CY CIDc=FICIc''JT C. 3u422 
C '1I SSI'ý: ü Ü=, i"n`! Ii"'ý5 =S 
APPENDIX 3-5-21 
----------CkuTAou:. :. TI J' vUF---------- 
1Ci_Tv p ý" 
OY iluT I` CC. ! 1(` T iSSuE wUITY. ^I^ BUT VAN 
----------------- 
-- 
--------. ------ 
PAG" 1 ýF 1 
z. SO ILU'" 
ýUu": 1 e 
EA° VAL = 
°; 1'. J ='CT =J^'I"? ')rT P4; JT I,: in: ) IMPORT 3uITF vrsv a0l' 
CUL OCT PTA;. T I i°UQT I"POi2T TOTAL 
TUT 'LT # 5a 
rC15TYr_ --------+--------+--------*-----------------+--------+ 
11z113-e-z3 
ur., inary - new 1.1 z .5 .S4 .54 .2 12. J: 
33. '.:: a 33.3': " 33.3s, a-- 
11.1-: 
'3 ? 5.0: 20.0x. ;--a 4.1J %=G. Rý. 
_-- 
"i 
+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
=z4-e-z-z-z3 
, riir. ary - ri2. nt = 1.1 w .5 .5* .o 2" .2x 12.0% 
er 
Y12. n ý. w--R-K- ii 
+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
rl ref shares 1. + z 
.ý .ý .ö= .3a 1ý. 0 
-y SO. r. ; 25.0': "-# 25.0': x-M 
c2.?:: 4 25.0% e-U 20.0": =-4 
4. °J 4. J': r-4 r. ". n 
+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
y :'? 42!! 44 
,i4? 
2.15 
? L) t 5.4 'i 2.4 2 3.0 w 3. U 1.? n 60.0% 2o. 7'= tt 13 
= 3?.. ': 
-: Su. U": 7 Lf!. 0:. z °"J. 0': r 00.0:. z 
"L 12. E-. z ö. ýý := lß. ß': a 16. J': r F. ý:. 4 
+--------+--------"--------+--------+--------+ 
C^Lt: t' °552 25 
TOTAL 36. ^":: 
-'_C. 0% 20. ^ . 2u. 0. R. 0!. 100.0» 
C: i'_-S, LUA'-_ n. F. ¶1C. 141FICAN CE ML E. F. CFLL S . 4ITH E. P. ( 5 
--------------------------------------------------- 
1u. ýy31°7 12 v. 5347 1.24n 19 OF 20 ( 05.0: ) 
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06x4 
.'41 11 RETAIL A;:! ) CIST° = 
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CyI-S: t1APc ^= SIý! 4IFICA: Cý 
---------- ---- ------------ 
1o. 93422 Y 0.049': 
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TOT PCT = lx 2tt 3x A 5a 
Pýi L': V-- L 
--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
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APPENDIX 3-6 CORRELATION OF VARIABLES 
The correlation between scores on the variables 
was analysed using Pearson's correlation 
coefficient. Care is needed when interpreting 
the coefficients as high positive correlation 
could arise when either (i) two varjables are 
considered to be very important on the scoring, 
or (ii) two variables are considered to be 
unimportant on the scoring. 
The Pearson correlation coefficients are shown in 
Appendix 3-6. The Pearson correlation 
coefficient is the number to the right of the top 
variable of each pair; the number in brackets 
indicates the number of cases used in calculating 
the correlation (this will often vary between 
each different pair of variables because the 
number of missing cases is not the same for all 
variables); and 'p=' shows the correlation 
coefficient (based on its estimate, the sample 
correlation coefficient 'r') for a one tail test. 
Strong correlations between variables. are 
highlighted by 'boxing', and the significance 
level is also shown. 
The variables which have a correlation 
coefficient significant at 0.1% or less are: 
(i) Highlevg & Targetde 
(ii) Firmshph & Stmktph 
(iii) Firmshpl & Stmktpl 
(iv) Epslevel & Divlevel 
(v) Epslevel & Leverage 
(vi) Divlevel & Attsharh 
(vii) Divlevel & Leverage 
(viii) Prevmkt & Attsharh 
There would be a prior expectation that 
'Highlevg' and 'Targetde' would be highly 
correlated as the decision of 'Leverage would 
have been too-high if more debt were issued' is, 
it may be-reasonably assumed, related to meeting 
a target-debt equity ratio. Retaining both of 
these acted as a check of consistency. 
Similarly, the high correlation between 
'Firmshph' and 'Stmktph', and between 'Firmshpl 
and 'Stmktpl' would be expected as, except for 
stocks with a significant negative beta, the 
share price of an individual firm would, ceteris 
paribus, rise or fall as stock market prices as 
a whole rose or fell. 
There is high correlation between the importance 
of 'Epslevel' and 'Divlevel'. This is perhaps 
not surprising given that there are short-term 
pressures to maintain dividends as there are 
short-term pressures to maintain earnings. It 
could be that any increase in EPS would be as a 
result of financing projects by debt and not by 
equity, thereby avoiding any increase in the 
number of ordinary shares. This could help to 
explain both the correlation between 'Epslevel' 
and 'Leverage', and between 'Divlevel' and 
'Leverage'. 
The correlation between the importance of 
'Divlevel' and 'Attsharh' is probably 
attributable to the perception by financial 
directors that maintenance of dividends is an 
important component of shareholders' approval. 
It may be that a declining dividend could signal 
to shareholders that the company is experiencing 
declining sales and/or increasing expenses, and 
if part of the decline in profits were 
attributable in large interest payments on debt, 
then this could also tie in with the 'Divlevel' 
and 'Leverage' relationship mentioned above. 
'Prevmkt' and 'Attsharh' are correlated and one 
would expect that the shareholders' attitudes 
would be affected by prevailing market conditions 
in markets and vice versa. 
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APPENDIX 6-1-1 
EXOPtg: 
operating profit 
INTEREST (ex new fin) 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 
TOTAL INTEREST 
Net profit after int 
Pub. pre-tax profit 
basic taxation 
tax change 
Angus Secure Noses ye Sep 1990 : YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE 
............ ........................ 
EQUITY DEBT ALT. (13.05%) 
E000 E000 E000 E000 
-2245 ý -2245 7361 7361 
0 274 
--- 
7361 
------- 
ý 7635 
...... 
-9606 
---- 
-9880 
-8888 I -9162 
-165 
0 
-165 
-165 
-96 
-261 
Earnings after tax -8723 I -8901 
Prof dividend 0 0 
Minority interest 50 ý 50 
EARNINGS for ORO -8773 f -8951 
s: sasasssssssassssa 
I s: s: sassssssassaass 
EPS (pence/ord share) 
I 
-35.61 ý 
sassssssasassssssaa 
( 
-42.58 
sasssssasssssasasss 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year (1000) 21020 21020 
Average no. ord. shares 
cat start of veer. '000) 20890 20890 
No. of new ord. shares 
(total, '000) 12016 0 
No. of new ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 3743 130 " 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 33036 21020 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 
- 
24633 21020 
Amount of dabs E ß"4a^ 
(nominal) 
Coupon rate 13.05 
Tax rate 35.00 35.00 
270490 Rights issue 1 for 2 ords at E0.70 
Raised E0.4en. 12,000,000 shares 
New shares in year a 12,016,000 
. 
Difference is due to rounding. 
Ex-rights date 240590 
Cum-rights price E0.70 
Last date for payarnt in full 150690 
Benchmark Gilt a Treasury 9% 2008. BY = 12.05% 
Additional interest would be payable of E8400000 x 13.05%, etc., 
with tax relief being available (tax rate   35%) 
In the year of issue, this has been taken as 3 months interest. 
It can be seen that there is a 'negative' EPS which becomes increasingly 
more negative under the debt recon. as the coupon rate increases. 
" There is an increase of 130,000 which does not relate to the rights 
issue and so this hu also been included in the debt recon. weighted 
average rs. w1b er of shares figure. 
HYPOTHETICAL ISSUE 
DEBT ALT. (14 
. 
05%) DEBT ALT. ( 15.05X) 
E000 E000 E000 E000 
-2245 
-2245 
7361 7361 
295 316 
7656 ý 7677 
-9901 -9922 
"9183 -9204 
-165 
-165 
-103 
-111 
... 
-268 
....... 
-276 
-6915 
- --------- 
-8928 
0 ý 0 
50 50 
asssaasas ss 
'8965 
ssaa s 
-8978 
s s s 
-42.65 
aaassssss a assaasua 
-42.71 
21020 21020 
20890 20890 
0 0 
130 130 " 
21020 21020 
21020 21020 
EB. 4an E8.4nn 
14.05 15.05 
35.00 35.00 
MB. IMttrest capitalised in 1990 anio ntsd to £522,000 (E0.522sn). 
ExMa tS: Anglia Secure Homes ye Sep 1991 : YEAR FOLLOWING YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE 
............ 
........... ............. 
HYPOTHETICAL 
................ 
ISSUE 
............ .............. ......... 
EQUITY DEBT ALT. (13.05%) DEBT ALT. (14 
. 
05%) ý DEBT ALT. ( 15.05%) 
E000 E000 E000 E000 E000 E000 E000 E000 
Operating profit ý -7789 ý -7789 ý -7789 -7759 
INTEREST (ex new fin) 6360 6360 ý 6360 6360 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 0 1096 I 1180 
--------- 
I 
1264 
--------- 
TOTAL INTEREST ý 6360 
..... ".. 
ý 
. 
7456 
......... 
. 
I 
--- 
7540 ý 
"------ . 
7624 
......... 
Net profit after int ý 
.. 
-14149 
ý ý 
-15245 -15329 ý -15413 
Pub. pre-tax profit ý -16991 ý -18087 ý -18171 ý -18255 
basic taxation -741 -165 -165 -165 
tax change 0 I -373 -401 -430 
-741 -538 -566 
- ---- - 
-595 
-------- 
Earnings after tax ý ----"----- -16250 
- "----"-"- 
-17549 
I 
--- ý - - 
-17605 
I ý 
-17660 
Prof dividend 0 0 0 0 
Minority interest ý 36 ý 36 I 36 36 
EARNINGS for ORD ý -16286 ý -17585 -17641 -17696 
saassaaaaýsssasaaa I aaaaaasasaa: a: asaa" 
I saasaaasaaaaaasaaaa I sasaassszaasaaasasa 
EPS (pence/ord share) -49.30 ý -83.66 ý -83.92 -84.19 
U SSSS=aafia=aa=i=1 
I 
 aaaafaaaa aasaiaaat aaaiaaaaaalaaalaaii aaaaalaa: a 
aalaaaaaa 
Total ord. shares at. 
start of year ('000) 33036 21020 21020 21020 
Average no. ord. shares 21020 (at start of year, 1000) 24633 21020 21020 
No. of new ord. shares 
(total, '000) 0 0 0 0 
No. of new ord. shares 0 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 8403 0 0 
Total ord. shares at y/e 21020 ('000) 33036 21020 21020 
Average no. ord. shares 21020 21020 (used In EPS calc., 1000) 33036 21020 
Amount of dabs £ E8.4an 
E8.4an E8.4sn 
(nominal) 
13 05 14.05 15.05 Coupon rate . 
Tax rate 34.00 34.00 
34.00 34.00 
270490 Rights issue 1 for 2 ords at E0.70 
Raised E8.4an 
Ex-rights date 240590 
Cups-rights price E0.70 
Last date for payment in full 150690 
Benchmark Gilt a Treasury 9% 2008. RY a 12.05% 
Additional interest would be payable of E8400000 x 13.05%, etc., 
with tax relief being ava ilable (tax rate a 35%) 
It can be seen that there is a 'negative' EPS which becomes increas ingly 
more negative under the debt recon. as the coupon rate increases. 
NB. There was no Interest capitalised in 1991. 
ANGLIA SECURE HOMES Y/E SEP 1990 
Calculation of weighted average number of shares 
------------------------------------------------- 
As the rights price is the same as the can rights price, there is no bonus 
element in this case and so the weighted average number of shares is 
calculated as follows: 
01/10/89 
- 
26/04/90 = 21,020,000 x 7/12 = 12,261,667 
27/04/90 
- 
30/09/90 = 33,036,000 x 5/12 = 13,765,000 
26,026,667 
EjImpt e: 
operating profit 
INTEREST (ex now fin) 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 
TOTAL INTEREST 
Net profit after int 
Pt. pre-tax Oroflt 
basic taxation 
tax change 
Sire In Ker 1992 : TEAM OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE 
............ .......... .............. 
EQUITY DEBT ALT. 0 0.97%) 
E000 E000 E000 E000 
7214 7214 
1201 1201 
0 I 623 
. 
1201 
....... . 
1824 
.... .. 6013 ..... 5390 
6041 I 5418 
910 910 
0 
-206 
... 
910 
....... . 
704 
......... 
Earnings after tu 5131 ý 4714 
Prof dividend ý00 
Minority interest 00 
EARNINGS for ORD ý 5131 ý 4714 
EPS (pence/ord share) ý 5.06 S. 64 
I 
.... a..... ". a..... I Arms"" 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 82663 E2663 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of year, '000) 73716 73716 
No. of new ord. shares 
(total, '000) 27666 3489 
No. of new ord. shares 
(used In EPS cale., '000) 27765 9819 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 110331 86152 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 101481 83535 
Amount of dabs E E11.36si 
(nominal) 
Coupon rate 10.97 
Tu rate 33 33 
190791 Rights issue 2 for 7 ords at E0.47 
Raised E11.36on. issued 24,179,177 shares. 
Ex-rights date 160891 
Cur rights price E0.75 
Lost date for payment in full 050991 
Benchmark Gilt a Treasury 9% 2008. Rt " 9.97% 
Additional Interest would be payable of £11360000 x 10.972, ete., 
with tax relief being available (tax rate   33X) 
In the year of issue, this has been taken as 6 months interest. 
There has been an actual Increase in the number of ordinary shares 
during the year of 3,489,000 (27,668,000 - 24,179,000), issued S Jan '92, 
and this increase has also been included in the debt reconstruction. 
For the debt reconstruction, shares in issue during the year: 
01/04/91 
- 
04/01/92 " 82,663,000 
05/01/91 
- 
31/03/92 a 86,152,000 
The weighted average nuniber of shares for the debt reconstruction scenario 
is therefore: 
82,663,000 x 9/12 + 86,152,000 x 3/12 " 83,535,250 
On the original equity issue the EPS is 5.06p, an the debt recon., " this 
increases slightly as follows: 
With interest at 10.97%, the EPS is 5.64p, 
at 11.971, the EPS is 5.60p, 
at 12.97%, the EPS is 5. SSp. 
HYPOTHETICAL ISSUE 
GENT ALT. (11.97%) 
E000 E000 
7214 
1201 
680 
1461 
5333 
5361 
910 
-224 
686 
4675 
0 
0 
4675 
"  aas s aaa  a saa 
5.60 
$2663 
73716 
3439 
9519 
86152 
83535 
E11.36m 
11.97 
33 
....................... 
DEST ALT. (12.97%) 
E000 E000 
7214 
1201 
737 
1938 
5276 
5304 
910 
-243 
667 
4637 
0 
0 
4637 
nan.... a....... 
5.55 
82663 
73716 
3439 
9819 
$6152 
83535 
£11.36m+ 
12.97 
33 
EitMplt 
operating profit 
INTEREST (ex new fin) 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 
TOTAL INTEREST 
lowtsr y, Dec 1990 : YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE 
............ ........................ 
EQUITY DEBT ALT. (12.12%) 
E000 E000 E000 £000 
106000 106000 
55900 55900 
0ý 86M 
Net profit after int 
Pub. pre"tax profit 
basic taxation 
tax change 
Earnings after tax 
Prof dividend 
Minority interest 
EARMIMGS for ORD 
EPS (ponce/ord share) 
Total ord. shares at 
55900 
50100 
113100 
32300 
0 
32300 
50800 
7100 
1600 
72100 
sssafsasasasas = 
51.46 
asasssssaas: ssassas 
. 
6458U 
. ........ 41412 
104412 
32300 
3041 
29259 
75153 
7100 
1600 
66453 
55.68 
. sas.... a. s.. mm mm 
start of year ('000) 119200 119200 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of year, '000) 118900 118900 
No. of new ord. shares 
(totat, '000) 33924 190 
No. of new ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 21200 458 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
(1000) 153124 119390 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS catc., '000) 140100 119358 
Aslant of debs E E143in 
(nominal) 
Coupon rate 12.12 
Tax rate 35 35 
Caput. of 
 in. int 
300590 lights issue 1: 4 ords at E4.25. 
Raised E143.37on. Issued 33,734,360 shares 
Ex-rights date 040690 
cum-rights price E5.235 
Lost date for payment in full 240690 
iirk rk Gilt " Treasury 9% 2008. RY " 11.12% 
Additional interest would be payable of E143,000,000 x 12.122, etc., 
with tax relief being available (tax rate   35%) 
In the year of Issue, this has been taken as 6 months interest. 
Total now shares in year a 33,924,000. Difference " 189,640,000 
issued 1 March 1990, also included In debt reconstruction. 
For the debt reconstruction scenarios, the total number of shares in Issue: 
01/01/90 
- 
28/02/90 " 119,200,000 
01/03/90 
- 
31/12/90 " 119,390,000 
The weighted average number of shares for the debt recon. is: 
119,200,000 x2/12 " 119,390,000 a 10/12 " 119,358,333 
Under the original equity issue, the EPS is 51.46p. 
Under the debt recon, the EPS rises: 
. 
with interest at 12.12%, EPS is 55.68p 
at 13.12x, EPS is 55.28p 
at 14.12x, EPS is 54.89p 
NO. In 1990 Bowater capitalised E7.6an interest. 
In 1990 Bowater had neg. irrecoverable ACT (i. e. write-back) 
of E1.8 v1. 
NrPOTHETI Gl ISSUE 
GEBT ALT. (13.12%) DENT ALT. (14.12%) 
E000 E000 ý E000 E000 
106000 106000 
55900 55900 
9405 ý 10122 
... 
65305 ý 
....... 
66022 
40695 
.......... 
39978 
103695 102975 
32300 32300 
3292 3543 
... 
29008 
....... 
28757 
74687 .......... 74221 
7100 ý 7100 
1600 1600 
65987 65521 
s... aaaas.. sosss I 
. a....... .......... 
55.28 ý 54.59 
119200 119200 
118900 118900 
277 277 
458 4sa 
119477 119477 
119358 119358 
E143w+ E143an 
13.12 14.12 
35 35 
Example: Bowater ye Dec 1991 : YEAR FOLLOWING YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE 
............ ......... ............... 
EQUITY DEBT ALT. (12.12%) 
E000 E000 E000 E000 
Operating profit ý 99200 ý 99200 
INTEREST (ex new fin) 54000 54000 
NEw FINANCE INTEREST 0 17332 
TOTAL INTEREST ý 
--- 
54000 ý 
------- 
I 
71332 
....... --- 
Net profit after int 45200 ý 27868 
pub. pre-tax profit I 112700 ý 95368 
basic taxation I 30700 30700 
tax change 5719 
30700 24981 
Earnings after tax 
... ....... 
92000 ( 
.. -------- 
70388 
Prof dividend 7000 7000 
Minority Interest 1900 1900 
EARNINGS for ORD 73100 
sasaaaaaaaassasassa 
I saaasaaas 
61488 
: sss: a: sss 
EPS (pence/ord share) I 
saasaass:: ss 
47.59 
: aýassa 
51.25 
aaasasaaaaasasaaasa 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 153124 119477 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of ye. r, '000) 140100 
No. of new ord. shares 
(total, '000) 776 776 
No. of new ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 13500 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 153900 120253 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 153600 
Amount of dabs E 
(nominal) 
Coupon rate 
Tax rate 33 
Co put. of min. int 
300590 Issue of 25p ords at E4.25. 
Raised E143en 
If issue price"E4.25 No. of shares   £143000000/E4.25 
a 33,647,059 
Benchmark Gilt a Treasury 9% 2008. NY a 11.12% 
Additional interest would be payable of 1143,000,000 x 12.12%, etc., 
with tax relief being available (tax rate   33%) 
There has been an increase in the actual n' er of ordinary shares of 
776,000, issued 20 May 1991. This increase has also been included in 
the reconstruction. 
For the reconstruction, shares in issue during the year: 
01/01/91 
- 
19/05/91 
  
119,477,000 
20/05/91 
- 
31/12/91 a 120,253,000 
The weighted average re.. ber of shares is calculated as: 
119,477,000 x 4.6/12 * 120,253,000 x 7.4/12 " 119,980,200 
Under the original equity Issue, the EPS is 47.59p. 
Under the debt region, the EPS rises: 
with interest at 12.12%, EPS is 51.25p 
at 13.12%, EPS is 50.45p 
at 14.12%, EPS is 49.65p 
NO. In 1991 Bowater capitalised E3.1sn interest. 
In 1991 Bowater had neg. Irreeoversble ACT (i. e. write-back) 
of E0.4en. 
119358 
622 
119950 
E143vn 
12.12 
35 
HYPOTHETICAL ISSUE 
DEBT ALT. (13.1Z%) 
E000 E000 
99200 
54000 
18762 
72762 
26438 
93938 
30700 
6191 
24509 
69430 
7000 
1900 
60530 
*ZZSflszzzsiiiizszi 
50.45 
z: szsssszszszzs*zzs 
119517 
DEBT ALT. (14.12%) 
£000 E000 
99200 
54000 
20192 
74192 
25008 
92508 
30700 
6663 
24037 
68472 
7000 
1900 
59572 
m-z-az. aaaaaaa za- 
49.65 
szazaszz.... aaaasan 
119517 
119200 
776 776 
780 
120293 120293 
119980 
E143an 
13.12 
35 
119200 
780 
119980 
E143sn 
14.12 
35 
ExamPle: 
Operating profit 
INTEREST (ex new fin) 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 
TOTAL INTEREST 
Net profit after int 
pub. pre-tax profit 
basic taxation 
tax change 
Yorthorpe Moldings plc ye Dec 1987 : YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE HYFO1 
EQUITY DEBT ALT. ( 11.16%) 
E000 E000 E000 E000 
28965 28965 
986 986 
0 844 
986 1830 
27979 ý 27135 
32524 31680 
12519 12519 
0 ý 
-295 
12519 12224 
Earnings after tu 20005 19456 
Pref dividend 00 
Minority interest 1472 ý 1472 
EARNINGS for ORD 18533 17984 
ssassas=sasssssssan USAUSSssssas Re"as 
EPS (pence/ord share) 13.16 13.47 
ififffffffifffiffif fffsffffaffsfiafifi 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 44490 44490 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of year, '000) 44490 44490 
No. of new ord. shares 
(total, '000) 111230 88985 
No. of new ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 96370 88985 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 155720 133475 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 140860 133475 
Amount of dabs E E44.48an 
(nominal) 
Coupon rate 11.16 
Tax rate 
- 
35.00 35.00 
290987 Rights issue I for 6 orris at £2.00 
Raised E44.48on. Issued 22,244,839 shares 
Total number of new shares in the year = 111,230,000 including the rights 
issue. The balance relates to a2 for 1 capitalisation (bonus) issue 
on 20 May 1987, based on the shares at the start of the year (44,490,000) 
Ex-rights date 300987 
Cum-rights price E2.21 
Lest date for payment in full 221087 
Benchoark Gilt 
  
Treasury 11.75% 2003-2007. RY = 10.16% 
Additional interest would be payable of E44,480,000 x 11.16X, etc., 
with tax relief being available (tax rate   35%) 
In the year of issue, this has been taken as 2 months interest. 
The capitalisation issue has also been included in the debt reconstruction. 
Per SSAP3 bonus issues should, assuming that they rank for dividend, 
be treated as being. in issue for the whole year. 
The weighted average number of:. shares for the debt reconstruction has 
therefore been taken as the number of shares at the start of the year 
plus the capitalisation Issue, with all the shares being treated as though 
in issue for the whole year. 
Under the original equity issue, the EPS is 13.16p. 
Under the debt region. there is an increase in EPS as follows: 
With interest at 11.16%, the EPS Is 13.47p, 
12.16%, the EPS is 13.44p, 
13.16%, the EPS is 13.40p. 
NETIGL ISSUE 
DEBT ALT. (12.16X) DEBT ALT. (13.16%) 
E000 E000 I E000 E000 
28965 28965 
986 ý 986 
919 ý 995 
1905 
---------- 
1981 
27060 
" --------- 
26984 
31605 ý 31529 
12519 ý 12519 
-322 
-348 
12197 
.......... 
12171 
19407 
- -----"--- 
19358 
0 ý 0 
1472 1472 
17P35 17886 
ssssssssssassssssas I sssaaasssa sassas=aa 
13.44 13.40 
-names sssaaassuaaaa a aaasas.. a asasaa_l: 
44490 44490 
44490 44490 
88985 88985 
88985 88985 
133475 133475 
133475 133475 
E44.48im E8.4mn 
12.16 13.16 
35.00 35.00 - 
ExMpIo: 
Operating profit 
INTEREST (as new fin) 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 
TOTAL INTEREST 
Net profit after int 
Pub. pre-tax profit 
basic taxation 
tax change 
Yowtherps Moldings plc ye Dec 19M ; YEAR FOLLOWING YEAR OF (SLUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE 
............ . ---. -----" ............ 
HYPOTHETICAL ISSUE 
............................ 
...... "-................ 
EQUITY ý DEBT ALT. (11.16%) ý DEBT ALT. (12.16%) ý DEBT ALT. (13.16%) 
E000 E000 E000 E000 ý E000 E000 ý E000 E000 
33262 ý 332112 33282 33282 
1360 1360 ý 1360 1360 
0 4964 ý 5409 ý 5654 
1360 
31922 
40067 
14227 
0 
14227 
6324 
2695a 
35103 
14227 
-1737 
12490 
Earnings after tax 25860 ý 22613 
Prof dividend 0 0 
Minority interest ý 1955 1955 
EARNINGS for ORO 23805 I 20658 
I : assssaasaaasasasss I ssassausassaasasss 
EPS (pence/ord share) ý 15.33 15.64 
saasassssaaaasaassa I saasasasssaasaasasa 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year (1000) 155720 133475 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of vear_10001 140860 133475 
No. of new ord. shares 
(total, '000) 290 290 
No. of new ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 14960 290 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 156010 133765 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 155820 133765 
Amount of dabs E E44.48 
(nominal) 
Coupon rate 11.16 
Tax rate 35.00 35.00 
290987 Rights issue I for 6 ords at E2.00 
Raised E44.4&m 
Ex-rights date 300987 
Cus-rights price E2.21 
Last date for payaiant in full 221087 
ienclrt Gilt " Treasury 11.75% 2003-2007. RY " 10.16% 
Additional interest would be payable of E44,480,000 x 11.16%, etc., 
with tax relief being available (tax rate " 33%) 
A full year's Interest has been charged for ye Dec 1988. 
There has been a small increase in the total number of shares of 
290,000. This has been included in the debt reconstruction as an 
increase in the total number of shares and in the weighted average mater 
of shares. 
Under the original equity issue, the EPS is 1S. 33p. 
Under the debt recon. there is an increase in EPS for the lowest Interest 
rate, but then the EPS declines at higher interest rates: 
With interest at 11.16%, the EPS is 1S. 44p, 
12.16%, the EPS is 15.23p, 
13.16%, the EPS is 15.01p. 
6769 
26513 
34658 
14227 
-1893 
1 Z334 
22324 
0 
i9ss 
20369 
15.23 
133475 
133475 
290 
290 
133765 
133765 
E44.48W 
12.16 
35.00 
7214 
26068 
34213 
14227 
"2049 
. 
12178 
......... 
22035 
0 
1955 
20080 
,I 
saaasasasa ssassssss 1 
15.01 
saaasaaaasaaaaaaaas 
133475 
133475 
290 
290 
133765 
133765 
EB. ýý+ 
13.16 
35.00 
APPENDIX 6-1-5 
Exaep(e: Casket p(c March ye Mar 1991 : YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE 
------------- ......................... 
EQUITY DEBT ALT. (12.6X) 
E000 £000 E000 E000 
operating profit ý 2336 2336 
INTEREST (ex new fin) 2539 ý 2539 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 0 543 
---------- 
I 
---------- 
TOTAL INTEREST 
wet profit after Int 
Pub. pre-tu profit 
basic tuition 
tax char i 
-118 
0 
2539 
-203 
212 
-118 
Earnings after tax 330 ý 
Pref dividend 66 
Minority interest 26 ý 26 
EARNINGS for ORD 235 
' 
.   . a  . as sss . a.    I . s.. wa aa 
EPS (pence/ord share) 0.35 
I aasa  s  aa a a. sa I    sas s sa 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 37740 37740 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of year, '000) 37740 
No. of now ord. sharp 
(total, '000) 37740 0 
No. of new ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 30870 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 75480 37740 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 68610 
Amount of dabs f 
(nominal) 
Coupon rate 
Tax rate 34.00 
030590 Rights issue I for I ords at £0.1S 
Raised E3.66ei, issued 37,739', 508 shares. 
Total new issues in year   37,740,000. Difference " rounding. 
Ex-rights date 220590 
Cum-rights price £0.18 
Last date for full payment 110690 
Benchrk Gilt 
  
Treasury 9% 2008. MY a 11.8Z 
Additional Interest would be payable of E5660000 x 12.8X, etc., 
with tax relief being available (tax rata 
  
34%) 
In the year of issue, this has been taken as 9 months interest. 
The effect of the rights issue in increasing the total no. of ord. 
shares and the average no. of ord. shares has been stripped out in the 
debt region. 
Under the original equity issue, the EPS is 0.35p. 
Under the debt recon. there is a 'negativ. ' EPS which becomes more 
negative as the coupon rate increases: 
With interest at 12.11x, the EPS is "0.32p, 
at 13.82, the EPS Is -0.39p, 
at 14.8*, the EPS is -0.47p. 
3082 
. 
7" 
-331 
-118 
-185 
"303 
"29 
"u1 
-0.32 
37740 
0 
37740 
ES. bbw, 
12.80 
34.00 
HYPOTHETICAL ISSUE 
............................ 
DEBT ALT. (13.8%) 
E000 E000 
2336 
2539 
566 
." 
3125 
-759 
-374 
"113 
-199 
-317 
-57 
66 
26 
-149 
sn"nowassummusam 
-0.39 
wassommus"Ussums 
37740 
37740 
0 
0 
37740 
37740 
£5.66mn 
13.80 
34.00 
OUT ALT. (14.81) 
E000 £000 
2336 
2539 
628 
3167 
-631 
-416 
-118 
-214 
-332 
-S3 
66 
26 
-1n 
................... 0.47 
37740 
37740 
0 
0 
37740 
37740 
ES. 3. n 
14.80 
34.00 
NB. In 1991 Casket had irracovorabl" ACT of EO. 053mn (030O0) 
Earrplo: C, skot Pic March y. Nor 1992 : YEAR FOLLOWING YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE 
.... --------- 
......................... 
EQUITY GEIT ALT. (12.8%) 
E000 E000 E000 E000 
operating profit 3692 
I 3692 
INTEREST (ox now fin) ý 1934 1934 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 0 
724 
1 
.......... 
.......... 
TOTAL IMTESEST 
Net profit after int 
pub. pro- tax profit 
basic taxation 
tu. change 
1934 
1758 
2062 
561 
0 
561 
2658 
.......... 
1034 
1333 
561 
"239 
322 
Earnings after tax ý- 1U1 Buie 
Prof dividend 66 66 
Minority interest I 16 ý 16 
EARNINGS for ORD 1419 934 
 aasaaaafaasssassaaf I ssssssassaaasaafsafa 
EPS (pence/ord share) ( 1.85 2.40 
I fffafafffifilfYasfl 
I 
aaffffffffffiffififf 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 75480 37740 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of year, '000) 68610 37740 
No. of now ord. shares 
(total, '000) 4090 4090 
No. of now ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 7987 1125 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 79570 41830 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 76597 38865 
Amount of dabs E 
(nominal) E5.66on 
Coupon rate 12.80 
Tax rate 33 33 
030590 Rights issue 1 for I ords at E0.15 
Raised E5.66an 
Ex-rights date 220590 
Cum-rights price E0.18 
Lost date for full pant 110690 
Benchmark Gilt a Treasury 9% 2008. NY   11.8% 
Additional interest would be payable of E5660000 x 12.8%, etc., 
with tax relief being available (tax rate   34%) 
In the year of issue, this has been taken as 9 months interest. 
The effect of the rights Issue in increasing the total no. of ord. 
shares and the average no. of ord. shares has been stripped out in the 
debt recon. 
There has been an actual increase in the rnaber of ordinary shares of 
4,090,000, issued 22 Doc 1991, and this increase has also been included 
in the reconstruction scenarios. 
For the debt reconstruction sceneries, the shares in issue during the year: 
01/04/91 
- 
21/12/91 
  
37,740,000 
22/12/91 
- 
31/03/92 a 41,830,000 
The weighted average re. er of shares for the debt reconstruction 
scenarios is calculated as: 
37,740,000 x 8.7/12 " 41,830,000 x 3.3/12 a 38,864,750 
Under the original equity issue, the EPS is 1.85p. 
Under the debt recon. this would increase as follows: 
With interest at 12.8X, the EPS Is 2.40p, 
at 13.8%, the EPS is 2.30p, 
at 14.3%, the EPS Is 2.21p. 
HYPOTHETICAL ISSUE 
DENT AIT. (13 
. 
8Z) DEBT ALT. 0 4.8%) 
£000 £000 £000 E000 
3692 I 3692 
1931 I 1930 
781 ý 838 
2715 I 2772 
977 ý 920 
1281 1224 
561 561 
-258 
......... 
ý 
-276 
--------- . 
303 285 
.. ........ 
d78 
.. ........ 
940 
66 I 66 
16 16 
896 858 
I iif   1f. fa. . if. if   1ii.. i. is...  f...   
2.30 2.21 
ifp  i  ý  fi .  111f 
 f Yfýiýf... ff. was 
37740 37740 
37740 37740 
0 0 
1125 1125 
37740 37740 
38865 38665 
£5.66an £5.66a+ 
13.80 14.80 
33 33 
N9. In 1992 Casket had no Irrtcowr. blt ACT. 
APPENDIX 6-1-6 
Example: Cater Allyn ye Apr 1991 : YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE 
%.. 
--...... . 
EQUITY 
.......... 
DEBT ALT. ( 
.............. 
11.8%) 
E000 E000 E000 E000 
Operating profit ý 0 0 
INTEREST (ex new fin) 0 ý 0 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 0 ý 1277 
TOTAL INTEREST ý 
... 
0 
....... 
1277 
Net profit after int 
ý 
0 . ......... 
-1277 
Pt. pre- ax profit ý 0 0 
basic taxation 0 I 0 
tax change 0 ý -434 
0 
-434 
Earnings after tax 0 434 
Prof dividend ý 0 0 
Minority interest 0 I0 
EARNINGS for ORD ( 1896 1053 
 . s. av.. a. za. n.   I  s.  s. s..   . aa  a. a 
EPS (pence/ord share) ý 7.96 5.40 
Total and. shares at 
start of year ('000) 19387 19387 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of year. '000) 19387 19387 
No. of nw ord. shares 
(totst. '000) 6435 127 
No. of new ord. shares 
(used In EPS calc., '000) 6435 127 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 23822 19514 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 23822 19514 
Amount of dabs E 
(nominal) E14.43en 
Coupon rate 11.80 
Tax rate 34.00 34.00 
140690 Rights issue 2 for 9 ords at E3.35 
Raised E14.43.. Issued 4,308,222 shares. 
A further 127,000 shares were issued after the rights issue, and 
have been included in the debt reconstruction, both in the total and the 
weighted average figures. 
Ex-rights date 180690 
Cur rights Price E4.21 
Last date for payment In full 090790 
Sench ark Gilt " Treasury 9% 2008. RY " 10.82 
Additional interest would be payable of £14430000 x 11.82, etc., 
with tax relief beino"avsilable (tax rate " 342) 
In the year of Issue, this has been taken as 9 months interest. 
Cater Allen is in the banking sector and the information available 
, Is therefore limited. 'Published retentions' has been taken as the 
equivalent of 'earnings for ord. ', and then this figure will be adjusted 
for any additional interest that would have arisen If debt had been 
issued instead of equity (see reconstructions). 
under the original equity issue, the EPS is 7.96p. 
Under the debt recon. there is a fell in EPS: 
With interest at 11.81, the EPS Is 5.40p 
at 12.8%. the EPS is 5.03p 
at 13.8x, the EPS is 4.66p 
HYPOTHETICAL ISSUE 
........................... 
DEBT ALT. 02.8%) 
E000 E000 
0 
0 
1385 
1385 
-1385 
"0 
0 
-471 
-471 
471 
0 
0 
982 
5.03 
19387 
19387 
127 
127 
19514 
19514 
E14.43e+ 
12.30 
34.00 
....................... 
DEBT ALT. 03.8%) 
E000 E000 
0 
0 
1494 
1494 
. 
......... 
-1494 
0 
0 
-50$ - 
. 
-50$ 
...... --- 
503 
0 
0 
910 
A. 6 
suetfa2ýstli. i0 
19387 
. 
19387 
127 
127 
19514 
19514 
£14.43. i 
13.80 
34.00 
ExMpl.: Cater Allen ye Apr 1992 : YEAR FOLLOWING YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE 
...... .......... .. ...... 
EQUITY DEBT AL1. ( 
........... 
11.82) 
E000 E000 E000 E000 
Operating profit ý 0 0 
INTEREST (ex new fin) 0 0 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 0 1703 
TOTAL INTEREST ( 
... 
0( 
....... . 
1703 
......... 
I 
Net profit after Ent 
I 
0 
-1703 
Ptb. pre-tax profit 0 -1703 
basic taxation 0 0 
tax change 0 I -562 
0 
-562 
Earnings after tax ý 0 -1141 
Prof dividend 0 0 
Minority interest 0 ý0 
EARNINGS for ORO 1819 678 
EPS (pence/ord share) ý 7.61 ý 3.46 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 23822 19514 
Average no. ord. shares 
t t 
 rert of vear_'000) 23822 19514 
No. of new ord. shares 
(total, '000) 90 90 
No. of new ord. shares 
(used in EPS eale., '000) 90 90 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 23912 19604 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS catc., '000) Z3912 19604 
Amount of dabs E 
(nominal) E14.43en 
Coupon rate 11.80 
Tax rate 33 33 
140690 Rights issue 2 for 9 ords at E3.35 
Raised E14.43an 
Ex-rights date 180690 
Cum-rights price £4.21 
Last data for payment in full 090790 
Benchmark Gilt " Treasury 9% 2008. RT 
  
10.8% 
Additional interest would be payable of E14430000 x 11.8%, etc., 
with tax relief being available (tax rate " 33%) 
Cater Allen is in the banking sector and the information available 
is therefore limited. 'Published retentions' has been taken. as the 
equivalent of 'earnings for ord. ', and then this figure will be adjusted 
for any additional interest that mould have arisen if debt had been 
issued instead of equity (sea reconstructions). 
There has been an actual increase in the number of ordinary shares of 
90,000. These also been included in full in the debt reconstructions for 
both the total number of shares and the weighted average number of shares 
calculations. 
Under the original equity issue, the EPS is 7.61p. 
Under the debt recon. there is a decrease in EPS as follow: 
With interest at 11.81, the EPS is 3.46p 
at 12.8%, the EPS is 2.97p 
at 13.8x, the EPS is 2.47p. 
HYPOTHETICAL ISSUE 
DEBT ALT. (12 
. 
8%) DEBT ALT. ( 13.8%) 
E000 E000 I E000 E000 
0 0 
0 0 
1847 1991 
... 
1847 ý 
....... 
1991 
-1847 
. 
.. --. ---- 
-1991 
-1847 -1991 
0 0 
-610 
-------- 
-657 
, 
... 
-610 
....... 
--------- 
-657 
-- -. - - 
-1238 
. -- - 
"1334 
0 0 
0 0 - 
Sal 485 
................... 
2.97 
 . n.. nn. nfln.. 
I 
....,.... . 
uaa. U.. a 
......... 
2.47 
saasssas. 
19514 19514 
19514 19514 
90 90 
90 90 
19604 19604 
19604 19604 
E14.43en E14.43w 
12.80 13.80 
33 33 
APPENDIX 6-1-7 
Exaapts: 
operating profit 
INTEREST (ex new fin) 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 
TOTAL INTEREST 
Met profit after int 
Pub. prs-tax profit 
basic taxation 
tax change 
Community Nospitai Group ye dun 1991 : YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE 
............ ----..... --"------..... 
EQUITY DEBT ALT. 00.69%) 
E000 9000 E000 E000 
5548 5548 
76 ý 76 
0 199 
76 275 
.......... 
ý 
.......... 5472 5273 
5814 I 5615 
1593 
0 
1593 
Earnings after talc ý 4221 ý 4089 
Prof dividend 0 ý0 
Minority interest ý0 ý0 
EARNINGS for ORO 4221 
a aa aaasa 
ý 4089 
sssaaaaaasaa a sa 
EPS (ponce/ord share) 
sssaasa aa aa 
15.56 
sssssaassaaaaassass 
I aa sa 
16.90 
I ssasassaasssassasaa 
Total ord. shares at 
start of rear ('000) 24201 24201 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of year, '000) 24198 24198 
No. of new ord. shares 
(total, '000) 8067 0 
No. of new ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 
- 
2928 3 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 32268 24201 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 27126 24201 
Amount of dein E. E10.97mn 
Coupon rate 10.69 
Tax rate 34.00 34.00 
200291 Rights issue 1 for 3 ords at E1.36 
Raised E10.97on. Issued 3,067,282 shares. 
E*-rights date 110391 
Cum-rights price E1.69 
Last date for payment in full 020491 
Benchmark Gilt " Treasury 9% 2008. RT " 9.69% 
Additional interest would be payable of E10970000 x 10.69%, etc., 
with tax relief being available (tsa rate a 34%) 
In the year of issue, this has been taken as 2 months interest. 
under the original equity issue, the EPS Is 15.56p. On the debt recon., 
the EPS Is as follows: 
with interest at 10.691, the EPS is 16.90p, 
at 11.69X, the EPS is 16. lSp, 
at 12.69x, the EPS is 16.60p. 
1593 
1525 
HYPOTHETICAL ISSUE 
DEBT ALT. (11.692) DEBT ALT. (12.69%) 
E000 E000 E000 E000 
5548 5548 
76 ý 76 
213 
......... 
237 
-- 
. 
294 -- ----- 313 
5254 5235 
55% 5577 
1593 1593 
. 
74 ý 
-a0 
1519 
...... . 
1513 
. .. 
4077 
.......... 
4065 
0 I 0 
0 0 
s asa 
4077 
a sssassss 
4065 
asass 
aaasssssa 
s 
16.85 
aaasasasas 
 aass sssasasaaasss 
16.80 
assasaass assssusý 
24201 24201 
24193 24198 
0 0 
3 3 
24201 24201 
24201 24201 
E10.97sº E10.97on 
11.69 12.69 
34,00 34.00 
Note. Interest capitalised for y/e June 1991 was E1.074an 
APPENDIX 6-1-8 
Example: Cookson Group ye Dec 1991 : YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE 
............ " .......... ......... 
HYPOTHETICAL ISSUE 
EQUITY DEBT ALT. (1 
.. " 
0.83%) 
-". -----------..... ------"- 
DEBT ALT. (11.83%) 
--..... --"--. 
DEBT ALT. 
......... 
(12.83%) 
E000 E000 E000 E000 E000 E000 E000 £000 
Operating profit I 63400 63400 ý 63400 63400 
INTEREST (ex new fin) ý 27000 27000 27000 ý 27000 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST ý0ý 6023 ý 6579 ý 7135 
TOTAL INTEREST I 27000 I 33023 33579 ý 34135 
Net profit after int 36400 30377 ý 29821 29265 
Pub. pre-tax profit 34400 28377 27821 27265 
basic taxation 18000 ý 18000 18000 18000 
tax change I0 -1987 
...... ......... 
ý 
-2171 -2354 
18000 
......... -- 
16013 
-"-^-- 
.......... 15829 
ý 
--------- 15646 
Earnings after tax 16400 12365 
I. ý ........ 11992 I --------- 11620 
Prof dividend 100 100 100 100 
Minority interest ý 8500 I 8500 ý 8500 8500 
EARNINGS for 0R0 7800 3765 
if if iitiiiif ifiif iaiif iiif iiaiiiiii 
3392 
i i f 
ý 3020 
a s i 
I If 
EPS (pence/ord share) 1.83 1.03 
a asasassss"saassii assssssiss""si"is" 
' fiiiiaa ii ti iif  
0.93 
sasissisa"ssasasas 
I 
iaiiiiifi a ii sis 
ý 0.83 
sssspsassasssissa 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 364000 364000 364000 364000 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of year, 1000) 363888 363888 363888 363888 
No. of new ord. shares 
(total, '000) 81400 500 500 500 
No. of new ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 61812 500 S00 S00 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 445400 364500 364500 364500 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., 1000) 425700 364388 364388 364388 
Amount of dabs E E83an E83M Main- 
Coupon rate 10.33 11.83 12.83 
Tax rate 33.00 33.00 33.00 33.00 
210391 Rights issue 2 for 9 ords at E1.05 
Raised Main. issued 80,899,813 shares. 
The total of new shares issued in the year is 81,400,000. Shares of 
500,187 were issued after the rights issue. This increase has been 
included in the debt reconstruction for both the total number of shares 
and for the weighted average number of shares figure. 
Ex-rights date 110491 
Cum- rights price E1.40 - 
Last date for payment in full 110491 
Benchmark Gilt " Treasury 9% 2008. RY a 9.83% 
Additional interest would be payable of E83000000 x 10.63%, etc., 
with tax relief being available (tax rate " 33%) 
In the year of issue, this has been taken as 8 months interest. 
Under the original equity issue, the EPS is 1.83p, an the debt 
recon., this falls as follows: 
With interest at 10.83%, the EPS is 1.03p, 
at 11.83%, the EPS is 0.93p, 
at 12.83X, the EPS is 0.83p. 
NB. The Cookson group had irrecoverable ACT of E5.6. for y/e 
Dec 91 (E0.8em, 1990) 
APPENDIX %-i-v 
E DIs: Thom Do La Rue ya Mar 1992 : YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE 
-- ------ ........... .............. 
HYPOTNETICAL ISSUE 
...... 
EQUITY DEBT ALT. (10.65%) ý 
......... "-""---....... 
DEBT ALT. (11.65Z) 
......... ------...... -- 
DENT ALT. (12.65%) 
E000 E000 E000 E000 ý E000 E000 ý E000 E000 
operating prof lt 65500 ý 65500 65500 65500 
INTEREST (ex now fin) ý 10700 10700 I 10700 10700 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 0 
---""-""- 
7170 
-----"---" 
( 
ý 
7843 
---------- 
8517 
TOTAL INTEREST ý 
"-- 
10700 
"""""-- 
ý- 
17870 
"""-"""-- ý 
18543 19217 
Net profit after int 54800 47630 
"......... 46957 ý 
- 
46283 
Pub. prr tax profit I 76200 69030 68357 67683 
basic taxation 22500 ý 22500 ( 22500 I 22500 
tax change 0 
... -----" 
I 2366 
"-------"- 
I 
I 
2588 
"--------- 
2811 
22500 20134 19912 .......... 19689 
Earnings after tax 53700 48896 48445 47994 
Prof dividend 0 0 I0 0 
Minority interest 2700 I 2700 ý 2700 I 2700 
EARNINGS for ORD ý 51000 ý 461% 45745 ý 452% 
I asa. *a. a. sssaaasss I aasasasaassssaassu I  .. assassa.. sa.... a I massaua. ua. a, u 
EPS (p. nce/ord share) ý 30.63 ý 32.55 ý 32.23 I 31.91 
asaa.. ssa.... a. aaa. . a. a...... a ..... a... saa.... as.... a... a. a .......,. aa.... a.. a 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 140697 140697 140697 140697 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of ye. r, '000) 140653 140653 
No. of now ord. shares 
(total, '000) 50700 4900 
No. of new ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 25x50 1269 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 191397 145597 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 166503 141922 
Amount of dabs E 
(nominal) E160.3an 
Coupon rate 10.65 
Tax rate 33 33 
Coaput. of min. int 
221091 Rights issue 1 for 3 25p ords at E3.50 
Raised E160.3en 
Share price 14.43 
Benchwsrk Gilt ". Treasury 9% 2008. NY " 9.651 
Additional interest would be payable of E160300000 x 10.65%, etc., 
with tax relief being available (tax rate   33%) 
In the year of issue, this has been taken as 5 months interest. 
There was an actual increase In the ra. er of ordinary shares of 
4,900,000 shares. These have also been included in the debt reconstruction 
sceneries. 
For the reconstruction scenarios, shares in issue during the year: 
01/04/91 
- 
03/01/92 
" 140,697,000 
04/01/92 
- 
31/03/92 a 145,597,000 
The weighted average mbar of shares Is calculated as: 
140,697,000 x 9/12 " 145,597,000 x 3/12 " 141,922,000 
The EPS under the original equity issue was 30.63p, under the debt recon., 
The EPS would Increase slightly as follow: 
With interest at 10.65X, the EPS is 32. S9p 
at 11.65X, the EPS is 32.23p 
at 12.65%, the EPS Is 31.91p 
NB. In 1991, Do La Rue capitalised interest of E1.247sn, though 
NONE was capitalised in 1992. 
140653 
4900 
1269 
145597 
141922 
E160.3ar 
11.65 
33 
140653 
4900 
1269 
145597 
141922 
E16O. 3m' 
12.65 
- 
33 
APPENDIX 6-1-10 
EAav«: Omina Princirq ye Oct 1991 " YEAR OF ISSUE 
AUIUAr" I)WC 
. ----------- .......... ........... 
MYPOTNETIGL ISSUE 
EQUITY DEBT ALT. ( 
.. 
10.36X) ............................ I DEBT ALT. (11.3") 
............... 
DEBT ALT. ( 
......... 
12. M; ) 
E000 £000 E000 E000 I £000 E000 1000 (000 
oporlttMO profit I 9065 9065 9065 9065 
INTEREST (on now fin) SOS I SaS SOS 5a5 
MEW FINANCE INTEREST 
I 0 I0 I0 0 
TOTAL INTEREST 585 I SOS I 585 
. 
I SOS 
MAt profit after int 8480 bulo 
. 
$4,60 
I 
5,6W 
pub. pr'"tax profit I 9026 9026 9026 9026 
alle taxation 3138 3138 3131 3138 
tax change 0 I0 I0" I0 I 
... 
3138 
....... - 
3138 
--.. 
3138 3138 
Earnings after tut I S880 Saw saw saw 
Prof divided I0 I0 I0 I0 
Minority interest (65 I 45 I GS I 45 
EARNINGS for ORD I 5843 I 5843 I 5843 ý 5643 
aassassassss ssssssa I sassssaass asasaaasa I asaaasassssssaaaaa  "asaasaas uaasssss  
EPS (p. nc. /ord shore) 25.84 28.54 28.34 28.84 
aasssataaaaa aasaaas aassaaassa sasaaaasa satassaaasaasssssss sssaasua uaassssss 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 20200 20200 20200 20200 
Avirpi no. ord. shares 
(at start of year, 1000) 20164 20134 
No. of now ord. share$ 
(totst, '000) 160 160 
No. of now Ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 76 76 
Total ord. shares at y/" 
('000) 20360 20360 
Average no. ord. shares 
(wid in EPS calc '000) 20260 20260 
Aaowt of dabs E E1S. dM 
(mains( ) 
Coupon rata 10.36 
Tax rate 33.00 33.00 
20184 
160 
76 
20360 
20260 
E15.5. 
11.36 
33.00 
20184 
160 
76 
20360 
20260 
£15. a+ 
12.36 
33.00 
250991 Rights issue I for 4 ords at E3.10 
Raised E1S. dwt. Issued 5,081,681. 
Ex-rights data 141091 
Cut-rights price ©. 8 
Lost date for psy ent in full 041191 
BIRChasrk Gilt " Treasury 9% 2008. NY " 9.362 
Additional interest would be payable of ElSS00000 n 10.36X, etc., 
with tax relief being available (tax rat*'- 332) 
In the year of issue, no interest has been taken into account, as the 
issue is so near the and of the year. 
This is a difficult issue to deal with as it straddles the company's 
Year vg, and tha""svdspuent year's results (for y/e Oct 1992) are not 
Yet available. Also the only new shares shorn in the y/" Oct 1991 are 
160,000 issued before the rights issw (and these have been included in the 
debt reconstruction), the increase relating to the rights issue is in y/e 
Oct 1992. 
41i 
APPENDIX 6-1-11 
Example: Eurotumel ye Dec 1990 . YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE 
............ --" ......... ............ 
HYPOTHETICAL ISSUE 
...... 
EQUITY I DEBT ALT. (12 
. 
00%) I 
........ 
DEBT ALT. ( 
. "----------.. 
13.00%) 
................ 
---"--- 
I DEPT ALT. (16.00z) 
E000 E000 E000 E000 I E000 E000 E000 £000 
Operating profit 171860 171860 171860 I 171860 
INTEREST (ex new fin) 202529 202529 I 202529 202529 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 0 I 5453 5907 I 6362 
TOTAL INTEREST I 202529 
.......... 
I 
I 
... 
207982 
....... 
I 
. 
208436 
......... 
208891 
Net profit after int -30669 -36122 I -36576 
I 
-37031 
Pub. pre-tax profit ý 243 I "5210 -5664" 
-6119 
basic taxation 1 II I 1 
tax change 0 I -1908 I -2066 I 
-2227 
1 
-1907 
-2067 
-2226 
Earnings after tax I 242 -3302 
-3596 "3893 
Prof dividend I0 I0 0 0 
Minority interest I0 I0 0 0 
EARNINGS for ORD 242 
-3302 -3598 I 
-3893 I 
"ta//aa1////a//a"aa I aaa///i///// /////aa I  aaf/a//// /SYN//1 I as////aaýawlW  
EPS (pence/Ord share) I -0.05 I -0.99 -1.08 
-1.17 
saaasaaa/aas//a/ata /asaaaaaa/a/asaasaa aasaa////asaa/as//a aaaaaaao/awaaa// 
Total ord. shares at 
at start of year ('000) 332392 332392 332392 332392 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of year, 1000) 332392 332392 332392 332392 
No. of new ord. shares 
(total, '000) 199435 0 0 0 
No. of new ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 199435 0 0 0 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 531827 332392 332392 332392 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS catc., 1000) 531827 332392 332392 332392 
Amount of dabs E E56Bm+ X68"^ E568on 
(nominal) 
Coupon rate 12.00 13.00 14.00 
Tax rate 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 
021190 Rights issue 3 for S units at E2.85 
Raised E568sn. issued 199,435,068 units. 
Ex-rights date 121190 
Cum-rights price E4.03 
Last date for payment In full 031290 
Benchmrk Gilt " Treasury 9X 2008. RT " 11.00% 
Additional interest would be payable of E568000000 x 12.00%, etc., 
with tax relief being available (tax rate " 35%) 
In the year of issum, "one+ month's Interest has been t aken into account 
. 
The whole Increase in the ord. shares relates to the rights issue, and 
has therefore been stripped out in the debt recon. 
The EPS Is 0.0Sp under the original equity issue, however under the 
debt recon., the EPS declines and becomes 'negative': 
With interest at 121, the EPS is -0.99p, 
13%, the EPS is 
-1.08p, 
14X, the EPS IS 
-1.17p. 
E*+mplt: Eurotunnel ye Dec 1991 : YEAR FOLLOWING YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE 
EQUITY DEBT ALT. ( 12.002) 
E000 E000 E000 £000 
Operating profit 297226 297226 
INTEREST (ex new fin) ý 348840 348840 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 0 68160 
TOTAL INTEREST 348840 417000 
Net profit after int "51614 -119774 
Pub. pre-tax profit -109 -68269 
basic taxation 0 ý0 
tax change I0 -22493 
0 
-22493 
Earnings after tax -109 -45776 
Prof dividend 0 ý0 
Minority interest 0 0 
EARNINGS for ORD 
-109 
saaa 0 
ý 
auaasaua 
-45776 
I waaaaaaaauaaaa 
EPS (pence/ord share) 0.00 
saaaaasaaasasaaaa: a 
I aaasuaaa 
ý 
"0.89 
aaaaaaaauaaaaaasaa 
Total ord. shares at 
at start of year ('000) 531827 332392 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of year, '000) 531827 332392 
No. of new ord. shares 
(total, '000) 4797173 4797173 
No. of new ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc-, 1000) 4797173 4797173 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 5329000 5129565 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., 1000)- 5329000 5129565 
Amount of dabs E ES68an 
(nominal) 
Coupon rate 12.00 
Tax rate 33.00 33.00 
021190 Rights issue 3 for 5 units at E2.85 
Raised E568an 
Ex-rights date 121190 
Cum-rights price E4.03 
Last date for payment in full 031290 
Yenchanrk Gilt 
  
Treasury 9% 2008. RT 
  
11.00% 
Additional interest would be,. payable of E566000000 x 12.00X, etc., 
with tax relief being available (tax rate a 33%) 
The increase of 4797173 In no. of shares does not rel ate to the prev ious 
year's rights issue and is therefore included in full for the debt 
recon. 
The EPS is 0.00p under the original equity issue, however under the 
debt recon., the EPS declines and becomes 'negative': 
with Interest at 12%, the EPS Is -0.89p, 
13%, the EPS is -0.97p, 
14%, the EPS IS -1.04p. 
HYPOTHETICAL ISSUE 
DEBT ALT. ( 13.00%) ý DEBT ALT. (14.00%) 
E000 E000 E000 E000 
297226 297226 
345540 ý 348840 
73540 ý 79520 
. 
422680 
......... 
428360 
-1254654 
. ......... 
-131134 
-73949 
-79629 
0 0 
-24367 -26242 
. 
-24367 
......... 
-26242 
-49SU 
. 
I 
......... 
-53387 
0 0 
0 I0 
-49582 -53387 
 . as. aaaassasssssss I a. asaasas.. s..... a I 
-0.97 ý 
-1.04 
s.. sa... s....  aaasa 
332392 332392 
332392 332392 
4797173 4797173 
4797173 
5129565 5129565 
5129565 
E566M 
13.00 
33.00 
4797173 
5129565 
14.00 
33.00 
APPENDIX 6-1-12 
EA&Opio: 
operating profit 
INTEREST (ex now fin) 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 
TOTAL INTEREST 
Net profit after int 
Pub. pre-tax profit 
basic taxation 
tax change 
Jeyss ye Dee 1989 : YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE 
............ ....................... 
NYPOTNETICAL ISSUE 
.... . 
EQUITY DEBT ALT. (10.97%) 
. ....................... 
I DEBT ALT. (11.97%) 
E000 E000 E000 E000 I E000 E000 
2725 2725 I 2725 
1029 I 1029 I 1029 
0 0 0 
1029 
... ----"- 
1029 
I 
---"-"---- 
I 1029 
16% 16% 
I 
........... 1690 
2363 I ZM3 2363 
502 
0. 
502 
502 
0 
502 
Earnings after tax ý 1861 1861 
Prof dividend ý 0 I 0 
Minority interest 0 0 
EARNINGS for ORD 1861 1861 
I asaasssssa ssssissa I isissssaasssssassii 
EPS (pence/ord share) 16.16 17.23 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 10760 10760 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of year, '000) 8020 8020 
No. of new ord. shares 
(total, '000) 3280 40 
No. of new ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 3494 2780 
Total ord. shares at y/e - 
('000) 14040 10800 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS cale., '000) 11514 10800 
Amount of dabs E E7.45en 
(nominal) 
Coupon rate 10.97 
Tax rate 35.00 35.00 
011289 Rights issue 3 for 10 ords at E2.30 
Raised E7.45 t. Issued 3,240,295 shares. 
The total new shares Issued -in the year are 3,280,000. The difference 
of 39,705 has been included in the debt reconstruction, for both the 
total number cf shares and the weighted average calculations. 
Ex-rights dato 041289 
Cum-rights price E2.56 
Lost dote for potent in full 221289 
Benchnrk Gilt " Treasury 9% 2008. IY " 9.97% 
Additional interest would be payable of E7650000 x 10.97x, etc., 
with tax relief being available (tax rate " 35X) 
In the year of issw no interest has been taken into account as the 
issue is so near the and of the year. 
The EPS is than 17.23p under all the debt scenarios, as against 16.16p 
for the original equity issue. 
502 
0 
502 
1361 
0 
0 
1561 
a aaasaassassasasaaa 
17.23 
10760 
8020 
40 
2780 
10800 
10800 
E7.45on 
11.97 
35.00 
DEBT ALT. (12.97%) 
E000 £000 
2725 
1029 
0 
. 
1029 
.... ..... 
16% 
2363 
502 
0 
- 
502 
--.... .. 
1861 
o 
0 
1861 
Susan aaaas aaaauo 
17.23 
aasaassaý: aassaw 
10760 
8020 
40 
2780 
10800 
10800 
E7.45m 
12.97 
35.00 
Eaaaplt: Jtyts Ye Doc 1990 : TEAR FOLLOWING YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE 
EQUITY ý DEBT ALT. 00.97%) 
£000 E000 E000 E000 
Operating profit ý 4253 4253 
INTEREST (ex new fin) 686 686 
NEw FINANCE INTEREST 0 ý 817 
TOTAL INTEREST ý 686 I 1503 
Net profit after int 3567 ý 2750 
Pub. pro-tax profit ý 3564 ( 2747 
basic taxation ý 1276 ý 1276 
tax change 0 -286 
1276 990 
Earnings after tax 
. ........ 
2288 ý 
.......... 
1757 
Prof dividend I 0 I0 
Minority interest 0 ý0 
EARNINGS for ORD 2288 ý 1757 
=saasauss . asasaa I =.. awass. aa. saa. sa 
EPS (pence/ord share) ý 16.30 16.27 
=usssx : asa. u . =: sssas   . ssss. naa 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 14040 10800 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of year, '000) 11514 10800 
No. of new ord. shares 
(total, '000) 0 0 
No. of new ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 2526 0 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 14040 10800 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 14040 10800 
Amount of deba E E7"45an 
Coupon rate 10.97 
Tax rate 35.00 35.00 
011289 Rights issue 3 for 10 ords at E2.30 
Raised E7.45an 
Ex-rights data 041289 
Cur rights price £2.86 
Last date for payment in full 221289 
Bench rk Gilt " Treasury 9% 2008. AT " 9.97% 
Additional interest would be payable of E7450000 x 10.97%, etc.. 
with tax relief being available (tax rate   35%) 
In the following year, the EPS under the actual issue method is 16.30p. 
Under the debt recon. there is a decrease in the EPS: 
With interest at 10.97%, the EPS is 16.27p. 
at 11.97%, the EPS Is 15.82p, 
at 12.97%, the EPS is 13.37p. 
HYPOTHETICAL ISSUE 
............................ 
DEBT ALT. (11.97%) 
E000 E000 
6253 
686 
892 
1578 
2675 
2672 
1276 
-312 
964 
1708 
0 
0 
1708 
uýaaseatrý»so»s 
15.82 
loam 
10800 
0 
0 
10300 
1 0800 
E7.45. 
11.97 
35.00 
....................... 
DEBT ALT. (12.97%) 
E000 E000 
4253 
686 
966 
1652 
2601 
2598 
1276 
"338 
938 
1660 
0 
0 
1660 
am "ussuýsaýfu 
15.37 
loam 
10600 
0 
0 
10800 
1 0800 
E7.45 M 
12.97 
35.00 
APPENDIX 6-1-13 
Exaupl": 
operating profit 
INTEREST (ex now fin) 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 
TOTAL INTEREST 
Net profit after int 
P b. pre-tax profit 
basic taxation 
tax change 
[wik-Fit ye Feb 1989 : YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE 
........................ 
EQUITY DEBT ALT. (10.09i) 
E000 E000 E000 E000 
17476 17476 
1172 ý 1177 
0ý 2603 
1172 
16304 
13454 
3775 
13701 
15851 
6747 ý 6747 
0ý 
-911 
6747.00 5835.87 
Earnings after tax 11707 10015 
Prof dividend 0ý0 
Minority interest 48 ý 48 
EARNINGS for ORD 11659 9967 
"I aaaaaaaas"sa""aassa I a"a""aa"aasaaasasaa 
EPS (pence/ord share) 7.64 8.10 
saaaa"asa""""a"aaaa aaaaa""aa"aasaasa"" 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 85670 85670 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of year, '000) 85140 85140 
No. of new ord. shares 
(total, '000) 75210 40810 
No. of new ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 67490 37939 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 160880 126480 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS ult. '000) 152630 123079 
Amount of debs E E34.4mn 
(nominal) 
Coupon rate 10.09 
Tax rate 35.00 35.00 
Coeput. of . in. int 
240588 Rights issue I for 4 ords at £1.00 
Raised E34.4an. Issued 34,400,000 shares. 
Rena rk Gilt " Treasury 9% 2008. NY " 9.09% 
Additional interest would be payable of E34400000 x 10.09X, etc., 
with tax relief being available (tax rate " 35%) 
In the year of issue, this has been taken as 9 months interest. 
On the original equity issue, the EPS is 7.64p. This increases an the 
debt recon. as follows: 
With interest at 10.09%, -the EPS is 8.10p, 
at 11.09%, the EPS is 7.96p, 
at 12.09%, the EPS is 7.83p. 
There is a total increase in the number of new ordinary shares of 
75,210,000. The rights issue accounts for 34,400,000 of these, the balance 
of 40,810,000 (issued 1 Apr 1988) has been included in the debt reconstruction. 
For the reconstruction scenario, the weighted average number of shares 
has been calculated as follows: 
01/03/88 31/03/88 " 85,670,000 x 1/12 " 7,139,167 
01/04/88 31/03/89 
  
40,810,000 
126,480,000 x 11/12 
  
115,940,000 
123,079,167 
" as"saagsaq 
HYPOTHETICAL ISSUE 
DEBT ALT. (11.09%) ý DEBT ALT. (12.09%) 
E000 E000 ý E000 E000 
17676 - 17476 
1172 1172 
2661 3119 
4033 4291 
13443 13185 
15593 15335 
6747 ý 6747 
-1001 ý 
-1092 
5745.57 5655.27 
9847 9680 
0I 0 
48 48 
9799 ý 
.. t. ssstt. t.. istt.. 
9632 
7.96 
I 
..... a.... asaam... 
( 7.83 
... am.. flu .p 
85670 
$5140 
40810 
37939 
126480 
123079 
E34.40, 
11.09 
35.00 
85670 
85140 
40810 
37939 " 
126480 
1taa79 
04.4.., 
12.09 
35.00 
Exam is: 
Operating profit 
INTEREST (sx now fin) 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 
TOTAL INTEREST 
Net profit after int 
Pub. prr tai profit 
basic taxation 
tu chsrpo 
Kwik-Fit yt Feb 1990 : YEAR FOLLOWING YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE HYPOTHETICAL ISSUE 
"... "....... ....................... ......................... 
.. ""........................ 
EQUITY DEBT ALT. (10.09%) DEBT ALT. (11.09Z} DEBT ALT. (12.092) 
E000 E000 £000 E000 I E000 E000 E000 E000 
14336 14336 14336 14336 
4892 4892 I 4892 4892 
0 3471 3815 I 4159 
... 
4892 
....... 
8363 
I 
.......... 
8707 
I 
... 
I 9051 
9444 I 5973 5ý I I ... 5285 
15320 I 11649 I 11305 I 1MIAI 
Earnings after tax 
Prof dividend 
Minority interest 
EARNINGS for ORD 
EPS (pence/ord share) 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of year, '000) 
No. of new ord. shares 
(total, '000) 
No. of new ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS calf. '000) 
Amount of dabs E 
(nominal) 
Capon rate 
Tax rate 
Comput. of ein. int 
5494 ý 5494 I 5494 ( 5494 -- 
0 ý 
-1215 -1335 "1456 
5494 4279 4159 403$ 
9626 ý 7370 ý 7146 ý 69 
0 I0 0 ý0 
-16 -16 -16 -16 
9642 7386 ( 7162 6939 
taasas: ts ssasssaaa I iisstisssasasaasaaa I sssasasaaaassi: assa I siuasaisfulii!!! 
5.98 I 
iifff iffatitlafflf  iffaaiiii 
5.97 ý 
iitttitai 
5.79 
iittifialiaaitaaafi 
ý 5.61 
 iil ilii ttiiai!!! fi 
160880 126480 126480 12640 
152630 123079 123079 123079 
567 567 
3522 567 
161GG7 127047 
567 
127047 
567 
567 567 
127047 
161152 123616 
E34.4 
10.09 
35.00 35.00 
240588 Rights issue I for 4 ord at 91.00 
Raised E34.4an 
Benchmark Gilt 
  
Treasury 9% 2008. RY a 9.09% 
Additional interest mould be payable of £34400000 x 10.09X, etc., 
with tax relief being available (tax rate a 35%) 
In the following year, the EPS u sr the actual issue mthod is S. 98p. 
Under the reconstruction for debt the EPS falls as follows: 
With interest at 10.09x, the EPS is S. 97p, 
at 11.09X, the EPS is 5.79p, 
at 12.09x, the EPS is S. 61p. 
There has been an actual increase in the Huber of ordinary shares of 
567,000. This has also been included in the debt reconstruction in both 
the total nuiber of shares in issue and the weighted average wrier of shares. 
123646 
E34.4 
11.09 
35.00 
123646 
E34.4., 
12.09 
35.00 
APPENDIX 6-1-14 
Ei Is: r. J. Love1L yo Sop 1991 YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE NYrOTNETICAL ISSUE 
EQUITY DEST ALT. (10.8%) DEBT ALT. (11.8%) DEBT ALT. (12.8%) 
E000 E000 £000 E000 ý E000 (000 I E000 E000 
Operating profit ý 10078 ý 10078 10078 10078 
INTEREST (ex now fin) ý 6665 ( 6665 ý 6665 ý 6665 
NEW FINAMCE INTEREST 0 
----..... 
83G 
I 
..... _.. _ 
912 ( 989 
TOTAL INTEREST ý 6665 ý 7499 
----..... 
ý 7577 ý 7654 
Net profit after int I 3413 2579 2501 2421. 
pub. pre-tax profit I -20307 -21141 
-21219 
-212% 
basic taxation ý -5087 ( 502 ý $02 ý 502 
tau drang. ý0 ý -284 ( -310 
-336 
Earnings after tax 
Prof dividend 
Minority Interest 
EARNINGS for ORO 
EPS (pence/ord share) 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of year, '000) 
No. It new ord. shares 
(total, '000) 
No. of new ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 
Total ord shares at y/s 
('000) 
Average no. ord shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 
Aao. mt of dabs E 
(aasfinal) 
Coupon rate 
Tax rate 
-5087 218 " 192 166 
......... ......... 
I 
........ 
I 
......... 
"15220 -21360 -21411 -21462 
0I 0 0 I0 
0I 0 0 0 
-15220 -21360 I -21411 -21462 
man 8Y wasum "no" 
-22.65 I -36.22 I -36.31 -36.39 
...... 44.7444... 14 ....... i.. Y.... O , if.,. ilf"li,... ii 
58332 58332 58332 59332 
57946 
24660 
9258 
83192 
67204 
34.00 
57946 
1094 
1024 
59426 
58970 
E30.9mn 
10.80 
34.00 
57946 
1094 
1024 
59426 
58970 
£30.9un 
11.80 
34.00 
57946 
1094 
1024 
59426 
58970 
E30.9mn 
12.80 
34.00 
250491 lights issue 2 for S ords at E1.30 
Raised E30.9on. Issued 23,765,826 shares. 
There was a total increase in the rs. er of new ordinary shares of 
24,860,000, of which 23,765,626 rotates to the rights issue. The balance 
of 1,094,174 has been included in the debt reconstruction. 
Ex-rights dote 210591 
Cum-rights price E1.26 
Last date for payment in full 100691 
Benchmark GILL 
  
Treasury 9Z 2008. RT 
  
9.8% 
Additional interest would be payable of E30900000 x 10.8%, etc., 
ritt tax relief being available (tax rate " 34x) 
In the year of issue, this has been taken as 3 months interest. 
Under the original equity issue, there is a 'negative' EPS of -22.65p. 
under the debt region. there is an increase in the negative EPS: 
With interest at 10.8%, the EPS is -36.22p, 
at 11.82, the EPS is -36.31p, 
_ 
at 12.8%, the EPS is -3T. 39p. 
For the debt reconstruction scenario, the weighted average number of shares 
has been calculated as: 
01/10/88 
- 
29/02/89 
  
58,332,000 x 5/12 " 24,305,000 
01/03/89 
- 
30/09/89 " 59,426,000 a 7/12 " 34,665,167 
58,970,167 
APPENDIX 6-1-15 
EAl plI: MW" tank ye Doc 1987 : TEAl OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE 
............. .. ------- -------------.. 
HYPOTHETICAL ISSUE 
... 
EQUITY DEBT ALT. (10.13%) 
......... 
- 
DEBT ALT. 
----......... -- 
C11.13%) 
----""----.... --------- 
DEBT ALT-02.13%) 
E000 E000 E000 E000 ý E000 E000 ý E000 E000 
Operating profit I -493000 -493000 
-493000 
-493000 
INTEREST (ex new fin) ý 191000 191000 ý 191000 191000 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST ý 0 
---------- 
23360 
ý 
......... 
ý 
25666 
------ 
( 27972 
TOTAL INTEREST ý 191000 
.......... 
ý 
214360 
---------- 
--- 216666 
....... . 
218972 
Net profit after int ý -664000 -707360 .. 
-709666 .......... 
-711972 
Pub. pre-tax profit -505000 -528360 
-530666 I 
-532972 
basic taxation -58000 ý -58000 
-58000 
-58000 
tax change I 0 
---------- 
-4176 
I 
--------- 
-8983 
......... 
. 
9790 
-58000 
---------- 
-66176 
.......... 
ý 
-66983 
I 
......... 
-67790 
Earnings after tax -447000 -462164 ý 
.......... 
-463683 
-465182 
Prof dividend I 0 0 0 ý0 
Minority interest 9000 I 9000 9000 ý 9000 
EARNINGS for ORO 
-456000 -471184 -47268.3 
-474182 
I 
..... ua,     .      , 
I 
.,,.  ,   ,,, o..    I ....,.... .,.  ....  . I .. a....... a.... n 
EPS (pence/ord share) -1.25 I -1.97 -1.98 
-1.99 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 232000 232000 232000 232000 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of year, 1000) 234000 231000 231000 231000 
No. of new ord. shares 
(total, 1000) 315000 82074 52074 82074 
No. of new ord. shares 
(used in EPS catc., '0007 134000 7840 7840 7840 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
(1000) 547000 314074 314074 314074 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used In EPS catc., 1000) 365000 238840 238840 238840 
Amt of dabs i E698.8mn E698. gain E698.8sn 
(nominal) 
Coupon rate 10.13 11.13 12.13 
Tax rate 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 
070787 Rights issue 1 for 1 ords at E3.00 
Raised E698.8an. Issued 232,926,169 shares. 
Esc-rights dote 110887 
Cum-rights pried £6.15 
Last date for payment in full 030987 
Ssnchimart Gilt " Treasury 11.752 2003-2007. NY " 9.13% 
Additional interest would be payable of E698800000 x 10.13%, ate., 
with tax relief being available (tax rate   352) 
In the year of Issue, this has been taken as 6 months interest. 
In the y/e Dec 1987, there was a total increase in the no. of 
ord. shares of 315,000,000. Of this, only 232.926,169 was attributable 
to the rights issue. The balance of 82,074,000 shares, issued 2 Doc 1987, 
has been included in the debt reconstruction. 
For the reconstruction scenario, the total shares in issue is: 
01/01/87 
- 
01/12/87 " 232,000,000 
02/12/87 
- 
31/12/87 
  
314,074,000 
For the recon., the weighted average nu1 r of shares Is calculated as: 
232.000,000 i[ 11/12 + 314,074,000 x 1/12 " 238,839,500 
On the original debt issue, the EPS was 'negative' at -1.25p. Under 
the debt recon., the EPS is as follows: 
With interest at 10.132, EPS is -1.97p, 
at 11.13X; EPS Is -1.95p 
at 12.13%, EPS is -1.99p. 
Example: Midland sank ye Dec 1988 : TEAR FOLLOWING YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE 
............. ......... ............... 
MYPOTNETICAL ISSUE 
...... 
EQUITY DEBT ALT. (10.13%) I 
...................... 
DEBT ALT. (11.13%) I 
E000 E000 £000 £000 I E000 E000 I 
Operating profit ý 675000 675000 I 675000 
INTEREST (ex now fin) 194000 194000 I 194000 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 0 
---------- 
70788 
I 
------"-- 
I 77776 
TOTAL INTEREST I 
-- 
194000 
--""---- 
I 
I 
264738 
.......... 
--------- 271776 
Nat profit after int 481000 410212 
---------- 403224 
Pub. pre-tax profit 693000 I 622212 615224 
basic taxation 273000 I 273000 I 273000 
tax change 0 
---------- 
"24776 
--------- 
-27222 
-- 
.. 
273000 
........ 
248224 
.......... 
------- 
245778 
Earnings after tax 420000 373980 I 
..... ----- 369445 
Prof dividend 0 0 0 
Minority interest I 8000 8000 8000 
EARNINGS for ORD 412000 365988 
. 
361445 
I 
 ws aaaaas saas    (  s :  asssaasasaaas  aaaassaa: aa saaasaa 
EPS (pence/ord share) ý 0.75 1.16 1.15 
:  saasa.    . s aa s     a a na a  aaa sa . 888.8.8 a.   a a. 
 , 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 547000 314074 314074 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of year, '000) 365000 238840 238840 
No. of new ord. shares 
- (total, '000) 3000 3000 3000 
No. of new ord. shares 
(used in EPS cale., '000) 183000 76234 76234 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 550000 317074 317074 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS cale., '000) 
- 
548000 315074 315074 
Amount of dabs E E698.8an E698.8on 
(noei na L) 
Coupon rate 10.13 11.13 
Tax rate 35.00 35.00 35.00 
070787 Rights issue 1 for 1 ords at E3.00 
Raised E698.8sn 
Ex-rights date 110887 
Currights price 16.15 
Last date for payarnt in full 030987 
Benchmark Gilt 
  
Treasury 11.752 2003-2007. RY 
  
9.132 
Additional interest would be payable of E698800000 x 10.13%, etc., 
with tax relief being available (tax rate " 3S%) 
A full year's interest has been included for 1988. 
There has been an actual increase in ord. shares of 3,000,000 during the 
year, issued 1 Sep 1988. These have also been included in the debt 
reconstruction scenario. 
For the reconstruction scenario, the total muter of shares in issue is: 
01/01/88 
- 
31/08/88 
  
314,074,000 
01/09/88 
- 
31/12 88 " 317,074,000 
For the recon., the weighted average number of shares is calculated as: 
314,074,000 x 8/12 " 317,074,000 a 4/12 " 315,074,000 
On the original equity issue the EPS is 0.75p, under the debt recon., this 
increases ss follow: 
with interest at 10.13%, EPS is 1.16p, 
11.13%, EPS is 1.1Sp, 
12.13%. EPS is 1.13p. 
....................... 
GEBT ALT. (12.13%) 
E000 E000 
673000 
194000 
64764 
. 
273764 
.... ..... 
396236 
6 
273000 
00236 
"29668 
243332 
364903 
0 
8000 
356903 
1.13 
316074 
238840 
3000 
76234 
317074 
315074 
E698. din 
12.13 
35.00 
APPENDIX 6-1-16 
ExvvVL8: R. yslion ys Mar 1992 : YEAR Of ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE 
...... -----. .......... ............ 
HYPOTHETICAL ISSUE 
... 
EQUITY DEBT ALT. ( 11.19%) 
...................... 
DEBT ALT. (12.19%) 
...................... 
--- 
DEBT ALT. (13.19%) ý 
E000 E000 E000 E000 I E000 E000 E000 E000 
Operating profit 7287 ý 7257 7287 I 7287 
INTEREST (eA new fin) ý 0 0 ý0 0 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 0 1558 1698 ý 1837 
TOTAL INTEREST I 
. 
0 
... . 
ISM 
. 
1698 
. _.. 
' 1837 
Profit after int Not 
i 
7287 I 5729 5589 I 5450 
PuD. pre-tax profit -2680 -28362 
-28502 
-286"1 
basic taxation ý -5293 ý -5293 ý -5293 ý 
-5293 ý 
tax change I0 -516 ý -560 I -606 
. 
-5293 
........ . 
-5807 
........ 
5853 
----- - 
-5899 
after tax -21511 -22555 
ý 
- -- ý 
-22648 
I 
......... 
-22742 
Prof dividend (0 I0 0 0 
Minority interest ý0 0 ý0 ý0 
EARNINGS for ORD 
-21511 ( -22555 -22648 
-22742 ý 
"fWaaaiila Wife I afaaaaaaia taaaaaal I iaf affalafiaalaala Ia affalaaaafaa... I 
EPS (pence/ord share) 
-19.74 -25.68 ý -25.79 ý 
-25.89 
afasfaaaasaWasaa aassassua saasasss saasassaasaaassua saasaasas uWfaas 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 87829 87829 87329 87829 
Average no. Ord. shares 
at start of year ('000) 87829 87829 
No. of new ord. shares 
(totat, '000) 29276 0 
No. of new ord. shares 
used in EPS calc. ('000) 21156 0 
Total ord. Shares at y/e 
('000) 117105 87829 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS catc., '000) 108985 87829 
Amount of debs E E20.786en 
(nosinal) 
Coupon rate 11.19 
Tax rate 33.00 33.00 
120691 lights issue I for 3 ords at E0.71 
Raised E20.786. i. issued 29,276,471 shares. 
Ex-rights date 010791 
Cum-rights price 10.82 
Last date for peymnt in full 220791 
Benchmark Gilt " Treasury 9% 2004. NY.   10.19% 
Additional interest would be payable of E20786000 a 11.19%, etc., 
with tax relief being available (tax rate   33%) 
In the ypr of issue, this hu been taken as & aronths interest. 
Under the oriyinsl equity issue, there is a 'negative' EPS of -19.74p. 
Under the debt recon. there is an increase in the negative EPS: 
With interest at 11.19%, the EPS Is -25.66p, 
at 12.191, the EPS is -25.79p, 
at 13.192, the EPS is "25.69p. 
87829 
0 
0 
87829 
87829 
£20.786 
12.19 
33.00 
a7829 
0 
0 
87829 
87829 
£20.786mi 
13.19 
33.00 
APPENDIX 6-1-17 
ExmPke: Ienold rs Nor 1985 : YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE 
EQUITY DEST ALT. ( 12.11%) 
E000 E000 E000 E000 
Operating profit I 9100 9100 
INTEREST (ex new fin) 4600 ý 4600 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST ý 0 ý 0 
TOTAL INTEREST 
... 
4600 
....... . 
4600 
......... 
Net profit after int 4500 4500 
Pub. pre-tax profit ý 4500 4500 
basic taxation 1200 ý 1200 
tax change 0 0 
1200 1200 
Earnings after tax 
... ....... 
3300 ý 
. ......... 
3300 
Prof dividend 100 ý 160 
Minority interest 100 100 
EARNINGS for ORD 3100 
i i susiiisiii  iwsswi 
3100 
uitiiw 
EPS (pence/ord share) 
i aisi I s 
6.67 7.66 
Totat ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 40352 40352 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of year, '000) 40352 40352 
No. of new ord. shares 
(to ul, '000) 24048 0 
No. of new ord. shares 
(used in EPS ca(c., '000) 6092 0 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 64400 40352 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS ca(c., '000) 46441 40352 
Anntnt of dabs E E9.37sn 
(nowinaI) 
Coupon rate 12.11 
Tax rate 45.00 45.00 
250185 Rights issue 3 for 5 orris at E0.39 
Raised E9.37sn 
Ex-rights dote 120285 
Cis-rfohts price E0.545 
Last date for pay. ent In full 060385 
Bend rk Gilt a Treasury 11.75% 2003-2007. RY " 11.112 
Additional interest would be payable of E9370000 x 12.11%, etc., 
with tax relief being available (tax rate a 652) 
In the year of issue, no interest has been charged as the issue 
was close to the year and. 
The EPS on the original equity issue Is 6.67p. The EPS an the debt 
scenarios is 7.68p, i. e. It is the sar for all of thes as no Interest 
has been taken into account in this year. it is sore than under the 
equity scenario, as the 6,092,000 increase in the average no. of shares 
has been stripped out in the debt recon. as this Increase relates to the 
rights Issue. 
HYPOTHETICAL ISSUE 
............................ 
DEBT ALT. 03.11%) 
E000 E000 
9100 
4600 
0 
4600 
4500 
4500 
1200 
0 
1200 
.......... 
3300 
100 
100 
3100 
uuswsassawwd ým 
7.68 
40352 
40352 
0 
0 
40352 
40352 
E9.37rn 
13.11 
45.00 
.... " ................ "- 
OEiT ALT. (14.11%) 
E000 E000 
9100 
4600 
0 
1-600 
.......... 
4500 
4500 
1200 
0 
1200 
3300 
100 
100 
3100 
". Y$... sssYs"" I 
7.68 
fasfna., ..... n... 
40352 
40352 
0 
0 
40352 
40352 
E9.37on 
14.11 
45.00 
EAmplo: 
Operating profit 
INTEREST (ex new fin) 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 
TOTAL INTEREST 
Net profit after int 
Pub. pr. -tax profit 
basic taxation 
tax change 
Renotd y. Per 1986 : YEAR FOLLOWING YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE 
............ ........ . 
EQUITY 
. 
ý DEBT ALT. ( 
.............. 
12.11%) 
E000 E000 £000 E000 
10000 10000 
3700 ý 3700 
0 1135 
3700 ý 4935 
6300 5165 
7600 6465 
2300 I 2300 
0 ý 
-454 
... 
2300 
....... . 
1B46 
......... 
Earnings after tax 5300 ý 4619 
Pref dividend 100 100 
Minority interest 100 ý 100 
EARNINGS for ORD 5100 4419 
I aaaaaaasaaaaaaaaaaa I "aasa"asasaaaaaasaa 
EPS (pence/ord share) ý 7.90 ý 10.91 
unman= =a" "aaaa=iaaaaaauaa 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 64400 40352 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of year, '000) 46444 40352 
No. of new ord. shares 
(total, '000) 160 160 
No. of new ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 18116 160 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 64560 40512 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 64560 40512 
Amount of dabs E ß"37s^ 
(nominal) 
Coupon rate 12.11 
Tax rate 40.00 40.00 
250185 Rights issue 3 for S orris at E0.39 
Raised E9.37en 
Es-rights date 120285 
Cur rights price E0.545 
Last date for payment in full 060385 
Benchmark Gilt a Treasury 11.75% 2003-2007. MY " 11.11% 
Additional interest would be payable of E9370000 x 12.11%, etc., 
with tax relief being available (tax rate   40%) 
There has been an actual increase during the year of 160,000 ordinary 
shares, issued 1 April 1985. These shares have also been included in the 
debt reconstructions in full for both the total number of new shares and 
the weighted average number of shares. 
The EPS on the original equity issue is 7.90p. The EPS an the debt 
recon. Is as follows: 
with interest at 12.11%, the EPS is 10.91p, 
at 13.11%, the EPS is 10.77p, 
at 14.11%, the EPS is 10.63p. 
MTPOTHETICAL ISSUE 
DEBT ALT. (13 
. 
11%) ý DEBT ALT. ( 116.11%) 
E000 E000 E000 E000 
10000 ý 10000 
3700 3700 
1228 1322 
... 
4928 
....... 
5022 
5072 I 
. ......... 
4978 
6372 ( 6278 
2300 2300 
-491 ý 
-529 
.. 
1809 
..... 
1771 
. .. 6563 .. ...... -- 4507 
Too. 100 
100 100 
aaaaa 
4363 ý 
a aa 
6307 
 :. aaaa aa sa I 
10.77 
asssaaaaýssasssassaa 
a/asssaalaaaa/ataf 
10.63 
sss: aaassssossasa" 
40352 40352 
40352 40352 
160 160 
160 160 
40512 40512 
40512 40512 
£9.37in £9.37. 
13.11 14.11 
40.00 40.00 
Note. There was irrecoverable ACT of EO. Ssn for y/e Mar 1986. 
APPENDIX 6-1-18 
Example: Richards plc ye Sep 1989 : YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE 
........ ---- .......... ........ 
NYPOTNETICAL ISSUE 
EQUITY DEBT ALT. ( 
..... 
10.29%) 
................. 
DEBT ALT. (11 
........... 
. 
299) 
............... 
DEBT ALT. ( 
......... 
12.29%) 
E000 E000 E000 E000 I E000 E000 ý E000 E000 
Operating profit I 2905 2905 2905 2905 
INTEREST (ex new fin) ý 584 584 ý 584 584 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 0 254 ý 278 ý 303 
TOTAL INTEREST ý 
... 
564 
....... 
r. 
ä38 
......... 
ý 
... 
862 
....... 
587 
Net profit after int 2321 2067 ý 2043 
. ......... 
2018 
Pub. pre-tu profit I 2767 2513 ý 2439 2464 
basic taxation 778 ý 778 na ne 
tax change 0 I . 89 ý -97 -106 
.. 
778 
........ . 
689 
......... ... 
681 
....... 
672 
Famines after tax I 1989 I 1824 I 1808 
. 
1 
......... 
1792 
Prof dividend ý 3 ý 3 
Minority interest ý 0 ý 0 
EARNINGS for ORO ý 1986 1821 
EPS (pence/ord share) 8.96 11.39 
::::::  .: aasss: a:. a . z. w... uzaa. asa 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 13230 13230 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of yeer, '000) 13210 13210 
No. of new ord. shares 
(total, '000) 9980 6636 
No. of now ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 8960 2785 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 23210 19866 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 22170 15995 
Amount of dabs E E3.678 m 
(nominal) 
Coupon rate 10.29 
Tax rate 35.00 35.00 
091288 Rights Issue I for 4 ords at E1.10 
Raised 93.678m. issued 3,343,801 shares. 
Ex-rights date 090189 
Cum-rights price E1.26 
Last date for full payment 300789 
Benchmark Gilt " Treasury 9% 2008 NY " 9.292 
Additional interest would be payable of E3678000 x 10.29x, etc., 
with tax relief being available (tax rate   35%) 
In the year of issue, this has been taken as 8 annths interest. 
During the year, ordinary shares increased by 9,980,000. However, the 
rights Issue accounted for only 3,344,000 new ord. shares. Therefore, 
the balance of 6,636,000 was included in the debt recon. for the total 
number of new shares. 
For the debt reconstruction, the weighted average number of shares is 
calculated ass 
01/10/88 
- 
04/05/89 " 13,230,000 * 7/12 " 7,717,500 
05/05/89 
- 
30/09/89 " 19,866,000 x 5/12 " 8,277,500 
i. e. a total of 15,995,000. 
In the original equity issue, the EPS is 8.96p. 
On the debt recon., the EPS figures changed as follows: 
With interest at 10.29%, the EPS is 11.39p, 
at 11.29%, the EPS is 11.29p, 
at 12.292, the EPS is 11.19p. 
3 
0 
1805 
11.29 
a. aaaaaaaaaaasuasa 
13230 
13210 
6636 
2785 
19866 
15995 
E3.67aon 
11.29 
35.00 
3 
0 
1739 
iittititt ittttittf  
11.19 
tiiiiiiii tiifiitif" 
13230 
13210 
6636 
2785 
19966 
15995 
E3.67Ean 
12.29 
35.00 
Example: Richards plc ye Sep 1990 : YEAR FOLLOWING YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE 
............ ......... ............... 
HYPOTHETICAL ISSUE 
.... 
EQUITY OUT ALT. (10.29%) 
... "----- 
DEBT ALT. 
-........... -- 
(11.29%) 
--............ 
DEBT ALT. 
.......... 
(12.29%) 
E000 E000 E000 E000 ý E000 E000 E000 E000 
Operating profit ý 2543 2543 2543 2543 
INTEREST (ex new fin) ý 231 231 ý 231 231 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 0ý 378 ý 415 452 
TOTAL INTEREST I 231 
--"-----"" 
I 
609 
.......... 
646 683 
Nat profit after hit 2312 I 
I 
1934 .......... 1897 
I ý .......... 1860 
Ptb. pre-tu profit I 2815 2437 
, 
2400 2363 
basic taxation 679 ý 679 ý 679 679 
tu change ý0 -132 ý -145 
-158 
679 547 534 521 
Earnings after tax 2136 ý 1890 1866 ý 1842 
Prof dividend ý3I 3 I3 3 
Minority interest (0ý 0 0 0 
EARNINGS for ORD 2133 1887 1863 1839 
aasataaaaaaaaaaaasa I sasasaaaaaasaafaasa I aaaaaaasa aaaaaam. I aaaaaaaasaaaasaaaa 
EPS (penc. /ord share) 9.18 9.49 ý 9.37 ( 9.25 
aasaataaaaaasaaaasa  aasaaaa saaataaasaa aaaaaaaaa aaaaa. aaaa aaasaaasaaasasasu 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 23210 19866 19866 19866 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of y. ar, '000)22170 15995 15995 15995 
Na. of now ord. shares 
(total, '000) 146 146 146 146 
No. of now ord. shares 
(used in EPS cale., '000) 1063 3895 3895 3895 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 23356 20012 20012 20012 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 23233 19890 19890 19890 
Amount of dabs E E3.67amn £3.678an E3.678on 
(nominal) 
Coupon rate 10.29 11.29 12.29 
Tax rate 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 
091288 Rights Issue I for 4 ords at 11.10 
Raised E3.678sn 
Ex-rights date 090189 
Cum-rights price £1.26 
Last date for full payment 300189 
Benchmark Gilt 
  
Treasury 9% 2008 RT 
  
9.29% 
Additional interest would be payable of E3678000 x 10.29%, etc., 
with tax relief being available (tax rats " 35%) 
There has been an actual increase in the rung of shares of 146,000, 
issued 3 August 1990, and this has also been included in the debt rscon. 
For the raten. scenarios, total shares in issue: 
01/10/89 
- 
02/08/90 
  
19,866,000 
03/08/90 
- 
30/09/90 
  
20,012,000 
For the debt ratan., the weighted average number of shares is: 
19,866,000 x 10/12 " 20,012,000 x 2/12   19,890,333 
In the original equity issue, the EPS is 9.18p. 
On the debt recon., the EPS figures increase as follow: 
With interest at 10.291, the EPS Is 9.49p, 
at 11.29%, the EPS is 9.37p, 
at 12.29%, the EPS is 9.25p. 
APPENDIX 6-1-19 
Exaspiat Skatchtsy ye Mar 1991 : YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE 
----------- ------------ 
HYPOTHETICAL ISSUE 
" 
EQUITY DEBT ALT. (11.93Z) 
----... 
-----. 
---.. -----.... 
DEBT ALT. (12.93%) 
..... ---... ---" 
I DEBT ALT. ( 
--------. 
13.93%) 
E000 £000 E000 E000 I E000 E000 
, 
I E000 E000 I 
Operating profit I 3293 I 3293 I 3293 I 3293 
INTEREST (ex now fin) 6380 I 6380 6330 6380 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 0I 
......... 
I 
1735 
---------- 
law 
--- 
2025 I 
TOTAL INTEREST 6380 ý 
I 
. _.. _.. __ 
I 
8115 
------- 
I 8260 
---------- 
acos 
at profit after int -3057 I 
-822 "4967 
-5112 Pub. pre-tax profit 
-5264 I "6999 
-71GA 
-7289 basic taxation I 
-1619 
-1619 I 
-1619 
-1619 
tax change I0I 
-590 
-639 I 
-689 
1619 
-2209 
-2258 
-2309 
Earnings after tax . 3645 
-47g0 
-4356 
-"-6982 
Prof dividend I6 6 6 6 
Minority Interest I0I 0 I 0- 0 
EARNINGS for ORD 
"3651 I -47% 
-4892 
. 
4968 
liiiiiiitiiiiiiiii ( 
 iifiq iiiiiiiiif ii I iiiii/itiiiiiiiiii  I 
 sasiiiii. iiasiit  
EPS (p. nce/ord share) I 
-6.92 I 
-13.24 I 
-13.50 
-13.77 
u isi iiiiisiiisiis su iisiiýiii uýisii siisiitiiiiiiiýa ii "iiiiiiisf itfiiiii 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 36223 36223 
Average no. ord shares 
(at start of ytar, '000) 34206 36206 
No. of now ord. ehares 
(total, '000) 21729 0 
No. of new ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 16559 17 
Total ord shares at y/e 
(000) 57952 36223 
Average no. ord shares 
(used-in EPS calc., '000) 52765 36223 
Awou t of dabs E E21.7an 
(nominal) 
Coupon rate 11.93 
Tax rate 34.00 34.00 
180690 Rights issue 3 for 5 ords at E1.00 
Raised E21.71mr. Issued 21,729,000 shares. 
Ex-rights data 120790 
Cum-rights price E1.73 
Last data for pant in full 030890 
kJ rk Gilt a Treasury 9% 2008. RY " 10.932 
Additional Interest would be payable of E21700000 a 11.93%, etc., 
with tu relief being available (tax rate 
  
34X) 
In the year of issue, this has bean taken as S months interest. 
The weighted average number of shares for the debt reconstructions is 
36,223,000, the shares which have been in issue all year (there were no 
new shares issued apart from those relating to the rights issue). 
It can be seen that the EPS would actually be 0.00p under all scenarios 
but looking at the 'negative EPS' figures, it is least negative under 
the original equity issue, at -6.92p. under the debt recon. we have: 
with interest at 11.93%, the EPS is -13.24p, 
at 12.93%, the FPS is -13.50p, 
at 13.93%, the FPS is -13.77p. 
36223 
36206 
0 
17 
36223 
36223 
E21.7w 
12.93 
34.00 
36223 
36206 
0 
17 
36223 
36223 
E21.7mn 
13.93 
34.00 
Exnple: Sketchlsy ye Mir 1992 
. 
YEAR FOLLOWING YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE 
....... ........... ....... ..... 
EQUITY 
...... 
DEBT ALT. (11.93%) 
E000 £000 E000 E000 
Operating profit ý 6535 ý 6535 
INTEREST (ex new fin) ý 2980 2980 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 0 
......... 
2589 
---------- 
I 
TOTAL INTEREST ý 2980 5569 
Net profit after int 3555 ý 966 
Pub. pre-tax profit 6015 ý 3426 
basic taxation 1501 1504 
tax change ý 0 
-"-"--"-- 
I 
-as 
---------- 
1504 650 
Earnings after tax 4511 2776 
Prof dividend 14 14 
Minority interest 0 ý0 
EARNINGS for ORD ( 4497 ý 2762 
EPS (pence/ord share) 7.76 ý 7.63 
aasaw assuu a   ýwusa u  aw  
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 57952 36223 
Average no. ord shares 
(at start of year, '000) 52765 36223 
No. of new ord. sharss 
(ord, '000) 0 0 
No. of new ord. shares 
(used In EPS calc.. '000) 5187 0 
Total ord shares at y/e 
('000) 57952 36223 
Average no. ord shares 
(used in EPS calc. '000) 57952 36223 
Amount of dabs EQT" 7mn 
(nominst) 
Coupon rate 11.93 
Tax rate 33.00 33.00 
180690 Rights issue 3 for 5 ords at E1.00 
Raised E21.7sn 
Yencirsrt Gilt 
  
Treasury 9% 2008. RT 
  
10.93% 
Additional interest would be payable of E21700000 x 11.93%, etc., 
with tax relief being available (tax rate   33%) 
It can be seen that the EPS would actually be 7.76p under the original 
equity isaw, where" oder the debt recon, the EPS would drop as follows: 
with interest at 11.93%, the EPS Is 7.63p 
at 12.93%, the EPS is 7.22p, 
at 13.93%, the EPS is 6.82p. 
NYPOTNETIGI ISSA 
GEBT ALT. (12 
. 
93%) DEBT ALT. (13.93%) 
E000 E000 ý E000 E000 
6535 6535 
2980 I 2950 
2606 
.......... 
3023 
. 
5766 
. ........ 
- 
6003 
749 ý 532 
3209 ý 2992 
1504 1501. 
-926 
.......... 
-996 
------- " 
.. 
578 
....... 
-- 
506 
2631 
I. 
........ 2486 
14 14 
0 I0 
2617 2472 
7.22 I 6.82 
36223 
36223 
0 
0 
E21.7mn 
12.93 
33.00 
36223 
36223 
0 
0 
36223 
36223 
E21.7in 
13.93 
33.00 
APPENDIX 6-1-20 
Eanpl*: 
operating profit 
INTEREST (ex new fin) 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 
TOTAL INTEREST 
Net profit after Int 
Pub. pre-tux profit 
basic taxation 
tax charge 
Tay Nars ye Jun 19117 : YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE 
............ ........................ 
EOUITY DEST ALT. (9.67%) 
E000 E000 E000 E000 
3260 3260 
272 272 
0ý0 
272 
.......... 2988 I 
3024 
, 082 
0 
1082 
272 
2988 
3024 
10U 
0 
1082 
Earnings after tax 1942 1942 
Prof dividend ý 0 
Minority interest 0ý 0 
EARNINGS for ORD 1942 1942 
I 
   a as  ss    as s I           a as      
EPS (pence/ord share) 34.85 
a a : ssss ss s asss 
36.47 
  sasas:   a 
Total ord. shares at 
s            
start of year ('000) 5325 5325 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of year, '000) 5325 5325 
No. of new ord. shares. 
(totaL, '000) 1775 0 
No. of new ord. shares 
(used in EPS cite., '000) 247 0 
'ota( ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 7100 5325 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 5572 5325 
Amount of dabs E E6. Ion 
(nominal) 
Coupon rate 9.67 
Tax rate 35.00 35.00 
080587 Rights issue I for 3 ords at 13.65 
Raised Minn. Issued 1,775,264 shares. 
Ex-rights date 020687 
Cum-rights price 14.37 
Lost date for payment in full 240687 
Band rk Gilt " Treasury 11.75% 2003-2007. Rt " 8.67% 
Additional interest would be payable of E6100000 x 9.67X, etc., 
with tax relief being available (tax rate a 35%) 
In the year of issue, no interest has been taken into account as 
the last date for payment in full is 260687, very close to the 
company's year end. 
For the debt reconstructions, the weighted average number of shares Is 
5,325,000 i. e. the shares which have been in issue since the start of the 
year (there ras no Increase In the ember of new ordinary shares except 
for that relating to the rights issue). 
The EPS an the original equity issue Is 34.85p. The EPS on the debt 
scenarios is 36.67p, i. e. It is the some for all of then as no interest 
has been taken into account in this year. it is more than under the 
equity scenario, as the 247,000 Increase in the average no. of shares 
has been stripped out in the debt recon. as this increase relates to the 
rights issue. 
HYPOTHETICAL ISSUE 
DEBT ALT. (10 
. 
67%) DEBT ALt. (11 
. 
6? %) 
E000 E000 I E000 E000 
3260 3260 
272 272 
o I0 
... 
272 
....... 
I 
.. 
272 
2988 . I ...... 2988 
3024 I 3024 
1082 I 1082 
0 ý0 
1082 I 1082 
1942 1942 
0 I0 
0 
fif777i7W7 
1942 
i7777f  
191.2 
36.47 
ff777i7YW Y7i7f7 
I 1if YiiiýWi77f if 
36.47 
fiY YiltYiYffY 
5325 5325 
5325 
0 
0 
5325 
5325 
E6. Ion 
10.67 
35.00 
5323 
0 
0 
5325 
5325 : 
E6.1an 
11.67 
35.00 
Esaspla: Tay Moses ye Jun 19M : YEAR FOLLOWING YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE HYPOTHETICAL ISSUE 
EQUITY DENT ALT. (9.67Z) DEBT ALT. (10 
. 
67%) ý DEBT ALT, ( 11.67%) 
E000 £000 E000 E000 I E000 E000 E000 E000 
Operating profit I 5537 ý 5537 ý 5537 ý 5537 
INTEREST (as new fin) 413 413 ý 413 ý 413 
NEW FINANCE. IIJTEREST 0 590 ý 651 712 
TOTAL INTEREST ý 413 ý 1003 " 1064 1125 
Not profit after int 5124 4534 4473 ý 4412 
Pub. pr, -tu profit 5151 ý 4561 4500 4439 
basic taxation 1799 ý 1799 1799 1799 
tu charge ý0 ý -206 -225 I 
-249 
""-- 
1799 
------ ... 
1593 
....... ... 
1571 
....... 
1550 
Earnings after tu 3352 2969 
ý ý 2929 . ......... 2639 
Prof dividend 0" 1 0 1 0. 1 0 
Minority interest 0 0 0 ý 0 
EARNINGS for ORD 3352 ý 2969 ý 2929 2839 
I saaawaaassitasw I wawawaaww I aawuawaaaaaaaa I "aamaaýwasaaas 
EPS (pence/Ord share) 47.21 55.75 ( 55.00 54.26 
saasaaas nn. aaaa  naoaaaasasaaaaap aa aaasaaaaaaaaaaaaa  aaasaaa_aas+aasa 
Total. ord. shares at 
. tart of veer (1000) 7100 5325 5325 5325 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of year, '000) 5572 5325 5325 
No. of new ord. shares 
(total, '000) 0 0 0 
No. of new ord. shares 
(used in EPS catc., '000) 1528 0 0 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 7100 5325 5325 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 7100 5325 5325 
Amount of dabs E E6. lain E6.1en 
(nominal) 
Coupon rate 9.67 10.67 
Tax rate 35.00 35.00 35.00 
080587 Rights issue I for 3 ords at E3.45 
Raised E6. lan 
Ex-rights date 020687 
Cur rights price E6.37 
Last date for payment in full 240687 
Benchmark Gilt " Treasury 11.75% 2003-2007. IT " 8.67% 
Additional interest would be payable of E6100000 x 9.67%, etc., 
with tax relief being available (tax rate   35%) 
Under the original equity issue, the EPS Is 47.21p. On the debt rec on. 
the EPS increases as follows: 
with interest at 9.671. EPS is $5.75p, 
at 10.67%, EPS Is 55.00p, 
at 11.67%, EPS Is 54.26p. 
5323 
0 
0 
5325 
5325 
E6.1un 
11.67 
35.00 
APPENDIX 6-1-21 
Excels: Tibbtt i Britten ye Doc 1989 
. 
YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE 
............ ......... 
.............. 
NYPOTNETICAL ISSUE 
.... 
EQUITY DEBT ALT. (10.08X) 
.......... 
ý DEBT ALT. 
.............. 
(11.08Z) 
E000 E000 E000 E000 ý E000 E000 
Operating profit 9111 9111 ý 9111 
INTEREST (ex new fin) ý 1208 I 1208 1208 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST ý 0 
... ------ 
ý 1108 
ý 
-_.... 
_.. 
ý 1217 
TOTAL INTEREST 
... 
1208 
....... 
I 
2316 
........ 
I--. 
-ý 
ý 2425 
Net profit after int 7903 .. 6795 I 
". -6686 
Pub. pre-tax profit 9062 7954 ý 7845 
basic taxation ý 3208 I 3208 3208 
tax change I 
ý 
0 
.... 
I 
-388 ý 
3208 2820 
..... 
4782 
Earnings after tax 5854 5134 
... 
5063 
Prof dividend 0 0 I0 
Minority interest ý 0 0 I0 
EARNINGS for ORD 5854 5134 5063 
sasaasasaaapsaaata I aasaasaaasaaasaasaa I 
"aawaaassasaaaaaa 
EPS (pence/ord share) 18.74 19.33 19.06 
sasasstaaaaa aaaaafa saaaq saaatssaaafaa taaataaaYaafalaaas 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 26260 26260 26260 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of year, '000) 26260 26260 26260 
No. of now ord. shares 
(total, '000) 7280 715 0 
No. of new ord. shares 
(used in EPS ealc., '000) 4980 298 298 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
(000) 33540 26975 26260 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., 1000) 31240 26558 26558 
Amount of dabs g E16.4sn E16.4an 
(nominal) 
Coupon rate 10.08 11.08 
Tax rate 35.00 35.00 35.00 
220389 Rights issue I for 4 ords at E2.50. 
Raised 116.4m. Issued 6,564,840 shares. 
Esc-rights date 230389 
Cue-rights price E2.83 
Last date for payment in full 140489 
Benchmark Gilt 
  
Treasury 9Z 2008. RT " 9.08% 
Additional interest would be payable of E16400000 a 10.081, etc., 
with tax relief being available (tax rate 
  
35%) 
In the year of issue, this has been taken as 8 months interest. 
There has been an increase in the nastier of new ordinary shares of 
7,280,000, of which 6,564,840 are attributable to the rights lawn, the 
balance of 715,000, issued.. 06 Aug 1989 has been included in the debt 
reconstructions as well. 
For the debt reconstruction scenarios, the weighted average rüber of shares 
is calculated u: 
01/01/89 
- 
05/08/89 " 26,260,000 x 7/12 " 15,318,333 
06/08/90 
- 
31/12/90 " 26,975,000 x 5/12 " 11,239,583 
I. e. a weighted average total of 26,557,916. 
Under the original equity issue, the EPS is 18.74p. 
On the debt recon., the EPS would increase as follows: 
With interest at 10.08X, the EPS is 19.33p 
at 11.05%, the EPS is 19.06p, 
at 12.081, the EPS is 16.79p. 
........................ 
DEBT ALT. (12. (Uz) 
(000 E000 
9111 
120$ 
1327 
2535 
6576 
7735 
3208 
-465 
2743 
4991 
0 
0 
4991 
18.79 
a --man "a someone- 
26260 
26260 
0 
29E 
26260 
26553 
E16.4w 
12.08 
35.00 
Exopls: 
Operating profit 
INTEREST (eA new fin) 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 
TOTAL INTEREST 
Net profit after int 
Pub. pre-tax profit 
basic taxation 
tact change 
Tibb. t $ Britten ye Dec 1990 : YEAR FOLLOWING YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE 
.. ---------- "-"" ...... ............. 
HYPOTHETICAL ISSUE 
.... 
EQUITY DEBT ALT. ( 10.08%) 
........................ 
DEBT ALT. (11.08%) 
............... 
ý DEBT ALT. ( 
......... 
12.082) 
E000 E000 E000 E000 E000 E000 ý E000 E000 
11296 11296 11296 ý"- 11298 
1665 1665 1665 1665 I 
0 ý 1653 ý 1817 1901 
1665 3318 3482 3646 I 
9633 ý 7980 7816 .. 7652 
11677 10024 9660 I 9696 
4087 4087 4087 ý 4087 
0 ý 
"579 ý 
-636 ý 
-693 
... 
4087 
....... . 
3508 
......... 
3451 
ý 
.......... 
ý. 
3394 
I 
......... Earnings after tan 7590 I 6S1S 609 ý 6302 ý 
Prof dividend 0 0ý 0ý 0ý 
Minority interest 0I 0 0 0 
EARNINGS for ORD ý 7590 
fafsoasu uaauau I 
6515 ý 
faifufassaussssss 
6409 6302 
I 
EPS (pence/ord share) 22.46 1 
loaf iaiifi piffffi  
I 
23. % ý 
"ifaf iafaff paafaf" 
 usuuuapussu f 
23.57 
fafaaafasapaiaitia 
upasaasapsppp 
23.17 ý 
iaaap pa aaf ffffaas 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 33540 26975 26975 26975 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of year, 1000) 51240 26553 
No. of new ord. shares 
(tocal, '000) 880 680 
No. of new ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 2520 637 
Total ord. shares at y/s 
(000) 34420 27855 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., 1000) 33760 27195 
Amount of dabs f E16.4an 
(nominal) 
Coupon rate 10.08 
Tax rate 35.00 35.00 
Comput. of  in. int 
220389 Rights issue 1 for 4 orris at E2.50. 
Raised E16.4on 
Benchmark Gilt " Treasury 9X 2008. RT " 9.08% 
Additional interest would be payable of E16400000 x 10.08%, etc., 
with tax relief being available (tax rate   3SX) 
There has been an increase in the maiber of new ordinary shares of 
880,000 issued 1 October 1990. These have also been included in the debt 
reconstruction scenarios. 
For the reconstruction scenarios, the weighted average ra. er of shares 
is calculated as: 
01/01/90 
- 
30/09/90 
  
26,975,000 x 9/12   20,231,250 
01/10/90 
- 
31/12/90 a 27,855,000 x 3/12   6,963,750 
27,195,000 
.......... 
The EPS under equity is 22.4$p. on the debt recon. it is as follows: 
With interest at 10.08% an EPS of 23.96p, 
at 11.01% an EPS of 23.57p, 
at 12.08% an EPS of 23.17p. 
26558 
aso 
637 
27855 
27195 
E16.44n 
11.08 
35.00 
26558 
880 
637 
27855 
27195 ' 
E16.4w 
12.08 
35.00 
APPENDIX 6-1-22 
Earple: 
Operating profit 
INTEREST (ax now fin) 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 
TOTAL INTEREST 
wet profit after int 
Pib. pr"-tax profit 
basic taaation 
tu charge 
V. stbury 1n Feb 1992 : YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE 
EQUITY DEBT ALT. (11.03%) 
£000 E000 E000 E000 
-9446 -9446 
S239 ý 5239 
0 1596 
... 
5239 
....... 
ý 
. 
6835 
.... 
-16685 
I ý ..... 
-16281 
-15120 "16716 
-4441 -4441 
0 I 
-S2T 
... 
-6641 
....... . 
-4968 
......... 
Earnings after tu -10679 1 -11748 
HYPOTHETICAL ISSUE 
........................... 
DEBT ALT. 02.03%) 
E000 E000 
. 
94" 
5239 
1740 
6979 
"16425 
-16x60 
"4641 
-576 
-5015 
-11845 
Prof dividend 0ý 0 0 
Minority interest 0 0 0 
EARNINGS for ORO 
-10679 -11748 -11845 
"=aaassaýsaaaaasaas I ýufassýassuasuss I saýuauaauýaaaaaa 
EPS (pence/ord share) -17.36 ý -23.57 ý -23.77 
aizu. I*iuaausaaas 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 49820 49820 49920 
Average no. ord. shares 
(. t start of vear_1000) 49820 49820 49820 
ý. a- "-lw ord. shares 
16630 17 
so. of new ord. shares 
(used in EPS ealc., '000) 116% 17 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 66450 49837 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS eaLc., '000) 61516 49537 
Amount of dabs E E21.59sn 
(nominal) 
Coupon rate 11.03 
Tax rate 33.00 33.00 
230591 Rights issue 1 for 3 ords at £1.30 
Raised E21.59an. Issued 16,612,797 shares. 
Ex-rights data 110691 
Cur rights price 11.56 
Lost date for payment in full 030791 
ienehaark Gilt " Treasury 9% 2005. IT   10.035 
Additional interest would be payable of 921590000 x 11.03%, etc., 
with tu relief being available (tax rate " 33%) 
In the year of issue, this has been taken as & months interest. 
There was an increase In the ntiaber of shares of 16,630,000, of which 
16,612,797 related to the rights issue, the balance of 17,203, issued Jan 
1991 has therefore been included in full in the total Hinher of shares end 
the weighted average number of shares for the debt reconstructions. 
Under the original equity issue, the EPS is 'negative*. Under the 
debt region., it becomes increasingly more negative as the Interest 
rate increases: 
with interest at 11.03%, EPS a -23.57p, 
at 12.03%, EPS   -23.77p, 
at 13.03%, EPS   -23.96p. 
17 
17 
49837 
49837 
£21.59mn 
12.03 
33.00 
....................... 
DEBT ALT. (13.03%) 
E000 E000 
9446 
5239 
1485 
7124 
-16570 
"17005 
-4"l 
-622 
-5063 
-11942 
0 
0 
-1191#2 
ssasssssssssasssas 
-23.96 
sssssassýssassss  
49820 
49820 
17 
17 
'9x37 
49837 
E21.5961n 
13.03 
33.00 
APPENDIX 6-1-23 
Exople: Alllid Lyons y* fsb 1989 : YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE HYPOTHETICAL ISSUE 
............ 
................... 
DEBT EQUITY ALT. 
1 £000 E000 I E000 E000 
operating profit 540000 540000 
INTEREST (ex now fin) 147000 147000 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST ý0ý0 
TOTAL INTEREST 
Net profit after int 
Pub. pre-tax profit 
basic taxation 
tax change 
TOTAL TAX 
Earnings after tax 
Prof dividend 
Minority Interest 
EARNINGS for ORD 
EPS (pence/ord share) 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 
'0 Average no. ord. shares. 
(at start of year, '000) 
No. of now ord. shares 
(total, '000) 
No. of now ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS ealc., '000) 
Amount of new dabs E 
(nominal) 
Coupon rate 
Tax rate 
147000 
393000 
502000 
139000 
0 
139000 
363000 
24000 
16000 
323000 
mal"Famalts"s sum 
43.69 
729612 
720288 
22668 
19064 
752280 
739352 
350000000 
9.750 
35.00 
147000 
393000 
502000 
139000 
0 
139000 
363000 
24000 
16000 
323000 
42.47 
729612 
720288 
10%54 
40308 
839266 
7605% 
N/A 
N/A 
35.00 
100289 1350,000,000 9.75% 2019 issued at 98.477 
E150sr use placed in Feb 189 at 98.477% and E200mn was placed 
in Sap 189 at 93.5912, raising a total of 9334,897,500. 
Interest due Apr 1 and Oct 1. First psy snt due 01/10/89 
Share price 100289 
  
£4.81 
If 201 discount, than would issue E334897500/E3.85 i. e. (. 8 x E4.81) 
  
86,986,364 new ordinary shares 
Given that the debt was issued so close to the year and, no interest 
has been taken into account in the year of issue. 
There has been an actual increase in the mbar of shares In issue of 
22,668,000. These were issued an 27 Septasiber 1988. 
The EPS under the original debt scenario is 43.69p. Under the equity 
raeon., this would drop to 42.47p. This is to be expected given that no 
interest relating to the large debt issue has been excluded (as the issue 
was so close to the year and that no Interest would have been charged) 
and yet the Inereass in shares relating to the sWity ratan. has been 
included. A better picture can be obtained by looking at the following 
year. 
Note. (1) Interest capitalised y/e 1989 Eli. 
Earpl s: Allid Lyons ye Feb 1990 : YEAR FOLLOWING YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE NYPOTNETICAL ISSUE 
DEBT EQUITY ALT. 
E000 E000 I E000 £000 
Operating profit 593000 593000 
INTEREST (ex now fin) 143625 ý 143625 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 24375 0 
TOTAL INTEREST ý 168000 143625 
.. "....... ý .......... Net profit after int 425000 649375 
Pub. pre-tax profit 565000 ý 589375 
basic taxation 161000 ý 161000 
tax change 0ý 8531 
TOTAL TAX 161000 169531 
.......... 
.......... 
Earnings after tax 404000 419844 
Prof dividend ý 24000 24000 
Minority interest ý 19000 19000 
EARNINGS for ORO 361000 3768" 
aaasa. aýausaa. as ' UUMasasa. snas:. aaan 
EPS (pence/ord share) 47.72 44.67 
I 
.  saaaaaaawww assaassaaaýasas. s. a 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 752280 839266 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of year, '000) 739352 760596 
No. of new ord. shares 
(total, '000) 7337 7337 
wo. of new ord. shares 
'', 
EPS calc., '800) 17149 82950 11 
. 
eL ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 759617 866603 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 756501 843546 
Amount of new dabs E 350000000 N/A 
(nominal) 
Coupon rate 9.750 N/A 
Tax rate 35.00 35.00 
100289 9350,000,000 9.75i 2019 Issued at 98.477 
E1SOsn was placed in Feb '89 at 98.477% and E200sn was placed 
In Sep '89 at 93.591%, raising a total of 9334,897,500. 
Interest due Apr 1 and Oct 1. first pant due 01/10/89 
Share price 100289 a 14.81 
If 20% discount, then would issue E334897500/E3.85 i. e. (. 8 x £4.81) 
  
86,986,364 new ordinary shares 
For 1990 a full year's interest is charged on E150sn debt issued 
Feb. '89 and 1/2 year's interest an E200an debt issued Sep. '89. 
On the original debt Isaus, the EPS is 47.72p. On the equity recon. 
this falls to ii. 67p. 
Mote. (1) Interest capitalised y/e 1990 Bon. 
There has been an Increase in the no. of ord. shares of 7,337,000 and this 
has also been included in the equity region. 
The 7,337,000 shares were issued on 4 August 1989. 
For the reconstruction scenario, shares in issue during the year: 
01/03/89 
- 
03/08/89 " 839,266,000 
04/08/89 
- 
24/02/90 
  
846,603,000 
The weighted average rnwber of there* Is calculated as: 
839,266,000 x 5/12 " 846.603,000 x 7/12   843,545,917 
ALLIED LYONS TIE FEB 1989 
Calcn. of "x-rights price 
.............................. 
Po 
  
0.8ic 
  
0.8 x £4.81 
  
E3.85 
N  752,260,000 shares " 
M  E3/ºo 
  
334,897,500/E3.85 
  
86,986,364 
The term of the rights issue are: 
M: N ": n 
86,986,364 : 752,280,000 
1: 8.65 
iz-ýo+n9)/Mn 
x E3. + 8.65 x E4.81 /I+8.65 
  
45.46/9.65 
  
94.71 
Therefore theoretical ex-rights price is E4.71. 
" The rights issue was very close to the year end and therefore 
based an the total number of shares issued by the year end. 
Calculation of Weighted Average No. Shares 
Total proceeds from rights issue 86,986,364 x E3.8S 
  
E334,897,500 
Market price per share " E4.81 
Fresh issue at market value   E334,897,500/E4.81 
  
69,625,260 shares 
Total no. shares issued = 86,986,364 
Less fresh issue at market value =(69,625,260) 
Bonus issue 
  
17,361,104 
Bonus issue based on: (1) 752,280,000 shares in issue before rights issue 
(ii) 69,625,260 shares (fresh issue) 
Total " 821,905,260 shares 
Ions ratio = 17,361,104 : 821,905,260 
a1: 47.34 (3 : 142) 
Factor = 142/145 
Shares Actwl Weighted Av. 
At start of yr. 729,612,000 x145/142 x7/12 434,598,697 
Issue in Sep 1988 22,668,000 
752,280,000 x145/142 x4/12 256,057,747 
Fresh issv 69,625,260 
821,905,260 x 165/142 x1/12 69,939,121 
Yams issue : -17,361,106 - 
839,266,364 760,595,565 
EiLmote: Asda Grail plc r. Aprit 1987 
. 
YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE NYPOTHETICAL ISSUE 
............ 
................... 
Operating profit 
INTEREST (ex now fin) 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 
TOTAL INTEREST 
Net profit after int 
Pub. pre-tax profit 
basic taxation 
tax change 
TOTAL TAX 
Earnings after tax 
Prof dividend 
Minority interest 
EARNINGS for ORD 
EPS (p. nc. /ord share) 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of year, '000) 
No. of now ord. shares 
(total, '000) 
No. of now ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 
Amon t of new data E 
(nominal) 
Coupon reu 
Tex rate 
DEBT EQUITY ALT. 
E000 E000 E000 E000 
185100 185100 
200 I 200 
0 I 0 
200 200 
184900 164900 
192000 192000 
62300 ý 62300 
0 ý 3369 
62300 ý 65669 
129700 126331 
200 ý 200 
0 0 
129500 126131 
11.38 ý 11.08 
1136000 1136000 
1133000 1133000 
7000 93522 " 
5000 88625 
1143000 1229522 
1138000 1221625 
100000000 N/A 
9.625 N/A 
35.00 35.00 
1S0586 E100000000 9.625% 2002 Issued it 99.5 
Interest due 1S0Sd6, payable as to 35X an 150586 and 64.52 an 310786 
(when issued in May 186). 
Share price 150586 " £1.64 
If 202 discount, then would issue E99500000/E1.15 (. E x £1.64) 
" 86521739 now ordinary shares 
The Elf an the original debt scenario was 11.3ap, under the equity 
ratan., this would drop to 11.08p. 
This is a particularly interesting case as the interest an the 
debenture amounts to £9,625,000, but Asda capitalised this interest 
and therefore it did not pass through the P&L Account, hence 
the low interest charge (in fact, Asda capitalised 117.5s+ interest 
charges in that particular year). This treatmsnt is beneficial 
fray the point of view of not adversely affecting EPS. 
Another advantage is that whilst the interest is capitalised and shown 
an the galena Shoot, avoiding the PiL altogether as an expense, 
for the purposes of taxation and the calculation of capital allowances, 
the eapitalised interest is not a relevant expenditure, but will be 
allowable in computing the taxable profits and hence the final tax 
charge, to the P&L tax charge will be lower reflecting the benefit of 
-Interest relief an debt finance. 
Also when the equity region. is perfoneed, the tax relief that was available 
on the debt oust be added back, thereby increasing the tax charge in the P&L. 
Note. There has been an actual increase in the Huber of ordinary shares 
during the year, so these have been included in the equity raten. also. 
" The number of now shares in the year is 66,522 relating to the rights 
issue, and 7,000 (all 000$) relating to an increase of this amount in 
the actual number of shares, i. e. total 93,522. 
The 7,000,000 shares actually issued during the year were issued an 
December 18th, i. e. 6.6 aonths into the year. 
Noce. Asda eaplt8lisud £17.5 Interest in the y/t Apr 1917. 
Exaýplý: Asch Group plc yo April 1988 YEAR FOLLOWING YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE HYPOTNETICAL ISSUE 
.................. 
DEBT ý EQUITY ALT. 
I E000 E000 I E000 E000 
operating profit ý 185660 185660 
INTEREST (ex new fin) 2700 ý 2700 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST ý0 I0 
TOTAL INTEREST ý 
.. 
2700 
........ 
2700 
Not profit after int 182960 
.. ........ 
182960 
Pub. pr. -tu profit ý 215300 215300 
basic tuition 69900 I 69900 
tax charge ý0 3369 
TOTAL TAX ý 
.. 
69900 
........ 
73269 
Earnings after tu 145400 
ý 
.. ...... -- 142031 
Prof dividend 200 200 
Minority Interest ý0 I0 
EARNINGS for ORD 
u=awasaxl 
145200 
jr aý 
ý 
ý s 
141831 
EPS (ponce/ord share) ý 12.64 
' sý ssaaaaN aasanow 
11.47 
I  sss"asssý""ss"s"w I "sý"""a"""" 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 1143000 1229522 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of y. ar, '000) 1138000 
No. of new ord. shares 
(total, 1000) 12000 12000 
No. of new ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc.. '000) 11000 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 1155000 1241522 
Average no. ord. shares 
_ (used in EPS calc., '000) 1149000 
Aaiant of new dabs £ 100000000 
(nominal) 
Coupon rate 9.625 
Tax rate 35.00 
150586 £100000000 9.625% 2002 Issued at 99.5 
Share price 150586 
  
E1.64 
If 20% discount, then would issue £99500000/(. 8 a £1.44) 
" 86521739 new ordinary shares 
The EPS figures for 1987 and 1988 would then be: 
1987 1988 
Actual(debt) 11.38 12.64 
Recon. (equity) 11.08 11.47 
Again there has been an increase In the no. of ord. shares and to this has also been included in the equity recon. 
The 12,000,000 shares were issued on 1 October 1987. 
For the reconstruction scenario, shares in issue during the year: 
01/05/87 
- 
30/09/87 
" 1,229,522,000 
01/10/87 
- 
30/06/88 
" 1,241,522,000 
The weighted average number of shares is calculated as: 
1,229,522,000 x 5/12 " 1,241.522,000 x 7/12 " 1,236,522,000 
Note. Aids capitalised £17. (, interest charges in y/" Apr 1988. 
1221625 
14897 
1236522 
N/A 
N/A 
35.00 
y/e Apr 87 
Catcn. of ex-rights price 
------------------------------ 
Po = 0.8PC 
= 0.8 x £1.44 
= £1.15 
N=1,136,000,000 shares * 
M= £8/Po 
= 99,500,000/£1.15 
= 86,521,739 
The terms of the rights issue are: 
M. N=m: n 
86,521,739 : 1,136,000,000 
1: 13.13 
Px+o+nPc/m*n 
=1x £1.1 
ý+ 
13.13 x £1.44 /1+ 13.13 
= 20.06/14.13 
= £1.42 
Therefore theoretical ex-rights price is £1.42. 
* Based on. number of shares in issue at the start of the year. 
Calculation of Weighted Average No. Shares 
------------------------------------------------- 
Total proceeds from rights issue 
Market price per share 
Fresh issue at market value 
Total no. shares issued 
less fresh issue at market value 
Bonus issue 
86,521,739 x £1.15 
= £99,500,000 
= £1.44 
_ 
£99,500,000/£1.44 
= 69,097,222 shares 
= 86,521,739 
=(69,097,222) 
= 17,424,517 
Bonus issue based on: (i) 1,136,000,000 shares in issue before rights issue 
(ii) 69,097,222 shares (fresh issue) 
Total = 1,205,097,222 shares 
Bonus ratio = 17,424,517 : 1,205,097,222 
=1: 69.16 (1 : 69) 
Factor = 69/70 
Shares 
Fresh issue 
Bonus issue 
Issue in Dec 1986 
Actual 
1,136,000,000 
69,097,222 
1,205,097,222 
17,424,517 
1,222,521,739 
7,000,000 
--------------- 1,229,521,739 
x7O/69 x. 5/12 
x70/69 x11.5/12 
x3.4/12 
Weighted Av. 
48,019,324 
1,171,622,299 
1,219,641,623 
1,983,000 
1,221,624,956 
=2izi=z=ZZ 2UZ 
APPENDIX 6-1-25 
Exaapte: Asda Group plc ye April 1989 YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE HYPOTNETICAL ISSUE 
............ 
................... 
DEBT ý EQUITY ALT. 
E000 E000 J E000 E000 
operating profit 195900 195900 
INTEREST (aa new fin) 767 ý 767 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST ý 1133 ý 0 
TOTAL INTEREST 1900 ý 767 
Net profit after int 194000 195133 
Ptb. pre-tax profit 246600 247733 
basic taxation 
tax change 
TOTAL TAX 
Earnings after tax 
Pref dividend 
Minority interest 
EARNINGS for 050 
EPS (pence/ord share) 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of. yesr, '000) 
No. of new ord. shares 
(total, '000) 
No. of new ord. shares 
(used in EPS ealc., '000) 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 
Amount of new dabs E 
(nominal) 
Coon rate 
Tax rate 
MM) 
0 
79000 
167600 
100 
0 
167500 
 ssssasesss s . 
 saa 
16.48 
atsssssasussasssss 
1155000 
79000 
397 
79397 
169336 
100 
0 
168236 
 usýýýýasaasaýuas 
14.21 
zaa a. suififuailaa 
1155000 
1149000 1149000 
8000 115789 " 
8000 36943 
1163000 1270789 
1157000 1183943 
125000000 N/A 
10.875 N/A 
35.00 35.00 
310389 E125000000 10.875% 2010 issued at 101.753 
Interest due Apr. 20. 
Share price 310389 a E1.67 
If 20% discount, then would issue E127191250/E1.18 (. 8 x E1.47) 
" 107789195 new ordinary shares 
The interest an the now debt is E13593750, for which tax relief is 
given a 351. In the year of issue, one month's interest has been accrued. 
There has been an actual increase during the year in the number of ordinary 
shares of 8,000,000. These were issued 1 February 1989. 
The EPS under the original debt issue is 14.6$p, oder the equity recon. 
this falls to 14.21p. 
Note (1) Aids capitalised E27.9an interest charges in y/" Apr 1989. 
" The total rw. er of new shares is 8,000,000 plus the hypothetical 
rights issue of 107,789,195. 
Example: Asda Group plc ye April 1990 YEAR FOLLOWING YEAR OF ISSM 
ACTUAL ISSUE 
............ 
HYPOTNETICAL ISSUE 
................... 
DEBT EQUITY ALT. 
E000 E000 E000 E000 
operating profit ý 217000 ý 217000 
INTEREST (ex new fin) 48606 ý 4a6O6 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 13594 I0 
TOTAL INTEREST ý 62200 48606 
Net profit after int 
.......... 
154800 
.. ........ 
1611,394 
Pub. pre-tax profit 180300 193894 
basic taxation 57500 ý 57500 
tax charge 0 ( 4758 
TOTAL TAX ý 57500 62258 
Earnings after tax ý 122800 ý 131636 
Prof dividend ý 0 ý0 
Minority Interest 200 ý 200 
EARNINGS for ORD 122600 131436 
ssssssssasassaassss I saamsssssoasssme 
EPS (ponce/ord share) 10.48 10.29 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 1163000 1270789 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of year, 1000) 1157000 1183943 
No. of new ord. shares 
(totat, '000) 10000 10000 
No. of new ord. shares 
(used in EPS catc., '000) 13000 93929 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 1173000 1280789 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., 1000) 1170000 1277872 
Amount of new dabs E 125000000 N/A 
(nominal) 
Coupon rate 10.875 N/A 
Tax rate 35.00 35.00 
310389 9125000000 10.875% 2010 issued at 101.753 
Share price 310389 " 91.47 
If 20% discount, then would issue 9127191250/(. 8 x E1.47) 
" 107789195 new ordinary shares 
The interest on the new debt is 113593750, for which tax relief is 
given a 35Z. 
under the original debt issue, the EPS is 10.45p, under the equity 
recon. the EPS Is 10.29p. 
There has been an actual increase in the ni. er of ordinary shares of 
10,000,000, issued 18 August 1989. 
For the reconstruction scenario, shares in issue during the year: 
01/05/89 
- 
17/08/89 
  
1,270,789,000 
18/08/89 
- 
30/04/90 " 1,280,789,000 
The weighted overage rn. sr of shares is cstculstod u: 
1,270,789,000 z 3.5/12 " 1,280,789,000 a 8.5/12   1,277,872,333 
Note (1) Aids capitalised E38.1an interest charges in y/e Apr 1990. 
y/e Apr 
_S9 
CaLcn. of ex-rights price 
Po = 0.8PC 
= 0.8 x £1.47 
= £1.18 
N=1,163,000,000 shares * 
M= EB/Po 
= 127191250/£1.18 
107,789,195 
The terms of the rights issue are: 
M. N=m: n 
107,789,195 :. 1,163,000,000 
1: 10.79 
Px =`mPo + nP, / m+n 
=Ix £1.18 f 10.79 x £1.47 /1+ 10.79 
= 17.04/11.79 
= £1.45 
Therefore theoretical ex-rights price is £1.45. 
* The rights issue was very close to the year end and therefore 
based on the total number of shares issued by the year end. 
Calculation of Weighted Average No. Shares 
------------------------------------------------- 
Total proceeds from rights issue 
Market price per share 
Fresh issue at market value 
Total no. shares issued 
less fresh issue at market value 
Bonus issue 
107,789,195 x £1.18 
= £127,191,250 
= £1.47 
= £127,191,250/£1.47 
86,524,660 shares 
= 107,789,195 
= (86,524,660) 
= 21,264,535 
Bonus issue based on: (i) 1,163,000,000 shares in issue before rights issue 
(ii) 86,524,660 shares (fresh issue) 
Total = 1,249,524,660 shares 
Bonus ratio = 21,264,535 : 1,249,524,660 
=1: 58.76 Cl : 59) 
Factor = 59/60 
Shares 
At start of year 
Issue in Feb 1989 
Fresh issue 
Bonus issue 
Actual 
1,155,000,000 
8,000,000 
1,163,000,000 
86,524,660 
1,249,524,660 
21,264,535 
1,270,789., 195 
==ssm=aase====szas 
Weighted Av. 
x60/59 x9/12 880,932,203 
x60/59 x2/12 197,118,644 
x 60/59 x1/12 105,891,920 
................... 
1,183,942,767 
APPENDIX 6-1-26 
Eaasgle: Bass ye Sep 1989 : YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE 
. ""......... 
NYPOTNETICAI ISSUE 
................... 
DEBT I EQUITY ALT. 
LOOO COOO E000 £000 
Operating profit 515000 515000 
INTEREST (ax new fin) 67192 I 67192 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 10608 I 0 
TOTAL INTEREST 76000 
.......... 
67192 
Not profit after int 
I 
437000 .. ........ u7ws 
Pb. pre-tax profit 529000 539808 
basic taxation I 147000 147000 
tax change I 0 1 3783 
TOTAL TAX I 147000 
.......... 
1507ö3 
Earnings after tax 
I 
382000 .. ........ 389025 
Prof dividend 300 
" 
300 
Minority Interest 11000 I 11000 
EARNINGS for ORD 370700 377725 
EPS (pance/ord share) 108.08 104.37 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 341673 341673 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of year, '000) 338400 333400 
No. of now ord. shares 
(total, '000) 3140 37202 * 
No. of now ord. shares 
(used in EPS eale., '000) 4600 23517 
Total ord. shares at y/o 
('000) 344813 378875 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS eale., '000) 343000 361917 
Astet of now dabs E 250000000 N/A 
(nominal) 
Coupon rate 10.375 N/A 
Tax rata 35.00 35.00 
1904a, 050000000 10.373% 2016 issued at 100.5511 
Internat Mop 30 and Sep 30 
Interest has boon taken into acemnt for 5 months in the your of luau.. 
share price 190489 
  
£9.22 
If 20Z ditemnt, then would Imme £251375000/ET. 38 (. 8 x E9.22) 
  
34061653 nw+ ordinary shares 
Under the original debt issue the Eºf is 108. O6p, ts+dsr the equity recon. 
this falls to 19.37p. 
There has been an increase in the actual nsabsr of ordinary shares of 
3,140,000, issued 2$ April 1919. 
* The now of new ordinary shares eosprisos 3,140,000 plus 34,061,653 
rotating to the hypothetical rights issue. 
Moto (1) in the y/e fop 1989, interest of lien row copitaliaad. 
EAamplo: Bass Ye Sep 1990 : YEAR FOLLOWING YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE HYPOTHETICAL ISSUE 
DEBT EQUITY ALT. 
I E000 E000 ED00 E000 
Operating profit I 612000 612000 
INTEREST (ex new fin) I 156062 I 156062 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST I 25938 I0 
TOTAL INTEREST I 182000 I 156062 
Net profit after int 430000 I 455938 
Pub. pro"tax profit I 535000 560938 
basic taxation L 164000 144000 
tax charge 0I 9078 
TOTAL TAX 144 000 
... ---------- 
153078 
....... 
I 
Earnings after tax 391000 I 407560 
Prof dividend I 300 300 
Minority Interest I 6000 6000 
EARNINGS for ORD 384700 401560 
EPS (pone, /ord share) I 109.60 I 
I 
104.25 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year (1000) 344813 378875 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of yoar, '000) 343000 361917 
No. of new ord. shares 
(total, '000) 9447 9467 
No. of now ord. shares 
(used in EPS ealc., '000) 8000 23256 
Total ord. shares at y/o 
('000) 354260 38922 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in Erg ealo., '000) 351000 385173 
Arrant of now dabs E 250000000 N/A 
(no. insl) 
Coupon rata 10.373 M/A 
Tax rate 35.00 35.00 
190489 E250000000 10.37512016 issued at 100.5511 
Shan price 190489 " E9.22 
If 20% discount, then would issue £251375000/(. 8 x £9.22) 
" 34061653 new ordinary shares 
0. In this ease a full year's Interest has been charged. 
Under the orriginsl debt issue the EPS Is 109.60p, under the equity rscon. -- 
it falls to 104.25p. 
Again there has been an actual increase in the mbar of ordinary shares 
and so this has also been included in the equity mean. 
The 9,447,000 shares were issued an 4 February 1990. 
For the reconstruction scenario, shares in issue during the year: 
01/10/89 
- 
03/02/90 " 379,875,000 
04/02/90 
- 
30/09/90 
  
388,322,000 
The weighted average number of shares Is calculated sae 
378,873,000 a 4/12 " 388,322,000 a 8/12 " 385,173,000 
Note. in the y/o gap 1990, interest of E3m we capitslisad. 
SASS Y/E SEP 1989 
Calcn. of ax-rights price 
.............................. 
Po " 0.8ºc 
" 0.8 x E9.22 
" E7.35 
w" 344,613,000 shares " 
M  Et/Pa 
" 251,375,000/17.38 
  
34,061,653 shares 
The tars of the rights loan are: 
N: N a: n 
34,061,653 : 344,813,000 
1: 10.12 
Px o" nPeý wn 
 x E7.3ö "" 10.12 x £9.22 /I" 10.12 
" 100.69/11.12 
"£9.05 
Therefore theoretical ex rights price Is 19.05. 
* Based on year and no. shares 
Calculation of Weighted Average No. Shares 
Dotal proceeds fror rights Issue 34,061,653 x 67.38 
  
£251,374,999 
Market price per share 
  
E9.22 
Fresh issue at market value " £251,374,999/E9.22 
a 27,264,100 shares 
Totsl`no. shares issued 
  
34,061,653 
Less fresh issue at market value "(27,264,100) 
4anýs issue " 6,797, äi3 
Sonia issue based on: (1) 344,813,000 shares in issue before rights issue 
(ii) 27,264,100 shores (fresh Issue) 
Total " 372,077,100 shores 
Boras ratio   6,797,553 : 372,077,100 
"1: 54.74 (1 : 55) 
Factor- " 55/56 
Shares Actual Weighted Av. 
At start of year 341,673,000 x56/55 x6.5/12 188,437,836 
Fresh issue 27,264,100 
368,937,100 x 56/55 x5.5/12 172,170,647 
Sonia issue 6,797,553 
........... ........... 
379,734,653 360,608,483 
Issue in Apr 1989 3,160,000 x5/12 1,306,333 
........... ........... 
378,874,653 361,916,816 
APPENDIX 6-1-27 
Eamp( : Blue circle ye Doc 1988 : YEAR OF I SUIJE 
ACTUAL I SE NYPOTNETICAI IS DA 
............ 
................... 
DEBT EQUITY ALT. 
I EDDO £000 EDoo Eoo0 
Operating profit 161600 161600 
INTEREST (ex now fin) 39256 ý 39256 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST ý 13"i ý0 
TOTAL INTEREST 
Not profit after Int 
Pub. pre-tax prof it 
basic taxation 
tax change 
TOTAL TAX 
Earnings after tax 
Prof dividend 
Minority interest 
EARNINGS for ONO 
EPS (psneo/ord share) 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of year, '000) 
No. of new ord. shares 
(total, '000) 
No. of now ord. shares 
(used In EPS eale., '000) 
Total ord. shares at y/" 
('000) 
Avenge no. ord. shares 
(used In EPS eatc., '000) 
Amount of now dabs E 
(na. insl) 
Capon rate 
Tax rate 
40600 
121000 
203100 
47200 
0 
47200 
155900 
39256 
122346 
20"" 
47200 
470 
47670 
156774 
5500 I 5500 
26W I 2W 
147800 148674 
56. % 55.16 
-- 
--------- - 
258561 298861 
253100 
ills 
1400 
259976 
259500 
150000000 
10.750 
35.00 
258100 
42241 
11441 
301102 
269541 
N/A 
*/A 
35.00 
29115$ 1150000000 10.752 2013 issued at 99.25 
She" price 291184 
  
E4.52 
If 202 discount, than would issue E148875000/E3.62 (. 8 x 14.52) 
" 41125691 now ordinary shares 
Under the original debt issue, the Eº$ is 56.96p, an the equity rscon., 
this falls to 55.16p. 
NO In this ease the interest Is payable srrmlly on 29/11 each year 
so by the year end, one month's Interest could be accrued for " this 
has been dar for the reconstruction In 1966, with a whole yowls 
interest being charged in 1989. 
Thor has been on actual increase In the n or of 4+oros in issue of 
1,115,000. Thaw were issued an 4 June 1988. 
Moto. In the r/o Doe 1988, there wes neeativo irrecoverable ACT 
(i. e. a mite-tool[) of £18.5m. 
ExMpl.: Btu* Circl. ye Doc 1909 : YEAR 
ACTUAL ISSUE 
DEBT 
E000 E000 
FOLLOWING YEAR O ISS. * 
NYPOTNETiCAL. 1S JE 
................... 
Ea11TT ALT. 
LOW EM 
Operating profit 194400 19400 
INTEREST (ex now fin) 39675 ý 3%75 
MEW FINANCE INTEREST 16125 0 
TOTAL INTEREST ý 
. 
SSa00 
......... 
39675 
Not profit after i nt 
ý 
138600 . ......... 154723 
P 
. 
pre-tax profit 231000 247925 
basic taxation 66000 66000 
tax chan0o 0 ( 56" 
TOTAL TAX ý 
. 
66000 
....... 
71644 
Earnings after tax .. 
ý 
165800 . ......... 176261 
Prof dividend ý bt00 ý 84M 
Minority interest 2500 ý 2800 
EARNINGS for C 154600 165081 
EPS (psneo/ord shots) 29.52 I 29.23 
Total ord. , hares at 
start of year ('000) 259976 301102 
Avers" no. ord. shares 
(at start of ysar, '000) 259500 
No. of now ord. shares 
(total, '000) 266994 266994 
No. of new ord. shares 
(used in EPS eale., '000) 264200 
Total ord. shares at y/" 
" 
('000) 526970 568096 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS ealc., '000) 523700 
Arrant of new dsbs t 150000000 
(nosinol) 
Coupon rata 10.750 
Tu rate 35.00 
291188 1150000000 10.73% 2013 issued at 99.25 
Share price 291188   E4.52 
If 20% discount. then would issue E148875000/C. 8 a £4.52) 
" 41125691 new ordinary sham 
A Nola yew's interest has been charged. 
- On the original debt Issue, the EPS is 29.52p. On the equity resin., 
this would decrease to 29.23p. 
them Aas been an actual increase in the rvj* r of ordinary shares of 
266,994,000 and this has also been included in the sanity roeon. 
The 266,994,000 shares were issued S January 1909. 
For the reconstruction aesnsrio, shares in issue during the years 
01/01/89 
- 
04/01/19 
  
301,102,000 
05/01/89 
- 
31/12/19 " 568,096,000 
The weighted own age veer of sharp is calcutatsd sm: 
301,102,000 x 0.15/12 " S6$, 096,000 a 11.35/12 " 564,758,575 
Note. There was no Irr, cororsblo ACT In y/* Doe 1909. 
269541 
295215 
SM7S6 
N/A 
N/A 
35.00 
BLUE CIRCLE t/E DEC 1918 
Calcn. of ex-rights price 
.............................. 
Pc a 0.8Pc 
  
0.8 x £6.52 
- 
0.62 
M" 259,976,000 shares " 
N  El/PO 
  
145,875,000/E3.6Z 
  
41,125,691 
The term of the rights issue are: 
N: N "n 
41,125,691 : 259,976,000 
1 6.32 
vx 
  
(Po- 
r4 s»n 
 1x E3.62 " 6.32 z E4.52 /1"6.32 
  
32.19/7.32 
  
£4.40 
Therefore theoretical oz-rights price is £4.40. 
" The rights issue ras very close to the year _+d and therefore 
based an the total Hubar of shares issued by the year w id. 
Calculation of Weighted Avora4o No. $ area 
Total proceeds from rights issue 41,123,691 x E3.62 
  
E148,875,000 
Markst price per share   E4.52 
Fresh Issue st market value " E148,875,000/E4.52 
" 32,936,947 shares 
Total no. shares Issued " 41,125,691 
Lose fresh issue at markst value "(32,936,947) 
Bonus Issue 
  
8,1ß8,7M 
Bonus Issue based on: Cl) 259,976,000 sham in Issue before rights issue 
(ii) 32,936,947 shams (fresh loan) 
Total 
  
292,912,947 share 
Bons ratio " 8,188 
, 
744: 292,912,947 
"I: 35.77 Cl : 36) 
Factor " 36/37 
Sharp Actual Weighted Av. 
At start of year 258,861,000 x37/36 x5/12 110,854,826 
Issue In Musa 1988 1,115,000 
259,976,000 x37/36 x6/12 133,596,778 
Fresh isaw 32,936,947 
292,912,947 x 37/36 0/12 25,087,451 
lanes issue 8,185,744 
.. ........... ......... 301,101,691 269,541,055 
APPENDIX 6-1-28 
Exmpts: Sritish lard ye mar 1987 : YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE NYPOTNETICAI ISSUE 
............ 
................... 
DEBT ( EWITY ALT. 
E000 E000 ý E000 £000 
Operating profit 47100 47100 
INTEREST (ex now fin) 7ý7 
NEW FIMAMCII INTEREST ý 1319 0 
TOTAL INTEREST ý 1319 0 
.......... 
ý 
......... Net profit after int 45781 X7100 
Ptb. pro-tau profit 30100 ý 31419 
basic taxation 
tax change 
TOTAL TAX 
Earnings after tax 
Prof dividend 
Minority interest 
EAAMINGS for =0 
EPS (pence/ord share) 
" 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of yoar, 1000) 
No. of now ord. shares 
(total, '000) 
No. of now ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 
Total ord. shares at y/" 
('000) 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EP$ calc., '000) 
Amount of new debt E 
(nawinal) 
Coupon rate 
Tax rate 
5500 
0 
5500 
24600 
0 
S00 
24100 
15.70 
139956 
139600 
63264 
13900 
203200 
153500 
12560000 
10.500 
35.00 
5500 
462 
5962 
25457 
0 
S00 
24957 
15.41 
139956 
139600 
72089 
22331 
212045 
161901 
M/A 
N/A 
35.00 
010686 112560000 10.5Z 2019/24 issued at 100.00 
interest due Mar 30 and Sap 30. 
share price 010486 
  
11.78 
If 20i< discount, then would issue £12560000/61.42 (. 8 x 11.78) 
" 8845070 new ordinary shares 
The debt has boon in issue for the whole of the y/s Mar 1987, therefore 
a ghats rar's"intorost is included. 
On the original debt issue the E! S Is 1S. 70p, an the equity r"ean.. 
It degreases to 15.61p. 
Notes. (1) Datastrnm does not provide " figure for total interest 
charges for financial companies, as the interest relating 
to the debt has been calculated separately, and then 
excluded as appropriate in the equity rieon. 
Ez Le: 
operating profit 
British land ye mar 19M : YEAR FOLLOWING YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE HYPOTHETICAL ISSUE 
............ 
................... 
DEBT ý EQUITY ALT. 
E000 E000 ý E000 (000 
INTEREST (ax new fin) ý7ý7 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 1319 ý0 
TOTAL INTEREST 1319 0 
Net profit after int 65i"1 66800 
Pub. prs-tau profit 56400 57719 
basic tuition 1Sä00 18300 
tu change (01 462 
TOTAL TAX ý 18300 ý 
.......... .. 
18762 
ý 
. Earnings after tu 38100 ý ....... 38957 
Prof dividend ý0(0 
Minority interest 400 400 
EARNINGS for OR0 37700 38557 
EPS (pence/ord share) 17.83 
II. 
17.50 
ae.. aa 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year (1000) 203200 212045 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of year, '000) 153500 161981 
No. of neig ord. shares 
(total, 1000) 21200 21200 
No. of now ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 58000 58367 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
(1000) 226400 2332.45 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used In EPS calc., '000) 211500 220348 
Aunt of new dabs E 12560000 N/A 
(nominal ) 
Coýgon rate 10.500 MIA 
Tu rate 35.00 35.00 
010486 112560000 10.5% 2019/24 Issued at 100.00 
Interest due Nor 30, and Sap 30. 
Share price 010406 " £1.78 
If 20% discount, then would issue E12560000/El. 42 (. d x 11.78) 
  
8645070 new ordinary shares 
Under the original debt issue the EPS Is 17.83p, an the equity recon., 
this decreases to 17.50p. 
There has been an actual increase In the ordinary shares of 21,200,000 
, 
issued 9 November 1987. This Increase has been included in the recons truction 
also. ý" 
, 
For the reconstruction scenario, shares in issue during the year: 
01/04/87 
- 
08/11/87 
  
212,045,000 
09/11/87 
- 
31/03/8 " 233,245,000 
The weighted awrpo Ir of shares is calculated u: 
212,045,000 a 7.3/12 " 233,245,000 a 4.7/12 " 220,348,333 
BRITISH LAID Y/E MAR 1987 
C. lcn. of ex-rights price 
Po " 0. bio 
  
0.8 x E1.78 
" E1.42 
M 139,956,000 shares " 
M" Eu/Po 
  
12,560,000/E1.42 
  
8,845,070 
The tars of the rights issue are: 
N: N an 
8,845,070 : 139,956,000 
1 15.82 
Px 
 o" nPC, / Mn 
 ýx E1.42 " 15.82 x E1.78 /1.15.82 
" 29.58/16.82 
" E1.76 
Therefore theoretical ax-rights price is 11.76. 
" The rights issue was very close to the start of the year and therefore 
based an the total number of shares issued at the start of the year. 
CaLcutatlon of Weighted Average No. Shares 
Total proceeds fromi rights issue 8,345,070 x £1.42 
  
E12,560,000 
Market price per share   91.78 
Fresh issue at market value " E12,560,000/E1.78 
a 7,056,180 shares 
Total no. shares issued   8,845,070 
Leu fresh issue at markst value "(7,056,180) 
Bonus issue 
  
1,788,890 
! onus item based on. (1). 139,956,000 shares in issue before rights issue 
(ii) 7,056,180 shares (fresh issue) 
Total " 147,012,180 shares 
genau ratio   1,788,890 : 147,012,180 
  
I: 82.18 (1 : 32) 
Factor " 32/83 
Shares Actual Weighted Av. 
At start of year 139,956,000 x83/82 x0/12 
Fresh issue 7,056,180 
147,012,180 x 53/82 x12/12 148,805,012 
Bonus issue 1,780,590 
` ........... 
. 
........... 
148,801,070 148,605,012 
issue in Jan 1987 63,264,000 x2.5/12 13,179,03 
212,045,070 161,980,45 
APPENDIX 6-1-29 
Exa, pke: British land ye nor 1992 : TEI 
ACTUAL ISSW 
DEBT 
E000 E000 
a OF 1ssul 
HYPOTNETIGI ISSUE 
................... 
EQUITY ALT. 
E000 E000 
Operating profit 109800 109600 
INTEREST (ex now fin) 7 7 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 17169 0 
TOTAL INTEREST ý 171" 0 
Not profit after int 92613 109! 00 
P. pro-tax profit ý 33300 504M 
basic taxation 5900 ý 5900 
tax change 0 5672 
TOTAL TAX ý 
. 
5900 
........ " 
11572 
Earnings after tax 
ý 
27400 . . "....... 38915 
Prof dividend ( 0 0 
Minority Interest 1100 1100 
EARNINGS for ORD 26300 ý 37815 
EPS (pence/ord share) I 11.46 I 12.99 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 225535 225539 
--rove no. ord. shares 
start of year, '000) 225400 
No. of now Ord. share 
(totat, '000) 8535 74773 
No. of new ord. shares 
(wed in EPS catc., '000) 4000 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 234070 300308 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS ealc., '000) 229400 
Amount of now data E 150000000 
(naminM ) 
Coon rate 12.50 
Tax rate 33.00 
300491 E150000000 12.5% 2016 issued at 100.682 
Share price 300491   E2.85 
If 202 discount, than would issue E151023000/E2.28 (. 8 x E2.85) 
" 66238158 now ordinary shares 
Under the original debt Issue the EPS is 11.46p, on the equity recan. 
it would Increase to 1S. 45p. 
Motes. (1) Datatrean does not provide a figure for total interest 
charges for financial co psnias, so the interest relating 
to the debt has been calculated separately, and than 
excluded as appropriate In the equity rican. 
There was an actual increase in the nu r of ordinary shares of 
8,535,000. issued 18 October M. This has also been included In the 
reconstruction. 
225400 
65603 
291003 
N/A 
N/A 
35.00 
U ITISN LANG T/E MUCH 1992 
Calcn. of ex-rights price 
.............................. 
Po " O. SPC 
" 0.8 a £2.55 
" E2.23 
M 225,535,000 shares " 
M" Et/Po 
" 151,023,000/Q. 21 
" 66,238,158 
The term of the rights issue are: 
M: M" n 
66,238,158 : 225,535,000 
1 : 
-3.4 
Px iio + nP / aºn " 
"a f2. + 3.4 x E2.55 /1+3.4 
" 11.97/4.4 
" E2.72 
Therefore theoretical ax-rights price is £2.72. 
* The rights issue would be very close to the start of the year and to is 
based an the total number of shares in issue at the start of the year. 
Calculation of Weighted Average No. Shares 
Total proceeds fray rights issue 66,238,158 a 92.28 
" E151,023,000 
Market price per share   E2.85 
Fresh issue at mrket value   E151,023,000/E2.85 
" 52,990,526 shares 
Total no. shares issued   66,238,158 
Loss fresh issue at wrkit value "(52,990,526) 
Bonus issue " 13,247,632 
Eons issue based ans (1) 225,535,000 shares in issue before rights issue 
(11) $2,990,526 shares (fresh issue) 
Total " 278,525,526 shares 
tones ratio   13,247,632 : 273,525,526 
aI: 21.02 (1 : 21) 
Factor " 21/22 
Shares Actual Weighted Av. 
At start of year 225,335,000 x22/21 81/12 19,689,563 
Fresh issue 52,990,526 
278,525,526 x 22/21 x11/12 267,472,926 
Bonus issue 13,247,632 
- 
........... ........... 
291,773,1l8 287,162,489 
Issue in Oct 1991 8,535,000 *5.4/12 3,840,750 
........... ........... 
300,308,158 291,003,239 
APPENDIX 6-1-30 
Example: British steel ye Mar 1992 : YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE MYPOTNETICAL ISSUE 
............ ................... 
DEBT EQUITY ALT. 
£000 E000 ý E000 E000 
Operating profit I 64000 64000 
INTEREST (ex new fin) 32062 ý 32062 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST ý 12938 ý0 
TOTAL INTEREST ý 45000 32062 
.......... 
ý 
.......... 
Net profit after int 19001 0 
Pub. pre-tax profit I -55000 -74001 
basic taxation I 
-20000 -20000 
tax change 0 4399 
TOTAL TAX ý 
-20000 ý -15601 
I 
.......... 
I 
.......... 
Earnings after tax ý -35000 I -58399 
Prof dividend ý0ý0 
Minority interest 
-1000 -1000 
EARNINGS for ORD 
. 
34000 
-57399 
EPS (ponce/ord share) -1.70 ý -2.71 
Total ord. shares 
at start of year ('000) 2000000 2000000 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of year, 1000) 2000000 2000000, 
No. of new ord. shares 
(total, '000) 0 149364 
No. of now ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 0 118821 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 2000000 2149364 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS cole., 1000) 2000000 2118821 
Amount of new debs E 150000000 N/A 
(nominal) 
Coupon rate 11.500 N/A 
Tax rate 34.00 34.00 
100791 £150000000 11.508 2016 Issued at 100.572. 
Share price 100791 " E1.26 
If 205 discount, then would issue E1S08S8000/E1.01(. 8 x 91.26) 
  
149364356 new ordinary shares 
Under the original debt Issue the EPS is 'negative' and would he" 
become even more 'negative' if equity had been Issued instead of debt. 
The interest that has been attributed to the first year in Issue 
of the now debt is 9 months i. e. E17.25an x 
. 
75 " E12.9375an. 
Note (1) There was irrecoverable ACT of Man for y/e Mar 1992. 
BRITISH STEEL r/E KAR 1992 
Ca(cn. of . x-rights price 
Po " 0.8PC 
  
0.8 x £1.26 
  
E1.01 
w"2,000,000,000 shares "" 
M" Ei/Po 
" 150,858,000/11.01 
  
149,36,356 
The terms of the rights issue ere: 
M: N  . n 
149,364,356 : 2,000,000,000 
1: 13.39 
Px C. Po"We /. ºn 
"1x 11.01 " 13.39 x 91.26 /1" 13.39 
  
17.88/14.39 
" £1.24 
Therefore theorsticit ex-rights price is £1.24. 
Calculation of Weighted Average No. Shares 
................................................. 
Total proceeds fra. rights issue 149,364,356 x E1.01 
" E150,658,000 
Market price per share " 91.26 
Fresh issue at Urkot value   E150,858,000/E1.26 
  
119,728,571 shares 
Total no. shares issued 
  
149,364,356 
Less fresh issue at mrket value "(119,721,571) 
tares issue 
  
29,635,785 
Baras issue based on: (i) 2,000,000,000 shares in iss before rights issue 
(ii) 119,728,571 shares (fresh issue) 
Total " 2,119,723,571 shares 
sonne ratio " 29,635,735 : 2,119,728,571 
"I: 71.53 Cl : 72) 
Factor " 72/73 
Shares Actual weighted Av. 
2,000,000,000 x73/72 x3/12 506,944,6ii 
Fresh issue 119,728,571 
2,119,721,971 x 73/72 *9/12 1,611,876,934 
30111A issue 29,635,735 
........... 
................... 
"'w 
2,149,364,356 2,113,821,378 
APPENDIX 6-1-31 
Exople: City Site Estates ye Sep 1987 YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE HYPOTHETICAL ISSUE 
DEBT ý EQUITY ALT. 
E000 £000 E000 E000 
operating profit 1527 1527 
INTEREST (. x now fin) 77 
NEW f1NAJ E INTEREST 1094 ý0 
TOTAL INTEREST ( 1094 0 
Not profit after int 433 ý 1527 
Pub. pr. -tax profit I 790 ý 1864 
basic taxation 
tax change 
TOTAL TAX 
Earnings after tax 
Prof dividend 
Minority interest 
EARNINGS for ORD 
EPS (pence/ord share) 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of ysar, '000) 
No. of new ord. shares 
(total, '000) 
No. of new ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 
Total ord. shares at y/" 
('000) 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 
Anmit of now dabs E 
(nominal) 
Coupon rate 
Tax rate 
111 
0 
111 
679 
43 
0 
636 
6.00 
8968 
7672 
6200 
2936 
15148 
10605 
25000000 
10.500 
35.00 
111 
383 
1390 
43 
0 
1347 
 . aaru .. a.. ssa 
6.55 
"941 
7672 
26238 
12884 
35186 
20556 
N/A 
M/A 
35.00 
140447 £25000000 10.5X 2017 issued at 99.17 
Man issued in Apr '87 at E99.17, and Men issued in Feb '89 
at £99.531. Total raised   £9,917,000 plus £14,930,700   £24,847,700. 
Interest due 31 Mar and 30 Sep. 
Share price 140687 = E1.55 
If 20Z discount, than would Issue E24867700/E1.24 (. b x E1.55) 
a 20,038,466 now ordinary shares 
Interest for 5 months has been taken into aeeomt. 
under the orioiwl debt issue the EPS Is 6.00p, an the puity recon. this 
increases to 6.55p. 
There has been an actual increase In the number of ordinary shares of 
6,200,000, issued 24 June 1967. The" have also been included in the 
equity reconstruction. 
Moto. City Sites is in the financial sector and information an total 
interest charges is not available. The interest for the debt has 
been calculated and than excluded in the equity neon., with extra 
tax payable due to loss of interest relief being added. 
Example: City Estates Yo Sp 1988 : YEAR FOLLOWING YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE NYPOTMETICAI ISSUE 
............ 
........... 
DEBT EQUITY ALT. 
........ 
E000 1000 E000 E000 
Operating profit ( 2%7 ý 2%7 
INTEREST (ex new fin) !(T 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 2625 0 
TOTAL INTEREST ý 2625 ý 
......... 
0 
. .. 
Nat profit after Inc 342 
........ 
2967 
Pub. prs-tax profit ý 3678 6303 
basic taxation 1314 ý 1314 
tax chargs 0 919 
TOTAL TAX ý 1314 ý 
.......... 
2233 
ý 
.. Earnings after tax 2364 ý ........ 4070 
Prof dividend ý 35 ý 33 
Minority interest 00 
EARNINGS for ORO 2329 
. _" 
4035 
I sa. "sas:::: 
EPS (psneNord share) 15.33 
. usassa 
11.45 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 15148 35186 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of y. ar, '000) 10608 20556 
No. of now ord. shares 
(totat, '000) 116 116 
No. of now ord. shares 
(used In EPS tale., '000) 4588 14678 
Total ord. shares at y/" 
('000) 15264 33302 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used In EPS calc., '000) 151% 35234 
Amount of now dabs E 25000000 N/A 
(nominal) 
Coupon rate 10.500 N/A 
Tax rats 35.00 35.00 
140487 £25000000 10.52 2017 Issued at 99.17 - -- 
E10Mn Issued in Apr 087 at £99.17, and E15an Issued In Fab '89 
at £99.538. Total raised " 19,917,000 plus £14,930,700 
  
124,847,700. 
Interest due 31 Mar and 30 Sapo 
share pries 140487 " 11.55 
If 20x discount, then would Issue E24847700/E1.24 (. b x 11.55) 
a 20,038,468 new ordinary shares 
A full year's Interest has been charged in 1968. 
Under the original debt issue the EPS Is 1S. 33p, on the equity racan. 
this fells to 11.45p. 
Again there has been an actual Increase in the nuabsr of ordinary shares 
of 116,000, issued I May 1988. 
For the reconstruction scenario, shares in Issue during the year: 
01/10/67 " 30/04/88 " 35,186,000 
01/05/88 " 30/09/88 " 35,302,000 
The weighted average after of shares is calculated ss: 
35,186,000 x 7/12 " 35.302,000 x 5/12 " 35,234,333 
CITY SITE ESTATES r/E SEP 1907 
Calcn. of ex-rights price 
.............................. 
ºo 
  
0. sac 
" 0.8 x E1.55 
" £1.24 
M 8,968,000 shares " 
M"E! /ºo 
" 24,547,700/E1.24 
" 20,038,468 
The term of the rights issue are: 
M: N" at n 
20,038,468 : 8,948,000 
1: 0.45 (20 : 9) 
ºx 
-(Po 
" nPc, / ann 
"1x 11.24 " 0.45 x E1.55 /1"0.45 
  
1.94/1.45 
" E1.34 
Therafora theoretical ax-rights pries is £1.34. 
" Based on shares in faun at start of year. 
Calculation of Weighted Aver"* No. Shares 
Total proceeds frost rights issue 20,038,466 a £1.24 
  
E24,847,700 
Markst price per share   E1.55 
Fresh issue at market value " £24,847,700/E1.55 
" 16,030,774 shares 
Total no. shares issued 
- 
20,038,460 
Less fresh issue at market value "(16,030,774) 
Bonus isaw " 4,007,694 
Bans issue based on: (1) 8,948,000 shares in issue before rights issue 
(ii) 16,030,774 shares (fresh issue) 
Total " 24,978,774 shares 
Bonus ratio 
  
4,007,6% : 24,978,774 
"I: 6.23 (6 : 25) 
Factor 
  
25/29 
Shares Actual Weighted Av. 
At start of year 8,948,000 x29/25 s6.5/12 5,622,327 
Fresh issue 16,030,774 
24,976,774 *29/25 ßc5.5/12 13,280,382 
Bonus Issue 4,007,694 
........... ........... 
'" 28,986,666 18,902,709 
issue In Jun 1967 6,200,000 n3.2/12 1,653,333 
35,186,466 20,556,062 
APPENDIX 6-1-32 
Example: Dares Estates ye Dec 1987 : YEAR Of ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISOJE HYPOTHETICAL ISSUE 
DEBT EQUITY ALT. 
E000 E000 1 E000 E000 
Operating profit ý 7382 ý 7382 
INTEREST (ax now fin) 7ýT 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST ý 2081 ý0 
TOTAL INTEREST ý 2081 0 
Not profit after int 5301 7382 
Pub. prs-tu profit ý 5096 ý 7177 
basic taxation ý 1122 ý 1122 
tu change 0 728 
TOTAL TAX 1122 ý 1850 
.......... 
ý 
.......... Earnings after tu 3974 5326 
Prof dividend ý00 
Minority interest 103 ( 103 
EARNINGS for ORO 3871 5223 
I 
,.. s. a. a.... aa. a.. a. I . od. a..... aa.... 
EPS (pence/ord share) ý 2.12 ý 2.22 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 132560 132560 
Avsrsge no. ord. shares 
(at start of ysar, '000) 90160 90160 
No. of now ord. shares 
(total, 1000) 73640 158564 
No. of now ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 92500 144955 
Total ord. shares at y/" 
('000) 206200 291124 " 
Average no. of ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 182660 235115 
Amount of now dab E 35000000 N/A 
Coupon rate 10.250 N/A 
Tu rats 35.00 35.00 
_ 
080687 E35000000 10.25% 2012 issued at 99.239 
E15sn was placed In Juns '87 at 99.239% and E20ai was placed In Mar '89 
at 95.4181, raising a total of E33,969,450. 
Interest due 1 Doc and 1 June. First payment due 01/12/87. 
Share price 080687 a E0,50 
If 202 discount. then would issue E33,969,450/E0.60 i. e. (. 8 x E0.50) 
  
84923625 now ordinary shores 
Seven months Interest has been taken into accent. 
Under th. "original debt issue the EFS is 2.12p, an the equity re con. 
this Increases to 2.22p. 
Then has been an actual increase in the mbar of shares In Issue of 
73,640,000, issued 25 April 1987. These have also been included in the 
equity reconstruction. 
Note. Dares Estates is In the property sector and information an total 
interest charm Is not available. The Interest for the debt has 
been calculated for the debt issue and then excluded In the equity 
recon., with extra tax payable (due to Loss of interest relief) being 
added back. 
Exrpls: 
Operating profit 
INTEREST (ox now fin) 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 
TOTAL INTEREST 
Net profit after int 
P b. pre-tax profit 
basic taxation 
tax change 
TOTAL TAX 
Earnings after tax 
Prof dividend 
Minority Interest 
EARNINGS for GRD 
EPS (ponce/ord share) 
Dares Eststss 119 Dec 1966 : YEAR FOLLOWING TEAM Of ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE NYPOTNETICAL ISSUE 
DEBT EQUITY ALT. 
E000 E000 E000 £000 
10907 10907 
T I7 
3588 I0 
... 
3588 
....... 
I 0 
7319 
I 
... ....... 10907 
12566 16154 
3530 I 3830 
0 1256 
"". 
3x30 
....... 
1 5086 
8736 
I 
... I ....... 11068 
0 I0 
I 185 1SS 
I 8551 I 10883 
4.15 I 3.74 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of yoar, '000) 
No. of men ord. shares 
(totat. '000) 
No. of now ord. shares 
(w. d in EPS cale., '000) 
Total ord. shares at y/s 
('000) 
Average no. of ord. shares 
(used in EPS eale., '000) 
Amount of now data E 
Coupon rate 
Taa rate 
206200 
192660 
-1000 
23500 
205200 
206160 
35000000 
10.250 
35.00 
080657 133000000 10.23% 2012 issued at 99.239 
291124 
235115 
-1000 
55%7 
290f26 
291082 
N/A 
M/A 
35.00 
E1Ssn use placed in June 887 at 99.239% and Man was placed In Mar 189 
at 95.4181, raising a total of 03,969,450. 
Interest due 1 Dec and 1 Jene. First payment due 01/12/87. 
Share price 080687 s E0.50 
If 202 discount, than would issue 03,969,450/(0.40 i. e. (. 8 x E0.50) 
" 84923625 now ordinary shares 
A full year's interest has been charged in 1988 (and therefore stripped 
out of the equity recon. ). 
Under the original debt loan the (PS is 4.1Sp, on the equity reeon. 
the EPS decreases to 3.74p. 
There was an actual decrease in the number of shares of 1,000,000 on 
16 December 1988. This has also been included in the equity recon. 
For the reconstruction scenario, shares in Issue during the years 
01/01/88 
- 
15/12/88 s 291,123,625 
16/12/88 
- 
31/12/88 
  
290,123,625 
The weighted average v sr of shares is calculated as: 
291,123,625 z 11. S/12 " 290.123,625 x 0.5/12 a 291,011,950 
DARES ESTATES TE DEC 1967 
Calcn. of "x-rights price 
.............................. 
Po ". 0.8Pc 
a 0.8 x £0.50 
" E0.40 
M  206,200,000 shares " 
N" O/Po 
" E33,969,450/E0.40 
  
84,923,625 
The tarn of the rights Issue are: 
M: N 
   n 
34,923,625: 206,200,000 
1: 2.43 (2 : 5) 
Px 
  
(aio 
+ nPC am 
"Tx 
ft 
" 2.43 x 10.50 /1+2.43 
" 1.62/3.43 
" E0.47 
therefore theoretical ox-rights price I. 10.47. 
' used an rs er of shares in issue at the year and. 
Calculation of Weighted Average No. Shares 
Total proceeds fro. rights issue 84,923,625 x £0.40 
  
ß3,969,450. 
Market price per there " E0.50 
Fresh issue at market value " £33,969,450/60.50 
  
67,938,900 shares 
Total no. shares Issued 
  
84,923,625 
Less fresh Issue at market value "(67,938,900) 
Bonus issue 
  
16,984,725 
Bonus Isaue based on: (1) 206,200,000 shares in issue before rights Issue 
(ii) 67,938,900 shares (fresh Issue) 
Total " 274,138,900 shares 
/onus ratio 
  
16,984,725 : 274,138,900 
" 1: 16.14 Cl : 16) 
Factor 
  
16/17 
Shares Actual weighted Av. 
At start of year 132,560,000 x17/16 x4/12 46,948,333 
Issue In Apr 1987 73,640,000 
206,200,000 x17/16 x1/12 18,257,292 
Fresh Issue 67,938,900 
274,138,900 x17/16 x7/12 169,909,001 
Bonus issue 16,984,725 
........... ......... -- 
291,123,625 
.. m.... o 
235,114,626 
. sue 
APPENDIX 6-1-33 
E*.. pls: Trustnase Fort* yo Jan 90 : TEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE MTPQTNITICAL IsJJI 
............ ................... 
DEBT EQUITY ALT. 
£000 E000 I ID=D £000 
Operating profit I 233600 253600 
INTEREST (u now fin) ý 797" ý 79746 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 9Q34 ý0 
TOTAL INTEREST 
Not profit after int 
Pub. pre- taa prof it 
basic taxation 
tax change 
TOTAL TAX 
Earnings after tax 
Prof dividend 
Minority Interest 
EARNINGS for ORD 
EPS (pence/ord share) 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of yoar, '000) 
No. of now ord. shares 
(total, '000) 
No. of now ord. shares 
(used In EPS eale., '000) 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS eale., '000) 
Amount of new dabs E 
(nominal) 
Coupon rate 
Tu rate 
89600 7"4k 
.......... .......... 164000 173854 
232800 242654 
45600 
0 
45600 
187200 
0 
7200 
180000 
22.98 
782643 
45600 
3449 
49049 
193605 
0 
7200 
166405 
22.81 
7ateca 
782520 
2076 
600 
784724 
7ä312O 
100000000 
10.750 
35.00 
782520 
46656 
34790 
829304 
817340 
N/A 
N/A 
35.00 
220289 1100000000 10.75% 1996 Issued at 100.75 
Interest clue 24 Jan. 
Interest for 11 . snths has born taken into account. 
Share price 220289   £2.83 
If 20% dlseov+t, then would issue E100730000/Q. 26 (. 8 x E2.83) 
  
44579646 new ordinary shares 
There was an actual increase of ordinary shares of 2,076,000 Issued 
18 October 1989. Thaso have also been included in the reconstruction. 
For the reconstruction shares in issue during the year: 
01/11/M = 21/02/89 
  
782,643,000 
22/02/89 
- 
17/10/89 
  
827,227,646 
18/10/89 " 31/01/90   829,303,646 
For the reconstruction. the weighted average number of shares Is 
calculated as: 
782,648,000 x 3.5/15 + 827,227,646 x 8/15 + 829,303,646 z 3.5/15 
  
817,310,129 
if 
The £fl an the origin. 
l 
debt issue 1s 22.98p, an the equity recon. this 
decrees" to 22.81p. 
Mote. Forte capitalised interest of E11.2ß+ In the y/i Jan 1990. 
t t.: Trusthot.. fort* r JWn 91 : YEAR FOLLOWING YEAR Of ! SVA 
ACTUAL ISSUE NYPOTNETICAL ISSUE 
............ 
................... 
OUT EQUITY ALT. 
E000 ED00 ý E000 £000 
Operating profit ( 268000 ý 268000 
INTEREST (ex new fin) ý 89250 89250 
MEW FINANCE INTEREST 10730 ý0 
TOTAL INTEREST ý 100000 
.......... ... 
89250 
Net profit after Int 168000 
....... 
178710 
Pub. pre-tax profit I 190000 200750 
basic taxation I 31000 31000 
tax change 0ý 3655 
TOTAL TAX ý 31000 
.......... ... 
34655 
I 
Earnings after tax 159000 ....... 166091 
Prof dividend I0ý0 
Minority interest 11000 11000 
EARNINGS for ORD 148000 155095 
EPS (pence/ord share) 18.85 18.69 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 784724 829304 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of year, '000) 783120 817310 
No. of now ord. shares 
(total, '000) 1211 1211 
No. of new ord. shares 
(used in EPS cale., '000) 2201 12595 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 785968 830548 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used In EPS calc., 1000) 785321 829903 
Arrant of new dabs E 100000000 N/A 
(nominal) 
Coupon rate 10.750 N/A 
Tax rate 34.00 34.00 
220289 E100000000 10.752 1996 issued at 100.73 
Share price 220289 " Q. 83 
if 202 discount, then would issue E100730000/(. 8 x 92.83) 
" 44579646 now ordinary shares 
Interest for the whole year has been taken into account. 
On the original debt issue the EPS is 18.85p, on the equity recon., this 
decreases to 18.69p. 
Thera has been an actual increase in the number of ordinary shares of 
1,244,000, issued 7 August 1990. This Increase has also been Included 
in the equity ncanstruetlon. 
For the reconstruction scennario, shares in issue during the year: 
01/02/90 
- 
06/08/90 + 829,384,000 
07/08/90 
- 
31/12/91 " 830,548,000 
The weighted average mabsr of shares Is calculated ass 
829,304.000 x 6.2/12 " 830,548,000 x 5.8/12 " 129,905,267 
Note. Forte capitalised Interest of 112o+ in the y/o Jan 1991. 
TRUSTNOUSE FORTE T/E JAM 1990 
Calcn. of . x-rights price 
.............................. 
Po " 0.810c 
  
0.8 x 92.83 
  
E2.26 
M" 784,724,000 sharp 
M" E1/ºo 
  
100,750,000/E2.26 
" 44,579,666 
The term of the rights Isom are: 
M. M 
 ". n 
44,579,666 : 734,724,000 
1: 17.6 
ºx 
 (eºo " nº4 mºn 
 Ix 12.26 " 17.6 a E2.83 /1" 17.6 
" 52.07/18.6 
" 12.80 
Therefore theoretical ex-rights price is E2.80 
Calculation of Weighted Average No. Shares 
Total proceeds fray rights issue 44,579,646 x 62.26 
" El00,750,000 
Market price per share a 92.83 
fresh issue at market value E100,750,000/E2. $3 
a 35,600,707 shares 
Total no. shares issued 
  
44,579,646 
Less fresh Issue at market value 
-(35,600,707) 
Yonur isaua 
  
8,978,939 
Bonus issue. basad on: (1) 784,724,000 shares in issue before rights issue 
(11) 35,600,707 shares (fresh, issw) 
Total 
  
820,324,707 shares 
$=%A ratio " 8,978,939 : 820,324,707 
"1: 91.36 (3 : 274) 
Factor " 276/277 
$har" Actual Weighted Av. 
784,724,000 x277/274 x1/12 66,109,656 
Fresh issue 35,600,707 
820,324,707 x 277/274 x11/12 760,197,501 
lento issue 8,978,939 
........... 
........... 
829,303,646 826,307,157 
mmý 
APPENDIX 6-1-34 
Exempts: Lard Saeuritiss ye Nor 1967 : TEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL I$$L 
............ 
NYPOTNETICAL ISSUE 
................... 
DEBT EQUITY ALT. 
E000 E000 ý E000 E000 
Operating profit 149500 149500 
INTEREST (ex now fin) 7 ý7 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 16943 0 
TOTAL INTEREST ý 
... 
1696$ 
....... 
ý 0 
Nat profit. after int 132555 
ý 
.. ........ 149500 l 
pes-tax profit 120600 ý 13754$ 
basic taxation ý 31100 ý 31100 
tax chariot 0 5931 
TOTAL TAX ý 31100 37031 
Earnings after tax ... ....... 89500 
I 
". ........ 100514 
Prtf dividend 
. 
0 (0 
Minority Interest I0 ý0 
EARNINGS for ORD 89500 100514 
EPS (punts/ord share) 17.78 
I maa. ss 
ý 
tsataN. 
17.52 
Total ord: shares at 
start of year ('000) 503400 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of yaar, '000) 503400 
No. of now ord. shares 
(total, '000) 0 
No. of now ord. shares 
(used in EPf calc., '000) 0 
Total ord. shares at y/" 
('000) 503400 
Average no. ord. sharp 
(used in £PS calc., '000) 503400 
Aunt of now dabs E 200000000 
(nminsl) 
Coupon rata 9.500 
Tax rate 35.00 
503400 
503400 
7548 
70264 
571838 
573664 
N/A 
M/A 
35.00 
290486 E200000000 9.5Z 2007 issued. 
E100w Issued Apr 186 at 198.125, and E100mm in Apr 087 at M. 75. 
Total raised 'L 193,875,000. 
Interest due 29April. 
Share price 290486 a 0.21 
If 20% discount, then would issue 1193875000/92.57 i. o. (. 8 it 93.21) 
  
75437743 new ordinary shares 
Interest for 11 wnths has been taken into account. 
The EPS udsr the original debt issue is 17.7$p, an the oqulty region. 
this drops to 17.52p. 
Example: Land Securities ye Mar 1988 TEAR FOU. OYING TEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE HYPOTHETICAL ISSUE 
............ ................... 
DEBT EQUITY ALT. 
E000 E000 ý E000 £000 
Operating profit ( 169600 169600 
INTEREST Cox now fin) 7(7 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 19000 ý0 
TOTAL INTEREST ý 19000 0 
.......... 
I 
----. ----- Net profit after int 150600 ý 169600 
Pub. pre-tax profit I 133600 ý 152600 
basic taxation ý 37600 ý 37600 
tax charge 0ý 6650 
TOTAL TAX 37600 44250 
.......... 
ý 
........ -- Earnings after tax 96000 ý 108350 
Prof dividend ý00 
Minority interest 0I0 
EARNINGS for ORD 96000 ý 108350 
EPS (panes/ord share) 19.07 18.72 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year (1000) 503400 578838 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of year, '000) 503400 573664 
No. of now ord. Mares 
(total, '000) 100 100 
No. of now ord. shares 
(wed in EPf eale., '000) 100 5274 
Total ord. shares at y/o 
('000) 503500 578938 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS eale., '000) 503S00 575938 
Amount of now dabs £ 200000000 N/A 
(nominal) 
Coupon rate 9.500 M/A 
Tax rats, 35.00 35.00 
290486 E200000000 9.5% 2007 issued. '- 
£100sr issued Apr '86 at £98.125, and £100sn in Apr '87 at £95.75. 
Total raised " £193,875,000. 
Interest due 29 April. 
Share price 290486   £3.21 
if 202 discount, then would issue £193875000/62.57 i. e. (. 8 x E3.21) 
  
75437743 now ordinary shares 
A full row's interest has been taken into account. 
The EºS on the original debt issue is 19.07p, on the equity raeon. this 
drops to 18.72p: " 
There has been an actual small increase of 100,000 shares, issued 
April 1987. These have all been included in the weighted average number 
of shares for the year in the actual issue scenario. 
For the reconstruction scenario, the weighted average number of shares 
is: 
578,838,000 " 100,000 a 578,938,000 
LAND SECW ITIES WE MAN 1987 
Caton. of ox-rights pries 
Po " 0.8PC 
  
6.8 
i E3.21 
" 
£2.57 
M  503,400,000 shares 
M" ES/Po 
- 
193,875,000/92.57 
  
75,437,743 
The terms of the rights issue are: 
M: N ". n 
75,437,743 : 503,400,000 
1: 6.67 
Px ' 
ýsio 
" nPC aºn 
 1a E2.5 " 6.67 x 13.21 /1+6.67 
" 23.98/7.67 
  
93.13 
Therefore theoretical ex-rights price I. 13.13. 
Calculation of Weighted Awrago Wo. Sharon 
Total proceeds fromm rights issue 73,437,743 x 62.57 
  
E193,873,000 
Market price per share 
  
E3.21 
Fresh issue at mrket value " 1193,875,000/13.21 
" 60,397,196 shares 
Total no. shares issued " 75,437,743 
--- 
less fresh issue at mrket value "(60,397,1%) 
Bonus issue " 15,040,547 
Bonus issue based on: (1) 503,400,000 shares in issue before rights Issue 
(ii) 60,397,1% shares (fresh issue) 
Total " 563,797,196 shares 
Bans ratio   15,040,547: 563,797,1% 
"I: 37.49 (2 : 75) 
Factor " 73/77 
Shares Actual Weighted Av. 
503,400,000 x77/75 0/12 43,068,667 
Fresh (saus 60,397,1% 
563,797,1% x 77/75 x11/12 530,595,805 
Bonus Iaaw 15,040,547 
........... ........... 578,837,743 573,664,472 
': lo 
0 
APPENDIX 6-1-35 
Eaaapla: Lasso ys DOC 1986 : YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE MTPOTNETICAL ISSUE 
DEBT ý EQUITY ALT. 
E000 E000 I E000 E000 
Operating profit 25900 25900 
INTEREST (ax now fin) I 33323 ý 33323 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST ( 3375 ý0 
TOTAL INTEREST 36700 
.......... -- 
33325 
Not profit after 1nt 
-10800 
I 
...... -- 
-7425 
VtC. pro-tax profit 7000 10375 
basic taxation 
-13200 -13200 
tax change 0 1215 
TOTAL TAX ý 
-13200 
.......... 
4 
. - 
-11985 
-... Earnings after tax 20200 
ý ý ---- 22360 
Prof divider 4500 ý 4500 
Minority interest ý 0 0 
EARNINGS for ORD 15700 ý 17860 
EPS (pent/ord share) I 9.63 9.05 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 122364 122364 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of y. ar, '000) 114220 114220 
No. of now ord. shares 
(total, 1000) 41272 85686 " 
No. of now ord. shares 
(used in EPS ealo., '000) 43816 93022 
Total ord. shares at y/o 
('000) 163636 208050 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EP eatc., '000) 163036 197242 
Ast of new dabs E 50000000 N/A 
(nosinal) 
Coupon rate 10.125 N/A 
Tax rate 36.00 36.00 
170486 E30000000 10.125% 1993 isswd at 100.375 
Interest due 7 May. 
Share price 170486 " E1.41- -- 
It 20X discount, then would issue E30187500/E1.13 (. 8 x 11.41) 
" 44413717 now ordinary shares 
an the originsl. dsbt issue the EPS is 9.63p, on: the equity recon. this 
falls to 9.05p. " 
Interest for 8 months has been taken account of in the statements. 
There was an actual Increase in the nabor of ordinary shares of 
41,272,000, issued 5 Jan. 1986. 
Wate. Interest capitalised in the y/o Ooe 1986 was 11.2 en 
Exupl e: lsllo y+ Doc 19$? : YEAR FOLLOWING YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE NYPOTNETICAL ISSUE 
... --------- 
................... 
GENT ý EQUITY ALT. 
E000 E000 ý E000 E000 
Operating profit ý 29100 29100 
INTEREST (et new fin) ( 29037 ý 29037 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 5063 (0 
TOTAL INTEREST ý 34100 29037 
.......... 
ý 
.......... Not profit after Inc 
-5000 ý 63 
Ptb. pr. 
- 
uu profit 33 000 I 43063 
basic taxation 
tax charge 
TOTAL TAX 
Earnings after tax 
Prof dividend 
Nlnsrity interest 
EARNINGS for ORD 
EPi (psnco/ord share) 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year (1000) 
Average no. ord. shares 
(St start of yaar1'000) 
No. of now ord. shares 
(total. '000). 
No. of now ord. shares 
(wad in EPS ealo., '000) 
Total ord. shares at We 
(1000) 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS eatc., '000) 
Amount of now dabs E 
(nominal) 
Coupon rata 
Tu rate 
13700 
0 
13700 
24300 
4000 
0 
20300 
12.40 
163636 
163036 
364 
708 
164000 
1 63744 
50000000 
10.123 
35.00 
13700 
1m 
15472 
27591 
4000 
0 
ýY 
23391 
YY YYa 
11.33 
aYYYY1 YWYý 
208050 
191242 
3" 
10917 
208414 
208159 
N/A 
M/A 
35.00 
170486 150000000 10.125% 1993 issued at 100.375 
Shore price 170486   E1.61 
If 202 discount, then would issue E50187500/C. 8 x E1.41) 
  
44413717 now ordinary shares 
interest for a full year has boon taken account of in the ststasswºts. 
On the original debt issue the EPS is 12.40p, an the equity rocon., 
this docreooos to 11.33p. 
Thom has been an actual Increase In the number of ordinary shares of 
3M 000,4ssusd 13 September 1967. This has also been included to the 
equity reconstruction. 
For the reconstruction scenario, shares in issue durins the yew: 
01/01/87 
- 
12/09/87 " 208.050,000 
13/09/87 
- 
31/12/87 a 208,414,000 
The weighted wes age nabar of shares is calculated as: 
208,050,000 x 4"6/12 " 200,414,000 a 3.6/12 " 208,159,200 
Mots. Interest ospitaIIssd in the y/o Oso 1917 was 11.4m. 
LASMO WE DEC 1986 
Calera. of "x-rights price 
.............................. 
Po " 0.8Pc 
" 0.3 A £1.41 
  
E1.13 
M" 163,636,000 shares " 
N" Et/Po 
  
50,187,500/E1.13 
" 44,413,717 
The terns of the rights issue see: 
N: N  n 
44,413,717 : 163,636,000 
1: 3.66 
Px "(gPo " noe, / Nn 
 1x E1.13 " 3.68 x E1.41 /1"3.66 
" 6.32/4.68 
" E1.35 
Therefore theoretical ex-rights price is E1.35 
tasad on the m moor of shares at start of year plus the issue 
in early January. 
Calculation of Weighted Auerapo No. Shares 
................................................. 
Total proceeds from rights issue 44,413,71? s 11.13 
" 150,187,500 
Market price per share " £1.61 
Fresh issue at market value " ß0,187, S00/E1.41 
" 35,593,972 shares 
Total no. shares issued " 44,413,717 
Less fresh issue at market value -(35,593,972) 
Bonus issue " 8,819,745 
Bonn Issue based on: (1) 163,636,000 shares In isew before rights issue 
(ii) 35,593,972 shares (fresh issue) 
Total 
  
199,229,972 shares 
Benue ratio " 8,819,745 : 199,229,972 
"I: 22.59 (2 : 45) 
Factor " 45/47 
Shares Actual Weighted Av. 
At start of year 163,636,000 WAS x3.5/12 49,848,374 
Fresh issue ' 35,593,972 
199,229,972 x 47/45 *8.5/12 147,393,285 
Benue issue 8,819,745 
........... ........... 
208,049,717 197,241,659 
... mss.... .. ý. a. 
APPENDIX 6-1-36 
Exaspli*: Lassa ye Dec 1989 : YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL IS SUE NYPOTNETICAL ISSUE 
DEBT ý ECUITY 
E000 E000 E000 E000 
Operating profit ý 
. 
53100 53100 
INTEREST (ex now fin) ý 33331 ý 38331 
NEW FIMAMCE INTEREST 12969 0 
TOTAL INTEREST ý 51300 
.......... 
38331 
wet profit after int 
ý 
1800 .. ........ 14769 
Pub. pre-tut profit ( 61900 94569 
basic taxation 19200 ý 19200 
tax change ý 0 4539 
TOTAL TAX 19200 
--------"" 
23739 
Earnings after tax 
I 
62700 ý .. ........ 71130 
Prof dividend 7400 ý 7400 
Minority Interest 1200 1200 
EARNINGS for ORD 54100 62530 
EPS (ponce/ord share) 
... ýa+s. 
..... wo. ' 
23.65 
...... aa... w. o. a 
23.71 
Total and. shares at 
start of year ('000) 193916 193946 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of yoar, '000) 175766 175766 
No. of now ord. shares 
(total; 1000) 44222 84471 " 
No. of now ord. shares 
(used in EPS eale., '000) 52998 87937 
Total and. shares at y/e 
('000) 238168 275617 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS eale., '000) 228764 263703 
Aasft of now dabs E 150000000 N/A 
(nominal ) 
Coon rat* 10.375 N/A 
Tax rate 35.00 35.00 
130389 9150000000 10.375% 2009 Issued at 99.281. 
Interest duo 22 Juno and 22 Dec. 
Share price 130389-m-14.62 - 
If 202 discount. than would issue E146921S00/E3.70 (. 6 x £4.62) 
" 40249054 now ordinary shares 
interest for 10 . onths has been taken into account. 
on the original debt issue the EPS Is 23.65p, an the equity rocon, this 
increases slightly to 23. T1p. 
There has "lao bon an actual Increase In the r of ordinary shares 
of 44,222,000, issued 17 March 1989. 
" Comprises the actual increase of 44,222,000 plus the hypothetical Issue 
of 40,249,054. 
Ezrpte: Lasso yi OK 1990 : YEAR FOLLOWING YEAR of ISDA 
ACTUAL ISSUE NYPOTNETICAI ISSUE 
-........... ................... 
DEBT EQUITY 
£000 E000 £000 E000 
Operating profit I 74800 74800 
INTEREST (as now fin) ý 60737 60737 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 13563 ý0 
TOTAL INTEREST 76300 
Net profit after int -1500 
P 
. 
pre-taa profit 112200 
basic taxation 27600 
tax Chan" 0 
TOTAL TAX 27600 
.......... 
Earnings after tax 84600 
Prof dividend 7300 
Minority interest 1600 
EARNINGS for 010 75700 
EPS (pence/ord share) 21.16 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 238168 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of ysar, '000) 228764 
No. of new ord. shares 
(total, '000) 120388 
No. of new ord. shares 
(used in EP! ealc., '000) 129327 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 355356 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EDf eale., '000) 358091 
Amount of now data E 150000000 
(naninal) 
Coupon rate 10.375 
Tu rate 35.00 
130389 1150000000 10.375% 2009 issued at 99.241. 
Shan price 130389 
  
£4.62 
If 202 discount. than would issue £148921500/C. 3 x E4.62) 
" 40249054 now ordinary shares 
Interest for 10 
. onths has been taken into account. 
60737 
14063 
127763 
27600 
SK7 
33047 
94716 
7300 
1600 
85816 
21.52 
278417 
263703 
1203M 
135102 
398E05 
398805 
M/A 
N/A 
35.00 
On the original debt issue the EPS is 21.14p, an the equity recon., this 
increases slightly to 21.52p. 
Again there has been an actual increase in the number of ordinary shares 
of 120,388,000, issued 2 January 1990. This has also been included in 
the equity reconstruction, and given the proximity of the haus to the start 
of the year, it has been Included in Its entirety in the weighted average 
number of shares figure. 
For the reconstruction scenario, shorn in issue during the paar and 
weighted average mbar of Mares Is 278,417,000 + 120,384,000 
398,805,000. 
USMO TIE DEC 1989 
Calcn. of ex-rights price 
Po " 0.8Pe 
" 0.8 x E4.62 
" E3.70 
M" 193,946,000 shares " 
M"E! /Po 
  
E14L 921.500/0.70 
  
40,249,054 
The terser of the rights issue are: 
N: N"". n 
60,249,054 : 193,946,000 
1: 4.82 
Px"(ro"Me)/n. n 
"1a E3.70 " 4.82 x 14.62 /i"4.82 
" 25.97/5.82 
  
E4.46 
Therefore theoretical ex-rights price I. £4.46 
" eased an shares in issue at start of year. 
Calculation of Weighted Average No. Shares 
Total proceed free rights issue 40,249,054 x E3.70 
  
E148,921,500 
Market price per share   E4.62 
Fresh issue at morket value   E148,921,500/E4.62 
" 32,234,091 shares 
Total no. shares issued " 40,249,054 
Less fresh issue at market value 
__"(32,234,091) Sams iasw " 8,014,963 
$onus issue based an: (i) 193,946,000 shares in Issue before rights issue 
(ii) 32,234,091 sharp (fresh issue) 
Total 
  
226,180,091 shares 
Ilona ratio " 8,014,963: 226,180,091 
" I: 28.22 (1 : 28) 
Factor 
  
28/29 
Shares Actual Weighted Av. 
At start of year 193,946,000 a29/28 a2/12 33,478,774 
fresh Issue 32,234,091 
226,180,091 x10/12 195,214,960 
/onus Issue 8,014,963 
........... 
........... 
234,199,034 228,693,734 
Issue in March 1989 44,222,000 x9.5/12 35,009,083 
........... 
........... 
278,417,054 263,702,817 
APPENDIX 6-1-37 
Eaampte: MEPC ye Sep 1966 : YEA! OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE HYPOTNETICAL ISSUE 
DEBT ý EQUITY ALT. 
I E000 E000 E000 E000 
Operating profit 83700 55700 
INTEREST (es new fin) 7 T 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 3846 ý 0 
TOTAL INTEREST ý 3544 
........ 
7 
Net profit after Int .. 
ý 
818%6 .. ........ 85700 
Pub. pre-tax profit 58400 622" 
basic taxation ý 19100 ý 19100 
tax change ý 0 ý 1461 
TOTAL TAX ý 19100 
....... 
20561 
Earnings after tax 
... 
39300 
.. ... ..... 
41693 
Prof dividend 100 ý 100 
Minority interest 0 ý 0 
EARNINGS for 010 I 39200 41583 
EPS (pence/ord share) 16.35 16.25 
Tajal ord. shares at 
start of year (1000) 237508 237505 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of year, '000) 212500 212300 
No. of new ord, shares 
(total, '000) 3292 30866 
No. of new ord. shares 
(used In EPS tale., '000) 27244 43456 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
(1000) 240800 268376 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS colc., '000) 2397" 255956 
Aoant of now debe E 75000000 N/A 
(nosinst) 
Coon rate 10.75 N/A 
Tax rate 38 35.00 
260386 £75000000 10.25% 2003 issued st 100. 
Interest due 15 April 
Share price 260386 " 13.40 
if 20% discount, then would issue E73000000/ 2.72 (. 8 x £3.40) 
  
27,573.529 now ordinary shares 
Interest No been included for 6 months. 
On the original debt issue the EPS is 16.35p, on the equity recon., the 
EPS decrees" to 16.25p. 
There was an actual increase of 3,292,000 shares during the year, issued 
26 Jan. 1986. This hu also been included in the equity rsoonatruction. 
EAaMPIO: MEºC y. Sep 1987 : YE AN FOLLOWING YEAR of ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE HYPOTNETICAI ISSUE 
............ ................... 
DEBT I EQUITY ALT. 
£000 E000 I £000 £000 
Operating profit 109700 109700 
INTEREST (u now fin) 7 7 
MEW FINANCE INTEREST 7688 0 
TOTAL INTEREST ý 7688 
.......... 
0 
Mot profit after Inc 
ý 
102013 .......... 109700 
f 
. 
pro-tu profit ý 80200 I 87888 
basic taxation 
tax change 
TOTAL TAX 
Earnings after tax 
Prof dividend 
Minority Interest 
EARNINGS for ORD 
EPS (punt. /ord share) 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of ysar, '000) 
No. of now ord. shares 
(total, '000) 
No. of now ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 
Average no. ord. shares 
(usad. in EPS calc., '000) 
Anent of now dsbs E 
(nominal ) 
Cowan rate 
Tax rata 
I 25800 
0 
I 25500 
I 5"00 
100 
53500 
19.20 
240800 
2397" 
75200 
316000 
278600 
150000000 
10.75 
35 
25800 
2691 
28491 
59397 
100 
800 
58497 
19.12 
268374 
255956 
75200 
50016 
343574 
305974 
N/A 
N/A 
35.00 
260386 £75000000 10.252 2003 Issued at 100. 
Interest due 15 April 
Share price 260386   93.40 
if 202 discount. then would issue £75000000/a. 72 (. 8 a E3.40) 
" 27,573,529 now ordinary shares 
A full yew** interest has been taken into account. 
On the original debt issue the EP! Is 19.20p, on that equity rscan., the 
Us decreases to 19.12p. 
There has been an actual increase in the number of ordinary shares 
of 75,200,000, issued 30 March 1957. This Iwo been Included In the equity 
reconstruction. 
For the reconstruction scenario, shares in issue during the year: 
01/10/86 
- 
29/03/87 " 268.376,000 
30/03/87 
- 
30/09/87 " 343,574,000 
The weighted average saber of shares is calculated as: 
"268,375,000 
* i12 " 343,174,000 : 6/12 " 305,974,000. 
"-- -., --., - 
Calcn. of ex-rights price 
------------------------------ 
Po = 0.8Pc 
= 0.8 x E3.40 
= x. 72 
N= 240,800,000 shares " 
M= £B/Po 
= 75,000,000/E2.72 
= 27,573,529 
The terms of the rights issue are: 
M. N=m: n 
27,573,529 : 240,800,000 
1: 8.73 
Px =(mPo + nPc)/ m; n 
=1x £2.72 + 8.73 x £3.40 /1+8.73 
32.40/9.73 
=£3.33 
Therefore theoretical ex-rights price is £3.33. 
* Based on number of shares in issue when the rights issue was made. 
calculation of Weighted Average No. Shares 
------------------------------------------------- 
Total proceeds from rights issue 
Market price per share 
Fresh issue at market value 
27,573,529 x £2.72 
= £75,000,000 
£3.40 
E75,000,000/E3.40 
= 22,058,824 shares 
Total no. shares issued 
Less fresh issue at market value 
Bonus issue 
= 27,573,529 
(22,058,824) 
= 5,514,705 
Bonus issue based on: (i) 240,800,000 shares in issue before rights issue 
(ii) 22,058,824 shares (fresh issue) 
Total = 262,858,824 shares 
Bonus ratio = 5,514,705 : 262,858,824 
= 1: 47.67 (1 : 48 ) 
Factor = 48/49 
Shares Actual Weighted Av. 
At start of year 237,508,000 x49/48 x4/12 80,818,694 
Issue in Jan 1986 3,292,000 - 
240,800,000 x49/48 x2/12 40,969,444 
Fresh issue 22,058,824 
262,858,824 x49/48 x6/12 134,167,525 
Bonus issue 5,514,705 
- 
268,373,529 255,955,663 
sssssssssss assssssss=s 
APPENDIX 6-1-38 
Example: Toy(or Woodrow Ye Doe 1909 : YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE NYPOTNETICAL ISSUE 
DEST EQUITY ALT. 
£000 £000 E000 E000 
Operating profit j 37500 37500 
INTEREST (ox new fin) I 19700 19700 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 1900 ý0 
TOTAL INTEREST 
... 
21600 
....... 
19700 
Net profit after int 15900 
... ....... 
17800 
". pre-tax profit ( 116900 118800 
basic taxation 
tax change 
TOTAL TAX 
Earnings after tax 
Prof dividend 
Minority interest 
EARNINGS for ORD 
EPS (pence/ord share) 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of year, '000) 
No. of now ord. shares 
(total. '000) 
No. of new ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 
Amount of new deb E 
(nc. inal) 
Coupon rate 
Tax rate 
36900 
0 
36900 
80000 
0 
3600 
76400 
23.72 
156257 
156571 
170811 
165489 
329068 
322060 
80000000 
9.500 
35.00 
090389 £80000000 9.5Z 2014 Issued at 30.00 (part-paid) 
36900 
665 
37565 
81235 
0 
3600 
77635 
... 
23.78 
amsmmmuumsý 
'Sea? 
156571 
18691" 
169056 
345175 
326427 
N/A 
N/A 
35.00 
Share price 090389 " 16.19 
if 202 discount, then would issue E24000000/E1.49((. " x E6.19)x. 3) 
" 16107383 now ordinary shares 
(The now ord. shares have been treated as issued part-poid, 
at 303, to Carrospord with the debt issued pert-paid at 30X). 
interest for 10 snnths has been taken into aecoat, based an 
the 924000000 part-paid debt. 
There has been, An actual increase in the nºabor of shares in issue 
of 170,811,000, issued 15 janusry 1989. This has been included in the 
putty reconstruction. 
On the original debt issue the EPS is 23.72p, on the . laity recon., the 
EPS increases to 23.71p. 
Moto. Thor* was interest capitalised of 15.2m for y/o Doe 1909. 
EsMple: Taylor Woodrow ye Doc 1990 : YEAR º0LLOWING YEAR OF ISAJE 
ACTUAL ISSUE NYPOTNETICAI ISSUE 
_...... ..... ................... 
DEBT I EQUITY 
E000 E000 E000 E000 
Operating profit ý 16800 16800 
INTEREST (ax now fin) 23220 23220 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST ý 2280 ý0 
TOTAL INTEREST ý 25500 23220 
.......... 
ý 
.......... Net profit after Int 
-8700 
-6420 
Pub. pro-tax profit ý 83400 $5680 
basic taxation ý 25200 ý 23200 
tax change 0 7" 
TOTAL TAX ý 25200 ý 25998 
I 
.......... 
( 
.......... 
Earnings after tax 58200 59662 
Prof dividend ý00 
Minority interest ý 2600 ý 2600 
EARNINGS for ORD 55600 57082 
EPS (pence/ord share) 16.82 17.01 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year (1000) 329068 345175 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of year, '000) 322060 326427 
No. of now ord. shares 
(total, '000) 3194 3194 
No. of now ord. shares 
(used In EPS calc., '000) 8573 9070 
Total ord. Neros at y/t 
('000) 332262 348369 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 330633 335497 
Amount of now dabs E 80000000 N/A 
(nominal) 
Coupon rata 9.500 N/A 
Tax rate 35.00 35.00 
090389 £30000000 9.52 2014 Issued at 30.00 (part-paid) 
Share price 090389 " £6.19 
If 202 discount, then would issue £24000000/((. 8 x £6.19)x. 3) 
  
16107383 now ordinary shares 
(The now ord. shares have been treated as issued part-paid, 
at 301, to correspond with the debt issued part-paid at 302). 
Interest for the whole year has been taken into account, based on 
the 124000000 port-paid debt. 
On the original debt scenario the EK is 16. E2p, on the equity mean., 
this increases to 17.01p. 
Thom has been an actual Increase in the number of ordinary shares of 
3,194,000, issued 4 July 1990. This has also been Included in the equity 
reconstruction. 
For the reconstruction, shares in issue during the year: 
01/01/90 
- 
03/07/90 " 345,175,000 
(4/07/90 
- 
31/12/90 " 348,369,000 
The weighted average Heimbor of shares Is calculated as 
345,175,000 x 6/12 " 348,369,000 x 6/12 - 06,107,333 x 0.7) 
  
335,496,832 
Again an adjustswnt for the partly paid shares is made in calculating the 
weighted average number of shares for the reconstruction. 
Moto. There ras interest capitalised of E8.7. for y/" Doe 1990. 
TAYLOR WOODROW Y/E DEC 1989 
Calcn. of ex-rights price 
Po 
  
0.8Pc 
" 0.8 it E1.86 
  
E1.49 
M  329,068,000 shares " 
N" Ei/Po 
  
24,000,000/E1.49 
" 16,107,383 
The terns of the rights issue are: 
M. N" n 
16,107,363 329,068,000 
1: 20.43 
Px "CmPo " nPc)  . n 
"Ix E1.49 " 20.43 x 11.86 /1" 20.43 
" 39.49/21.43 
" E1,34 
Therefore theoretical ex-rights price is £1.84. 
" Based on nuwber of shares in issue when rights issue made. 
Calculation of Weighted Average No. Shares 
Total proceeds frow rights issue 16,107,383 x 11.49 
a E24,000,000 
markst price per share " £1.56 
Fresh issue at mrkst value " E26,000,000/E1.86 
a 12,903,226 shares 
Total no. shares issued - 16,107,383 
Less fresh issue at wrkst value "(12,903,226) 
Bona issue 
  
3,204,157 
Bonus issue based on: (1) 329,068,000 shares in issue before rights issue 
(il) 12,903,226 shares (fresh Issue) 
Total 
  
341,971,226 shares 
Bonus ratio " 3,206,157 : 341,971,226 
 I: 106.73 (3 : 320) 
Factor " 320/323 
Shares Actual Weighted Av. 
At start of year 158,257,000 x323/320 80.5/12 6,655,861 
Issue in Jan 1989 170,811,000 
329,068,000 x323/320 x1.5/12 41,519,127 
Fresh issue 12,903,226 
341,971,226 x 323/320 x10/12 287,647,672 
loss adj. for port pd. see note below (9,395,973) 
Bonus issue 3,204,157 
- 
........... ......... -- 
345,173,3a3 326,426,697 
Mote. It is necessary to adjust for the port-paid shares as follows: 
16,107,353 a 10/12 x 0.7 a 9,395,973 
In the reconstruction it is assumed that partly paid shareholders 
are to receive such proportion of the divided entitlement due to 
fully paid shareholders so as to reflect the extent and period 
that the shares are partly paid. 
This is because S$AP3 states that where sass of the shares are 
not fully paid, earnings should be apportioned over the different 
classes of shares in accordance with their divided rights or other 
rights to participate in profits. 
APPENDIX 6-1-39 
Example: vaux Group ye Sep 1909 : YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE HYPOTHETICAL ISSUE 
DEBT EQUITY ALT. 
E000 E000 ( E000 E000 
Operating profit 26515 28815 
INTEREST (ex now fin) 3340 ý 3340 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 2150 0 
TOTAL INTEREST ý 
... 
5490 
....... ... 
3340 
. .. Net profit after int 
ý 
23325 ý . . .. 25475 
Pub. pre-tax profit 31569 33719 
basic taxation 8839 8539 
tax change 0 753 
TOTAL TAX ( 8839 9592 
Earnings after tax --- ------- 
ý 
22730 ... ....... 24128 
Prof dividend 125 125 
Minority interest I 0 0 
EARNINGS for ORD 22605 24003 
°_eS (pence/ord share) ý - 18.61 ý 
. suuua. uussu. 
17.72 
. swuaauu.. uu ' 
: tat ord. shares at 
I 
start of year ('000) 47417 47417 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of year, '000) 47320 47320 
No. of new ord. shares 
(total, 1000) 
- 
75343 101649 " 
No. of new ord. shares 
(wed in EPS calc., '000) 74130 88119 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 122760 149066 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 121450 135439 
Aast of now deba E 60 000000 N/A 
(nowinat) 
Coupon rate ' 10.750 N/A 
Tax rate 35.00 35.00 
170589 £60000000 10.75% 2019 Issued at 99.523 
Interest due Nor 26 and Sep 26. 
Share price 170äe9   E2.84 
If 202 discount, then would Issue 159713800/12.27 (. 8 x 92.14) 
  
26305639 now ordinary shares 
Interest for 4 . onths has been taken into account. 
On the original debt issue, the EPS Is 18.61p. On the equity recon., 
the EIS drops to 1T. 72p. 
  comprises the actual increase in the year of 75,343,000 plus the 
hypothetical rights issue of 26,305,639. 
Mots. There was interest capitalised of E1.307s+ for Ybo SOP 1989" 
EAMpl g: vaux Group ya Sep 1990 : YEAR FOLLOWING YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE MYPOTMETICAI ISSUE 
............ ................... 
DENT EQUITY ALT. 
E000 E000 ( E000 E000 
Operating profit 34069 34069 
INTEREST (ox now fin) 1534 1534 
NEY FINANCE INTEREST "SO ý0 
TOTAL INTEREST 
. 
6284 
... . 
Net profit after int 
. .... 
25783 
Pub. pre-tax profit 35326 
basic taxation 8910 
tax change 
TOTAL TAX ý 
. 
8950 
..... . 
Earnings after tax 
. .. 
26876 
Prof dividend 125 
Minority interest 0 
EARNINGS for ORD 26751 
EPS (pence/ord share) ý 20.30 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 122760 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of yeer, '000) 121450 
No. of now ord. shares 
(total, '000) 13030 
No. of new ord. shares 
(wed in EPS cale., '000) 10350 
Total ord. shares at y/o 
('000) 135790 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 131800 
Aao. mt of new dabs E 60000000 
(nominal) 
Ca. on rata 10.750 
Tax rate 35.00 
14 
32233 
62276 
8950 
2258 
11208 
31069 
123 
0 
30WA 
19.57 
149066 
135439 
13030 
22639 
162096 
158078 
M/A 
N/A 
35.00 
170589 £60000000 10.75% 2019 Issued at 99.523 
Shore price 170589 " E2.84 
If 202 discount, then would issue £59713800/(. 8 x £2.84) 
v 26305639 new ordinary shares 
interest for the whole year has been taken into account. 
On the original debt issue the EPS is 20.30p, an the equity recon. this 
decreases to 19.57p. 
There was an actual increase in the number of ordinary shares in issue of 
13,030,000, issued 21 January 1990. 
For the reconstruction scenario, shares in Issue during the year: 
01/10/89 
- 
20/01/90 " 169,066,000 
21/10/90 
- 
30/09/90 " 162,096,000 
The weighted average number of shares is calculated as. 
149,066,000 z 3.7/12 " 162,096,000 x 8.3/12 " 158,078,617 
Mote. There wes interest capitalised of E2.775o for r/e Sep 1990. 
VAU% T/E SEP 1989 
Calcn. of ex-rights price 
.............................. 
Po " 0.8Pc 
" 0.8 x E2.64 
" E2.27 
M" 122,760,000 shares 
M" EB/Po 
" 59,713,800/E2.27 
  
26,305.639 
The terse of the rights issue are: 
M: M"i. n 
26,305,639 : 122,760,000 
1: 4.67 
Px 
  aha + nPcý e" 
"ý x E2.2T " 4.67 x E2.84 /I"4.67 
" 15.53/5.67 
" E2.74 
Therefore theoretical ex-rights price is 12.74 
" Based on number of shares in issue when rights issue erde. 
Calculation of Weighted Average No. Shares 
Total proceeds from rights issue 26,305,639 x £2.27 
" 959,713,800 
Market price per share   92.64 
Fresh issue at market value- " £59,713,800/E2.84 
" 21,025,986 shares 
Total no. shares issued 
  
26,305,639 
Less fresh issue at ayrket value "(21,025,9a6) 
Gomm issue " 5,279,653 
ionue issue bused on: (1) 122,760,000 shares in issue before rights issue 
(ii) 21,025,906 shares (fresh Issue) 
Total " 143,705,986 shares 
Bonus ratio " 5,279,653 : 163,785,986 
 I: 27.23 (4 : 109) 
Factor " 109/113 
Shares Actual Weighted Av. 
At start of year 122,760,000 x113/109 x7.5/12 79,540,596 
Fresh issue 21,025,986 
143,755,986 a 113/109 x4.5/12 55,898,651 
loran Issue 5,279,653 
169,065,639 135,639,047 
_ "'" aýiapw . asm.. m 
As the 75,343,000 issue was mode in early October, class to the start of 
_ 
the carry's year, it has been included os shares at start of year'. 
APPENDIX 6-1-40 
Exrgle: Yhitbreed ye Feb 1991 
. 
YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE 
............ 
NYPOTNETICAL ISSUE 
.... 
GEBT 
............... 
EQUITY ALT. 
E000 E000 I E000 £000 
Operating profit 203100 203100 
INTEREST (ex new fin) 67584 ý 47554 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST ý 2616 ý 0 
TOTAL INTEREST 50200 
.......... 
47584 
Not profit after 1nt 
ý 
152900 .......... 155516 
it. pre- tax profit I 266800 I 219416 
basic taxation 
tax change 
TOTAL TAX 
Earnings after tax 
Prof dividend 
Minority interest 
EARNINGS for ORD 
EPS (pence/ord share) 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of year, '000) 
No. of new ord. shares 
(total, '000) 
No. of new ord. shares 
(used in EPS catc., '000) 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS ca(c., '000) 
Amount of new dabs f 
(no, inal) 
Cagan rate 
Tax rata 
71000 
0 
71000 
215800 
400 
5600 
209600 
.......... 
......... 
47.29 
i417u 
441300 
3971 
2301 
445715 
443601 
135000000 
11.625 
34.00 
71000 
71äa9 
217526 
400 
5600 
211526 
47.17 
441744 
1300 
15939 " 
7171 
457683 
445471 
N/A 
N/A 
34.00 
071290 E135000000 11.625% 2011 Issued st 99.286 
Interest Jan 31 and Jul 31. 
Share price 071290 
  
E14.00 
If 202 discount, than would Issue E134036100/ E11.20 C. 8 x 114) 
  
11967509 new ordinary shares 
interest has bMn"taken into account for two nanths. 
Tharp has been an actual increase in the Haber of shares In issue of 
3,971,000. These were issued 5 Sep 1990. 
on the orfglnsl debt scenario the Eºt is 47.29p, on the equity rucon. 
the EPS decreases to 67.17p. 
" Comprises the hypothetical rights Issue of 11,967,509 plus the actual 
ineroaso of 3.971,000 shares. 
mots. There on interest eapitalla. d of E9. tfor y/9 Feb 1991. 
Exrapie: W+itbr"Ad y. Feb 1992 : YEAR FOLLOWING YEAR OP ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE HYPOTNETICAL ISSUE 
............ ................... 
DEBT EQUITY ALT. 
I E000 E000 I E000 E000 
Operating profit ý 148700 148700 
INTEREST (ax now fin) 37306 37306 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 15694 (0 
TOTAL INTEREST I 53000 
Not profit after hit 95700 
Pub. pre-tax profit 219000 
basic taxation 53500 
tax change ý 0 
TOTAL TAX ý 53500 
Earnings after tax 165500 
Prof dividend 400 
Minority interest 5100 
EARNINGS for ORD 
saaa a. a 
160000 
a a ' 
EPS (pence/ord share) 
s a a wsao 
35.78 
" Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 645715 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of year, '000) 443601 
No. of new ord. shares 
(total, '000) 3171 
No. of new ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 3599 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
(1000) 448M6 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used In EPS calc., '000) 447200 
Amant of new dabs E 135000000 
(no. inal) 
Capon rate 11.625 
Tu rate 33 
53500 
5179 
37306 
111394 
234694 
58679 
176015 
400 
5100 
170515 
almommmumm" 
37.13 
457683 
448471 
3171 
10798 
4606 54 
459269 
M/A 
M/A 
33 
071290 E135000000 11.6252 2011 issued at 99.286 
Interest Jan 31 and Jul 31. 
Share price 071290 " E14.00 
If 202 discount, than would issue £134036100/ E11.20 (. 8 x 914) 
  
11967509 now ordinary shares 
Interest has been charged for the whole year. 
There has bss,. an increase in the actual re. sr of shares of 3,171,000 
Issued 4 September 1991. This increase has also been included in the 
puity reconstruction. 
For the equity rseon., shares in issue during the year: 
01/03/91 
- 
03/09/91 
" 457,683,000 
04/09/91 
- 
29/02/92 " 460,854,000 
The weighted average rx-I r of shares is calculated as: 
457,683,000 a 6/12 " 460,854,000 a 6/12 " 459,268,500 
On the original debt issue the EPS is 35.78p, under the equity recon., 
this increases to 37.13p. 
Moto. There was interest eapitolisod of E-amn for y/" Feb 1992 
Calcn. of ex-rights price 
------------------------- 
Po = 0.8Pc 
= 0.8 x £14 
= £11.20 
N= 445,715,000 shares 
M= £B/Po 
= 134,036,100/£11.20 
= 11,967,509 
The terms of the rights issue are: 
M. N=m: n 
11,967,509 : 445,715,000 
1: 37.24 
Px=mPc+nPc)/m+n 
=1x £11.20 f 37.24 x £14 /1+ 37.24 
= 532.56/38.24 
= £13.93 
Therefore theoretical ex-rights price is £13.93 
Calculation of Weighted Average No. Shares 
------------------------------------------------- 
Total proceeds from rights issue 
Market price per share 
Fresh issue at market value 
Total no. shares issued 
Less fresh issue at market value 
Bonus issue 
11,967,509 x £11.20 
£134,036,100 
= £14 
= £134,036,100/£14 
= 9,574,007 shares 
= 11,967,509 
_( 9,574,007) 
= 2,393,502 
Bonus issue based on: (i) 445,715,000 shares in issue before rights issue 
(ii) 9,574,007 shares (fresh issue) 
Total = 455,289,007 shares 
Bonus ratio = 2,393,502 : 455,289,007 
=1: 190.22 (1 : 190) 
Factor = 190/191 
Shares Actual Weighted Av. 
At start of year 
Issue in Sep 1990 
Fresh issue 
Bonus issue 
441,744,000 
3,971,000 
445,715,000 
9,574,007 
455,289,007 
2,393,502 
457,682,509 
x191/190 x6/12 222,034,484 
x191/190 x3/12 112,015,217 
x191/190 x3/12 114,421,316 
448,471,017 
___________ 
APPENDIX 6-1-41 
Eaalpl" 
" NstlcsL Bar pie yo Jan 1986 YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE HYPOTNETIGºL ISSUE 
DEBT I EQUITY ALT. 
Operating profit 
INTEREST (ex new fin) 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 
TOTAL INTEREST 
Net profit otter int 
Pub. pre-tex profit 
basic taxation 
tax change 
TOTAL TAX 
Earnings after tax 
Prof dividend 
Minority interest 
EARNINGS for ORG 
EPS(p. nc. /sh. r. ) 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of year, '000) 
Mo. of now ord. shares 
(total, '000) 
No. of new ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 
Amount of dabs 
(nasinal) 
Coupon rate 
Tax rate 
i 5023 0 
ýc 
0 
8023 7161 
2431 
0 
2431 
4733 
204 
382 
4147 
I aswsawwssw 
21.92 
3620 
3620 
15300 
15300 
18920 
18920 
M/A 
N/A 
35 
8023 
0 
0 
0 
8023 
7161 
2431 
2431 
'733 ' 
0 
382 
4351 
awn mBumm "sasaaaaý 
21.56 
3620 
3620 
20327 
16557 
23%7 
20177 
M/A 
M/A 
35 
051187 Issue of 5.25% Conv. Cu. Red. Preference shares. 
Raised £19.6si. Redeemable 2012 at per (E1). 
Redaaption details : Cospony my at any tim purchase the 
shares at a price not greater than the average of the middle mrket 
quotations for the 10 days preceding the date of the purchase or, in the 
case of a purchase in the market, at the market price provided that the 
price is not awe than 5% above the average price. 
Conversion details :1 Prof. way be converted into I ordinary share at 
a price of 348p (cum price 348p, xe 09/10/87). Convertible into 
ordinary 25p shares on 1 Sep in each of the years frost 1990-2006 inc. on the basis of 25.65 orris 
an the basis of 25.65 orris for every 100 profs. 
This reconstruction will be carried out an the basis of what would have 
been the effect if the cony. cum. red. profs. had been converted 
INEDIATELY at the conversion ratio of 25.65 ords. for every 100 profs.? 
The ntiaberof ordinary shares mould have increased by 
19,600,000/100 s 25.65 
  
5,027,400 
The preference dividend would not be payable under the recon. scenario. 
For the recon., the total masher of ordinary shares is calculated as: 
01/02/87 
- 
04/11/87 " 18,920,000 
05/11/87 
- 
31/01/88 
" 23,947,000 
For the recon., the weighted average is calculated as 
18,920,000 x 9/12 " 23,947,000 a 3/12 a 20,176,730 
For the original issue the EPS is 21.92p, on the recon.. the EPS 
decreases to 21.56p. 
Mote that the increase in shares of 15,300,000 relates to the subdivision 
of existing shares into a edler nominal volts. Per UAº3 any such 
increase in the number of shares arising frost a stock split is treated 
In affect from the start of the year for ýk K, + v-r usightad averse nkr of shares. 
Example 
- 
Helical Bar plc ye ion 1989 YEAR FOLLOWING YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE HYPOTMETICAL ISSUE 
DEBT EQUITY ALT. 
Operating profit I 18987 18987 
INTEREST (ex new fin) 0 0 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST ý 0 0 
TOTAL INTEREST ý 0 0 
Met profit after int 18987 18967 
Popre-tax profit I 12212 ý 12212 
basic taxation 4028 4028 
tax change ( 0 
TOTAL TAX ý 4028 4028 
Earnings after tax 8184 ý 8184 
Prof dividend ý 994 0 
Minority interest ý 473 ý 473 
EARNINGS for ORD 
"s. o E t" 
6717 
ý.. a 
7711 
I 
EPS(pence/share) 
s 
35.50 
I 
32.20 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 18920 23947 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of year, '000) 18920 20177 
No. of now ord. shares 
(total, '000) 0 0 
No. of new ord. shares 
(used in EPS catc., '000) 0 3770 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 18920 23947 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS ealc., '000) 18920 23947 
Amount of dabs N/A N/A 
(nominal) 
Coupon rate N/A M/A 
Tax rate 35 35 
051187 Issue of S. 2S1 Conv. Cr. Red. Preference shares. 
Raised E19.6n. Redeemable 2012 at per (E1). 
Redemption details : Company my at any time purchase the 
shares at a price not greater than the average of the middle market 
quotations for the 10 days preceding the date of the purchase or, in the 
cue of a purchase in the market, at the market price provided that the 
price is not sore than Sx above the average price. 
Conversion details :1 Prof. my be converted into I ordinary share at 
a price of 343p"(aa price 348p, xe 09/10/87). Convertible into 
ordinary 25p"shares on I Sap in each of the years from 1990-2006 inc. an the basis of 
25.65 ords 
on the basis of 25.65 ords for every 100 profs. 
This reconstruction will be carried out an the basis of at would have 
been the effect if the cow. Cu.. red. profs. had been converted 
IIe DIATELT at the conversion ratio of 25.65 ords. for every 100 profs.? 
The nub or of ordinary shares would have increased by 
'19,600,000/100 x 25.65 " 5,027,400 
-The preference dividend would not be payable wider the region. scenario. 
For the recon., the weighted average IL er of shares is calculated is 
the shares in issue during the year, i. e. 23,967,000 
For the original issue the EPS It 35. S0p, an the region., the EPS falls 
to 32.20p. 
rote that the increase in shores of 19,300,00p rolota to the 0,6dtvioion 
of existing shares into a smaller nominal value. ºor SUMS WV such 
increase In the ru or of shares arising froa o stock split is treated 
-- 
"ý..... ý tha increase had been In effect from the start of the year for 
,ý "`""`" ^ý ^- 
-ghtod overage m .r of shares. 
11-k ýw -"V -- Wý N)4 . ), 
-N -1-42 
Eaaple 
- 
Next Yee ion 19U : YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE 
OUT 
Operating profit ý 54565 
INTEREST (arc new fin) 5354 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 1917 
TOTAL INTEREST 
Not profit after int 
Pub. pre-tax profit 
basic taxation 
tax change 
TOTAL TAX 
Earnings after tax 
Prof dividend 
Minority interest 
EARNINGS for ORD 
EPS (pence/ord share). 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of year, '000) 
No. of new ord. shares 
(total, '000) 
No. of new ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 
Aowint of dabs 
(nominal) 
Coupon rate 
_ 
Tax rate 
Comput. of 
 in. int 
7271 
77294 
$6471 
29435 
0 
29435 
57036 
71 
0 
sa na 
56965 
a " as uas aaasa 
19.33 
 aa. as. s.. aasa. sata 
254590 
1484: 00 
105180 
146300 
359770 
294700 
100000000 
5.75 
35 
HYPOtHETICAL ISSUE 
................... 
EQUITY ALT. 
54565 
5356 
0 
5354 
79211 
6388 
29435 
671 
30106 
582E2 
71 
0 
58211 
I falgaafplsssflflf 
19.71 
we"massawassummous 
254590 
148400 
128436 
146929 
313026 
295329 
35 
180987 Issue of 100,000,000 E1 5.7SZ convertible bonds, 2003. 
Issued at per by way of rights, being E1 bonds for 3.57 ords. 
cum-rights price of ord. E3.73, xc Sep 22). 
Proceeds E100,000,000 
Conversion terms: convertible into ordinary shares at any time from 
12/11/87 to 02/01/03 Inc. at the rate of 1 ord. share for 430p (subject 
to adjustment) nominal of convertible bonds. 
The reconstruction is based an what would have happened if the conversion 
to ordinary shares had taken place Immediately? 
The number of ordinary shares issued would have been 100,000,000/4.30 " 
23,2SS, 814 ordinary shares that would need to be issued if the bonds were 
converted immediately. 
There was also an issue of shares in July 1987 of 105,180,000. This 
has also been included In the reconstruction scenario. 
For the recon., the total shares in Issue: 
01/09/86 
- 
16/07/87 " 254,590,000 
17/07/87 
- 
17/09/87 " 359,770,000 
18/09/87 
- 
31/01/88 " 383,025,814 
For the recon., the weighted average number of shares Is calculated as: 
254,590,000 x 10.5/17 " 359,770,000 x 2/17 " 383,025,814 x 4.5/18 
" 
295,329,101 
On the original issue, the EPS is 19.33p, on the reconstruction this 
would have increased to 19.71p. 
It is assumed that the new equity would not result 
in irrecoverable ACT. 
MOTE (1) The period sndsd 31 Jon 1984 represents s 74 wok accounting period. 
the fire's year and prior to this was 31 Auoust 1906. 
(2) There was interest espitallsod of E3.459iwi for y/s Jan 19äa. 
Ea&wpl" 
- Nett rye ion 1989 : YEAR FOLLOWING YEAR OF ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE NYPOTNETICAL ISSUE 
.......... ................... 
DEBT I EQUITY ALT. 
Operating profit 82600 82600 
INTEREST (ex now fin) ý 19750 19750 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST ý 5750 ý0 
TOTAL INTEREST 25500 19750 
Net profit after int 57100 62850 
Pub. pre-tax profit 62300 68050 
basic taxation 22500 ý 22500 
tax change 0ý 2013 
TOTAL TAX ý 22500 24513 
.......... 
.......... 
Earnings after tax 39800 43538 
Prof dividend 100 100 
Minority interest 0ý0 
EARNINGS for ORD 39700 43438 
 sussassswsss"we I 
 ssususssussssas 
EPS (pence/ord share) 10.86 11.19 
sssss"a"sssussasss usuusssusssssss 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 359770 383026 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of y. ar, '000) 294700 295329 
No. of new ord. shares 
" (total, '000) 8860 8860 
No. of now and, shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 70800 92865 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 368630 391886 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 365500 388194 
Amount of dabs 100000000 
(nominal) 
Coupon rate 5.75 
Tax rate 35 35 
Cosput. of win. int 
180987 issue of 100,000,000 E1 5.75% convertible bonds, 2003. 
Issued at per by way of rights, being E1 bonds for 3.57 ords. 
Cum-rights price of ord. ß. 73, xc Sp 22). 
Proceeds 9100,000,000 
Conversion term: convertible into ordinary shares at any time from 
12/11/87 to 02/01/03 Inc. at the rate of 1 ord. share for 630p (subject 
to adJustomt) nominal of convertible bonds. 
The reconstruction is based an what would have happened if the conversion 
to ordinary shares had taken place immediately? 
The Huber of ordinary shares Issued would have been 100,000,000/4.30 " 
23,255,814 ordinary shares that would need to be issued if the bonds were 
converted Immediately. 
There was an actual Increase In the nunber of shares of 8.860,000, Issued 
7 June 1988. This has also been included in the recon. scenario. 
For the recon., the weighted average Huber of shares is calculated as. 
01/02/88 " 06/06/U " 383,026,000 x 5/12 - 159,594,167 
07/06/88 
- 
31/01/89 " 391,886,000 x 7/12   228,600,167 
i. e. 388,194,334 
On the original issue the EPS is 10.86p, on the recon., this increases 
to 11.19p. 
it is assiwed that the new equity would not result 
in irrecoverable ACT. 
Mote. There was interest espitelised of £6. isn for y/s Jon 1989. 
J PV J' L 'I UU 44 )(" ýA "" 
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EAmple 
- Yoresstsr Groff ye D. c 1990 TEAR OF ISM 
ACTUAL ISUN NYPOTNETICAI ISSUE 
............ ................. 
DEBT ý EQUITY ALT. 
Operating profit 
INTEREST (ex new fin) 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 
TOTAL INTEREST 
Net profit after int 
Pub. pre-tax profit 
basic taxation 
tax change 
TOTAL TAX 
Earnings after tax 
Prof dividend 
Minority Interest 
EARNINGS for 0110 
EPS (pence/ord share) 
Total and, shares at 
start of year ('000) 
Average no. and, shares 
(at start of year, '000) 
No. of new ord. shares 
(totat, '000) 
No. of new ord. shares 
(used in EPS calc., '000) 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 
Average no. and. shares 
(used in, EPS catc., '000) 
Amount of prof. shares 
Coupon rate 
Tax rate 
tc27 I u27 
758 I 758 
00 
758 
3669 
3553 
1182 
0 
1182 
Z371 
30 
1 
2340 
ýýYiAWaspYY 
9.59 
ssaaALUSUM aýssasaa 
23260 
7a 
3669 
3553 
1192 
0 
1182 
2371 
0 
2370 
7.66 
aaasaasaaasasss. sa 
23260 
23260 
3240 
1140 
26500 
z"oo 
4500000 
N/A 
34 
23260 
$1329 
7660 
716589 
30920 
34 
101190 Issue of E5.0490n 10p Cumulative Redeemable Profs at 100p, 
redeemable 2006. 
Issued 5,049,385 cum. red. profs. 
Conversion term : Preference shares are convertible into ordinary shares 
at the rate of El nominal of erde. for every 11.05 nominal of profs. 
converted on any bank business day up to 23/12/2001. 
Redemption term, : Redewrble as to 950,000 nominal an each of 31 Doe 
and 30 Jun in each year, commencing on 31-12-96, with a final redemption 
of E54938.5 nominal an 30/06/2001. There shall be paid on each preference 
Mere so redeeýod the nominal seerot paid up plus a premium of 90p per share 
and any arrears of dividend. 
The reconstruction is based an what would have happened if the preference 
shares had been converted Immediately. 
The number of new ordinary shares issued in the event of an immediate 
conversion would be: 5,049,385/1.05   4,808,938 X 10 " 48,089,381 
(the ordinary shares have a nominal wlue of 10p) 
In the first year of issue the preference dividend was only 
£30,000 and not the full year's dividend. 
There has been an actual Increase in the number of ordinary shares of 
3,240,000, this comprises 1,990,000 Issued In Apr 1990 and 1,250,000 Issued 
in Mov 1990. These increases have also been included In the reconstruction. 
For the reconstruction, the total ntieber of ordinary shares is: 
01/01/90 
- 
06/04/90 " 23,260,000 
05/04/90 
- 
09/11/90 
- 
25,250,000 
10/11/90 
- 
31/12/90 " 74,589,381 
For the recon. the weighted average number of ordinary shares is calculated 
es: 
23,260,000 a 3/12 " 25,250,000 a 7.5/12 " 74,989,381 a 1.5/12 " 30,919,923 
On the original issue the EPS is 9. s9p, on the reconstruction scenario 
this decreases to 7.66p. 
Exrpls 
- 
Worcester Group ys Doc 1991 
. 
TEAS FOLLOWING TEAR Of ISSUE 
ACTUAL ISSUE NYPOTNETICAL ISSUE 
............ 
.................. 
DEST EQUITY ALT. 
Operating profit 
INTEREST (ex new fin) 
NEW FINANCE INTEREST 
TOTAL INTEREST 
Net profit after int 
Pub. pre-tax profit 
basic taxation 
tax change 
TOTAL TAX 
Earnings after tax 
Prof dividend 
Minority interest 
EARNINGS for ORO 
EPS (pence/ord share) 
Total ord. shares at 
start of year ('000) 
Average no. ord. shares 
(at start of year, '000) 
No. of new ord. shares 
(total, '000) 
No. of new ord. shares 
(used in EPS catc., '000) 
Total ord. shares at y/e 
('000) 
Average no. ord. shares 
(used In EPS calc., '000) 
Amount of prof. shares 
Coupon rate 
Tax rate 
1280 
0 
1280 
4160 
4520 
1160 
0 
1160 
3360 
500 
90 
2770 
 sasassssa assssaaa 
10.42 
26500 
24400 
400 
2187 
26900 
5420 
26587 
4500000 
10 
34 
5420 
1230 
0 
1280 
cuo 
4520 
1160 
0 
1160 
3360 
0 
90 
uýwaýa 
3270 
ýusýa ýý a 
4.38 
74589 
30920 
400 
43759 
74969 
74679 
34 
101190 Issue of E5.049nº 10p Cumulative Redeemable Profs at loop, 
redeeu"ble 2006. 
issued 5,049,385 cum. red. profs. 
Conversion term : Preference shares are convertible into ordinary shares 
at the rate of E1 nominal of ords. for every £1.05 nominal of profs. 
converted an any bank business day up to 23/12/2001. 
Redeoption tens : Redeembls as to 150,000 no. in"l on each of 31 Dec 
and 30 Jun In each year, commencing on 31-12-%, with a final redemption 
of £54938.5 nominal an 30/06/2001. There shall be paid an each preference 
share to redeeosd the nominal aao: nt paid up plus " premium of 90p per share 
and any arrears of dividend. 
The reconstruction is based on what would have happened If the preference 
shares had bow converted immediately. 
The number of_new ordinary shares issued In the event of an iss'"diat" 
conversion would be: 5,049,385/1.05 " 4,808,938 X 10 " 48,099,381 
(the ordinary shares have a nominal walue of 10p) 
The preference dividend for the year is £500,000. This has been excluded 
in the equity reconstruction. 
There has been an actual increase in the number of ordinary shares of 
400,000 issued 12 October 1991. This has also been included in the recon. 
For the reconstruction, the total nueber of ordinary shares is: 
01/01/91 
- 
11/10/91 " 74,589,000 
12/10/91 
- 
31/12/91 " 74,989,000 
For the recon. the weighted average rxaýbsr of ordinary shares Is calculated 
as: 
74,589,000 t 9.3/12 " 74,989,000 : 2.7/12 " 74,679,000 
On tho ori, in. l issw the (PS is 10.42p, on the r. co, truetion sconsrio 
this decrossos to 4.38p. 
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